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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of neo-liberal marketisation on the provision of two 
types of minority interest content; children’s and religious programmes, in the 
terrestrial broadcasting environments of the UK and Finland between 1986 and 2009. 
Utilising a customised explanatory model devised for this study: the Industrial 
Equilibrium Model, which combines elements of historical institutionalism and the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm, the thesis provides an empirical record of 
marketisation-driven changes in broadcasting institutions and their impact on the 
provision of children’s and religious programmes. In so doing, the study allows us to 
evaluate the current state of and future outlook for minority interest content in the 21st 
century marketised multi-platform broadcasting environment. 
The thesis demonstrates that notwithstanding significant social, political, cultural, 
economic and demographic differences between the UK and Finland, similar 
marketisation-driven changes have taken place in the strategies of broadcasting 
institutions. Increasing competitive pressures produced by liberalisation and 
reorientation of regulation have forced commercial broadcasters in particular to focus 
increasingly on majority preferences and populist content in their programming, while 
catering for minority interests occupies a lesser role in the agendas of these 
broadcasters. The thesis demonstrates that popular preferences increasingly inform 
programming strategies and production resource allocation. The rise in the 
preference to use commercial and economic yardsticks in measuring the performance 
of broadcasting companies has also resulted in an increasing preference for cost-
effective and/or commercially lucrative types of programming with mass audience 
potential. All these changes have influenced the structure of the output of public 
service broadcasters, which is increasingly shaped by these populist, economic and 
commercial considerations, while the significance of the historically dominant social 
and cultural goals has declined to an extent. 
Through these changes in broadcasters’ institutional conduct, an understanding is 
gained of the impact of neo-liberal marketisation on the conceptual model of public 
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service broadcasting. The thesis demonstrates that broadcasters and regulators have 
adopted an increasingly consumerist interpretation of the missions of public service 
broadcasting, and use viewing preferences of the audience majority to set their public 
service agenda. This tendency has compromised their ability and willingness to cater 
for certain disadvantaged minorities. By highlighting potential areas of vulnerability in 
the emerging model for minority interest provision, the thesis also presents 
recommendations for securing diversity and plurality in future minority interest 
provision. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Public service television at a critical juncture 
The last 25 years represent an interesting, while turbulent period in European 
broadcasting. Television broadcasting, which was previously under a state monopoly 
in most European countries, was opened up for commercial competition in all 
European countries by the end of the 1990s. Technological changes have been 
influential in the process: the introduction of digital broadcasting technologies has 
transformed the past spectrum scarcity into capacity abundance. Cable and satellite 
broadcasting technologies have facilitated foreign and transnational operators to 
enter previously secluded national broadcasting markets and challenge the national 
broadcasters. Even more influential, however, has been the rise in the political 
preference – often associated with the emergence of the neo-liberal agenda in 
political and social life – for organising social and economic life along the lines of the 
principles and practices of the capitalist market; marketisation in other words. The 
process has seen corporate goals and organisational procedures being introduced as 
the yardsticks against which the performance of all forms cultural enterprise are 
judged (Murdock and Golding 1999: 118). This wide and extensive process, which is 
still in progress, has seen disenchantment with public provision of goods and 
services, with whole industry sectors previously under state ownership being 
transferred to private hands. In this political climate, the social and cultural merits 
arising from public ownership and control of broadcasting were subdued to the 
efficiency gains that liberalisation realised in a host of sectors ranging from 
telecommunications to public transport. As a consequence, several transfers of power 
have taken place in broadcasting: ‘from public to private media, from normative to 
commercial goals, from the political system to the market, from national to 
transnational operators, and particularly from creative personnel to owners, 
administrators and advertisers’ (Blumler 1993: 404). Meanwhile, the ability of public 
institutions to impose order on these tendencies has been compromised. As changes 
in the political discourse make these transformations to seem increasingly ‘natural’ or 
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‘just’, it is often the case that even the political will to harness these tendencies is 
missing, and a policy of laissez-faire is preferred instead. 
If the sheer number of companies in a market is considered as an indicator of 
success, then private broadcasters can be considered to have greatly benefited from 
the process, as it has both opened up markets for them and allowed them to operate 
with less public intervention. The number of private broadcasters in European 
countries has surged over the last quarter of a century. Their omnipotent presence 
has influenced not only the structure of the broadcasting market, but also the cultural 
form of television. This culture of commercialism also holds implications for television 
content: aside from an abundance of advertising matter, commercial content is likely 
to be more oriented to amusement and entertainment (escapism), more superficial, 
undemanding and conformist, more derivative and standardised (McQuail 2000: 105-
7). The abundance of the populist offerings of commercial television has influenced 
the audience’s image and expectations of the role of television. 
Meanwhile, public service broadcasters (PSBs) have faced a crisis in terms of their 
political legitimacy as well as their audiences. While once a standard in European 
broadcasting, public funding of broadcasting is now assessed in more critical terms. 
The multitude of channels and alternative platforms have rendered PSBs less 
indispensable than they were in the era of analogue broadcasting. Simultaneously, 
they have been forced to reassess their relationship with their audiences and adapt to 
the fact that they no longer have the privilege of setting the agenda in broadcasting. 
In a number of countries, public broadcasters were in monopolistic positions until the 
1980s, and the fact that in smaller countries like Norway and Iceland there was only 
one public channel available eliminated competition and effectively gave PSBs full 
control on viewing habits of the audience. As more channels and platforms are now 
competing for viewers’ attention, channel competition is fierce and marketing 
strategies previously associated with commercial commodities (such as branding, 
packaging and positioning) have found their way into the cultural realm of public 
service television. To survive and retain legitimacy for public funding, PSBs adopted 
various institutional responses, which, according to Steemers, include: 
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changes in programming policy (competitive scheduling, extensions in 
broadcast hours, an extension of “popular” programming formats at the 
expense of cultural and information programming), cooperation with third 
parties (independent producers, outsourcing, co-producers, joint ventures), the 
exploitation of supplementary sources of revenue (advertising, sponsorship, 
subscription), rationalisation strategies and changes in working practices. 
(Steemers 1999: 49-50) 
Considering the competitive and commercial challenges marketisation creates for 
broadcasters that previously adhered to the public service paradigm, they could be 
predicted to modify their behaviour along the lines of a commercial strategy. While it 
is often assumed that one of the benefits of competition is that it widens the range 
and quality of goods made available to consumers, broadcasting provides an 
interesting counter-example: competition between broadcasters can encourage 
copycat programming strategies and lead to more uniformity of output than would 
occur in a monopoly (Doyle 2002: 73). Broadcasters may adopt competitive 
duplication strategies that target mass audiences by highly similar programmes, as it 
will be more profitable to carve up the majority-taste audience than to cater for 
minority tastes by alienating the majority (Doyle 2002: 74). A number of scholars 
suggest that public broadcasters have adopted a commercial agenda and the 
programming strategies of private broadcasters, and the diversity of their 
programming has consequently been compromised (see e.g. Ang 1991: 103-4; 
Blumler 1992c: 30-40; Dahlgren 1995: 13-4). Prophecies voiced in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in particular painted particularly apocalyptic visions of a future of 
commercialist public service – or a future with no PSBs at all. A common feature for 
these interpretations is that they are mainly based on highly subjective interpretations 
and lack concrete evidence; therefore, they are contestable. Later studies (e.g. Siune 
and Hultén 1998; Bardoel and d'Haenens 2008) indicate that changes less radical 
have taken place in PSBs’ strategies, and that the impact of commercial elements 
has been complementary rather than substitutional. 
Of course, this does not mean that the strategies of PSBs would have remained 
unchanged. Bergg (2004: 14) argues that UK public service broadcasting (PSB) 
channels have attempted to ‘minimise the risk of losing audience share, […] by 
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concentrating on the more popular genres to the detriment of the “niche market 
failure” genres such as arts’. He goes on to predict that with multi-channel penetration 
increasing, broadcasters will be increasingly concentrating on the safe and familiar. 
Meanwhile, risk taking, ‘at least in the sense of investment in new programming titles 
and those genres that are not big ratings winners, is in danger of diminishing further.’ 
Considering that programmes are fighting for the same scarce resources in this day 
and age when publicly funded PSBs can only expect modest increases in their 
budgets, while broadcasters with commercial funding are equally troubled with the 
maturing, possibly stagnating, television advertising market, this scenario suggests 
that broadcasters are under greater pressure to concentrate their resources on 
catering for mass audiences, while their ability to cater for viewers with minority 
interests and tastes will be compromised, as in an unregulated market the interests of 
minorities will be served only if the number of channels is large enough to exhaust the 
profits in competitive duplication, making minority interest programming as profitable 
as majority taste programming at the margin (Doyle 2002: 74). 
 
1.2. Aims, objectives and research questions 
It was suggested in the previous section that imperatives produced by neo-liberal 
marketisation have compelled or encouraged broadcasters to change their strategies 
and corporate policies. However, given the nature of marketisation as a broad and 
complex phenomenon with socio-political, economic, ideological and institutional 
dimensions, its precise impact on broadcasting organisations has not been 
comprehensively documented. The policy impact of marketisation has hitherto 
attracted the greatest research interest: Crisell (1997), Goodwin (1998), Leys (2001) 
and Freedman (2003), to name a few, have conducted major studies on UK policy 
transformations, while Hellman (1988, 1999, 2010, 2012) and Jääsaari (2007) have 
analysed policy changes in the Finnish context. There are also numerous studies on 
the impact of marketisation on broadcasting institutions: for instance, O’Malley (1994) 
and Born (2005) have studied marketisation-driven institutional transformations within 
the BBC. 
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Yet to date no comprehensive attempts have been made to examine the impact of 
marketisation on broadcasters’ willingness and ability to perform one of the key duties 
of PSB: to cater for minority tastes and interests. Such audiences are generally not a 
particular priority of commercial broadcasters because of their limited commercial 
potential, which suggests that programming for these audiences would be 
compromised in a marketised broadcasting environment. However, the process is far 
from being this straightforward and many of its aspects remain unclear. Although 
Gunter (1996: 198) argues in his article, written before the start of the digitalisation of 
television, that ‘even with some regulatory protection, minority interest programming 
faces an uphill struggle in gaining access to the airwaves in the absence of a clearly 
established market or audience for such material’, previous empirical studies on 
programming demonstrate that great differences exist in the way marketisation has 
affected different programming categories. While all programmes without mass 
audience appeal are undoubtedly disadvantaged with respect to programmes of mass 
audience appeal, it would be unfeasible to argue that the provision of these 
programmes would have followed a common developmental path over the last two to 
three decades. 
This study aims to close this gap in the knowledge by undertaking a critical in-depth 
investigation in the influence of the aforementioned process of neo-liberal 
marketisation on broadcasters’ behaviour with regards to two core cases of minority 
interest programming; children’s and religious programmes, in two European 
countries that have historically featured robust and cultivated PSB systems; the UK 
and Finland, between 1986 and 2009. In so doing, the study serves to make a binary 
contribution to knowledge. First, it improves our understanding of the impact of neo-
liberal marketisation on the selected programme cases, thus shedding light on an 
area that has been subject to little academic interest, at least in the UK-Finland 
comparative context of this study. While numerous studies have been made on UK 
minority interest programming in both academic and professional contexts, few 
studies have attempted to analyse the particular impact of the neo-liberal policy 
paradigm on programming in spite of its all-encompassing influence. In contrast to the 
abundance of UK research on children’s and religious programming, little longitudinal 
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research on the relationship between broadcasting policies and television 
programming has been conducted in the Finnish context. Given the central role 
television has in reproducing and shaping culture and the society, this contribution 
can be considered particularly important. 
As catering for minority interests and tastes has traditionally been considered a core 
duty of PSB, the study also examines whether the changes can be considered to 
have had repercussions on the theoretical model of PSB. The previous normative 
definitions for PSB were drafted in an era when access to airwaves was under a 
stricter political control, and politicians, media professionals and academic scholars 
had more capacity to set the agenda in mass communications through policy 
measures. The emergence of the neo-liberal policy paradigm has produced 
ideological transformations that have changed our expectations of the characteristics 
and missions of PSB. In some cases, PSBs’ ability to meet the objectives imposed by 
these models is fundamentally compromised owing to marketisation-driven changes 
in the broadcasting environment. By contrasting the results of this research with the 
theoretical models, the study identifies potential changes in the theoretical models. In 
so doing, the study aims to contribute to the provision of a revised theoretical and 
pragmatic model of the relationship between PSB and minority interest programming 
in the 21st century public service media environment. 
This contribution is delivered through the realisation of the following objectives: 
1. To undertake a critical analysis of the academic and professional literature on 
the theoretical core of public service broadcasting and neo-liberal 
marketisation; 
2. To identify, analyse and compare marketisation-driven political, ideological, 
and economic-commercial changes in the broadcasting environments the UK 
and Finland, and their influence on broadcasting organisations; 
3. To undertake empirical research on changes in the provision of the selected 
minority interest programmes on selected UK and Finnish television channels 
over the research period; 
4. To critically evaluate how the marketisation-driven changes in the broadcasting 
environments and institutions are reflected in the provisions of children’s and 
religious programmes;  
5. To contrast changes in broadcasters’ conduct with the normative models of 
public service broadcasting; 
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6. To describe key characteristics of the emerging model for minority interest 
provision in the 21st century broadcasting environment. 
With regards to the research objectives, the research will ask the following broad 
questions: 
1. How has neo-liberal marketisation altered the media policies of the UK and 
Finland? 
2. How have marketisation-driven policies shaped the broadcasting environments 
in which UK and Finnish broadcasters operate? 
3. How have broadcasting institutions responded to changes in the broadcasting 
environments? 
4. How have the marketisation-driven changes in institutional policies, strategies 
and structures altered the provision of the selected minority interest 
programme cases? 
5. What institutional factors explain national differences in the provision of 
children’s and religious programmes? 
6. What do changes in the delivery of the research cases indicate about 
marketisation-driven changes in the public service paradigm? 
7. From the evidence gathered, what kind of model is developing for minority 
programme delivery in the early 21st century multi-channel UK and Finnish 
broadcasting? 
 
1.3. Definition of minority interest programmes 
The ambiguity of the concept of minority interest programming is somewhat 
problematic. There is no universal definition for minority interest – or specialist 
interest – programming, even though these programmes are regularly referred to in 
academic literature (e.g. Wedell and Luckham 2001) and by broadcasters and 
regulatory organisations. While catering for minority tastes and interests has certainly 
been a key feature within the theoretical concept of PSB, closer specification of the 
subject has been left to the discretion of these companies. Even recent studies on the 
future of PSB content (e.g. Ofcom 2008a, 2008b) – while referring to these 
programmes as small-audience PSB content – do not attempt to bundle these 
programmes under a single entity. Various publications by Yleisradio (e.g. annual 
reports of the Company and its Administrative Council, see e.g. Yleisradio (2007: 
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14)), in turn, refer to ‘specialist programmes’1, which include programmes for 
immigrants, classical music, religious programmes, programmes in minority 
languages, programmes on Finnish culture and arts, children’s programmes, 
parliamentary broadcasts and educational programmes. However, this definition is 
not comprehensive and tends to vary from report to report. 
Indeed, minority interest programmes comprise a heterogeneous group, whose 
outlook and characteristics vary significantly. They contrast with so-called mass 
audience programmes, which include popular (and often populist) mass-audience 
content such as entertainment, reality television, lifestyle programmes, Hollywood 
films, game shows, light drama and popular sports (e.g. football in the UK and ice 
hockey in Finland). Programmes often bundled to the minority interest category 
include arts and culture, science, children’s programmes, educational programmes, 
personal interest programmes targeted at specific social groups (e.g. immigrants, the 
elderly), political programmes (e.g. programmes representing minor or alternative 
political views, parliamentary broadcasts and trades union issues programmes), 
programmes in minority languages, and religion (see e.g. Wedell and Luckham 2001; 
Ofcom 2008a: 68). While these programmes exhibit heterogeneity in respect of form, 
genre and target audience, they can, however, be considered to share certain 
common characteristics: 
- They are considered to have only a limited audience appeal. This may be 
because they are targeted primarily at a specific group (or groups) in 
society (e.g. regional or local audiences; culturally, ethnically or 
linguistically-defined minority groups; groups that share a common taste, 
opinion, belief or interest; peer groups [e.g. children, the elderly]), or since 
there is a common and established view (often based on empirical data, 
e.g. audience figures) that the programmes regularly attract only limited 
audiences. 
                                                 
1
 In Finnish: “erityisohjelmistot”. 
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- As they do not regularly attract a majority share of viewing, they are 
vulnerable because the audiences they attract may be insufficient to earn 
the support of advertisers in the commercial sector (see table 1.1). On 
publicly funded channels, they may be equally vulnerable, because 
audiences have to be found to obtain public support and to justify time, 
talent and resources devoted to them. 
- In spite of their small reach, they are often considered to produce positive 
externalities by serving certain social and cultural goals. 
- For the above reason, their provision is considered as a key duty of PSB 
(see e.g. Broadcasting Research Unit 1985; Blumler 1992b), and their 
output has traditionally been promoted by various regulatory measures. 
For the purposes of this research, a definition for minority interest programming, 
which combines both their limited audience appeal and their limited potential for 
commercial revenue generation, is adopted: minority interest programmes are 
programmes, which, in the commercial arena, are generally unprofitable because of 
their relatively small audiences. Thus, in the words of Bergg (2004: 14), minority 
interest programming could also be referred to as ‘niche market failure’ programming, 
whose provision by public service broadcasters is particularly important. Examples of 
various areas of programming with different degrees of (un)profitability are presented 
in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Current profitability of areas of programming for commercially funded PSBs 
Schedule margin of genres for 
commercially funded PSBs 
Small audiences Large audiences 
Very profitable  Soaps 
Factual Entertainment 
Marginally profitable Arts 
Factual 
National News 
Natural History 
Human Interest 
UK Entertainment 
Non-UK Film 
Football 
Factual Drama 
UK Drama Series and Serials 
Marginally unprofitable Music 
Religion 
Hobbies & Leisure 
UK Film 
Current Affairs 
UK Sitcom 
UK One-off Drama 
Very unprofitable Nations and regions news 
UK Children’s 
Nations and regions other 
programming 
 
(Source: Ofcom 2008a: 68) 
 
The term ‘minority’ itself deserves further examination. While programmes in this 
category seem at first glance to be targeted only at fractions of the audiences, it 
needs to be considered that everyone is likely to be in a numerical minority on some 
matter (Wedell and Luckham 2001: 144). Moreover, an average viewer is likely to 
have an interest for a variety of topics, extending over the borders of mass audience 
programming. Michael Wakelin, former head of the BBC Religion & Ethics, 
interviewed as part of this research, passionately challenged the categorisation of 
religious programmes under the ‘minority interest’ label on the grounds that religion 
has had a major influence on the cultural heritage of the UK, and thus its 
understanding is essential for everyone. It is also noteworthy that the definition of 
minority interest does not rest on subject alone. Some programmes will not be 
delivered for reasons of cost and would therefore only be provided rarely, like opera, 
even if they were enjoyed in repeat showings (Wedell and Luckham 2001: 144-5). 
Therefore, it would be more accurate to refer to these programmes as specialist 
interest programming. However, as minority programming is a common descriptive 
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convention, which also highlights the limited sizes of the audiences of these 
programmes, the term is used in this study instead. 
As catering for minority interests and tastes has been widely considered a core 
component of the European PSB model, changes in broadcasters’ priorities in this 
respect also reflect paradigmatic shifts in broadcasting. Minority interest programmes 
constitute a group of programmes whose production costs per viewer are relatively 
high, while their mass audience appeal is low. Thus, broadcasters may feel 
pressurised to cut their production resources to a level they consider to be more 
proportionate to the audiences, or reduce the volume of programming, in order to 
vacate resources for other purposes. While both public and private broadcasters in 
both the UK and Finland have maintained – rhetorically at least – their commitment to 
‘public service’, great variations exist in the levels of service for minority audiences. 
Thus, minority interest provision can be viewed as a ‘litmus test’ of the traditional 
public service paradigm in broadcasting. A significant reduction in the volume or 
production resources of minority interest programmes can therefore be interpreted as 
a shift in the broadcaster’s public service interpretation, which may have 
repercussions for the public service concept too. 
 
1.4. The culture realms of the UK and Finland 
There are some notable differences between the social and cultural environments of 
the UK and Finland in which the provision of children’s and religious programmes 
takes place. These cultural and demographic differences between these countries 
deserve a brief overview, as they help to understand the origins of institutional 
configurations surrounding the provision of children’s and religious programmes. 
Finland is a predominantly homogenous Christian country, which is characterised by 
a high rate of church membership but a relatively low degree of religious activity (e.g. 
church attendance) amongst citizens (Ketola et al. 2011). There are two churches 
officially endorsed by the state. For historical reasons, both of these churches in 
Finland have retained certain privileges (e.g. the right to collect church tax) in 
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exchange for obligations to provide certain services (e.g. maintaining population 
registers and cemeteries). The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the largest church, 
with its membership covering 79.9 per cent of the population in 2009. The Orthodox 
Church is the minor church, with 1.1 per cent of the population being its members. 
17.7 per cent of the population had no religious affiliation in 2009, and their share has 
been rising rapidly in the 2000s. The proportion of followers of other religions is just 
around 1.5 per cent (Statistics Finland 2011). 
As the UK does not have a similar official system of registering religious affiliation in 
place, estimating the numbers of followers of UK religious affiliations poses a more 
difficult problem. Nevertheless, the UK features a much higher degree of religious 
diversity than Finland does. In the 2011 census, 59.3 per cent of the respondents in 
England and Wales identified themselves as Christians, while the proportion of 
Muslims totalled 4.8 per cent. 4 per cent of respondents identified themselves with 
other religious affiliations. Notably, 25.1 per cent of the respondents reported that 
they have no religion; an increase from 14.8 per cent in 2001. The proportion of 
respondents identifying themselves with Christianity had seen a particular drop from 
71.7 per cent between the 2001 and 2011 censuses (Office for National Statistics 
2012).2  
The provision of children’s programmes has also – to an extent – been different in the 
UK and Finland because of differences in the way childhood is perceived in these 
countries. In Finland, catering for child audiences has been done with great caution 
owing to a pervasive idea that in an ideal situation children should not be exposed to 
television. Wagner and Einarsdottir (2008: 265) refer to a pervasive child-
centeredness in the notion of ‘the good childhood’ ideal that is a distinctive cultural 
feature in the Nordic countries. It ‘presumes that children should enjoy childhood, 
have their rights respected and their voices heard’ (Wagner and Einarsdottir 2008: 
265). The state and its instruments, Wagner and Einarsdottir (2008: 265) argue, are 
                                                 
2
 The religion question was the only voluntary question on the 2011 census and 7.2 per cent of people 
chose not to answer the question (Office for National Statistics 2012). 
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expected to ‘share responsibility with parents for ensuring the good childhood, on 
both the individual and collective levels within society.’ The central tenets of this ideal 
include: 
naturalness of the childhood; equality and egalitarianism; democracy defined 
as lived daily experience for children; freedom, conceptualised as autonomy to 
play and to develop one’s own self; emancipation, or liberation from over-
supervision and over-control by adults; warm and cooperative social 
relationships with adults and peers; and solidarity with Nordicness, or 
connecting with Nordic heritage through consistent enactment of distinct 
cultural traditions. 
(Wagner and Einarsdottir 2008: 265) 
 
In terms of mass media, this approach highlights the state’s duty to protect children 
from excessive media consumption and the harmful effects of media on children’s 
physical and emotional development, while encouraging them to spend more time 
with creative play and physical activity (see e.g. Pulkkinen 2012). This approach 
steered the Finnish political administration and the public broadcaster Yleisradio to 
adopt several protectionist practices in children’s programming, which included 
preventing the commercial broadcaster MTV from catering for pre-school audiences 
and Yleisradio adopting a strict pedagogic-paternalistic agenda in its children’s 
programming policies. The influence of this doctrine was particularly evident in 
Yleisradio’s children’s programming in the 1970s, which focused mainly on factual 
and educational content (often produced in cooperation with senior pedagogues) 
(Suoninen 2007: 495). 
UK media policies and values underpinning children’s programming have been less 
influenced in this respect by such a consensual view on the importance of 
naturalness of the childhood – not least because the UK represents a more 
heterogenic society, where the traditional relationship between the state and the 
individual vis-à-vis Finland is also more complex to accommodate a similar 
consensus on the role of the state in promoting these values in family life in such a 
proactive and direct manner. Instead of adopting a highly critical view on the influence 
of television on children’s development that was prevalent in Finland until the 1980s 
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(and even beyond), parents in the UK have a much more optimistic view on 
television’s educational potential. In a study conducted by the University of Leicester 
in 1974, 45 per cent of mothers questioned for the survey actively encouraged their 
children to watch television. Of these, 80 per cent did so because of the educational 
merits of television (Messenger Davies 2001: 65). Preschool and factual 
programming, for instance, are widely considered to improve children’s cognitive 
skills. Thus, the UK ‘good childhood’ discourse has been more preoccupied with the 
quality of children’s television rather than debating about whether children should be 
exposed to television at all. Correspondingly, UK children’s programming policies and 
regulatory guidelines were historically designed along the lines of harm prevention; 
for example, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) guidelines included 
recommendations against the use of bad language, violence and dangerous 
behaviour, while the organisation regularly expressed its desire for a higher 
proportion of educational and informing content in children’s programming 
(Messenger Davies 2001: 31-7). 
As historical institutionalism – the analytical framework adopted for this study – 
considers that actors’ behaviour, and the consequent changes in the UK and Finnish 
children’s and religious programming, can be best explained by analysing the 
institutional setting in which their production takes place, rather than treating these 
changes as outcomes of wider social, demographic and cultural transformations in 
the society, this study does not explicitly focus on the aforementioned factors, but 
considers changes in the provisions of children’s and religious programmes to stem 
mainly from their respective institutional environments. The analytical framework of 
historical institutionalism will be justified and examined in closer detail in section 
3.2.2. 
 
1.5. The structure of the thesis and chapter outlines 
The thesis opens with an examination of the concept and history of the European 
PSB paradigm and the challenges set for it by the rise of the neo-liberal policy 
agenda. This section serves as a theoretical background for the study: by examining 
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various theoretical conceptions of PSB, it identifies the key characteristics and 
components of the model. It grounds the UK and Finnish broadcasting organisations 
to the theoretical model of PSB, thus enabling us to examine changes that have taken 
place in the broadcasting agendas of these broadcasting institutions. As the chapter 
draws on secondary academic literature, it also serves as a literature review on the 
impact of the neo-liberal policy agenda on the conceptual model of PSB and 
broadcasting institutions. The study then proceeds to define the analytical framework 
of the study; historical institutionalism, and examines the design and data gathering 
methods. The key contribution to the knowledge will be made in the three following 
chapters of the thesis. These chapters examine the impact of the neo-liberal agenda 
on UK and Finnish broadcasting policies, how these policies shaped the broadcasting 
market, their cumulative impact on UK and Finnish terrestrial broadcasting 
institutions, and how the institutional impact of neo-liberal policies is reflected in the 
children’s and religious programme outputs of the UK and Finnish broadcasters 
selected for the study. In so doing, these chapters will provide empirical evidence of 
the impact of neo-liberal marketisation on the provision of children’s and religious 
programmes that allows us to make conclusions about changes in the UK and Finnish 
broadcasters’ institutional priorities. The thesis will conclude by discussing whether 
these changes in institutional priorities reflect changes in broadcasting paradigms, 
and in the theoretical model of PSB. 
The theoretical and empirical contribution will be delivered in seven chapters. Chapter 
2 is a theoretical chapter that examines the concept and theories of public service 
broadcasting. It begins with an examination of the origins of the public service model 
and details the common characteristics of PSB by comparing different interpretations 
of the model. The role of minority interest programmes within the model will also be 
discussed. The chapter then proceeds to analyse the process of neo-liberal 
marketisation and its ideological impact on broadcasting paradigm and policies, and 
explores institutional responses by PSB organisations to the challenge set by 
marketisation. Thus, the purpose of the chapter is to provide a historical and 
theoretical background for examining institutional changes in broadcasting. 
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Chapter 3 details the analytical framework, design and methodology of the study. It 
outlines the defining characteristics of the analytical framework selected for the study 
– historical institutionalism – and justifies its use in this research. The limitations of 
historical institutionalism are also discussed, and the chapter presents a modified 
model for analysing critical junctures in institutional continuity utilising the Industrial 
Equilibrium Model devised for this study. The chapter also examines and rationalises 
the case selection for the comparative study. 
Chapter 4 provides a historical account of the institutional arrangements in 
broadcasting in the UK and Finland. It examines the origins of the broadcasting 
systems of these countries, focusing on their unique characteristics. It then charts the 
introduction of the neo-liberal agenda into national broadcasting policies and 
paradigms, and examines the impact of neo-liberal ideas and policies on 
broadcasting institutions. Thus, it grounds our research cases to the national policy 
environments and provides a basis for the analysis of the effects of marketisation on 
broadcasting institutions utilising the Industrial Equilibrium Model undertaken in the 
empirical chapters. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide empirical accounts of the marketisation-driven institutional 
changes on the provisions of children’s and religious programmes in the UK and 
Finland. Based on empirical research on television outputs on UK and Finnish 
terrestrial free-to-air (FTA) channels, these chapters examine changes in 
broadcasters’ children’s and religious programming strategies utilising the explanatory 
framework of Industrial Equilibrium Model, as outlined in chapter 3. The Model 
enables us to use broadcast output as evidence of changes in broadcasters’ conduct 
(i.e. changes in formal organisational structures, corporate strategies, internal 
policies, rules and conventions). Thus, its key benefit lies in the sharper analytical 
lens it provides in analysing the impact marketisation-driven changes in the 
broadcasting environments of the UK and Finland examined in chapter 4 on the 
conduct of broadcasting institutions.  
Finally, chapter 7 summarises the research results and draws conclusions of the 
effects of marketisation with regards to the provision of the two cases of minority 
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interest programming on broadcasting institutions and on the conceptual model of 
PSB. It also examines the emerging use of alternative platforms in minority interest 
delivery and discusses the risks such a change presents for the provision of minority 
interest programmes. The thesis concludes with recommendations for further 
research in this field. 
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2. The public service paradigm and neo-liberal 
marketisation 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter drills down to the theoretical core of the European PSB model in a 
historical context. It briefly looks at the origins of the concept and identifies some of its 
key influences, whose legacy can still be found in the 21st century PSB institutions. 
The chapter will then analyse the characteristics of PSB, as theorised by academic 
scholars and political institutions, and contrasts the model with the commercial 
agenda in broadcasting. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of neo-liberal 
marketisation and its ideological influence on the public service paradigm. It analyses 
the technological, political and economic factors that facilitated the rise of the neo-
liberal discourse that challenged the public service orthodoxy. The theory of neo-
liberal marketisation, together with the different processes associated with it, will be 
presented. The chapter then presents a discussion about neo-liberal marketisation 
and transformations in the public service discourse. The chapter argues that these 
transformations have been mainly caused by the neo-liberal sentiments in media and 
communications policies and discourses. The impact of competition on programme 
diversity will also be examined in the light of the theory of ‘ruinous competition’ by van 
der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001). Thus, the chapter provides a theoretical 
foundation for analysing changes in broadcasting paradigms: as broadcasting 
systems of both the UK and Finland have historically been based on the public 
service ideology, understanding the theoretical roots of the concept is essential in 
order to identify marketisation-driven institutional changes. 
 
2.2. History and characteristics of the European public 
service broadcasting model 
2.2.1. Origins and characteristics of the European public service 
broadcasting model 
In broadest terms, PSB can be considered a sociological solution to a technical 
problem (Wheeler 1997: 87). Its historical justification was based on technological 
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grounds – the scarcity of the broadcasting spectrum – and on normative values 
associated with Western-style democracies, such as diversity, pluralism, universal 
service, and the maintenance of cultural identity (Steemers 2003: 125). As each 
European country was allocated just a limited number of frequencies, the spectrum 
was seen as ‘a valuable form of public property’ by national governments, as the 
British Sykes Committee on broadcasting put it in 1923 (Seymour-Ure 1996: 61). 
Thus, treating broadcasting as a public service was a ‘natural’ solution to avoid 
broadcasting becoming a private monopoly, and most European countries adopted 
this position. 
Many European public broadcasters emerging in the inter-war period shared similar 
characteristics, and this has led observers to believe that smaller European countries, 
such as Finland and Norway, consciously adopted the institutional model of another 
broadcasting company, such as the BBC. While many ideological features of the early 
public service broadcasters were borrowed from the BBC, the concept of PSB came 
to be associated with a set of ad hoc practical arrangements concerning broadcasting 
in Europe. As might be expected, many organisational arrangements resulted from 
practical, not ideological reasoning (Hellman 1999: 58). The policy-makers of the day 
operated predominantly within a national context, and the similarity in the institutional 
characteristics of the early public broadcasters is more likely to be a result of the 
forces which helped bring about public broadcasting companies, taking a similar 
configuration in different countries (Syvertsen 1992). Factors such as market size, 
language community, socio-political structure, policy style, cultural characteristics, 
economic circumstances and ‘the lessons of history’ (e.g. in Germany’s case) have all 
played a key role in shaping the European countries’ broadcasting systems 
(Humphreys 1996: 117). Thus, each country adopted a unique application of PSB, 
reflecting characteristics of national political systems and the aforementioned national 
socio-cultural factors (Humphreys 1996: 2). Hallin and Mancini (2004: 27-33) refer to 
this symmetry between the structures of national political institutions systems and 
broadcasting policies as ‘political parallelism’. They argue that owing to their nature 
as public bodies, public broadcasting systems and the regulatory agencies 
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responsible for supervising commercial broadcasting in particular reflect various 
degrees of this parallelism. 
While PSB arrangements were subject to national configurations, the vision of John 
Reith, the first Director-General of the BBC, became the most influential in the 
European PSB perspective. Reith cultivated this mission of broadcasting as a tool of 
national enlightenment, relying heavily on his personal views, which he presented to 
be representing those of the BBC. Reith believed that PSB was founded on four 
principles: monopoly, non-commercialism, universality and quality (McDonnell 1991; 
Franklin 2001). Referred to as ‘Reithianism’, the essence of this philosophy could be 
summed up with paternalism with high moral and cultural values. He strongly believed 
that broadcasting should give a lead to public taste rather than to pander it since ‘few 
know what they want, and very few what they need’ (cited in McDonnell 1991: 12). 
Broadcasting should act as an educational force for the improvement of knowledge, 
taste and manners. As McDonnell (1991: 11) notes, Reith considered himself to be 
best able to give define such values, and what constituted quality in broadcasting. 
This self-constructed authoritative certainty pertaining to virtuous norms and values in 
society was characteristic for early PSB organisations. Above all, broadcasting should 
contribute in creation of informed and enlightened democracy by enabling citizens to 
take interest in matters from which they had previously been excluded, thus enabling 
them to form informed and reasoned public opinion (Scannell 1990: 14; Price 1995). 
This paternalist tradition coupled with the post-war project of construction of the 
democratic European welfare state (Tracey 1998: 18-9; Brants and De Bens 2000: 
16). The policy focus was on socio-political rather than economic or national strategic 
concerns reflecting the spirit of progressive change and belief in social planning in all 
spheres of life (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 191-2). Broadcasting was 
considered an important tool in maintaining democracy, and its operations were 
subordinate to this duty (see figure 2.1). Thus, the traditional public service media 
paradigm was ‘primarily shaped by normative concerns deriving from the needs of 
democratic (thus representative and participatory) politics’. It was ‘largely bounded by 
the limits of the national territory’ and focused on ‘national interests’. It also 
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‘legitimised government intervention in communication markets for social purposes’ 
(van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 194). 
 
Figure 2.1: The post-war (1945-1980/90) paradigm of public service media policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 194) 
Reith’s conception of the missions of the BBC; to inform, educate and entertain, was 
adopted as the universal mission statement for PSB, and is commonly featured in 
broadcasting licences and legislations around the world. Within this trilogy, the 
informative mission can be interpreted as a duty to provide a comprehensive news 
service, world news, current affairs programmes and documentaries. The educational 
mission is not limited to the provision of schools and adult educational programmes, 
but can be interpreted as a broader mission to enlighten and ‘improve’ the audience. 
It is noteworthy that the duty to entertain is commonly placed last, reflecting its less 
significant status in PSB, preferably as a vehicle to promote the two other missions 
without sacrificing the ‘quality’ aspect. In short, PSB should be conceived as an 
interventionist institutional practice: it should contribute to construction of ‘quality’ 
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citizens rather than catering to, and therefore reinforcing and reproducing, the already 
existing needs and wants of consumers (Ang 1991: 102). Consequently, the Reithian 
discourse was prescriptive, not descriptive: the formulation of programming policy 
was a normative issue based on the abstract principles of public service philosophy 
(Ang 1991: 105-110; McDonnell 1991). Although Reithianism was at its most 
influential in the pre-Second World War BBC, its influence stretched further than 
Britain alone and has indirectly affected the programming policy of PSB 
organisations, if not in its concrete policy impact then at least in its spirit of 
‘authoritative idealism’ (Ang 1991: 101). Madge (1989: 34) even argues that BBC 
producers ignored their audiences and audience research until the competitive 
market forced them to pay a greater attention to their wants in the 1980s. 
In spite of the differences in the institutional arrangements of PSB, the public service 
paradigm shares some uniform characteristics, which can be considered as core 
elements of the theoretical model of PSB. In his cross-national survey on Western 
European public service broadcasters, Blumler (1992b: 7-14) argues that most of the 
European PSBs share six features of the public service legacy, in contradistinction to 
the market-orientated American model. His first criterion is an ‘ethic of 
comprehensiveness’, referring to omnibus services of education, information and 
entertainment, providing a universal service for the whole public. The second is that 
public service broadcasters were usually granted broadly worded ‘generalised 
mandates’, giving a high degree of flexibility and liberty in interpreting their 
broadcasting obligation and public service mission. In most systems the enforcement 
and supervision of broadcasters’ activities were entrusted to politically appointed 
bodies, either within the broadcasting organisation itself (as in the case of the BBC 
and Yleisradio), or above them (like the ITA/IBA/ITC/Ofcom). Humphreys (1996: 119) 
notes that these ‘generalised mandates’ typically provide in one form or another the 
requirement to supply diverse programming for all tastes, which is covered by 
Blumler’s third criterion: ‘diversity, pluralism and range’. This refers to diversity at 
several levels: in terms of the multiplicity of audiences served, in terms of the range of 
programme genres supplied, and in respect of responsiveness to society. Fourth, 
public broadcasters were imbued with a ‘cultural vocation’; a responsibility for 
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sustaining and renewing the culture, community and national identity of the society. 
The fifth criterion refers to the fact that since the public broadcasting corporations 
were ultimately creatures of the state, they were highly politicised organisations. 
Although typically detached from direct relation to governments, they have a close 
binary relationship with the political realm. The sixth and last criterion in this typology 
is that European public service broadcasters are characterised by ‘non-
commercialism’. Although some European PSB systems have accepted advertising 
revenue, it has been considered as a ‘necessary evil’ rather than the ‘guest of 
honour’. No competition has usually existed for television advertising support until the 
advent of commercial television. However, the role of commercials was regarded as a 
supplement to the licence fee and they were confined to strict limits in terms of 
amount and placement. 
The Broadcasting Research Unit has provided another much-cited categorisation of 
the mature PSB orthodoxy in their 1985 submission to the Peacock Committee. It 
outlines ‘those main elements of PSB as it has evolved in Britain which, it is argued, 
should be retained within whatever systems are devised to provide broadcasting as 
new communications technologies come in use’ (Broadcasting Research Unit 1985: 
i). The report is to a certain extent analogous to Blumler’s classification, but its core 
nature is more normative than descriptive in consequence of the origins of the report. 
Although the report refers specifically to the British broadcasting system, its principles 
are still useful to apply to other European broadcasting systems. First, programmes 
should be geographically universal for the whole population regardless of their 
location. Second, programmes should cater for all interest and tastes, providing 
programmes of wide range and diversity for practically all kinds of taste, for audience 
groupings of large and small. Third, minorities should receive particular provision. 
This applies to disadvantaged minorities in particular: those without great purchasing 
power or political influence. Fourth, broadcasters should promote national identity and 
community, providing shared cultural experiences and engages people as citizens 
into the public sphere. Fifth, broadcasting should be free from vested interests and 
government intervention. Broadcasting authorities should be accountable to 
Parliament rather than to the government of the day. This somewhat contrasts to 
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Blumler’s notion about broadcasting’s place in politics, which can be partly explained 
by the fact that British broadcasters have been generally more independent from 
political control and party politics than their European counterparts (Humphreys 1996: 
121). Sixth, at least the basis of the system should be funded by the corpus of users. 
This is best achieved by the licence fee. Other forms of funding – subscription, pay-
per-view, government funding and sponsorship – are considered to jeopardise the 
democratic nature of the system and the independence of political and economic 
pressures. Seventh, broadcasting should encourage competition in good 
programming rather than competition for numbers. As the system is funded by its 
users, it does not need to compete for viewership figures by broadcasting mainly 
popular programmes, but can concentrate on winning repute by the range and quality 
of programming. In a duopoly situation, the broadcasters do not compete for the 
same revenue source, allowing them to compete for quality, as was the case in British 
broadcasting until the 1990s. Eight, although Broadcasting Research Unit argues that 
there is no such condition as unregulated broadcasting, the public guidelines should 
be designed to liberate rather than restrict the programme makers. If society fails to 
make regulations in the interest of its members, commercial and political imperatives 
will take control. Liberating regulation also shelters the freedom to experiment in new 
styles and subjects, and to make mistakes in doing this, which is particularly 
important for commercial public service broadcasters (Broadcasting Research Unit 
1985). 
A third model also deserves a brief inspection. This model, drafted by the Council of 
Europe (CoE) for the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy in 
1994, is significant in that it represents a general European model of PSB for the CoE 
member states, which they are expected to adhere to in their national broadcasting 
jurisdictions. The model details PSB missions as follows: 
1.) to provide, through their programming, a reference point for all members of the 
public and a factor for social cohesion and integration of all individuals, groups 
and communities; 
2.) to provide a forum for broad public discussion in which as broad a spectrum as 
possible of views and opinions can be expressed; 
3.) to broadcast impartial and independent news, information and comment; 
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4.) to develop pluralistic, innovatory and varied programming which meets high 
ethical and quality standards and not to sacrifice the pursuit of quality to 
market forces; 
5.) to develop and structure programme schedules and services of interest to a 
wide public while being attentive to the needs of minority groups; 
6.) to reflect the different philosophical ideas and religious beliefs in society, with 
the aim of strengthening mutual understanding and tolerance and promoting 
community relations in pluriethnic and multicultural societies;  
7.) to contribute actively through their programming to a greater appreciation and 
dissemination of the diversity of national and European cultural heritage;  
8.) to ensure that the programmes offered contain a significant proportion of 
original productions, and to have regard to the need to use independent 
producers and co-operate with the cinema sector; 
9.) to extend the choice available to viewers and listeners by also offering 
programme services which are not normally provided by commercial 
broadcasters. 
(Council of Europe 1994: 36) 
The normative model by the CoE is different from the previous models in that it places 
the economic and commercial aims next to the cultural and social aims of the two 
previous models. Thus, it reflects the political and economic aims of the policy-
makers rather than representing an ideologically purist attempt to capture the noble 
social and cultural ideas behind the concept. It nevertheless contains the same ideals 
of universality, diversity, impartiality and quality than the two earlier models. 
Components of the three aforementioned models of public service broadcasting are 
presented in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Three interpretations of the characteristics of public service broadcasting 
 
The Broadcasting 
Research Unit 
(1985) 
Blumler (1992) The Council of Europe (1994) 
Universal 
service 
Geograpically 
universal service 
Comprehensive 
service 
To provide, through their programming, a 
reference point for all members of the public 
and a factor for social cohesion and integration 
of all individuals, groups and communities 
Diversity of 
output 
Catering for all 
interests and tastes 
Diversity, 
pluralism and 
range 
To develop and structure programme 
schedules and services of interest to a wide 
public while being attentive to the needs of 
minority groups 
Catering for 
minority 
interests and 
tastes 
Minority interest 
provision 
Social and 
cultural 
missions 
Promotion of 
national identity 
and community 
Cultural vocation To reflect the different philosophical ideas and 
religious beliefs in society, with the aim of 
strengthening mutual understanding and 
tolerance and promoting community relations 
in pluriethnic and multicultural societies 
 
To contribute actively through their 
programming to a greater appreciation and 
dissemination of the diversity of national and 
European cultural heritage 
 
To provide a forum for broad public discussion 
in which as broad a spectrum as possible of  
views and opinions can be expressed 
Impartiality Freedom from 
vested interests 
and government 
intervention 
PSBs as 
politicised 
organisations 
detached from 
direct government 
intervention 
To broadcast impartial and independent news, 
information and comment 
Freedom from 
commercial 
imperatives 
Funded by the 
corpus of users 
Non-
commercialism 
To extend the choice available to viewers and 
listeners by also offering programme services 
which are not normally provided by 
commercial broadcasters 
Programme 
standards 
Competition in 
good programming 
rather than 
competition for 
numbers 
 To develop pluralistic, innovatory and varied 
programming which meets high ethical and 
quality standards and not to sacrifice the 
pursuit of quality to market forces 
Independence 
and 
freedom of 
expression 
Public guidelines to 
liberate rather than 
restrict the 
programme makers 
Generalised 
mandates 
 
Economic and 
commercial 
missions 
  To ensure that the programmes offered 
contain a significant proportion of original 
productions, and to have regard to the need to 
use independent producers and co-operate 
with the cinema sector 
(Sources: Broadcasting Research Unit 1985: i; Blumler 1992b: 7-14; Council of Europe 1994: 36) 
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2.2.2. Public service versus commercial paradigm 
Another way to examine PSB paradigm is to contrast it with the commercial 
broadcasting paradigm, originating from the United States, whose salient institutional 
characteristics can be summarised with commercial funding, private ownership and a 
high level of freedom from regulatory intervention (Hellman 1999: 58). In essence, 
commercialism in broadcasting simply refers to the production and distribution of 
information and culture within a market structure, for profit (McQuail 1986). This profit 
is created by selling audiences’ attention to advertisers, or by subscription fees from 
the audiences. The system operates according to the laws of the capitalist market 
economy, and thus a programme that is most attractive for the advertisers (or, 
similarly, a channel with the highest number of subscribers) generates most income 
for its proprietors, as demand drives the prices up. Thus, finding the right audiences is 
the driving force for commercial broadcasters’ programming policies. In the past, this 
strategy involved simply attracting the largest possible audiences by programming of 
wide popular appeal. However, as Brants and De Bens (2000: 17) note, in the 
modern multi-platform media environment, the sheer audience size is not necessarily 
crucial, but commercial broadcasters’ strategy includes aiming at two kinds of 
viewers: those that are interesting by size and those that should be targeted for 
spending potential. The latter include the socio-economic groups with the highest 
spending power. As these groups are perceived to be interested in ‘quality’ factual 
programming like news, current affairs and culture, commercial broadcasters feel that 
they have to provide these programmes as well to minimise the potential damage 
done by the public competition for the higher income audience groups. However, as 
they have only a limited appeal to advertisers and mass audiences, the provision of 
such types of programming is subordinate in the commercial agenda. 
While commercialism may refer objectively to particular free-market arrangements, it 
has also come to imply consequences for the type of media content that is mass-
produced and ‘marketed’ as a commodity, and also to imply consequences for the 
relations between the suppliers and the consumers of media. In the days when PSB 
was the norm in broadcasting, commercialism became identified with the pursuit of 
profit above else and was associated with mass audience, low-cost, populist 
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productions (McQuail 1998: 108). Commercialism was seen as antithetical to the 
values of PSB, which itself was considered as the ideal model, against which 
commercial television was contrasted (Ruoho 2007: 122). Two contradicting sets of 
values were associated with the models, and were used to highlight differences in 
programming of PSB and commercial systems (see table 2.2). The division was 
manifested in programming policies of broadcasters operating under the opposing 
paradigms. 
 
Table 2.2: The dual standard of public service and commercial television 
Cultural form of television 
Public service Commercialism 
Primary mission 
Information Entertainment 
Objective 
Cognitive process Emotional experience 
Cultural standard 
High culture Popular culture 
Ideal content 
Stimulating thinking or action Balancing reality and dreams 
Portrayal of reality 
Realist Escapist 
Role of viewer 
Citizen Consumer 
Tastes defined by 
Elites Viewers 
Perception of realism 
Empirical Emotional 
(Source: Ruoho 2007: 124; see also Hujanen 1996: 192; Livingstone, Lunt et al. 2007) 
 
This division of values can be considered ultimately an outcome of the difference in 
the way PSB and commercial television models perceive their audiences. As Ang 
(1991: 26-8) argues, commercial television essentially treats its audiences as a 
market in which it generates the commercial profits. While other motives for 
programme production may exist, for instance, aspirations for communication 
excellence, social purposes or sheer creative autonomy, all such goals must be 
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subordinated to the overriding profit-maximising goal. Corresponding to this 
commercial logic, a programme with high commercial profit potential is more valuable 
to a programme with a potential to produce positive externalities. Thus, the 
commercial strategy concentrates on catering for the audiences’ ‘wants’ (as defined 
by the majority tastes). In terms of programming, this means an emphasis on 
entertainment (Brants and De Bens 2000: 17). PSB, on the other hand, features a 
significantly more complicated interpretation of the role of the audience. As already 
noted, PSB is essentially a paternalist system, whose relationship to its audience is 
characterised by a pervasive sense of cultural responsibility and social accountability. 
Thus, it addresses its audiences as citizens, whose ‘needs’ it aims to serve to enable 
them to better perform their democratic rights and duties (Ang 1991: 29). It requires 
more from the audience than the commercial paradigm in broadcasting: it is not 
enough for audiences to just pay attention to the programmes offered to them, they 
must get something out of those programmes that is presumably ‘good’ for them. As 
Ang (1991: 102) notes: ‘watching television as an activity is not considered 
meaningful or worthwhile as an end in itself, but is seen as a means towards a larger 
process of cultural change.’ PSB programmes should be in the public interest and not 
necessarily what the mass audiences are interested in (Brants and De Bens 2000: 
16). 
 
2.2.3. Public service broadcasting and catering for minority interests 
While the theoretical conception of PSB has undergone changes over the years 
reflecting changes that have taken place in the broadcasting environment, the 
provision for minority interest content has been considered as a core element of PSB, 
as demonstrated by the aforementioned definitions. While highlighting the importance 
of diversity in programming, which itself could be understood to include catering for 
minority interests, they also exclusively state particular provision for minorities as a 
key mission. Historically, this mission can be considered to be an outcome of the 
nature of PSB as a universal service, which itself derives from the limitations of the 
analogue broadcasting spectrum. Because the licence fee as a universal tax on 
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television viewers places all consumers of broadcasting services into an equal 
position, it also requires the PSBs to serve all audience groups in equal terms. 
Consequently, as well as providing programming of popular interests, PSBs are also 
obliged to provide minority interest content, notwithstanding the fact that production 
costs per viewer are usually higher in these productions. Catering for minority interest 
audiences has also an important social function in promoting social cohesion, which 
is harmonious with the social functions of PSB. By promoting alternative, minority 
interests and sets of values through programmes that highlight and strengthen the 
national cultural heritage by recognising minority (ethnic, cultural, class) identities as 
valuable to society as a whole, minority interest programmes act to strengthen the 
social bond of the minorities with the civil society (Brants and De Bens 2000: 17). The 
past spectrum scarcity acted to strengthen this cohesion, as the limited choice of 
viewing options preceding the multi-channel era and audience fragmentation 
promoted the visibility of such programmes in main channels’ schedules. Thus, 
broadcasting not only acted to serve these minorities socially and culturally, but also 
improved their social visibility in the society as a whole. 
The nature of PSB as a paternalistic system has acted to protect the provision of 
many types of minority interest content that would have not survived in a commercial 
system. As Ang (1991: 103) notes, the classic public service paradigm did not 
consider audience numbers (or other purely quantitative measurements of popularity) 
as a definitive measure of its success, which had to ‘encompass more qualitative and 
substantial achievements, ideally amounting to the persuasive transmission of ideas, 
values and tastes.’ Ratings per se do not provide broadcasters with ‘feedback’ about 
effects and communicative accomplishment of its public service task. In this context, 
audience measurement did not have a ‘natural’ place in PSB paradigm, as it has in 
commercial television institutions. Hence, concepts such as ‘mass audience’ and 
‘minority interest’ that were solely based on quantitative information of the size of the 
audience held much less significance than they did in a commercial broadcasting 
environment. The provision of minority interest content such as arts programmes, 
classical music, religion and education was simply considered an undisputable part of 
PSBs’ social duties in addressing the perceived social, political, cultural and 
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educational needs of the audience. Audience sizes were a lesser factor in resource 
allocation, and certain types of minority interest content deemed socially or culturally 
important were treated in equal significance. The limitedness of the schedules and 
the limited choice of alternative viewing options often guaranteed these programmes 
with reasonable ratings in any case. 
The expansion of commercial broadcasting and the ideological shift towards 
marketised audience-as-consumers discourse in broadcasting have set a challenge 
on minority interest programming on general interest PSB channels. Digital 
broadcasting platforms have enabled the introduction of niche channels targeting 
specialist interest audiences. This, however, does not offset the significance of PSB 
provision of these programmes. While this content may be available on digital 
terrestrial, cable and satellite channels, and over the Internet, concerns about 
accessibility, diversity, quality, cultural relevance and impartiality may be raised. 
Receiving these channels may be limited to those subscribing to digital cable or 
satellite services, or have internet access, which sets financial and technological 
barriers to the access. Most of the digital channels providing minority interest content 
are too small to make sufficient investments in original or domestic content. There are 
several issues with impartiality and diversity especially with regards to religious 
channels, which are often run by a particular religious group or sect, thus 
representing views of one doctrine only. Most of all, without costly measures of 
dubbing or subtitling programming, these international satellite channels are likely to 
serve only large language groups, while smaller nations and minority languages are 
unlikely to benefit from commercially-funded services. International channels are also 
unable to reflect local and national cultural characteristics in their programming, but 
contribute to the ‘cultural imperialism’ of large nations, whose markets these channels 
predominantly target in their programming. Consequently, minority interest provision 
by these channels does not meet many of the values and standards associated with 
PSB, and hence digital commercial operators cannot substitute PSB provision fully 
and satisfactorily. 
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2.3. Neo-liberal marketisation and its effects on broadcasting 
paradigms 
2.3.1. The neo-liberal challenge to the public service orthodoxy 
The traditional PSB orthodoxy in Western European broadcasting was challenged in 
the 1980s. The prevalent view stressing the cultural function of broadcasting and 
arguing that citizens’ needs are best served by a universal broadcasting service 
supplied by a public organisation was challenged by a view that viewers are best 
served by a system based on free market competition, and consequently 
broadcasting should be freed from all but necessary regulatory constraints and 
treated as a private commercial enterprise. 
The challenge against PSB had three main motives behind it, each brought about by 
changes taking place in the national broadcasting environments of the 1980s (see 
e.g. Hellman 1988; Syvertsen 1992; Humphreys 1996; Crisell 1997; Tracey 1998). 
The first is technological: advances in signal delivery technologies in the form of cable 
and satellite broadcasting (and, later, digital broadcasting technologies and the 
Internet) transformed the spectrum scarcity into capacity abundance, thus eliminating 
the need to limit the number of television channels. Technological innovations in 
cable networks and, in the late 1980s, in direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) 
increased internationalisation and commercialisation in European broadcasting by 
facilitating the effective use of pay-per-view and subscription services. Satellite 
services operating outside national legislations (such as the Sky Television and 
German-language CLT, based in Luxembourg) added further pressures to avoid the 
drain of advertising money into offshore companies (Esser 2009: 187). New 
frequencies had been made available in the analogue terrestrial spectrum as 
technological progress had allowed for their more efficient use, and signal 
digitalisation was already under development. Consequently, broadcasters’ ability to 
guide the viewing habits of the audience has been drastically reduced, thus 
increasing broadcasters’ pressure to utilise competitive scheduling strategies for 
audience maximisation. 
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The second, ideological motive is related to the rise of neo-liberalism as a prominent 
political ideology. The ideological challenge can be associated with the macro-level 
shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism in economic policy preferences. It was first 
championed by the rising political Right, which gained power from socialist 
governments in several European countries in the 1980s (Esser 2009: 187). Neo-
liberalism, ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade’ (Harvey 2005: 2), ultimately seeks to limit the role of the state 
to creating and preserving such practices. If markets do not exist (in areas previously 
under public ownership), they must be created through marketisation, by state action 
if necessary. First trialled in the UK during the Thatcher administration (1979-90) and 
continued under the successive Conservative (1990-7) and New Labour (1997-2010) 
administrations, its values and practices were gradually introduced to all sectors in 
society (see e.g. Harvey 2005). Facilitated by the collapse of socialist economic 
system in the Eastern European countries in the late 1980s and the following general 
disillusionment with socialist ideas (and the consequent ‘decline in ideology’ in 
general (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 197)), the influence of neo-liberalism has 
since extended to parties of the Left as well (see e.g. Glyn and Wood 2001; 
Freedman 2003).  
The neo-liberal view on broadcasting considers that the ideals of consumer 
sovereignty, public interest, efficiency of operation and diversity of supply are best 
served by treating broadcasting as a competitive market, where private enterprises 
compete with just minimal regulation. The advocates of this viewpoint commonly 
argue that as spectrum scarcity is no longer an issue, there is no need for state 
intervention in broadcasting, which also refers to PSBs. Neo-liberals promoted their 
case through a shift in the discourse of communication debate, which saw a re-
articulation of the traditional dichotomy between public service and commercial values 
(Hujanen 1996: 191; Mäntymäki 2006: 29-30). Public service values that previously 
held positive connotations: gravity, high culture, information orientation, public service 
and democratic control, were replaced by negative attributes such as paternalism, 
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elitism, partisanship, bureaucratic organisational culture, antiquatedness and 
economic ineffectiveness in the neo-liberal communications discourse (for examples 
of the latter, see e.g. Home Office 1986; Hujanen 1996; Hobson 1999; Jacka 2003; 
Peacock 2004; Armstrong 2005; Murdoch 2005). A common argument expressed by 
ideological critics of PSB is that it does not serve the ‘wants’ of consumers (i.e. 
viewers) effectively enough as it does not allow consumers to voice their preferences, 
but who are rather tied to the old-fashioned moral paternalism of ‘nanny-state’ 
broadcasting (Humphreys 1996: 161). These critics argued that PSB institutions were 
dominated by small elite of governors, editors and journalists, and their programming 
reflected the views of these people rather than the actual tastes of the audiences. 
Other common arguments against PSB included its vulnerability to government 
pressure, the poll-tax nature of television licence, the size and economic inefficiency 
of the public broadcasting institutions (due to their alleged tendency to overinvest and 
their vulnerability to ‘trade union exploitation’), and their unfair privileges in the 
broadcasting market, which distort competition. Consumer sovereignty can be better 
achieved by pay television or advertising funding. PSB, if it is to be preserved at all, 
should concentrate on mainly the market failure, i.e. producing or commissioning 
programmes that are socially important but commercially unprofitable. 
The influence of the lobby of neo-liberal politicians would have been less successful if 
they were not supported by a powerful industrial coalition, thus setting an economic 
challenge on PSB. This coalition consisted of electronic industries wishing to exploit 
the audio-visual electronics market; commercial broadcasters, satellite and cable 
television lobbies wanting to expand their commercial services; PTTs wishing to 
develop new media technologies and to maintain market positions; newspaper 
publishers wanting to diversify their media operations; and advertisers seeking new 
outlets and wanting to strengthen their market position. National governments across 
the political spectrum considered liberalisation necessary to contribute to economic 
growth and to attract investors in the growing media industry, whose importance had 
been growing since the 1980s along with the general growth in service sectors and 
decline in manufacturing (Humphreys 1996: 176). 
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Policies of the European Communities (EC, from 1993 the European Union, EU) have 
arguably played a major part in this transition, as the EC/EU has been active in 
promoting the free market ideas and stands for maximum liberalisation and free 
market competition in broadcasting and telecommunications (see e.g. Humphreys 
1996; Burgelman 1997; Murdock and Golding 1999; Stokes and Reading 1999; 
Collins 2002; Wheeler 2004; Rooke 2009; Svendsen 2011). The EC’s first media 
initiative, the Television without Frontiers Green Paper was published in 1984, and 
made into a directive in 1989. The directive defines television as ‘a product operating 
in a market’ (Burgelman 1997: 126) rather than a cultural medium. It anticipated 
improved competitiveness of the European broadcasting and audiovisual sector 
following the creation of a Single Market, but rather than fostering pan-European 
television promoting European integration, the key legacy of the directive was the 
gradual liberalisation of broadcasting and the unprecedented growth in the numbers 
of commercial channels in national markets (Esser 2009: 183-9). 
2.3.2. Neo-liberal marketisation and transformations in the broadcasting 
paradigm 
Murdock and Golding (1999: 118; 2001: 113-4) argue that a direct consequence of 
the rise of the neo-liberal agenda in media and communication policies is a wide-
reaching process of marketisation. The concept can be summarised to mean ‘all 
those policy interventions designed to increase the freedom of action of private 
corporations and to institute corporate goals and organizational procedures as the 
yardsticks against which the performance of all forms of cultural enterprise are 
judged’ (Murdock and Golding 1999: 118). According to Murdock and Golding, 
marketisation entails four analytically distinct processes: 
1.) The operating space allocated to capitalist enterprise was rapidly 
enlarged by opening up previously protected markets (liberalisation) 
and appropriating resources and markets previously managed by 
public institutions or held in common (privatisation); 
2.) These structural shifts were accompanied by a fundamental 
reorientation of regulatory regimes in which established conceptions 
of the “public good” were effectively dismantled and redefined as 
primarily about open markets, unimpeded competition and consumer 
protection. A growing consensus emerged within the polity that digital 
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transmission technologies render the established practice of 
licensing a limited number of entrants to a particular market 
redundant, and that where scarcity remains an issue, as with the 
radio spectrum, resources are most efficiently (and profitably) 
allocated by auction; 
3.) Market rhetorics and criteria of evaluation were established as the 
measures against which all organisations were judged, including 
those still formally in the public sector. Corporate market values: 
cost-efficiency, commercial revenue generation and customer 
maximisation, became the guiding norms of the organisations 
(corporatisation). Public sector organisations were encouraged 
and/or compelled (though cuts to their core public funding) to pursue 
commercial opportunities more aggressively and to adopt corporate 
forms of organisation Murdock uses the BBC as an example of the 
contradictions set in motion by this process of corporatisation (see 
e.g. Producer Choice, chapter 4); 
4.) These shifts were legitimated by a reinvigorated master ideology of 
consumerism, which invited people to think of themselves first and 
last as individual actors in the marketplace with a sovereign right 
(even a duty) to remake themselves and realise their aspirations by 
purchasing goods and services, rather than as citizens, whose right 
to full social participation carries with it an obligation to recognise and 
respect the needs and aspirations of others. By linking demands for 
expression and satisfaction to the logic of purchase and possession, 
marketisation promotes consumerism as the meta-ideology of the 
age. 
 
(Murdock and Golding 1999: 118-20; 2001: 113-4; Murdock 2004: 30)  
The impact of marketisation is not limited to the political sphere, but it can be 
considered a complex, all-encompassing socio-political, economic, ideological and 
institutional process, with direct and indirect effects on broadcasting institutions. Its 
political and ideological impacts have also caused repercussions for the structures of 
the broadcasting markets, while its institutional impact is a joint consequence of these 
political-ideological and structural changes. Thus, marketisation does not involve only 
policy shifts and economic restructuring, but represents a far more comprehensive 
process that manipulates institutional structures and practices; and, at the highest 
level, norms and values that guide behaviour. While liberalisation of broadcasting 
markets and reorientation of regulation are examples of processes of marketisation 
that have been carried out through political decrees, their impact has also changed 
the structure of the broadcasting market, which might be predicted to modify 
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institutional behaviour directly (through changes in regulation) and indirectly (through 
increases in competitive pressures). Thus, comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
marketisation requires us to examine socio-political and institutional structures in 
broadcasting, as well as changes in institutional norms, values and practices. 
The rise in the neo-liberal policy agenda, together with new digital communication 
technologies and the prerequisites set by telecommunications convergence have 
resulted in a transformation in the broadcasting policy focus. van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail (2003) argue that while the post-war public service media policy stemmed 
from collective socio-cultural and political goals, the emerging policy paradigm is 
driven by an economic and technological logic, with consumers’ individual interests 
gaining prominence in policy objectives (see figure 2.2). Pragmatism and populism 
rather than idealism and ideologies increasingly drive policies (van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail 2003: 197). While the previous democratic policy goals are still valid in this 
new policy paradigm, economic welfare has risen in salience in comparison with 
political welfare, and the underpinning values pertaining to social welfare are more 
exclusively concerned about issues like access and functioning of the communication 
services rather than being designed to promote social equality (van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail 2003: 200-1). 
Concurrently, the perception of the ways and means by which they are achieved has 
changed. Policy is attuned to the idea that a large and dynamic market is necessary 
to provide the communication needs of the society, while the field of communications 
is no longer primarily viewed as an appropriate area for collective welfare policies. 
Governments are retreating from regulation where it interferes with market 
development and giving relatively more priority to economic over social-cultural and 
political welfare where priorities have to be set (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 
198-9). In a wider perspective, the shift can be associated with changing perception 
of the role of the state in creating and directing cultural policies that rejects the 
previous pervasive ideals of the nation state and monoculturalism (Ellis 2000: 69-70; 
Ruoho 2007: 122). 
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Figure 2.2: The new (1980/1990-) communications policy paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 202) 
This redirection of policy has been accompanied by transformations relating to 
underlying norms and values of the public discourse surrounding PSB. While changes 
in the political and cultural climate that have accompanied the recent technological 
and economic transformations do not make publicly regulated television impossible, 
they make traditional public service solutions appear less logical and natural than 
before (Syvertsen 2003: 160 & 163). Commercial business environment has become 
the cultural norm, whose preconditions: competition, commercialism and 
consumerism, are considered to apply to public service institutions (Mäntymäki 2006: 
30). Because of postmodern and neo-liberal sentiments, larger segments of the 
population also perceive the potential demise of publicly regulated media as 
expressions of liberalisation and democratisation. This also provides a fertile ground 
for consumerist and neo-liberal arguments that consumers are the only relevant 
arbiters of taste. Such a position dismisses the traditional value hierarchies that 
favoured certain forms of content over the others, but suggests that viewers should 
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be able to make their viewing decisions based on their individual preferences; to be 
free to watch what they want (Syvertsen 2003: 163-4). This position equates mass 
audience preferences – manifested in ratings – as indicators of quality in 
programming (Ruoho 2007: 133). As the neo-liberal think-tank Adam Smith Institute 
declared: 
[T]he quality argument is clearly elitist […] The idea of a “quality” programme is 
a highly subjective one. The only fair criterion for judging programme quality is 
by how many people like it […] High ratings ought to be accepted as the 
yardstick of what people want, and should not be regarded as the object of 
disdain. 
(Adam Smith Institute (1984) "Communications Policy", 
cited in Goodwin 1998: 72) 
Indeed, Syvertsen’s (1999: 5-10) historical semantic analysis of the meaning of public 
service concludes that the interpretation of the concept has been influenced by 
different policy discourses, most recently by the influx of the neo-liberal discourse. 
The early interpretation of the concept referred to the institutional arrangement of 
broadcasting as a public utility, where the prime criteria of success was discussed in 
terms of features like universal access, uniform rates, regulated profits and high 
standards of engineering quality. The second general meaning of public service refers 
to the social, political and cultural externalities broadcasting produced; ‘broadcasting 
in the service of the public sphere’ (Syvertsen 1999: 7). The public sphere represents 
institutions in which members of the public take part as citizens and collectively make 
decisions for common good. Thus, a medium in the service of the public sphere 
mainly guarantees that all members of society have access to the information and 
knowledge to perform their civic duties (Syvertsen 1999: 7). This interpretation 
corresponds with the democratic aims of the post-war media policy paradigm (figure 
2.1), and gained substance in the era of public service orthodoxy that featured 
powerful regulatory practices to promote these goals. The third definition of public 
service stems from the equation of the public with audience, which implies a 
conception of the public as individual consumers of the media. In this context, public 
service may be translated as broadcasting in the service of the listener/viewer (i.e. the 
consumer). This interpretation highlights the duty of a broadcaster to serve the 
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interests of individual consumers rather than the needs of the collective, the citizenry. 
As such, it has become a catch-all concept that ultimately includes the greater part of 
institutions of a relatively commercialised media system, from the BBC to BSkyB. It is 
the most recent to gain acceptance in the public service discourse, and draws its 
legitimisation from the rise of the aforementioned postmodern and neo-liberal 
sentiments (Syvertsen 1999: 6-7). 
While none of these interpretations is exclusive in that elements of different 
interpretations have become interwoven, and each interpretation contains historical 
sediments of the previous renditions, actors tend to emphasise different components 
of the interpretations in different contexts (Mäntymäki 2006: 32-3). As public service 
has historically been associated with honorific connotations to values like national 
culture, professionalism and quality, and with certain institutional privileges and 
positive externalities arising from the association with such concepts, commercial 
broadcasters and their political champions have been systematically struggling to shift 
the content of the term from the two traditional interpretations towards the third, 
consumerist meaning (Ang 1991: 165-6; Syvertsen 1999: 6-9). In so doing, they have 
not only enhanced their status and weaken the justification for public broadcasters’ 
privileges, thus gaining a competitive advantage over their public counterparts, but 
also legitimised their calls for reorientation of regulation in broadcasting sector to be 
more closely akin to any other economic activity. This includes the gradual 
abolishment of the traditional regulatory obligations for public service programming 
(Syvertsen 2003: 166). 
 
2.3.3. Institutional responses to transformations in broadcasting 
paradigm: strategies for survival and implications of behaviour 
modification 
Marketisation has undoubtedly posed the greatest challenge to European public 
broadcasters, which have been compelled to adapt to competitive entry. According to 
Hultén and Brants (1992: 117-8), three possible strategies became apparent for 
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public service institutions: 1.) adaptation, which means competing with more or less 
the same logic as commercial stations, running the risk of diluting or abandoning the 
traditional public service. Hultén and Brants name RAI in Italy and RTVE in Spain as 
examples of broadcasters which have chosen the adaptation strategy; 2.) purification 
(also commonly referred to as the ‘Monastery Model’ (Aslama 2006: 22; Bardoel and 
d'Haenens 2008: 344)), restriction to public service only, which means withdrawing 
from competition and concentrating on programmes which the commercial channels 
do not prefer to offer, resulting effectively in marginalisation of PSB. Application of this 
strategy has been very limited, although commercial broadcasters and opponents of 
PSB frequently present this as the only fair model of modern PSB. France and 
Germany have introduced some thematic public service channels, such as Arte and 
3SAT, and; 3.) compensation, which is the middle way between the previous two 
strategies, avoiding both the logic of commercial television and the role of 
marginalised cultural enclave and concentrating on the strengths of established public 
broadcasting. 
While several scholars have suggested that accelerated commercialisation has 
prompted public broadcasters to adopt a programming strategy that imitates that of 
their commercial competitors (Ang 1991: 103-4; Dahlgren 1995: 13-4; d'Haenens 
2001: 111), empirical evidence indicates more elaborate responses to the competitive 
entry. Syvertsen (1992), Siune and Hultén (1998) and Bardoel and d’Haenens (2008: 
340-44) argue that the vast majority of public service broadcasters have chosen the 
compensation strategy, trying to balance between traditional public service values 
and commercialism. In addition, Siune and Hultén (1998: 29) and Brants and De 
Bens (2000: 18) argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the so-called 
convergence hypothesis, which stipulates that competition will gradually make public 
service and commercial channels increasingly alike. Experiences from European 
PSBs point rather towards a divergence hypothesis: public service channels and their 
commercial rivals emphasise different content segments, with public service channels 
stressing their fortes of e.g. news, current affairs and domestic fiction. Empirical 
research on Finnish television supports this argument: while Hellman’s (1999) study 
demonstrated that certain convergence had taken place in Finnish broadcasters’ 
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strategies in the 1980s and 1990s, Aslama et al. (2004: 126-7) concluded that the 
strategies of public (YLE TV 1 and TV 2) and commercial (MTV3 and Nelonen) 
channels had been increasingly diverging in the 2000s.  
The new competitive market, together with the aforementioned transformations in the 
interpretation of public service, has forced PSBs to redefine their relationship with 
their audiences. While they were responsible mainly for political elites during their 
monopoly/duopoly era, the commercial market has necessitated PSBs to consider the 
multiple markets of television: the popular, political, technological, business and 
professional markets (Lowe and Alm 1997: 169-91; Hellman 1999: 26-7). In seeking 
legitimacy for their privileges, the previously dominant tradition of paternalism that 
was based on a priori, normative knowledge on audience ‘needs’ has been replaced 
by increased awareness to the presumed ‘wants’ of the mass audience (Ang 1991: 
103-4). Ang (1991: 103-4) refers to this practice of measuring audience preferences 
by audience ratings and viewing shares as ‘ratings discourse’; a system which is 
naturally geared at audience maximisation. Syvertsen (1992) argues that public 
service institutions have been forced to adopt a dual role in the post-
monopoly/duopoly broadcasting landscape: they are simultaneously institutions 
providing a public service in the same sense than public libraries do and media 
corporations operating in a competitive media market. Balancing between these two 
roles requires them to constantly compromise between the potentially contradicting 
requirements of each domain: they are obliged to maintain their popular support – 
commonly measured by audience figures – while simultaneously fulfilling their social 
and cultural public service duties (Hellman 1999: 27-9; Mäntymäki 2006: 34). 
Contrary to the scenario of Ang (1991: 103-4), rather than leading to a straightforward 
consumerist paradigm within public service institutions, empirical evidence suggests 
that they have adopted more elaborate frameworks for audience preference 
measurement than those simply based on ratings. However, quantitative audience 
measurements such as ratings and reach nevertheless play a key role in PSBs’ 
considerations. How much they are weighed over cultural and social externalities 
depends on each individual case. For example, empirical research of the viewing of 
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Yleisradio’s programmes has, since the 1980s, been conducted all but exclusively by 
its own audience research unit3. Its primary methods have mainly comprised 
quantitative research on audiences. Such an approach is considered to have a 
legitimate status in assessing the relationship between the broadcaster and the 
audiences, while the validity, significance and generalisability of qualitative research 
on individual media experiences is commonly challenged in the political discourse 
(Yleisradio Oy 2004: 12; Mäntymäki 2006: 27). 
Public service institutions have recently introduced methods of assessing their impact 
that extend beyond conventional tools of audience measurement. In its 2004 report 
Building public value: Renewing the BBC for a digital world (BBC 2004) the BBC 
introduced a new concept; public value, as the measure against which its 
performance was to be measured. Introduced by the Harvard University professor 
Mark Moore in 1995 and combining a mix of economics and management theory, the 
concept and approach sought to improve the accountability and efficiency of public 
enterprises through a more pronounced framework for public value measurement 
(Coyle and Woolard 2010: 5-6). The public value of a public service was defined to 
include three components: value to individuals, value to society as a whole and 
impact on the performance of the wider commercial market (i.e. net economic value) 
(BBC 2004: 29). The BBC, the report states, contributes to public value in five main 
ways: by producing democratic, cultural, educational, social and global value. The 
realisation of these objectives will be measured by a number of diverse measures in 
four categories that the BBC considers to be ‘the main drivers of public value’: reach, 
quality, impact and value for money (see figure 2.3) (BBC 2004: 87). In contrast to the 
paternalist discourse of the traditional public service paradigm, the model contains 
several economic measures such as value for money that have little to do with the 
social and cultural value of broadcasting. By placing these measures to an equal 
significance with content measures, the model accepts that economic interests of the 
consumer are equal to those relating to citizenship, much in the same way that the 
                                                 
3
 The unit was closed down in 2006 as part of the corporation’s cost efficiency programme (Mäntymäki 
2006: 27). 
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Communications Act 2003 paralleled citizens and consumers (Doyle and Vick 2005: 
86). This indicates that the BBC has, to an extent, accepted the aforementioned 
interpretation of public service as broadcasting in the service of the listeners/viewers.  
 
Figure 2.3: The BBC model for measuring public value 
 
(Source: BBC 2004: 87) 
In terms of evaluating positive externalities of programming, such a mixed method 
approach for public value measurement does not waive problems associated with the 
complexity of the accurate measurement of public value, especially from minority 
interest point of view. A key question can be raised whether this model can 
appropriately allow for social and cultural externalities of a programme, as these 
externalities – together with the values and objectives associated with them – are 
hard to quantify (Steemers 2003: 127). While certain programmes have impact on 
smaller audiences, the positive externalities they produce may be significant and 
extend beyond boundaries of the audience group. The model also features systemic 
bias against certain low-reach programme genres whose cost per viewer is high (e.g. 
arts and religious programming), as the reach, impact and value for money of these 
programmes are low in spite of the significant cultural, educational and social 
externalities associated with them. Thus, the model employs elements of the ratings 
discourse that are antithetical to the values of PSB and risk placing these minority 
interest genres to a lesser position to genres that enjoy a more widespread 
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acceptance amongst audiences. By mixing quantifiable concrete measures such as 
audience size, weekly reach and cost per hour, with abstract hard-to-measure content 
features such as impartiality, trust and impact, the system risks of bias towards the 
former, as they provide concrete information in numerical form about programme 
“performance”. The use of ‘[a]udience share and volume […] as indicators of 
programme or service impact’ (BBC 2004: 83) is also problematical, since audience 
figures are heavily dependent on factors like scheduling and audience inheritance, as 
will be examined in chapter 6. 
 
2.3.4. Neo-liberal marketisation and programming diversity: risk of 
‘ruinous competition’ 
In terms of programming diversity across the systems, empirical experience suggests 
that the expansion in broadcasting, facilitated mostly by an expansion in commercial 
broadcasting, and the resulting intensification in the competition for viewers may 
produce adverse effects on programme diversity. Empirical studies by van der Wurff 
and van Cuilenburg (2001), Aslama et al. (2005) and Hellman (2010) demonstrate 
that intensification of competition will eventually lead to commercial broadcasters 
adopting similar (rather than different) programming strategies, at least in fierce 
market competition situations where the tendency is to compete for audiences and 
advertisers by offering the majority’s preference (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg 
2001: 216-7; Aslama 2004: 8). The cost leadership strategy, favoured by commercial 
broadcasters, initially involves maximising profits by acquiring structural cost 
advantage by realising economics of scale and scope and serving maximum 
audiences, and by minimising costs by a continuous process focus on cost reduction 
and investments in technological and non-technological process innovations. In 
limited markets with moderate competition, such a strategy would contribute to 
reflective diversity that fits the demand of the largest possible audiences. However, 
intensification of competition, inter alia, in a market where many competitors of similar 
size compete, or when significant new competitors enter a market, will lead to ruinous 
competition. In such a situation: 
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…too many companies adopt a cost leadership strategy, [and] these cost 
leaders will start to compete on price. They will start undercutting each other’s 
prices until prices equal marginal costs. Given that marginal costs are very low 
and that fixed first copy costs are relatively high in broadcasting, price 
competition will easily push prices below average costs. When this happens, a 
negative cycle starts. Revenues will not be sufficient to recoup first copy costs. 
Investments in content development or process innovation will become 
unfeasible. Broadcasters will start replacing cost leadership strategies with 
short-term price competitive strategies4 to minimize first copy costs. They will 
offer low quality content at low prices. Audiences will turn to other media 
markets and revenues will decline further. The end result will be that the 
remaining broadcasters all offer the same content. 
(van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg 2001: 216) 
Such a scenario suggests that ruinous competition would also radically reduce 
commercial broadcasters’ willingness to provide minority interest programming, as 
low-cost mass audience programming is likely to produce higher commercial return. 
While digital terrestrial television (DTT) has facilitated the introduction of thematic 
channels, they usually specialise in certain types of programming of popular interest, 
such as sports, entertainment and films, and have benefited minority interest 
provision only in a limited way.5 The study by Hellman (2010) demonstrates that the 
introduction of thematic channels in Finland has in long term only served to decrease 
the diversity across the system, especially among commercial operators. As Hellman 
notes, in trying to find content niches that serve increasingly fragmented target 
audiences, broadcasting executives produce variety rather than diversity of 
programming: viewers are provided with product differentiation, i.e. a wide choice 
between multiple shows of the same genre, while some minority interest genres 
remain under-represented. 
 
                                                 
4
 The price competitive strategy involves broadcasters re-broadcasting content that has already been 
aired in the same or other markets. Alternatively, they will broadcast content that has already been 
proven successful in other markets and that can be replicated at low cost (van der Wurff and van 
Cuilenburg 2001: 215). 
5
 With children’s programmes being a notable exception. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
Parallels between the models of PSB by the Broadcasting Research Unit (1985), 
Blumler (1992b) and the Council of Europe (1994) examined in the previous sections 
demonstrate that notwithstanding the differences in national PSB systems, certain 
characteristics of PSB are universal in European PSB systems. Catering for minority 
interests and tastes is considered one of these universal PSB duties. Originally 
stemming from the technological limitations set by spectrum scarcity, the obligation to 
cater for all interests and tastes, including those of audience minorities, universal 
service can be considered a natural outcome of the fact that the system is funded by 
the corpus of its users. The social and cultural objectives of the post-war PSB 
paradigm also backed catering for minority interests: the ultimate goal of the 
paradigm was to promote democracy through producing informed citizens. Thus, 
programming policies were based on a priori, normative knowledge on audience 
needs rather than their presumed ‘wants’, and audience size was a lesser factor in 
determining the output. 
The prevailing public service orthodoxy was challenged in the 1980s for 
technological, ideological and economic reasons. However, Murdock and Golding 
(2001), argue that a direct consequence of the rise of the neo-liberal agenda in media 
and communication policies is a wide-reaching socio-political, economic and 
ideological process of marketisation, whose impact has penetrated broadcasting 
policies and institutional structures of broadcasting organisations. van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail (2003) argue that a shift has taken place in broadcasting policy focus, with 
the emerging policy paradigm driven by an economic and technological logic. 
Concurrently, the public interest has been significantly redefined to encompass 
economic and consumerist values (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 200). 
As one of its key legacies has been the liberalisation and re-regulation of commercial 
broadcasting, marketisation has created pressures for PSB institutions to modify their 
institutional behaviour. While Syvertsen (1992), Siune and Hultén (1998) and Bardoel 
and d’Haenens (2008: 340-44) note that most broadcasters have chosen to balance 
between the traditional public service values and commercialism, the previously 
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dominant tradition of paternalism that was based on a priori, normative knowledge on 
audience ‘needs’ has been replaced by increased awareness to the presumed ‘wants’ 
of the mass audience (Ang 1991: 103-4). However, Syvertsen (1992), Siune and 
Hultén (1998) and Bardoel and d’Haenens (2008: 340-44) argue that the vast majority 
of public broadcasters have adopted the compensation strategy, trying to balance 
between the traditional public service paradigm and commercialism. Siune and Hultén 
(1998: 29) and Brants and De Bens (2000: 18) argue that experiences from European 
PSBs point rather towards a divergence hypothesis: public service channels and their 
commercial rivals emphasise different content segments, with public service channels 
stressing their fortes of e.g. news, current affairs and domestic fiction. In order to 
better justify their privileges, public broadcasters have developed elaborate 
frameworks for public value measurement, that combine both social-cultural elements 
with economic and consumerist factors. Thus, these economic and consumerist 
objectives have been accepted as part of the emerging public service paradigm. van 
der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) argue that intensifying competition between 
commercial channels will eventually lead to ruinous competition, in which 
broadcasters adopt similar types of mass-audience oriented programming policies 
that will lead to deterioration of programming diversity especially among commercial 
channels. 
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3. Analytical framework, research design and data 
gathering methods 
3.1. Introduction 
In the light of the objectives and underpinning questions of this research detailed in 
chapter 1, this chapter outlines the theoretical and associated methodological 
approach of the research in the process illuminating the underpinning analytical 
framework for the study: historical institutionalism. The chapter explores historical 
institutionalism over other varieties of ‘new’ institutionalism and elaborates the 
analytical framework of the approach to be deployed in the thesis. A customised 
explanatory model for analysing institutional change will also be presented here. The 
chapter then proceeds to an outline of the research design and methods, placing 
particular focus on the case selections for the research, followed by an account of 
each individual data collection methods. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
ethical issues pertinent to the research. 
Developing and presenting a sound methodological framework and research design 
are essential for the validity and reliability of the research (Jensen 2002: 40). The 
plethora of literature surrounding the subject is sometimes ambiguous in referring to 
methodology, methods and research design. Hence, these terms deserve clearer 
distinction. Methodology refers to ‘the philosophical framework and the fundamental 
assumptions of research’. Research design is ‘the plan of action that links the 
philosophical assumptions to specific methods’. Finally, data collection methods are 
‘techniques of data collection and analysis’ (Marshall and Rossman 1995: 4). 
 
3.2.  Analytical framework: historical institutionalism 
Broadcasting differs from other media in that it is under greater influence of public 
regulation than other forms media in Western Europe. Apart from times of war and 
national crisis, the press in most European democratic countries has remained free 
from direct state content control, and has developed along the rules and logic of the 
market (Humphreys 1996: 112). However, for reasons stemming from technological 
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necessity and later from a mixture of democratic choice, state self-interest, economic 
convenience and sheer institutional custom, television in Europe was typically placed 
under a relatively powerful regulatory control (McQuail 2000: 25). The relationship 
between broadcasting organisations and agencies responsible for supervising 
broadcasting as public bodies has obviously created a significant relationship 
between the broadcasters and the political system. Because of this, broadcasting has 
hardly anywhere acquired, as of right, the same freedom that the press enjoys, to 
express views and act with political independence (McQuail 2000: 25). As argued by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 30), the forms and degrees of this ‘political parallelism’ vary 
significantly depending on political traditions of each country, but each administration 
nevertheless shapes its broadcasting system in keeping with its own nature. Thus, 
changes in broadcasting policies and paradigms tend to reflect political discourses. 
Owing to the tendency of these policies to have a major and long-lasting influence on 
broadcasting organisations and their performance, it is necessary to examine the 
broadcasting institutions in the context of the policies, rules and conventions that 
shape their operation. 
The institutionalist school of political science argues that institutional factors are the 
most appropriate points of departure for social analysis. Unlike advocates of 
individualist theories, such as behaviouralism and rational choice theory, 
institutionalists place a special emphasis on the role institutions play in structuring 
behaviour. They argue that outcomes in social processes are determined or best 
predicted by structural factors of the institutional setting in which these processes 
take place, rather than by the impact of individual human agents (Peters 2005: 156). 
In addition to formal constructions such as government structures and policies, ‘new 
institutionalism’ allows scholars to observe amorphous institutions like political and 
organisational conventions and social structures, which are essential to comprehend 
the full extent of the impact of the neo-liberal agenda in the context of broadcasting. 
Given the nature of broadcasting as collective activity that is heavily dependent on, 
and shaped by, the social, cultural, political and economic environment in which it 
takes place, and which takes place and is shaped by its institutional setting (e.g. 
organisational strategies, policies and conventions), institutionalism provides an apt 
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approach to analyse such changes and their effects on broadcasting institutions. 
Unlike many other forms of industrial activity that operate largely to the rules of the 
free market, media (and terrestrial broadcasting in particular) is constrained by 
numerous formal and informal rules, conventions and ideas of ‘good’ practice. The 
following sections will elaborate this approach, and rationalise why historical 
institutionalism in particular provides suitable analytical tools to understand the effects 
of marketisation on broadcasting.  
 
3.2.1. ‘Old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism 
The institutional approach served as a dominant paradigm in political sciences until 
the 1950s with its methodological and theoretical premises left unscrutinised. Outside 
of political theory, this ‘old institutionalism’ focused on formal aspects of government 
(Lowndes 2002: 90; Peters 2005: 4). However, the emerging individualist approaches 
of behaviouralism and rational choice rejected the role of institutions in favour of 
individuals. Both approaches assume that people act autonomously as individuals, 
making their own choices based either on socio-psychological characteristics or 
rational calculation of their personal utility, and are not seriously constrained by formal 
or informal institutions (Peters 2005: 1). They dismissed the traditional institutionalist 
view on politics as the formal structures and processes of government as too narrow, 
and consequently institutionalism went out of fashion for three decades. 
Since the advent of ‘new institutionalism’ in the 1980s, the approach has enjoyed a 
strong revival, bringing institutions back in the focus of political research. Growing out 
of the ‘old institutionalism’ as a reaction to the ‘under-socialised’ character of 
behaviouralism and rational choice, ‘new institutionalists’ vehemently reject the 
behaviouralist argument that observable behaviour is the basic datum of political 
analysis (Immergut 1998: 6). While ‘new institutionalism’ acknowledges the role of 
individual actors, it differs from behaviouralism and rational choice theories in that it 
believes that ‘the organization of political life makes a difference’ (March and Olsen 
1984: 747): rules, which are ‘routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, 
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organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is constructed’, 
and the ‘beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that surround, support, 
elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines’ (March and Olsen 1989: 22) 
control our behaviour more than rational consequential calculation. ‘New 
institutionalists’ believe that these institutions play a dual role by both constraining 
and corrupting behaviour (Immergut 1998: 9); ‘the state is not only affected by society 
but also affects it’ (March and Olsen 1984: 738). Institutions are actors in their own 
right, who define and defend their interests. In the words of Campbell: 
Institutions are settlements born from struggle and bargaining with each other. 
They reflect the resources and power of those who made them and, in turn, 
affect the distribution of resources and power in society. Once created, 
institutions are powerful external forces that help determine how people make 
sense of their world and act in it. They channel and regulate conflict and thus 
ensure stability in society. 
(Campbell 2004: 1) 
The ‘new institutionalism’ reflects many features of the ‘old’ institutionalism, but also 
‘enriches it with the research tools and the explicit concern for theory that had 
informed both behaviouralism and rational choice analysis’ (Peters 2005: 2). Unlike 
‘old’ institutionalism, it is not solely concerned with the impact of institutions upon 
individuals, but also examines the interaction between institutions and individuals 
(Lowndes 2002: 91). It also features a shift from a formal to an informal conception of 
institutions. Institutions are no longer equated solely with formal (political) 
organisations, but institution is understood more broadly to refer to a collection of 
formal and informal rules, norms, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and 
routines that define the context within which individuals and organisations operate 
and interact within each other (Campbell 2004: 1; Peters 2005: 29). 
‘New institutionalism’ does not constitute a unified school of thought. At least three 
different varieties have appeared since the 1980s, with historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism representing the three 
main schools of ‘new institutionalism’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936). As Thelen (1999: 
370) notes, each of these schools ‘represents a sprawling literature characterised by 
tremendous internal diversity’, and thus drawing lines between them can be difficult. 
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Researchers in the field also regularly cross borders between the schools and borrow 
liberally where they can, in order to answer specific empirical questions. For instance, 
certain rational choice institutionalists have attempted to document the pervasive 
effects of early choices, commonly utilised by the historical institutionalist approach, 
while historical institutionalists scholars Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth appear quite 
comfortable with some aspects of the rational choice institutionalism (Peters 2005: 
71-2). In spite of this, key differences exist e.g. in the ways the three main schools of 
‘new institutionalism’ define institutions, how institutions influence actors’ behaviour 
and how institutions are formed. For instance, with reference to the definition of 
institutions, rational choice institutionalists see institutions as formal and informal 
rules and the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that cause actors to comply 
with these rules. Similarly, historical institutionalists consider institutions to be the 
formal and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct. In contrast, 
sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions much more broadly than political 
scientists do to include symbol systems, cognitive scripts, taken-for-granted cultural 
frameworks and moral templates, thus breaking the conceptual divide between 
institutions and culture (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947; Campbell 2004: 4). Likewise, 
significant differences exist in the ways these schools consider institutions to 
influence behaviour: for sociological institutionalists, rules work by determining 
appropriate behaviour, while proponents of the rational choice variant assume rules to 
determine the basis of exchanges between utility-maximising actors (Lowndes 2002: 
98). Acknowledging these differences is fundamental, as they do not only guide how 
the scholars conduct their analysis and interpret their results, but also have a key 
influence on how scholars focus their research. Key similarities and differences 
between rational choice, organisational and historical institutionalism are presented in 
table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Similarities and differences in rational choice, organisational and historical 
institutionalism 
 
Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Organisational 
institutionalism 
Historical 
institutionalism 
Similarities    
Favoured patterns of 
change 
Punctuated equilibrium, 
evolution 
Punctuated equilibrium, 
evolution, punctuated 
evolution 
Punctuated equilibrium, 
evolution, punctuated 
evolution 
Favoured causal 
concepts 
Path dependence: 
Based on feedback, 
increasing returns and 
choice within 
institutional constraints 
 
Diffusion: Based on 
information contagion, 
feedback and imitation 
Path dependence: 
Based on constraining 
and constructive 
aspects of institutions 
 
Diffusion: Based on 
mimetic, normative and 
coercive processes 
Path dependence: 
Based on feedback, 
learning and choice 
within institutional 
constraints 
 
Diffusion: Based on 
learning and coercive 
processes 
Role of ideas Increasing: Cognitive 
structures, beliefs and 
norms constrain actors 
(and make institutions 
inefficient) 
Substantial: Taken-for-
granted cognitive and 
normative structures 
constrain (and enable) 
actors 
Increasing: Policy 
paradigms and 
principled beliefs 
constrain actors 
Differences    
Theoretical roots Neoclassical 
economics 
Phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology, 
cognitive psychology 
Marxist and Weberian 
political economy 
Definition of institution Formal and informal 
rules and compliance 
procedures; strategic 
equilibrium 
Formal rules and taken-
for-granted cultural 
frameworks, cognitive 
schema and routinised 
processes of 
reproduction 
Formal and informal 
rules and procedures 
Level of analysis Micro-analytic 
exchanges 
Organisational fields 
and populations 
Macro-analytic national 
political economies 
Theory of action Logic of instrumentality Logic of 
appropriateness 
Logics of 
instrumentality and 
appropriateness 
Theory of constraint Action is constrained 
by rules, such as 
property rights and 
constitutions, and 
bounded rationality 
Action is constrained by 
cultural frames, 
schema and routines 
Action is constrained 
by rules and 
procedures, cognitive 
paradigms and 
principled beliefs 
(Source: Campbell 2004: 11) 
 
3.2.2. Historical institutionalism and its analytical framework 
The institutional-based analysis in this research derives from the historical 
institutionalist approach. Although other institutionalist approaches are possible, 
several features of historical institutionalism are particularly apposite in terms of 
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illuminating the research questions and delivering the objectives of this research. 
First, historical institutionalism features a perspective on historical development that is 
highly compatible with longitudinal research and provides scholars with ‘an avenue of 
looking at policy across time, while many other approaches are bound in time and 
even in space’ (Peters 2005: 85). As already noted, broadcast media is under a more 
rigid public control than other types of digital and print media. This control does not 
only feature formal statutory and regulatory structures – e.g. broadcasting legislation 
and regulation – but also covers informal rules, ideas, conventions and expectations, 
which are grounded to the institutional past. A PSB organisation is expected to 
operate to a certain, established and recognised PSB model, which bears traces of its 
own history. Thus, past institutional choices have a long-lasting effect on 
organisational structures, policy choices and operational strategies. Historical 
institutionalism’s concept of ‘path dependency’ provides an apt method to examine 
consistency and change in institutional practices and configurations, as it focuses its 
analysis on changes in the institutional continuity (‘critical junctures’), but also 
provides a plausible explanation for the persistence of certain institutional 
configurations that do not necessarily represent the most rational or beneficial options 
for broadcasting institutions.  
Second, since historical institutionalists focus on structural features of institutions that 
constrain and influence actors’ behaviour and preference formation, historical 
institutionalism provides a particularly suitable analytical framework for a cross-
national comparative study. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 14) argue that historical 
institutionalism has been ‘especially helpful in illuminating cross-national differences’: 
the approach explains ‘different policy outcomes in different countries with reference 
to their respective (stable) institutional configurations.’ Historical institutionalism 
rejects the argument of so-called grand theories (such as Marxism) that the outcome 
of certain social, political and economic forces can be predicted in any context, but 
stress the contextual nature of causality and the influence of sequencing and timing of 
events on outcomes. Thus, historical institutionalists focus their research on systemic 
features that explain why similar processes and forces result in different outcomes in 
different national environments. In so doing, they also identify features in national 
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institutional configurations that have acted as key agents in shaping process 
outcomes. 
Third, historical institutionalism allows suitable theoretical flexibility to accommodate 
elements of analysis from other schools of political research, which is required to 
analyse complex processes involving institutions of the polity and society, human 
agents, and the broadcasting organisations themselves. Historical institutionalism is 
not a rigid theoretical structure, but historical institutionalists are eclectic and use 
elements from rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
939-40; Peters 2005: 71-72). Differences between the ways the institutionalist 
schools consider institutions to shape individual behaviour serve as an apt example. 
While sociological institutionalists adopt a cultural approach in their analysis and 
consider human beings as norm-abiding rule followers, who act according to the logic 
of appropriateness (‘what should I do’), and rational choice institutionalists adopt a 
calculus approach and believe that people base their decisions on strategic 
calculation to maximise personal gain using the logic of instrumentality (‘what do I get 
out of this situation’), historical institutionalism use both these approaches to specify 
the relationship between institutions and action: human beings are both norm-abiding 
rule followers and self-interested rational actors. In such situations, individual 
behaviour is determined by the individual, the context and the rule. Historical 
institutionalists would use historical evidence to determine whether a political 
outcome stems from self-interest or altruistic/collective motives, or whether it reflects 
simply habitual behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939-40; Steinmo 2008). This 
theoretical synergy is particularly useful in analysing motives behind actions of 
broadcasting organisations, which are influenced by both their historical legacy and 
private, institutional interests (e.g. commercial aspirations). 
Historical institutionalism lacks what one could call a ‘universal tool kit’ that can be 
applied to virtually any political setting, which proponents of theories of deductive 
logics such as rational choice theorists and Marxists have. Rather than ‘deducing 
hypotheses on the basis of global assumptions and prior to the analysis’, proponents 
of historical institutionalism ‘generally develop their hypotheses more inductively, in 
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the course of interpreting the empirical material itself’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 12). 
They are not bounded by one theory, but use different approaches to examine the 
relationships between institutions and action (Hall and Taylor 1996). Scholarly 
differences exist within historical institutionalism in the scope of the definition of 
institution, with scholars like Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Immergut (1998) 
appearing to support a looser definition that accommodates formal and amorphous 
structures ranging from government institutions to social classes, including ‘formal 
rules of political arenas, channels of communication, language codes, or the logics of 
strategic situations’ (Immergut 1998: 20). Yet Lowndes (2002: 103-4) warns about the 
risks of adopting a ‘conceptually stretched’ definition of institution that includes implicit 
rules and vague understandings, as it prevents their distinction from other social 
facts. In line with this recommendation, this study adopts a slightly narrower definition 
of institutions, considering them ‘organizations and the rules or conventions 
promulgated by formal organizations’, including ‘the formal and informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure’ (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 938). In the empirical analysis of this study, the units of analysis are the 
broadcasting organisations, whose operating policies, rules, strategies, norms and 
routines provide the institutional setting that constrain and corrupt actors’ behaviour 
and preferences. 
Historical institutionalism has a distinctive perspective on historical development, 
which rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the 
same outcomes in all institutional settings. Instead, it argues that ‘the effect of such 
forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited 
from the past’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 941). This view, commonly referred to as ‘path 
dependency’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999; Campbell 2004; Peters 2005; 
Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), asserts that the policy choices made when an 
institution is being established – through complex struggles and bargaining among 
organised groups – or, when a policy is being initiated, create a path which the 
institution follows until some significant forces intervenes to divert them from the 
established direction. This path will ‘constrain the range of events that is possible at 
later stages’ (Tilly 2009: 525). While the path may be altered, it requires a good deal 
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of pressure to produce this change (Peters 2005: 71). Thus, there is an inertial 
tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. Even when institutional change 
takes place, experiences of these past policy choices continue to constrain and 
corrupt future institutional configurations, as they serve as ‘signals, models, threats, 
and/or aspirations for later actors’ (Tilly 2009: 525). 
As the phrase suggests, there is an expectation in the punctuated equilibrium model 
that for most of its existence an institution will exist in an equilibrium state, functioning 
in accordance with the decisions made at its initiation, or perhaps those made at the 
previous point of punctuation (Peters 2005: 77). Historical institutionalists focus their 
research on how institutions produce such paths; that is, what kind of institutional 
responses they make to new challenges. Patterns of institutional change and stability 
are frequently explained by a model of punctuated equilibrium. This model posits that 
relatively long periods of institutional stability and continuity are punctuated by short 
bursts of change: moments when substantial and critical institutional change takes 
place thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves 
onto a new path (March and Olsen 1989; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Hall and Taylor 
1996). During these ‘rapid bursts of institutional change’ (Peters 2005: 77), ‘public 
policy is assigned new objectives, new priorities are established, and new political 
and administrative coalitions evolve to sustain those new policies’ (Peters et al. 2005: 
1276). These short periods of significant change that are hypothetised to produce 
distinct legacies6 are referred to as critical junctures, that represent the choice points 
when a particular option is adopted among two or more alternatives (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007: 347). Critical junctures are characterised by a situation, in which ‘the 
structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on 
political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main 
consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors 
                                                 
6
 In their study on critical junctures, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 352) demonstrate that change is not 
a necessary element of a critical juncture, but contingency of such change may result in re-equilibration 
of an institution. However, since this study is primarily interested in institutional changes, such critical 
junctures that result in a re-equilibration deserve lesser attention in this study. 
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expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of 
interest are potentially much more momentous’ (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 343). 
Historical institutionalists often stress the impact of crisis in particular, e.g. economic 
depression, civil unrest or military conflict, in triggering these junctures (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 942). Accordingly, historical institutionalism considers the nature of 
institutional change to be more contingent and dependent on past policy choices, 
rather than a consequence of conscious process initiated by failure of an existing 
institution to meet the requirements for which it was formed, as argued by advocates 
of rational choice institutionalism (Peters 2005).  
This idea of punctuated equilibrium, however, has come under increasing criticism 
from a number of scholars (e.g. Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 2000; Campbell 
2004; Peters 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005) for its inability to explain incremental 
change. Some scholars suggest that the periods of equilibrium occurring between 
punctuations are better characterised as incremental-evolutionary than static. The 
punctuated evolution model considers that there may be two different types of 
change, each driven by different dynamics. In this model, evolutionary periods, that 
are characterised by social learning during which self-reflexive actors gradually adjust 
their institutions in ways that are constrained by already-given institutional practices, 
rules, routines, and cognitive schema, are punctuated occasionally by crises that 
involve open struggles over the very core of the institutional status quo and that 
eventually result in truly fundamental institutional transformations (Campbell 2004: 
34). Campbell (2004: 69) presents the process of bricolage – the process of crafting 
new institutional solutions by recombining existing institutional principles and 
practices with new ones – as an example of such an incremental-evolutionary 
process of change. Substantive bricolage involves the recombination of already 
existing institutional principles and practices to achieve various substantive goals that 
include such things as reducing transaction costs, increasing market share, improving 
product quality, and so on. As Fligstein (1991) demonstrates, new institutions existing 
in already existing fields may provide an example for other institutions: ‘[o]nce some 
set of organizations in a field has changed its strategies, and once others perceive 
that the change has resulted in some allegedly superior results, then other actors will 
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follow suit’ (Fliegstein 1991: 316). Institutional models may travel from one country to 
another, occasionally with a coercive push from powerful states (Campbell 2004: 26; 
Peters 2005: 78). 
Historical institutionalism challenges the ability of the political sciences to form ‘grand 
theories’ that provide explanations to various phenomena of political life in a universal 
context. It represented a shift away from concepts that tended to homogenise whole 
classes of nations, towards concept that capture diversity amongst them (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992: 5-6). Reacting against such ‘grand theorising’ tendencies in 
behaviouralism and Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s, historical institutionalists have, 
often by using comparison, demonstrated that ‘large-scale social, economic and 
political forces can produce divergent outcomes in different countries as a result of 
the diversity of their institutional arrangements’ (Hopkin 2002: 263). Explaining such 
differences requires more explicit attention to the institutional landscape in which the 
forces take effect. While historical institutionalism shares the concern for building 
theory with behaviouralism and Marxism, its scholars emphasise the particularities 
and specificities of individual cases that these theories had obscured (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992: 5-6).  
Much of the work of historical institutionalism has been developed in a macro-level 
comparative context, and consists of cross-national comparisons of public policy (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 938; Campbell 2004: 23). As Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 14) note, 
historical institutionalism has been particularly helpful in illuminating cross-national 
differences and the persistence of patterns or policies over time within individual 
countries. Though not initially branded as historical institutionalist as the use of the 
term itself was not coined until the early 1990s, Skocpol’s (1979) study on the 
sources and patterns of social revolutions in France, China and Russia provides an 
example of early use of the historical institutionalist approach in a cross-national 
comparative context. It challenged the preceding orthodoxy that class structure and 
elite power (rather than the structure of state institutions in the pre-revolutionary 
period, as new institutionalists would argue) would explain different patterns between 
the nations. Hall’s (1986) comparative analysis of the development and direction of 
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economic policy in the UK and France provides another example of early utilisation of 
the approach by explaining economic policy with an institutional model that focuses 
on socio-economic organisation of a nation. Immergut (1990, 1992), in turn, applied 
the approach in her comparative studies on health policies of France, Sweden and 
Switzerland, illustrating how the institutionalisation of ‘veto points’ within political 
systems explained the influence of pressure groups in health policy-making rather 
than the initial strengths of the ‘veto groups’ themselves. In the field of mass media 
research, Jääsaari (2007) has, more recently, utilised the approach in her 
comparative case study on the impact of marketisation on national broadcasting 
policy paradigms in Finland and Canada during the broadcasting digitalisation 
process. In particular, her study demonstrates that institutional structures and policy 
paradigms of the past shaped policies for the introduction of the digital television in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The critique by Humphreys (2012: 170-2) on the 
methodological weaknesses of the study by Hallin and Mancini (2004) highlights the 
benefits of historical institutionalism’s utilisation in comparative studies on national 
media systems to better understand the relationship between media systems and the 
socio-cultural and political system in which they are embedded. 
This study, too, demonstrates through a comparative study that institutional 
transformations in the UK and Finland can be explained through the model of 
punctuated equilibrium, and new institutional configurations and policy choices are 
shaped by ideas and institutional structures from the past. As per the analytical 
framework of historical institutionalism, this study considers that behaviour can be 
best analysed and explained through the institutional setting in which it takes place; in 
other words, institutions constrain and corrupt individual behaviour. Thus, changes in 
institutional policies and practices with regards to the provision of children’s and 
religious programming are considered to emanate from institutional changes rather 
than to represent outright changes in viewing demographics that could be explained 
by a straightforward supply-demand box office model. For this reason, this study does 
not examine changes in demographics or audience data in detail, nor does it examine 
changes in the culture realms of the UK and Finland; while such changes may 
contribute to institutional change to a minor extent, historical institutionalists do not 
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believe that they represent punctuations powerful enough to punctuate the powerful 
institutional equilibria of broadcasters’ programming policies. 
 
3.2.3. The Industrial Equilibrium Model and its contribution in analysing 
institutional dynamism: a customised explanatory model for the 
study 
Historical institutionalism has several advantages in this study in analysing large 
industrial organisations. Above all, by treating broadcasting companies as institutions, 
historical institutionalism is able to illuminate underlying rules, values, ideas and 
conventions that influence the behaviour of broadcasting institutions, which would be 
largely disregarded by e.g. game theory and other methods commonly used in 
industrial organisation research. Its punctuated equilibrium model on historical 
development enables analysis of institutional consistency and change in institutional 
settings over time, while other institutional approaches are more bound in time and 
even in space (Peters 2005: 85). Its use is also justified in a cross-national 
comparative study like this, as it sheds light on systemic features that are rooted in 
institutional histories and national environments, which explain how the same forces 
result in different outcomes in different national and institutional settings. 
In spite of these significant benefits associated with the approach, the main problem 
with the use of historical institutionalism in this study pertains to the degree of 
resolution of its analytical lens. As several scholars argue (see e.g. Hall and Taylor 
1996: 942; Peters 2005: 79; Peters et al. 2005: 1286-7), historical institutionalism is 
not a fertile source of explanations for change in organisations and institutions, and 
has little capacity to predict them. The analytical framework of historical 
institutionalism ‘appears premised upon the enduring effects of institutional and policy 
choices made at the initiation of a structure’ (Peters 2005: 76). Thus, the approach is 
better suited to explaining of the emergence and persistence of patterns once 
established, than to explaining how those patterns might change. As historical 
institutionalism has been developed primarily in the context of political science 
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(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2), its analytical capacity is to an extent insufficient to 
analyse completely the impact of changes in broadcasting environment on the 
behaviour of broadcasting organisations operating in a dynamic, liberalised market 
environment, and hence must adjust their institutional strategies, policies and 
priorities in terms of the necessities of the broadcasting environment in order to 
survive. 
More precisely, historical institutionalism lacks an explanatory model that establishes 
a causal relationship between the political and commercial forces in the broadcasting 
environment, the strategies of broadcasting institutions and their performance that is 
necessary for comprehensive analysis of the impact of marketisation on broadcasting 
organisations and their behaviour. In terms of this study, this poses a major 
weakness, as there appears to be no apparent logic in institutional change other than 
that of the legacy of the past institutional configurations. Analysing the effects of 
marketisation by using programme data as empirical evidence is also problematical, 
as the level of focus of historical institutionalism’s analytical lens is too wide to 
plausibly explain how changes in industry structure are reflected in programming. In 
analysing institutional change in particular, historical institutionalists treat institutions 
mainly as passive objects of change and do not allow for the influence industrial 
organisations have on other institutions in the market, and the industry structure. As 
broadcasting organisations compete for the same limited resources (advertising 
income, public funding, viewers’ attention, etc.), changes in the institutional strategy 
of a broadcasting organisation is likely to produce repercussions for the industry 
structure, whose impact may thrust other actors in the direction of institutional 
change. 
This study addresses this lack of resolution of historical institutionalism’s analytical 
lens in examining minute institutional changes in detail by devising a customised 
explanatory model – referred to hereafter as the Industrial Equilibrium Model – that 
employs elements of historical institutionalism and a variant of the Industrial 
Organisation Model, also known as the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
(SCPP). The SCPP is a model in industrial economics that is commonly applied in 
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economic analyses of mass media and other oligopolistic industries (see e.g. Wirth 
and Bloch 1995; Chan-Olmsted 1997; Hellman 1999). The analytical contribution of 
the SCPP lies in its ability to analyse forces that produce institutional changes in an 
industrial organisation that operates under the imperatives of a dynamic market, 
together with its capacity to establish a causal interrelation between the broadcasting 
market, media policies, broadcasting institutions’ strategies and their performance. By 
establishing a causal link between the broadcasting policies and industry structure; 
institutional conduct; and the performance of a broadcasting institution – manifested 
above all by television output, the SCPP also facilitates the use of television output as 
concrete evidence of institutional transformations. 
The general methodological approach used by industrial organisation researchers 
focuses on three concepts: 1.) industry or market structure, which is defined by 
factors like barriers to entry to the market (political or economic); number of 
competitors in the market; size of companies; concentration of ownership; 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of products (channel concepts or programming 
strategies), i.e. product differentiation; number of suppliers (e.g. independent 
producers or acquisitions opportunities) available in the market; concentration of 
ownership; method(s) of financing broadcasting; subsidies; etc., 2.) industry conduct, 
i.e. strategies that firms pursue to gain competitive advantage, which is expressed by 
operating (or business) strategies, programming policies and production strategies 
and arrangements (e.g. investment in production facilities) of broadcasting 
organisations; and, 3.) industry performance, which refers to values like profitability, 
efficiency of operations, quality of service and fulfilment of institutional goals, and is 
ultimately manifested by the television output of the broadcasting organisations in our 
case (Wirth and Bloch 1995: 16-17; Waldman and Jensen 1998: 6-7; Hellman 1999: 
18). The essence of the most widely accepted approach to industrial organisation 
analysis is that company performance is determined by the conduct of the firm, and 
that firm conduct is determined by various industry structure variables. 
Early versions of the SCPP treated this causality in a rather simple, linear manner: 
since structure determined conduct, which in turn determined performance, it was 
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unnecessary to examine conduct, but analysis of industry structure would explain 
performance (Porter 1981: 611). These early versions of the SCPP, however, came 
under an increasing criticism for the reason that they did not properly depict the 
relations between the different elements of the model. They lacked internal dynamism 
and treated the industry structure as exogenous, although performance and conduct 
often affect industry structure (Porter 1981: 611-7; Wirth and Bloch 1995: 17-18; 
Ramstad 1997: 46). Stemming from this criticism, the classical SCPP model has been 
revised to allow for greater dynamism between the elements of the model. The 
revised SCPP model recognises that there are feedback effects of firm conduct 
(strategy) on market structure: for example, firm conduct has impact on the degree of 
product differentiation in the market. Similar feedback effects are also possible from 
firm performance back to conduct, and from performance to structure (Porter 1981: 
616; Lipczynski et al. 2005: 7). The influence of public policy has also been 
incorporated to the model: policymakers may manipulate the structure of a market to 
improve firm conduct and ultimately market performance through structural remedy, 
or they may directly influence firm conduct by constraining firm behaviour through the 
establishment of behavioural regulations, or conduct remedy (Wirth and Bloch 1995: 
16-18; Ramstad 1997: 46). Finally, the revised SCPP model accepts that each market 
has various basic conditions pertaining to supply and demand that also influence the 
industry structure (Lipczynski et al. 2005: 7). These conditions vary across industries 
and market areas. Supply conditions, referring to the willingness of producers to 
provide a given quantity of output at a given price, include factors such as underlying 
technological base and cost structure, resource availability and economies of scale. 
Demand conditions refer to the willingness of a customer to pay a given price for a 
given quantity of a good or service. In broadcasting, customer may refer to audiences 
or advertisers, depending on the method of financing of a broadcasting company. 
Factors pertaining to this category include tastes, preferences and media 
consumption habits of audiences, advertisers’ ability and willingness to spend money 
on television advertising, the availability of substitutes (e.g. alternative platforms) and 
the size of the market area. 
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The Industrial Equilibrium Model combines key elements of historical institutionalism 
and the SCPP, thus forming a customised model that has better capacity to analyse 
change than those provided by historical institutionalism alone. It features the potency 
of historical institutionalism to treat broadcasting organisations as institutions that 
constrain and shape behaviour, and the merits of path dependency in examining 
consistency and change in institutional settings with the benefits of the SCPP in 
analysing the operation of industrial organisations, such as broadcasting companies. 
The key contribution of the Industrial Equilibrium Model is its sharper analytical lens 
compared to that provided by historical institutionalism or the SCPP alone. Industrial 
organisation researchers who utilise the SCPP, in turn, commonly use game theory in 
their analysis, which overlooks the influence of institutional factors in constraining and 
shaping behaviour. The Industrial Equilibrium Model is better able to identify and 
analyse institutional changes that are produced by more subtle changes in the 
broadcasting environment that do not necessarily meet the criteria for abrupt external 
‘shocks’ or crises. Consistent with the historical institutionalist position, the model 
believes that actors’ behaviour is constrained in, and shaped by, institutions. The 
institutional context also shapes the strategies and the goals actors pursue (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992: 8). Institutions usually exist in a state of equilibrium, with their 
operation in this equilibrium state following the logic of path dependency. Institutional 
change can be triggered by ‘triggering events’ or forces that punctuate the institutional 
equilibrium and initiate the process of institutional change. These events or forces 
may be relatively small, but if they occur at the right moment, they can have large and 
enduring consequences (Pierson 2000: 263). 
Figure 3.1 provides a schematic representation of the Industrial Equilibrium Model 
and its elements. The institutional equilibrium is presented here as scales of 
equilibrium, representing the status quo in broadcasting institutions. The causal 
relationships between the elements of the model (as per the SCPP, with institutional 
performance being determined by the conduct of the firms in the industry, and with 
firm conduct being dependent on various structural variables and manipulated by the 
basic conditions of supply and demand and public policy, of which the latter also 
regulates the industry structure) are represented by red arrows. The feedback effects; 
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from performance to conduct, from conduct to structure, and from performance to 
structure, are presented by dotted arrows. It should be noted here that the lists of 
‘factors’ in boxes representing industry structure, conduct and performance, are not 
exhaustive. 
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of the Industrial Equilibrium Model used in this 
study 
 
In terms of the model, punctuations emanate from changes in the broadcasting 
environment, i.e. public policies, the industry structure or basic conditions. When 
powerful enough, these changes represent shocks that render old institutional 
configurations unfit for the conditions of the new situation arisen from such changes, 
and thus increase pressures for institutional change. Figure 3.2 presents an example 
of such a shock. In this hypothetical case, a change in public policy – the 
government’s decision to grant a broadcasting licence to a new broadcaster – 
represent the shock that punctuates the institutional equilibrium of a broadcaster, as it 
results in an intensification of competition in industry structure. This punctuation is 
powerful enough to render the broadcaster’s existing strategies and programming 
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policies impotent, as they can no longer address the changed market conditions 
effectively. This is eventually reflected in the performance of the broadcasting 
institution, with its viewing share shrinking, income declining and profitability 
deteriorating. 
Figure 3.2: An example of punctuation in the institutional equilibrium emanating from 
a change in public policy 
 
Since ‘institutional survival depend[s] […] on a process of institutional transformation, 
to accommodate powerful new actors and to adapt the institutions to address new 
imperatives, both economic and political’ (Thelen 2000: 105), broadcasting institutions 
need to respond to the imperatives set by the new situation by changing their 
conduct, i.e. established institutional strategies and practices, in a way the actors 
involved in the process deem suitable to address the situation. This change may be 
rapid or incremental-evolutionary (punctuated evolution). In both cases, actors’ logic 
in such a situation is driven ultimately by desire to minimise loss in institutional 
resources and power. As Campbell (2004: 176) put it, since ‘institutions are 
settlements over the distribution of resources or power that are reached through 
struggle and bargaining’, ‘anything that threatens to upset this distribution is a 
problem that could trigger new struggles and bargains and eventually institutional 
change.’ Changes in conduct will logically also influence performance of the 
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organisation – i.e. the television output – that represents the observable end product 
of a broadcasting organisation. 
Figure 3.3 presents a visual representation of a hypothetical institutional response to 
punctuation that the institution takes to regain the state of equilibrium. The institution 
attempts to address the conditions of the new situation arisen from the punctuation 
outlined in figure 3.2 by changing its conduct. In this case, the institution amends its 
organisational strategies and programming policies. These changes are translated to 
changes in the broadcaster’s performance, i.e. changes in its viewing share and 
profitability, amongst others, with changes in the television output representing the 
visible outcome of the changes in the broadcaster’s conduct. If the actions are 
successful, the broadcasting institution will increase its viewing share and its 
profitability will eventually recover. It is noteworthy, however, that the actions are not 
necessarily successful, at least in the way the institution expected. They may not be 
sufficient to recover the viewing share or increase its profits. Once the institution has 
performed the changes it considers necessary to counter the impact of the 
punctuation, the institution returns to the state of equilibrium which it retains until the 
next punctuation. Thus, while institutions seek to regain the state of equilibrium, the 
model considers that institutions never reach a permanent state of equilibrium, but 
are in a perpetual state of flux. 
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Figure 3.3: An example of an institutional response to regain the state of equilibrium 
and the feedback effects it creates 
 
Rather than treating institutions as passive subjects of change, the model accepts 
that industry structure is not exogenously determined since the conduct and 
performance of broadcasting companies often affect industry structure (Wirth and 
Bloch 1995: 17-18). Thus, the model allows for the impact of the feedback effects on 
industry structure. Similarly, the model accepts that the conduct of a broadcasting 
organisation is affected by its performance: it may come under pressure to change its 
institutional strategies if it fails to meet certain targets it has set for its performance in 
terms of e.g. audience share. An example of such a feedback effect is presented in 
figure 3.3. In this case, changes in institutional conduct and performance represent a 
feedback effect on the industry structure, which results in increasing homogeneity of 
programmes and intensifying competition. As other institutions need to adapt to the 
conditions of the market, these feedback effects may set off further punctuations in 
other institutions’ equilibria, thus generating a chain reaction that may result in 
extensive changes in other institutions in the market. 
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3.3. Research design 
Research design can be summarised as ‘procedures for collecting, analyzing, 
interpreting and reporting data in research studies’ (Marshall and Rossman 1995: 58). 
It defines the purpose and perspective of the research, and also suggests the choice 
of data collection techniques most appropriate for the chosen design. The function of 
research design is ‘to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the 
initial question as unambiguously as possible’ (De Vaus 2001: 9). The research 
design needs to address the requirements set by the research question: what type of 
evidence is needed to answer the question in a convincing way? 
This study has been designed as a piece of comparative historical research with 
comparisons between two nations (Schutt 2009: 426-7). Comparative historical 
studies consist of five basic tasks: 
1. Specify an analytical framework and identify parameters that should be 
examined to explain a phenomenon; 
2. Select cases that vary in terms of these key concepts or events; 
3. Measure the parameter values and assess the strength of their relationships; 
4. By comparing differences and similarities in parameter values and structural 
relationships over space, as well as charting the development of parameter 
values and structural relationships over time, identify similarities and 
differences between the cases; 
5. Propose a causal explanation for the historical outcome and check it against 
the features of each case. 
 (Adapted from Rosengren et al. 1992: 287; Schutt 2009: 438)  
The following sections explain in more detail the selection of the comparative method 
employed in this research, the research cases and locations, and the data gathering 
methods. 
 
3.3.1. The comparative case study approach 
Marketisation is an abstract and dynamic process, whose comprehension, as 
Murdock (2004: 30) suggests, requires us ‘to develop a comprehensive comparative 
account of its variable impacts on the organization and ethos of public 
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communications and cultural institutions as it has unfolded across contrasting national 
sites grounded in different prior histories.’ Comparison across time is necessary in 
order to locate marketisation-driven changes in the institutional structures of 
broadcasting. As Tilly (2009: 536) notes, ‘every significant political phenomenon lives 
in history, and requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation.’ 
Nevertheless, comparison across countries with unique social and political 
characteristics enables us to identify consequences that would not necessarily be 
noticed in a single-country perspective. The comparison of such consequences 
facilitates more detailed analysis of the factors that have acted as catalysts in the 
process. The historical institutionalist research tradition also has strong links with the 
comparative method, as much of the work of historical institutionalism has been 
developed in a macro-level comparative context, and consists of cross-national 
comparisons of public policy. The key benefit of the comparative approach in 
historical institutionalist research is that it highlights the role of institutional 
configurations in explaining differences in policy outcomes in different countries 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 14; Hall and Taylor 1996: 938; Campbell 2004: 23). 
Comparative research is a principal method in social sciences and for political 
sciences in particular. As Ragin (1987: 1) points out, virtually all social research 
involves a comparison of some sort. In spite of the prevalence of the comparative 
tradition in social sciences research, most of the literature on the media is ‘highly 
ethnocentric, in the sense that it refers only to the experience of a single country, yet 
is written in general terms, as though the model that prevailed in that country were 
universal’ (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 2). One possible reason for this is the 
presumption that since media systems developed in a strictly national context and 
share so few uniform characteristics, ‘developments taking place in any one country 
can be explained by nationally unique political, economic and cultural factors’ 
Hellman (1999: 7). However, as Livingstone (2003: 477) notes, the emergence of 
globalisation and the concomitant rise of globalisation theory has prompted the 
researchers in media, communication and cultural studies to increasingly involve 
themselves in cross-national comparative research. 
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Notwithstanding the limitations in the comparability and generalisability of cross-
national cases owing to the problem of the high number of variables influencing 
national media systems in contrast to the relatively small number of cases to 
compare, the method has some significant benefits. The primary function of 
comparative research is that of developing, testing and refining theoretical 
propositions. Comparison can also be used to assess ‘micro replications’ of a 
proposition already validated in one setting in other national and cultural settings 
(Lijphart 1971: 685). As Peters (1998: 1) notes, in the absence of the possibility for 
experimentation in laboratory conditions, the comparative method is often the only 
way to test the validity of a theory in a wider context. Only comparative research can 
overcome space- and time-bound limitations on the generalisability of our theories, 
assumptions and propositions (Blumler et al. 1992a: 3). Equally, it can be used to 
challenge claim to universality. Moreover, comparative research enables us to 
evaluate the scope of marketisation in a transnational context in order to put the 
process better into perspective (Livingstone 2003: 479). 
Comparative research is also important at the level of observation. By revealing 
unexpected differences or surprising similarities between the cases, comparison 
brings a sense of perspective to a familiar environment and discourages parochial 
responses to socio-political issues. Cross-national comparative research does not 
only improve understanding of other countries, but also of one’s own country, and 
enables examination of transnational processes across different national contexts 
(Livingstone 2003: 479). It ‘helps us to see our communication arrangements in a 
fresh light, enriches the raw material sources of communication theory building, and 
deepens appreciation of communication policy issues, learning how they have arisen 
and been dealt with in other places and periods’ (Blumler et al. 1992a: 3). 
As illustrated by Peters (1998: 10), comparative studies range from single-country 
case studies (small N) to quantitative statistical analyses of a large number or all 
countries in the world (large N). While some scholars (e.g. Lijphart 1971: 685; Hopkin 
2002: 255) maintain that studies at the latter end of the range provide results which 
enable more robust generalisations, limitations in time, resources, availability and 
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comparability of data, and the theoretical approach selected, may point out to the 
utility of conducting small N research. The difficulty of large N studies in a PhD 
context to accommodate large volumes of qualitative data – e.g. interviews and 
documentary analysis – is also at odds with the objectives of this study.  
 
3.3.2. Justification for programme type selection 
As examined in chapter 1, there is no universal definition for minority interest 
programmes. Rather it is a loose umbrella concept referring to programmes that 
share certain common minority interest characteristics, but whose outlooks are 
different. As minority interest programmes cannot be observed as a single entity, the 
research needs to focus on certain cases. 
The ambiguity of the concept means that there are no minority programme types that 
should be observed self-evidently as representatives of this group of programmes. 
This requires selection of programme cases within certain boundaries as follows, set 
by the nature of the study as a comparative study, and practical requirements for 
historical data collection. First, the cases need to be universal: they need to be 
available in both countries and on both PSB and commercial environments over the 
entire research period. Second, they should be distinguishable: their determination 
needs to be relatively straightforward and they need to be recognisable in the 
schedules. Their formats should be unambiguous and commonly recognised in both 
broadcasting environments. Third, they should share the same general minority 
interest attributes, but they should not be too similar or overlapping in terms of subject 
area (as is the case with e.g. arts and classical music, or regional news and regional 
current affairs programmes) in order to make the comparative analysis worthwhile. 
However, perhaps most importantly, their characteristics pertaining to their production 
economics; e.g. the sizes and socio-economic characteristics of their audiences, their 
production costs, their international sales potentials, and their merchandising 
potentials, should be different, as these characteristics allow us to analyse the impact 
of marketisation-driven policies on programmes (‘products’) with different commercial 
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exploitation potential. As marketisation involves the introduction of values of the 
capitalist free market to sectors previously to a degree sheltered from such 
imperatives (see section 2.3.2), the significance of these characteristics in influencing 
broadcasters’ programming strategies may be expected to be on increase. 
Considering these prerequisites, two types of minority interest programmes were 
selected for this study: children’s programmes (case I) and religious programmes 
(case II). While these programmes share some common characteristics, there are 
also some notable differences relating to their audiences, production costs and 
commercial exploitation possibilities and value. Most importantly, children constitute a 
natural audience, and catering for them cannot be substituted by other types of 
programming. While children aged 4-15 in the UK spend the vast majority of their time 
viewing programmes that are not specifically targeted for them (Ofcom 2007: 94), this 
is the only type of programming that is targeted at this audience segment in particular, 
and the only one that is considered to directly serve their needs. In contrast, 
audiences for religious programmes are defined by their interests and/or belief rather 
than their demographic consistency. Viewers of religious programmes are considered 
to have other interests as well; thus, in a hypothetical situation where religious 
programming would disappear altogether, it is likely that these viewers would not be 
left without output of their interest altogether. There are also significant differences in 
terms of the outlook of these programmes. Previous studies on children’s 
programming (e.g. Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997; Buckingham et al. 1999; 
Ofcom 2007; Suoninen 2007a) have indicated in general terms a positive outlook for 
children’s programmes, while studies on religious programmes (e.g. Svennevig et al. 
1988; Gunter and Viney 1994; McDonnell 2009) indicate that these programmes are 
facing a future more difficult and insecure. Based on these conditions, it might be 
assumed that different effects would be discernible in these two programme 
categories. Children’s might be assumed to have retained a somewhat stronger and 
more pluralistic provision in both countries than religious programmes on this basis. 
The provision of the latter might be predicted to have more or less deteriorated. 
Therefore, rather than representing ‘average’ cases in this group of programmes, they 
are at different ends of the spectrum: while children’s programmes can be seen as a 
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popular type of minority interest content amongst the viewers, the provision of 
religious programmes is considered significantly less important by the general public 
(see e.g. Independent Television Commission 2001; Yleisradio Oy 2007: 15; Ofcom 
2008a: 34). However, both programme types meet the criteria for classic public 
service programming, whose provisions have been considered to produce positive 
externalities and therefore secured by various regulatory measures, as will be 
examined in the following chapter. Thus, they are appropriate instruments to conduct 
a ‘litmus test’ on the changing priorities within public service provision. 
 
3.3.3. Justification for the UK-Finland comparison 
The aim of a cross-national comparative study is to discover empirical macro-level 
relationships among variables. Thus, all meaningful comparisons need to meet the 
precondition that they are suitably comparable. Comparability in this context means 
that the cases should be similar in a large number of important characteristics 
(variables) which are to be treated as constants, but dissimilar enough to make the 
comparative analysis worthwhile (Lijphart 1971: 687). In terms of institutional 
research, this means that the political, fiscal and institutional structures of the national 
broadcasting sectors should be similar to allow rational comparison, whereas the 
national political, social, economic and cultural environments in which broadcasting 
takes place will serve, at the highest level, as independent variables for the study. 
The UK and Finland are not commonly placed in a binary comparative context. After 
all, there are significant differences in the political, socio-cultural, demographic and 
economic models of these countries. One of the few existing large-scale comparative 
studies on Western media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004) illustrates the 
differences between these countries. Based on theories of political and media 
studies, and empirical observations, Hallin and Mancini assign national media 
systems of Western developed capitalist countries into three models: the 
Mediterranean or the Polarised Pluralist Model, the North Atlantic or Liberal Model 
and the Northern European or the Democratic Corporatist Model. The first model, 
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represented by countries such as France, Italy, Greece and Spain, is characterised 
by low newspaper circulation, politically orientated press and high political parallelism. 
Broadcasting is under parliamentary or government model of governance and 
regulation, and periods of censorship and deregulation are distinctive for this model. 
The Liberal Model includes countries such as the United States, Canada, the UK and 
Ireland. This model is characterised by medium newspaper circulation, nonalignment 
(at least in formal terms) of commercial press and high professionalisation of 
journalism, including non-institutionalised self-regulation of media organisations. 
Broadcasting is governed by formally autonomous professional bodies, markets have 
historically controlled the media systems and the state intervention to media activities 
is limited (except for the PSB systems of the UK and Ireland). Finally, the Democratic 
Corporatist Model is characterised by high newspaper circulation, historically strong 
party affiliation of the press, but a current trend towards political neutrality, and strong 
professionalisation and institutionalised self-regulation. The role of the state in media 
activities is strong, with press subsidies in Nordic countries in particular, but with 
protection for press freedom. Broadcasting systems are characterised by 
parliamentary control (with substantial autonomy regarding political parallelism) and 
strong PSB. Countries in this model include Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Sweden, Norway and Finland. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the model by Hallin and Mancini (2004) is largely 
based on characteristics of the press, and does not accommodate broadcasting in a 
completely straightforward manner. For instance, the dominance of the PSB dogma 
and the strong regulatory control of television in the UK and Ireland (where 
commercial television started only in the late 1990s) place these countries in a 
category somewhat different to that of the United States and Canada, which feature 
highly commercialised broadcasting systems, whose regulation historically focused 
on their commercial elements rather than content. In a similar manner, the fact that 
commercial television was introduced in Finland as an institutionally independent 
service already in 19557 is not consistent with the Nordic PSB ‘purism’. Herkman 
                                                 
7
 TES-TV, Mainos-TV was founded in 1957. 
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(2009) has also challenged the model of Hallin and Mancini by pointing out that their 
analysis is based on outdated statistics and does not accurately reflect the recent 
commercialisation and re-regulatory measures taken in Finland. Thus, Herkman 
concludes that in Finland in particular, the global shift to neo-liberalism has 
challenged the Democratic Corporatist Model from the 1980s onwards, and the 
current media model is progressively adopting features previously associated with the 
Liberal Model. Hallin and Mancini (2004) themselves note that there has been a 
significant convergence towards the Liberal Model owing to political, cultural and 
technological changes in European media environments. Furthermore, a recent 
critique by Humphreys (2012) highlights some of the weaknesses of the Hallin and 
Mancini’s taxonomy, namely relating to the limited range of elements integrated into 
the analytical framework used by Hallin and Mancini, their neglect of the salient 
political, legal and economic variables that bear on the media systems, and the liberal 
categorisation of media systems into their categories. Therefore the validity of the 
model in the 21st century marketised broadcasting environment can be questioned to 
some extent. 
Several other significant parallels between the broadcasting institutions of the UK and 
Finland support a cross-national comparison between these countries. As for many 
other European PSBs, the BBC has served as a ‘model organisation’ for Yleisradio. 
The public service values and missions of the Reithian BBC had a clear influence on 
the founding of the company, and the policies adapted by the BBC were closely 
monitored and adopted by Yleisradio (Lyytinen 1996: 31-2; Salokangas 2007: 36). 
This influence has continued to shape the institutional choices of Yleisradio to date. 
Furthermore, the origins of the Finnish commercial television system can be traced to 
the UK. As already noted, Finland was the second country in Europe after the UK to 
launch commercial broadcasting, with the Yleisradio-MTV duopoly laid down in 1957. 
At the point of creation of the arrangement, the organisational structures and policy 
guidelines were based on those of the newly-founded ITV network (Salokangas 1996: 
118; Hanski 2001: 59; Salokangas 2007: 42). The UK influence can be seen in the 
separation of advertisements from the programme content, and also in the strong 
public control of commercial broadcasting. This was entrusted to the parliamentary-
95 
 
 
 
controlled Yleisradio, which owned and operated the transmitters like the ITA, and 
held the broadcasting licence for both companies. Until the reforms leading to the 
more widespread liberalisation of broadcasting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
only the UK and Finland hosted such public service oriented commercial television 
systems.8  
Furthermore, Jääsaari (2007: 130) notes that the UK has served as a model for policy 
reform for Finland in the 1990s. In the seminal 1993 Niemelä report on the future of 
PSB, the UK is referred to as ‘the spiritual home of PSB’, where also the greatest 
efforts have been made to reform the model during ‘the current period of PSB crisis’ 
(Niemelä 1993: 8).  In his 1995 parliamentary report, Mykkänen (1995: 18) goes even 
further, stating that ‘the BBC tradition has had a great influence on the decrees with 
which Finnish broadcasting legislation has created.’ The UK is also used to back the 
sustaining of features of the traditional broadcasting system, e.g. certain privileges of 
the PSBs. Given the cultural and political proximity of the Nordic countries, it is 
interesting that the BBC rather than Sveriges Television AB (or indeed any other 
Scandinavian broadcaster) is regularly selected for comparison and a yardstick for 
Yleisradio. This suggests that the diffusion of the BBC-originated PSB model to the 
Nordic countries has been so powerful, that the Nordic PSB models are considered 
even by the polity as variations of the BBC model rather than thoroughly independent 
models. Consequently, while there is a case for cross-national research between the 
Nordic countries in comparative politics as Anckar (1993) suggests, in terms of 
broadcasting research, the UK provides a better case for comparison. 
 
                                                 
8
 Albeit commercial broadcasting was licenced in Italy by a Constitutional Court ruling in 1975, the 
Italian stations were from the outset deregulated and entertainment-oriented, and thus their 
programming was not public service oriented, as was the case with commercial broadcasters in the UK 
and Finland (Humphreys 1996). 
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3.4. Data gathering methods 
The identification of apposite data gathering methods occurred through visiting the 
research objectives outlined in chapter 1. First, it was necessary to establish how the 
structure of the programming has changed over the research period chosen. In order 
to enable comparison between the cases and locations, the results need to be 
concrete, measurable and comparable. They also need to be compared in the context 
of an analysis of changes in broadcasting environments: changes in broadcasting 
paradigms, policies, organisational structures and resources. 
The predominantly quantitative character of the first task, involving a longitudinal 
survey on television output, in contrast to the qualitative character of the second task, 
point to the usefulness of mixed methods. While the research problem could, at least 
to some extent, be addressed without crossing the border between quantitative and 
qualitative methods, the combination of both approaches can provide a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone. Further advantages 
of the mixed methods approach include the ability to offset the weaknesses and bias 
of each individual approach, more comprehensive evidence for studying the research 
problem than either approach alone and the ability to answer questions that cannot 
be answered by either approach alone (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 9). 
There are two important aspects to consider in designing the strategy for mixed 
method design: the timing of the data collection, and the priority given to each 
approach. This research adopts a sequential explanatory strategy (Brannen 1992), in 
which the collection and analysis of quantitative data are followed by the collection 
and analysis of qualitative data. This design gives weight to the quantitative data 
collection, whose results inform and guide the qualitative research. The latter phase, 
in turn, seeks to explain the quantitative results and develop the depth and level of 
detail for the interpretation of entire results. 
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3.4.1. Television output research 
The purpose of the television output research conducted in this research was to 
gather quantitative data to construct a general picture of the changes in the provision 
of children’s and religious programmes in the two locations over the research period. 
The data was gathered by a longitudinal survey on television output. As pre-coded 
data extending over the entire period was not available, two samples of seven days 
for each year were used instead. Trends in these data allow the creation of a long-
term picture of the effects of marketisation on these types of minority interest content. 
In total, 22,077 individual programme titles, comprising 7,899 hours 53 minutes of 
output9, were analysed for this study. 
The channels selected for this study are terrestrial (analogue or digital) free-to-air 
channels with public service obligations of various degrees. In the UK, these channels 
were BBC One; BBC Two; ITV1 (Granada Television)10; Channel 4; Channel 5 (1997-
); CBBC, CBeebies, BBC Three and BBC Four (the 2003-2009 outputs of the four 
latter). Additionally, whilst not part of the UK PSB system, the CITV Channel (2006-
2009) was included to the study as well. In Finland, the channels included were YLE 
TV 1; YLE TV 2; MTV (on Yleisradio’s channels until 1993); Kolmoskanava (TV 3, 
1986-1992); MTV3 (1993-); Nelonen (1997-); YLE Teema and YLE FST511 (the 2007-
2009 outputs of the latter two) in Finland. The study refers to these channels 
collectively as terrestrial FTA channels. While all these channels except the CITV 
                                                 
9
 Of which 18,873 titles, or 6,672 hours 52 minutes on UK television; and 3,204 titles, or 1,227 hours 1 
minute on Finnish television. 
10
 Given the past nature of ITV as a network of regional broadcasters, each featuring a relatively high 
proportion of regional programming, it was impossible to observe the output of the entire ITV network 
within the scope of a single study. Therefore, the output of Granada Television (later ITV1 Granada) 
was selected for this study. 
11
 Prior to the digital switchover in 2007, much of the Swedish-language output on Yleisradio’s main 
channels was simulcast on the FST5 channel. As these digital channels’ simulcasts do not constitute 
real alternatives to main channels’ programming, they have been omitted from this study in order to 
give a more accurate picture of the choice available to the viewer. 
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Channel have public service obligations of various extent, for the purposes of the 
analysis this study differentiates between channels that get their primary income from 
public sources (YLE TV 1, TV 2, YLE Teema and YLE FST5; BBC One, BBC Two, 
CBBC, CBeebies, BBC Three and BBC Four; collectively referred to as publicly 
funded channels) and commercial sources (MTV, Kolmoskanava, MTV3 and 
Nelonen; ITV1, Channel 4, Channel 5 and the CITV Channel; collectively referred to 
as commercially funded or commercial channels). In children’s programming, the 
study also differentiates between main (general interest) channels (YLE TV 1, YLE 
TV 2, YLE FST5, Kolmoskanava, MTV, MTV3 and Nelonen; BBC One, BBC Two, 
ITV1, Channel 4 and Channel 5) and digital channels (CBBC, CBeebies and the CITV 
Channel). 
Programme data gathered from television listings contain information about 
programme scheduling and length12, and content. This data was supplemented by 
information on programme format and origin using various printed and online listings 
and databases, such as the children’s television encyclopaedias by Lewis (2001) and 
Sheridan (2004), and the British Film Institute’s Film and TV online database, 
broadcasters’ annual reports and yearbooks, and previous studies on minority interest 
programming. 
The quantitative data from television listings were coded into variables in spreadsheet 
databases. This data was then analysed using a variety of measurements: 
1. Volumes of output of children’s and religious programmes; 
2. Proportions of output of children’s and religious programmes of all 
programmes; 
                                                 
12
 The timings of programmes in listings magazines and databases are only approximate, and do not 
account for advertising breaks, continuity links, programmes guides and so forth, which, especially on 
commercial channels, can make up a significant proportion of programme time. The EU’s Television 
without Frontiers Directive (Directive 89/552/EEC) permits broadcasters to schedule up to 12 minutes 
of spot advertising in a given one-hour period. 
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3. Volumes and proportions of different sub-categories of children’s and religious 
programmes; 
4. Programme scheduling; 
5. Programme origin. 
 
3.4.1.1. Description of data collection and sampling 
Television programme data was collected from television listings magazines. Some 
previous UK studies have used programme data acquired directly from the 
broadcasters and the Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board’s (BARB) database, 
while Finnish studies have utilised data submitted by BARB’s Finnish counterpart 
Finnpanel, but there are major difficulties using data from these sources in a cross-
national comparative study. The main problems concerning data submitted by 
external bodies relate to inconsistencies in data provided by two different 
organisations. Organisations – and even researchers within the same organisation – 
use different methods in classifying data, thus resulting in dissimilar results. For 
instance, Messenger Davies and Corbett (1997: 237) note that the data submitted for 
their study by broadcasters did not include Channel 4’s Sesame Street (which clearly 
would qualify as a children’s programme in most other studies) as it was categorised 
as a different type of programme by the broadcaster. Furthermore, differences in 
national traditions in classifying programmes would have made it impossible to use 
the data provided by external bodies in a comparative context. Therefore, manual 
collection and coding of data turned out to be the best option for the valid and reliable 
analysis of the research data. 
For the UK, before the deregulation of television listings in March 1991, television 
listings were published separately in two magazines: the BBC’s programmes in Radio 
Times, and those of ITV and Channel 4 in TVTimes. Programme data from the 
sampling year 1991 onwards were gathered using Radio Times only, as listings for 
ITV and Channel 4 were included in the magazine only then. Finnish television data 
for the entire period were gathered using the Katso television listings magazine. 
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Programme data for CBBC, CBeebies and the CITV Channel were collected using 
the Television and Radio Index for Learning and Teaching (TRILT) database. 
In order to minimise the selection bias produced by the use of random sampling (e.g. 
the over-representation of certain weekdays or religious festivals in samples), 
programme data was gathered using two consistent and chronological seven-day 
sampling periods for each year, roughly six months apart from each other. This gives 
an annual sample size of 14/365 for common years, or ca. 4 per cent of days on any 
given year. These periods were chosen to represent the average television week as 
accurately as possible; that is, to omit all festive seasons with special programming 
(such as Christmas, New Year and Summer seasons with revised schedules), bank 
or school holidays (with increased children’s output and revised schedules), or major 
religious feasts in either country. These periods also needed to be identical for both 
countries to maintain the comparability of the results. Given these requirements, the 
first sampling period was set to start on the first Tuesday after the British May Day 
bank holiday (to avoid the inclusion of the revised schedules for bank holidays and 
the Finnish ‘Vappu’ [First of May] public holiday), and end on the following Monday. 
The second period covered was November 1st to 7th inclusive in each year. 
 
3.4.1.2. Programme type definition and data selection 
Perhaps the most important but also the most problematic prerequisite for data 
collection is the formulation of unambiguous definitions for the research cases, that is, 
the two programme types selected in the research. The key issue here is how to 
define what counts as a children’s or religious programme. Unfortunately, there is no 
straightforward solution to this matter, as demarcation lines between programme 
types can be vaguely defined, and programmes often cross boundaries of different 
programme classes, even though identifiability was one of the factors considered 
when selecting the cases for this study. To make matters even more complicated, the 
most popular programmes with children have always been those intended for a 
general audience (Buckingham et al. 1999: 79). 
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Programme selection criteria were slightly different for the two minority programme 
types selected for the study because of the differences between the programme 
types. Children’s programmes for this study were selected using a narrow definition of 
children’s programmes: only programmes specifically targeted for child and pre-teen 
audiences of roughly ages 0-12 were selected.13 Feature films (including animated 
films), programmes for family viewing and general entertainment programmes14 were 
thus excluded from this study, even though a majority of their viewers may be 
children. In addition, programmes for schools and colleges broadcast in separate 
daytime ‘programmes for schools’ blocks were excluded, as previous studies on 
children’s programming (e.g. Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997; Lehtinen 2010) 
have classified these programmes as education programmes. 
As religious programmes do not constitute a homogenous group sharing a common 
attribute (such as the age of the audience), their definition is somewhat complicated. 
Religious programmes also come in different formats and are produced outside 
religious departments too. Therefore, this study adopts a relatively eclectic definition 
of religious programmes: a programme is considered to belong to the religion 
category if its central theme is religion. This definition accommodates confessional 
programmes (Sunday services, prayers etc.) as well as religious music, talk shows 
and documentaries on religious matters. More specifically, the Central Religious 
Advisory Committee’s (CRAC) guidelines from 1996 provide a more articulated 
definition for religious programmes that can be applied to this study too:  
                                                 
13
 As Buckingham et al. (1999) note, drawing a border between childhood and adolescence is difficult 
particularly in a study that spans over a relatively lengthy period of time, as the nature of childhood is 
changing. Series such as Thunderbirds and Batman have evolved from family entertainment (in the 
1960s) to children’s – or cult/kitch – television. This study draws a nominal line between the childhood 
and teenage so that programmes targeted mainly for audiences over 12-13 years of age are classified 
as “teen” programmes, and thus are excluded from this study. Examples of such programming blocks 
include Channel 4’s T4 for older teens and young adults. Channel 5’s Shake!-block (under various 
names in 2000-2007 and since 2009) contains programmes targeted for pre-teens (e.g. Hannah 
Montana, The Tribe), which were included in this study. 
14
 Such as chart (e.g. Top of the Pops, The O-Zone) and variety shows.   
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- presents conventional religious belief and practice, worship and ceremonial, 
the reality and significance of being a believer; 
- reflects, scrutinises, proclaims or challenges aspects of the world of faith and 
the impact of faith (and non-faith) on the world; 
- keeps the audience in touch with issues which shape the world of belief and 
which are shaped by the world of belief; 
- addresses itself to questions and concerns which religions (but not 
necessarily religions alone) address, and affirms values which religions also 
affirm; 
- deals with a view of life not enclosable by the visible world; 
- acknowledges the spiritual dimension in human experience; and 
- does not fail to bring a religious perspective to bear on its subject matter, be it 
(for example) social justice, ethics, suffering or celebration. 
(CRAC (1996): "Religion in Religious Broadcasting: Report of the CRAC 
Working Party", cited in Viney 1999: 21) 
In addition to these genre-specific general guidelines, a set of five criteria developed 
by Suoninen (2007b: 11-3) for her survey of children’s output in Finland were used in 
programme categorisation: 
1.) Programme details published in television listings. These listings often contain 
some sorts of information about programme types and target audiences. The 
programme name itself is often a good indicator of the content. 
2.) Transmission time and slot. Children’s programmes in particular have been 
traditionally broadcast in separate programme blocks. Programmes broadcast 
late at night are not considered children’s programmes in this study, even if 
their format and content would suggest so. 
3.) Categorisation of a programme in previous studies. The study by Suoninen 
aims to match the programme selection criteria of the other annual reports on 
Finnish television output published by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. In addition to these, reports by Blumler (1992c), Messenger 
Davies and Corbett (1997), Buckingham et al. (1999) and Ofcom (2007), 
among others, were used for this study. 
4.) Composition of the audiences of a programme. This criterion applies mainly for 
children’s programmes, as audiences for religious programmes do not consist 
solely of viewers of certain ages. While certain programmes (e.g. action 
cartoons) are not necessarily formally categorised as children’s programmes in 
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schedules, they are clearly targeted at a child audience, and the vast majority 
of their viewers are children. Such programmes are thus included in this study. 
Nevertheless, animated sitcoms such as The Simpsons and King of the Hill, 
which have high proportion of child viewers, are excluded from this study, as 
their themes are mainly targeted for adult viewers. 
5.) Programme content. Although a programme may not be exclusively targeted 
for a specific minority interest group, its content may indicate that the 
programme should be classified as a minority interest programme. Examples 
of programmes meeting this criterion include certain documentaries on 
religious matters, which are not produced by a religious department, but whose 
content clearly meet the criteria of a religious programme. 
Of course, this selection system is not without weaknesses. With the historical 
boundary between factual programming and entertainment eroding, and the fusion of 
different genres and formats into new ones that cannot be pigeonholed using the 
categorisation systems created in the past, unequivocal and precise categorisation is 
impossible. Previous studies conducted by different authors contain different criteria 
for categorising these programmes and thus provide essentially different results that 
are not comparable.15 Ultimately, the effect of subjective judgement of the researcher 
is impossible to eliminate and must be acknowledged. This said, in both countries 
matching criteria for programme selection were used so that results between the 
research cases would be comparable. 
 
                                                 
15
 For instance, the study by Messenger Davies and Corbett (1997) excluded programmes like 
Channel 4’s Sesame Street, as these were classified under education subgenre. Likewise, the study by 
Suoninen (2007) uses a narrower categorisation for children’s programmes than the annual reports on 
television programming by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications, in which 
programmes like Buusteri, which, judged by its themes, was clearly targeted to teen audiences, are 
included in the category of children’s programmes.  
104 
 
 
 
3.4.1.3. Programme sub-category classification 
Programme data gathered from television listings was coded in sub-categories to 
enable the analysis of structural changes within each research case. The following 
sections explain the criteria and definition for each sub-category. 
 
3.4.1.3.1. Categorisation of children’s programmes 
In the absence of a universal classification system for both countries,16 children’s 
programmes were grouped using categorisation used by the BARB, which has been 
widely employed in studies on children’s programming (see e.g. Messenger Davies 
and Corbett 1997; Buckingham et al. 1999; Ofcom 2007). While Davies and Corbett 
note that this system is far from perfect, mostly owing to the fact that its categories 
are ‘very broad and non-specific’ (Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997: 14), allowing 
mis-categorisations to happen, its broadness can also be considered a strength. The 
categorisation accommodates programmes from the two different cultures and 
broadcasting traditions under research in this project. It also allows accurate coding of 
data in cases in which little information is available of the programme. Broad 
categories also take into account the evolution and changes in children’s programme 
traditions over time.17 
The BARB categorisation employs five sub-categories for children’s programmes:  
• Animation is a format rather than a genre; it refers to mostly fictional films 
produced with hand-drawn, stop motion or computer-generated animation 
                                                 
16In fact, no widely-used and recognised system of categorisation for children’s programmes exists in 
Finland. While the report by Suoninen (2007) classifies children’s programming into subcategories 
similar to those of the BARB, the annual reports on television output by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications employ a different system of categorisation that classifies programmes according to 
their function. 
17
 For example, storytelling programmes (e.g. Jackanory and Iltasatu), while itself a sub-category of its 
own in Blumler’s (1992) survey, have all but disappeared from children’s schedules in the 2000s. 
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techniques. It is a wide category containing programmes as diverse as the 
critically acclaimed preschool series Postman Pat and the more controversial 
He-Man and the Masters of the Universe, Care Bears, Transformers and My 
Little Pony, created for toy marketing purposes (Gunter et al. 2005: 27-8; 
Steemers 2010: 31). 
• Drama is a genre consisting of live-action fiction for children. Traditional 
storytelling programmes (such as Jackanory) are also classified as drama in 
this research. 
• Entertainment is a catch-all category for entertainment-oriented live-action or 
magazine programmes, which do not fit any other categories. It contains 
weekend morning presenter-led entertainment magazines (such as SM:TV 
Live, and Harlekiini-klubi, some of which contain high proportions of animation) 
as well as variety and music shows, comedy and sketch shows. Quizzes and 
game shows exclusively for children are also included in this subcategory. 
• Factual is another umbrella category for all non-fiction programmes, such as 
children’s documentaries, news, educational programmes, arts and crafts 
programmes, and presented hobby shows, such as the critically acclaimed 
Blue Peter. Programmes in this category often include an educational element, 
intended to stimulate children’s learning. 
• Preschool refers to a certain category of live action or presented programmes 
targeted at preschool audiences. Although Steemers (2010: 4) argues that the 
term is a blanket category for age and stage-specific programmes rather than 
a genre-specific categorisation, this study adopts a narrower, genre-specific 
definition of the genre in order to maintain consistency with previous studies 
(e.g. Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997; Buckingham et al. 1999; Ofcom 
2007). Preschool programmes may contain drama, puppetry and/or factual 
segments and usually serve a pedagogic purpose. Preschool programmes are 
intended to stimulate children’s learning and support their growth as members 
of a society. Play School and Sesame Street are classic examples of 
programmes in this category. 
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In addition, an unknown category was added for programmes of which insufficient 
information was available.18 In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the 
structure of programming on the CBBC channel, the categorisation also contains a 
schools category for the channel’s Class TV strand between 2003 and 2008. As 
already mentioned, such programmes for schools and colleges were omitted from the 
main channels’ schedules. 
Different traditions between the two countries naturally create a problem for accurate 
categorisation. For instance, the classic format for children’s programmes in Finland 
is children’s magazine (such as Pikku Kakkonen, Lasten TV Puoli Kuusi and Veturi), 
containing both entertaining and factual segments, comparable to the ‘mini-schedule’ 
tradition of the BBC. As borders between these programmes are obscure and 
programme details contain insufficient information to differentiate between the 
segments, these programmes (typically produced by Yleisradio) were mainly placed 
under the preschool category because of their target audience and pedagogic 
objectives. 
 
3.4.1.3.2. Categorisation of religious programmes 
Religious programmes pose a greater problem for categorisation. In previous studies 
on religious television, religious programmes have been treated as a single entity, 
and their output has not been separated into different categories. Therefore, no 
established system of sub-categorisation exists for this genre. As there are, however, 
significant differences between programmes in this genre, a system of categorisation 
was developed for this study, consisting of four sub-categories: 
                                                 
18
 Some imported programmes on Finnish channels in particular were unidentifiable, as their original 
titles had been translated to Finnish, making it impossible to establish the connection to the original 
programme. Unknown programmes, however, averaged just 2 per cent of all Finnish children’s 
programmes in the research, and less than 1 per cent of the UK programmes. 
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• Worship & devotion is a category for programmes of devotional and 
confessional nature. It includes televised broadcasts of religious ceremonies 
(e.g. Sunday services, religious festivals), sermons, prayers, and various 
religious ‘thought-for-the-day’ or epilogue styled programmes, usually given or 
led by a member of religious clergy. Programmes in this category aim to 
include the viewer in a religious act of worship, reinforce the viewer’s religious 
belief and strengthen the relationship of the viewer and the religious 
community.  
• Religious magazine and music is a catch-all category of programmes 
comprising talk shows on religious and ethical matters, religious current affairs 
programmes, magazines and music (e.g. hymns or gospel concerts). 
Programmes in this category are often less confessional in nature than those 
in the previous category and may take a more investigative look at questions of 
religion and matters of ethics than programmes in the previous category. The 
Heaven and Earth Show, Big Questions, Songs of Praise, Highway and Credo 
– Minä uskon fall into this category, as well as televised gospel concerts. 
• The documentary category includes documentaries and factual features on 
matters of religion and ethics. It also includes portraits of religious figures and 
other people, who have religious conviction, and in which religion is a central 
theme. Documentaries dealing with religious groups and politicised religion are 
also included in this category. 
• Children & schools is a category for programmes intended for religious 
education mainly for children and youth, but sometimes for adult learners. 
They comprise of religious children’s programmes (such as Revelations, 
Rooted and Rowanne Pasco’s Sunday Club for Children), religious education 
programmes for schools and colleges, as well as Open University 
programmes. 
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3.4.2. Interviews 
While the quantitative research for this study provides an accurate image of the 
changes in the provision of minority interest programming, it fails to provide reasons 
why has this change taken place. In order to compose a more detailed and extensive 
empirical picture of the research domain, a total of 23 interviews with former and 
present broadcasting executives, production executives and staff, members of 
regulatory organisations, professional organisations and advocacy groups in the UK 
and Finland were conducted for this research. These interviews serve as a source of 
additional evidence, confirm the researcher’s understanding of the empirical research 
results, fill in gaps in written sources and generally add a finer grade of detail for 
analysis, which cannot be obtained from other sources (Pierce 2008: 119). Selection 
of the interviewees and measures to overcome institutional spin are explained in 
more detail in the Triangulation section. 
In addition to the aforementioned triangulation aspects, and taking into consideration 
the limitations of the study resources, the interviewees were selected so that they 
would cover subjects and issues not covered by previous studies. Therefore, the 
selection of interviewees was uneven between the cases and countries. For instance, 
UK children’s programming is a relatively well-researched subject, with a number of 
comprehensive secondary sources available. There is on the other hand less 
research on religious programming, making it logical to concentrate the interviews in 
this area. For the same reason, more interviews were conducted in Finland than in 
the UK. 
The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth by nature. An interview guide was 
prepared for each interview, together with some questions, but questions and themes 
for discussion were tailored for each interview separately. The advantage of such 
interviews is that they provide enough flexibility for the interviewer to follow leads 
arising in the conversation, but also for respondents to steer the conversation, for 
example to bring in all sorts of tangential matters that, for them, have a bearing on the 
main subject (Hakim 2000: 35). The interviews were conducted face-to-face or over 
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the telephone. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. In some cases, when 
follow-up questions emerged, interviewees were contacted by email afterwards. 
 
3.4.3. Analysis of primary and secondary source documents 
The third method used in this research was analysis of primary and secondary source 
documents. Primary source documents here comprise statutes, government reports 
and other legal documents, broadcasting licences, memoranda, annual reports, 
yearbooks and reports by regulatory authorities.  
The access to primary source documents (other than those regarding broadcasting 
legislation) turned out to be problematic, as many of the internal documents produced 
by broadcasting organisations such as internal memoranda, minutes, plans and 
schedules are treated as sensitive data, which are not available to researchers. The 
archiving of such data is also limited. Historically, broadcasting organisations rarely 
had systematic archiving policies concerning such documents, and records have 
largely not been kept. Secondary source research was used whenever primary 
sources were not available or accessible. 
In addition, a comprehensive literature review was conducted on academic and 
professional literature on production and output of the selected programme types. 
These sources comprised of monographs, theses and dissertations, textbooks, 
anthologies and readers, professional surveys and reports, newspaper articles and 
other ‘popular media’ sources, as well as personal accounts of people associated with 
broadcast industries, including autobiographies and memoirs. This literature review 
served to indicate gaps and methodological shortcomings in previous research, and 
to provide additional and supporting evidence for issues the research is addressing 
(Ridley 2008: 17). 
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3.4.4. Triangulation 
Triangulation is a method of increasing the reliability and validity of empirical research 
data. It involves seeking accounts from three or more perspectives, using a variety of 
methods, approaches or sources (Pierce 2008: 90). Similar results achieved with 
different measures of the same variable indicate a higher level of validity of each 
measure (Schutt 2009: 122). Triangulation has been used in this study in two ways. 
First, methodological triangulation has been used to combine empirical data collected 
using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The aim is to ‘address 
aspects of the research question that the exclusive use of either quantitative or 
qualitative methods cannot cover’ and ‘to add validity to results produced by one or 
other method’ (Read and Marsh 2002: 238). 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods have their well-documented limitations, 
mostly with regards to the nature and scope of data they can excavate. While 
quantitative research, i.e. research on television schedules, is useful in producing a 
realistic picture of the changes in minority interest output in the two locations through 
analysing high volumes of historical data, it fails to explain the changes. Therefore, 
the research employed interviews to add a level of detail to the research. The 
subjectivity of interviews was balanced by research on primary and secondary source 
documents, which included a review of previous studies on the subject. 
Secondly, data triangulation was used within each empirical research method. The 
quantitative television schedules data were critically reviewed against, and, where 
applicable, supplemented by, previous studies, reports and statistics on television 
output to assess and improve its reliability and validity. Primary and secondary source 
documents were, when possible, selected to represent different sources and points of 
views. Reports and other publications released by broadcasting organisations were 
critically reviewed against academic studies and external reviews to minimise the 
effects of ‘public relations spin’ from representatives of broadcasting organisations 
wishing to give unrealistically favourable accounts for the benefit of their organisation. 
Data triangulation was also utilised in the selection of interviewees to reduce the 
effects of opinionated views. In conducting the interviews, it was necessary to ask 
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questions that returned rather subjective answers, or dealt with issues regarding an 
organisation the interviewee was employed in or commercially connected to that 
could portray the organisation in a negative light. In these cases, some interviewees 
were reluctant to express views and opinions which portrayed their organisations and 
policies in an unfavourable light, but expressed views that were biased towards their 
organisation or avoided answering the question altogether. Moreover, many of the 
questions concerned past events, which the interviewees may not have had a good 
recollection of, or their view may be affected by later events, e.g. dismissal or strained 
relationships with the company. To neutralise these effects, interviewees for the 
research cases were selected from three balancing positions. First, both past and 
present broadcasting executives were interviewed. To gain a more concrete view on 
institutional changes, production staff working with minority interest programmes – 
producers, editors and screenwriters – were interviewed as well. Finally, interviews 
with representatives of professional associations and interest groups were used to 
give an external insight into the subject. 
 
3.5. Ethical considerations 
Kimmel (1988: 36) demonstrates that ethical problems can be categorised according 
to the level of the research process that they most directly affect. The three levels are 
the participants; the society in and for which the research is conducted; and the body 
of scientific knowledge to which the results and conclusions are incorporated. With no 
specific requirements with regards to research methods or the use of the data set by 
the funding bodies (the university and the foundations named in the foreword to this 
thesis), and with no potential harm to society resultant from this research, ethical 
issues concern the interests of the human participants and the scientific accuracy of 
the data. These issues will be elaborated in the following sections. 
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3.5.1. Ethical issues relating to the participants 
With the absence of experimentation, covert methods, participant observation etc., 
ethical issues regarding the participants of the research mainly concern the principle 
of informed consent and publishing of sensitive information.  
Ethical research includes the principle of informed consent, whose essence is that 
‘the human subjects of research should be allowed to agree or refuse to participate in 
the light of comprehensive information concerning the nature and purpose of the 
research’ (Homan 1991: 69). Along to these guidelines, all participants in this 
research were given a comprehensive account of the nature of the research prior to 
participation. Moreover, all interviews were conducted to interviewees’ consent and 
no data collection took place without participants’ consent and prior knowledge. 
Interviews were recorded with interviewees’ permission, and the interviewees were 
informed about the use of the data. 
Information gathered through empirical research was used for research purposes 
only. In cases in which the use of primary sources required permission from a 
relevant authority, only non-confidential documents relevant for research purposes 
were used.  
As some of the interviews contained data which the interviewees considered 
sensitive, the interviewees were offered an opportunity to give their account ‘off the 
record’ or ‘unattributable’. However, nobody chose to use this opportunity. If an 
interviewee expressed concerns during an interview about publication of sensitive 
information, a confirmation was sought at the end of the interview to associate the 
information to the interviewee. Interviewees’ requests that sensitive data would not be 
used in the research in a way that could cause an offence were respected, where 
appropriate. If an interviewee gave information with potential to cause controversy or 
harm, but which was otherwise crucial for the aims of the research, efforts were made 
not to reveal the interviewee’s identity. 
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3.5.2. Ethical issues and interests of scientific knowledge 
Ethical research practice also includes a commitment to achieving valid results, which 
are not collected simply to verify our pre-existing prejudices or convince others to take 
action on behalf of our personal interests (Schutt 2009: 72-3). Bias, essentially ‘a 
predisposition or prejudice for or against a theory, person, group or institution which 
may distort or skew cognisance and interpretation of phenomena’ (Pierce 2008: 17), 
may occur if a researcher tries to hide something they have found in a study, or 
highlight something disproportionately to its true existence. This includes ‘cooking’ 
(the selection of only those data that fit the research hypothesis), ‘trimming’ (the 
manipulation of data to make them look better), or ‘forging’ (the complete fabrication 
of data) (Kimmel 1988: 39). The use of inappropriate methods or procedures, which 
are known to produce misleading and biased results, are also considered forms of 
bias (Kumar 1996: 195). 
Bias may occur in either gathering the empirical data or reporting the research 
results. At the data gathering stage, this includes intentional selection of sources 
and/or data. Measures to avoid data gathering bias taken for this research included 
developing a robust methodological framework for gathering of quantitative data (see 
Television output research). Interviewees were – where possible – selected to 
represent different organisations (see Triangulation) to gain a more balanced picture. 
In a similar manner, in reporting the empirical research, the principle of ‘the pursuit of 
truth’ (Homan 1991: 6) was respected and aspired to throughout the study. A detailed 
description of study procedures, methodological approach and research methods is 
provided in the thesis (Schutt 2009: 74). Empirical research results were presented 
truthfully, without omitting data from the study on grounds of mismatch with other 
results. Efforts were made to truthfully present a balanced view of contrasting 
opinions where applicable. 
Good research practice also requires it to be declared that funding for this research 
was received from sources that are associated with some of the institutions under 
observation in this research; the Finnish Cultural Foundation’s MTV fund, the 
Research Centre of the Church (Kirkon Tutkimuskeskus) and the Media Foundation 
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of the Church in Finland (Kirkon Mediasäätiö). However, the grant from the MTV fund 
was received through the Finnish Cultural Foundation, which ensures that there is no 
direct connection between MTV Oy and the grant recipient. The Research Centre of 
the Church and the Media Foundation of the Church, in turn, are both administratively 
part of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, which also funds the provision of 
devotional programmes produced for Yleisradio by Kirkon tiedotuskeskus. The two 
latter organisations support independent and objective research on matters of religion 
and operations of the Church, and did not set requirements of any kind for the 
research conduct or interpretation of the research results. Furthermore, both grants 
were received at the writing up stage (both in December 2011), when conclusions 
and recommendations had already been made. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the analytical framework, research design and methodologies 
utilised in this study. As marketisation is a process, whose comprehension requires a 
comparative account of its impacts on organisations and political institutions 
grounded in different prior histories (Murdock 2004: 30), the study adopts a 
comparative case study design. The UK and Finland were selected as the national 
cases because of the comparability of their broadcasting organisations, whose 
organisational cultures were – until recently – heavily influenced by the legacy of the 
public service paradigm. Furthermore, children’s and religious programmes were 
selected for the research mainly because previous research demonstrate that these 
programme types represent two ‘most different’ cases in the minority programme 
spectrum in terms of their prospects, but also because these programme types have 
enjoyed a specific regulatory protection, thus enabling analysis of the role of 
regulation in maintaining output of these programmes. 
Given the nature of broadcasting as social activity which takes place in – and is 
shaped by – its institutional setting, i.e. broadcasting organisations, institutionalism 
provides an apt analytical framework for the study. The historical institutionalism 
variant of new institutionalism was selected to the study for its benefits in undertaking 
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longitudinal analysis on large-scale historical processes and its capacity to examine 
continuities and changes within institutions utilising the theory of path dependence. 
The key deficiency of historical institutionalism, however, pertains to the degree of 
resolution of its analytical lens. Historical institutionalism is not a particularly fertile 
source of explanations for institutional change especially in organisations that operate 
in a dynamic market environment and must therefore adjust their conduct according 
to the requirements of the market. In order to address this key deficiency, a 
customised explanatory model utilising the Industrial Organisation Model – or the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm (SCPP) – is posited. The customised 
model is referred to in this study as the Industrial Equilibrium Model. The key benefits 
of the Industrial Equilibrium Model pertain to its ability to sharpen the analytical lens of 
historical institutionalism in analysing institutional change, while it also provides a 
dynamic model of the causal relationship between the structure of an industry, firm 
conduct and performance. As historical institutionalism lacks a model that explains 
institutional logic at critical junctures beyond that of the legacy of past institutional 
configurations, the Industrial Equilibrium Model can be considered to greatly improve 
the explanatory power of historical institutionalism, as successful analysis of the 
impact of marketisation-driven changes in a broadcasting company operating in a 
dynamic market environment requires an explanatory model that establishes a causal 
relationship between the political and commercial forces in the broadcasting 
environment; the strategies of broadcasting institutions; and their performance. In so 
doing, it facilitates the use of programming data as empirical evidence of consistency 
and change in institutional conduct. 
This mixed method study utilises three primary data gathering methods. Changes in 
television output were examined through a quantitative analysis of television output 
on selected UK and Finnish terrestrial channels between 1986 and 2009. Analysis of 
this quantitative data informs and guides the second method: interviews with 
broadcasting associates, which seek to explain the quantitative research results in 
more detail. Analysis on primary and secondary source documents and literature 
represents the third method in the study. 
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4. Marketisation and transformations in broadcasting 
policies in the UK and Finland 
4.1. Introduction 
Historical institutionalists argue that institutions are shaped by past actions and policy 
choices. Therefore, analysis of institutional configurations requires a historical inquiry 
on forces and circumstances that have influenced institutional development. This is 
particularly important for broadcasting research, as broadcasting is an activity that is 
specifically constrained and shaped by national policy frameworks. The full 
comprehension of institutional configurations also requires the analysis to be 
grounded to the institutional milieus and temporal contexts.  
The following chapter provides a historical analysis of changes in the policy 
frameworks of broadcasting in the UK and Finland. By examining the introduction of 
neo-liberal policy paradigm through a series of policy processes, it provides an 
empirical inquiry into the neo-liberal policy impact on institutional components of the 
national broadcasting systems of the UK and Finland. In so doing, it grounds the two 
programme cases under observation in this study; children’s and religious 
programmes, into the national political and institutional environments in which their 
production and broadcasting take place, and provides a foundation utilising the 
parameters of historical institutionalism and the Industrial Equilibrium Model outlined 
in the previous chapter for analysis of the effects of marketisation on broadcasting 
institutions and their performance undertaken in the empirical chapters (chapters 5 
and 6). In terms of research objectives, this chapter serves to address objectives 1 
and 2 as outlined in chapter 1 by undertaking a critical analysis of academic literature 
on the impact of the neo-liberal doctrine on broadcasting policies and institutional 
practices. 
The chapter is split in two sections, each of which focuses on national policy 
frameworks of the UK and Finland. In order to provide a better understanding of the 
formative ideas, values and institutional practices that have shaped the national 
broadcasting systems in the UK and Finland, the origins of UK and Finnish 
broadcasting organisations are examined briefly. The primary focus of the chapter, 
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however, is on policy changes that have taken place within the research period. 
Consistent with the historical institutionalist approach, the chapter focuses on actors 
and forces that have been central in producing critical junctures in institutional 
continuity. 
The chapter draws on both primary and secondary source documents. Primary 
sources for this section consist mainly of policy documents and other published 
material by institutions of the state: publications by organisations, committees and 
working groups, reports and licensing documents. However, as the impact of neo-
liberal marketisation on UK and Finnish broadcasting policies is a subject that has 
attracted relatively wide academic interest, secondary sources are the primary source 
for this chapter. In addition to seminal studies on institutional histories of broadcasting 
organisations (such as Independent Television in Britain and Yleisradion historia), 
neo-liberal marketisation has been subject to a number of critical studies. The studies 
by O’Malley (1994), Born (2005), Brown (2007) and Fitzwalter (2008) provide useful 
bases for analysis of the impact of marketisation on broadcasting institutions, 
whereas Goodwin (1998) and Freedman (2003) have examined the neo-liberal 
doctrine in media policies. In Finland, the studies by Hellman (1999, 2012) and 
Jääsaari (2007) stand out in particular. Additionally, these academic and professional 
sources are supplemented by newspaper articles that serve to close the gaps in the 
knowledge outside the academic research on the subject. 
 
4.2. History of broadcasting and broadcasting policy in the 
UK 
4.2.1. Origins of the UK broadcasting system 
The UK features one of the oldest broadcasting systems in the world, whose structure 
remained unchanged from the 1950s to the 1990s. It comprised a public service 
duopoly of the BBC and ITV (and, later, Channel 4). Commercial broadcasters’ public 
service standards were maintained by powerful proactive regulation. Thus, the 
commercial elements of the system were harnessed to serve the ideological missions 
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of PSB rather than to operate according to the rules of the free market. Institutional 
arrangements in broadcasting reflected this PSB idealism. Nevertheless, the 
arrangement was highly successful in producing both cultural and commercial 
benefits. Most of all, competition in programming is considered to have produced 
benefits for quality, while moderate competition also addressed audience preferences 
more effectively than a monopoly did (Scannell 1990; Curran and Seaton 2010). 
The origins of the institutional arrangements of the British broadcasting system can 
be traced back to the telecommunications acts of 1869 and 1904, which defined 
telegraphy and telephony as public utilities and universal public services (Briggs 
1985: 10). The electro-magnetic spectrum used for broadcasting was considered a 
limited and valuable public resource, and while the first radio stations were set up by 
private enterprises in 1922, the Postmaster-General called these companies to form a 
joint broadcasting syndicate. As a result, the private British Broadcasting Company 
began broadcasting on 14 November 1922 with a de facto monopoly on airwaves 
(Briggs 1985: 26; Crisell 1997: 13). However, the successive Sykes committee on 
broadcasting considered it a service too powerful and important ‘to be allowed to 
become an unrestricted commercial monopoly’ (McDonnell 1991: 10), leading to the 
establishment of the British Broadcasting Corporation under the Royal Charter on 1 
January 1927. It was a publicly funded, yet quasi-autonomous organisation, 
controlled directly neither by the government nor by industry, but by a regulatory 
body; the Board of Governors (Cave 1996: 22). It is notable that that the Royal 
Charter did not lay down detailed public service obligations for the BBC (McDonnell 
1991: 14), but the guidelines of the BBC’s programming policy, which survived largely 
intact until the end of the Second World War and even beyond, were largely based on 
the personal vision of the Corporation’s first Director-General Sir John Reith (in office 
1927-1938) (McDonnell 1991: 2-3). His vision of the mission and purposes of 
broadcasting (examined in more detail in chapter 2) served as a foundation for British 
broadcasting policy. One of the earliest attempts to articulate the principles of PSB 
was conducted by C. A. Lewis, the BBC’s organiser of programmes, in 1924. He 
identified the four major criteria governing BBC programme-making as follows:  
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(1) to cater for the majority of the time to the majority of the public, though 
without forgetting the needs of ‘minorities’; (2) to keep programming on the 
‘upper side’ of public taste and to avoid giving ‘offence’; (3) to provide a forum 
for public debate which would be impartial and free from governmental 
interference; (4) to provide religious broadcasts which were both non-sectarian 
and non-dogmatic. 
(Lewis, C. A. (1924) "Broadcasting from within", cited in McDonnell 1991: 13) 
Television broadcasts, formally commenced on 2 November 1936, were initially a 
privilege of the BBC and financed from the existing radio licence fee, with the Selsdon 
Committee having ruled out advertising financing in 1935. However, advocated by a 
lobby of the liberal market Right, audiovisual equipment manufacturers and 
advertisers (McDonnell 1991; Crisell 1997: 76-7; Johnson and Turnock 2005: 16-7), 
the Television Act of 1954 introduced advertising-funded commercial television to the 
UK in 1955. It consisted of a network of 14 regional ITV broadcasters, each holding a 
monopoly on their local area to avoid direct commercial competition between the 
companies, regulated by a powerful regulatory body, the Independent Television 
Authority (ITA)19. Its regulatory powers covered owning and operating the 
transmitters, regulating programming and advertising, and awarding of regional 
licences on the basis of programming and financial plans of the candidates through 
an administrative process referred to as the ‘beauty contest’ (Cave 1996: 19). The 
ITA/IBA held considerable interventionist powers on programme scheduling and it 
could also prohibit transmission of any programme it deemed objectionable (Johnson 
and Turnock 2005). Its regulation was not based so much on formal quotas; rather it 
held considerable powers in interpreting what constituted ‘taste’, ‘decency’ and ‘due 
impartiality’ in broadcasting, as specified in the 1954 Television Act (Cherry 2005: 
20). It did not only approve the schedules, but periodic competitions for regional ITV 
franchisees also gave the regulator considerable leverage over the ITV companies, 
especially in the period of franchise renewal (Cave 1996: 19). The allocation of the 
franchises for set periods through a ‘beauty contest’ that was based on programming 
and financial plans of the applicants allowed the ITA/IBA to ‘impose its own 
                                                 
19
 Since 1972 the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). 
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programming priorities to a considerable degree, although its capacity to enforce 
promises was limited’ (Cave 1996: 19). Thus, this administrative process of franchise 
allocation represented a ‘quasi-auction’, through which the ITA/IBA was able to grant 
franchises only to candidates whose programming plans were deemed to match the 
public service missions set in the legislation, which also acted as a powerful incentive 
for the ITV franchisees to maintain a public service agenda in their programming 
(Cave 1996: 19). For example, broadcasting legislation did not mandate ITV to 
broadcast religion until 1990, but the acceptance of the public service ethos made it 
axiomatic that a certain part of broadcasting time should be devoted to religion 
(McDonnell 2009: 151), and thus all ITV companies provided a certain amount of 
religious programming in fear of sanctions from the ITA/IBA for non-compliance. 
Therefore, rather than being a shift towards commercialisation in British broadcasting, 
commercial broadcasting was at an early stage developed into an extension of the 
UK PSB system, with the 1963 Television Act placing ITV formally within the public 
service framework, with public service missions similar to those of the BBC 
(McDonnell 1991: 44). 
Thus, commercialisation of the UK television system did not lead to a straightforward 
and immediate marketisation of broadcasting, but the system was merely a duopoly in 
extent as financial competition commonly associated with free-market capitalism was 
restricted, while competition for programming is widely considered to have positive 
effects on the quality and diversity of UK television programming (Cave 1996: 19; 
Goodwin 1998: 15). In the course of the 1960s regulatory actions manoeuvred ITV’s 
programming towards that of BBC1 (Milland 2004: 96), with both channels providing 
equally diverse mixes of the Reithian staples of information, education and 
entertainment. The Broadcasting Act 1963 empowered the ITA to mandate ITV 
network companies to produce programming of public service nature, and require all 
ITV contractors to broadcast them at prescribed times in the schedule (Crisell 1997: 
113). Furthermore, a levy was imposed on net profits of the ITV companies, which 
encouraged them to reinvest much of their revenues into programme production 
(Bonner and Aston 1998: 317). Meanwhile, the 1962 Pilkington report 
recommendation to allocate the third television channel to the BBC allowed the 
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Corporation to schedule programmes of minority and specialist appeals to the new 
channel, BBC2, and increase its overall audience share to 50 per cent by scheduling 
more programmes of populist tastes to BBC1, which was considered essential for 
maintaining the justification for the licence fee (Humphreys 1996: 130; Crisell 1997: 
18). The arrival of Channel 4 (and its much-awaited regional Welsh counterpart S4C) 
in 1982, can be seen as a compromise between the public service idealism of the 
Annan committee and the political and commercial aims of the first Thatcher 
administration and ITV. It did not contest the duopoly, as advertising for the channel 
was sold by ITV companies, an arrangement which maintained ITV’s monopoly on 
television advertising sales (Johnson and Turnock 2005: 26). This continuity extended 
to an ideological level too; while the channel’s early multicultural and minority-oriented 
agenda can, to a lesser extent, be seen as a step away from Reithian paternalism 
and monoculturalist view on the society, its focus on arts and culture, politics, 
specialist interests and minority groups indicate a strong commitment to the public 
service ethos in UK broadcasting (Scannell 1990: 25). 
 
4.2.2. Thatcherism and UK broadcasting policies 
Few attempts to challenge the established duopoly were made by the first Thatcher 
government (1979-1983). Despite the well-documented schism between the BBC and 
the Conservative Party, whose nature was mainly political (see e.g. Walters 1989; 
Prosser 1992; Goodwin 1998; King 1998; Tracey 1998; Born 2005), there were no 
initial plans for changes in the institutional framework of the BBC (Goodwin 1998: 36-
7). This can be put down partially to the fact that Home Secretary William Whitelaw 
was a firm defender of the duopoly and even threatened to resign if the funding basis 
of the BBC was to be changed (Goodwin 1998: 76). The government renewed the 
Corporation’s Royal Charter virtually unchanged for 15 years from 1981. However, 
while leaving the powers of the IBA untouched, the Broadcasting Act 1980 introduced 
the first elements of marketisation by requiring the ITV companies to become public 
limited companies within eight years. This not only made them liable to takeover, but 
also far more vulnerable to shareholder pressure to change their programming 
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policies towards a more populist direction for advertising revenue maximisation 
(Goodwin 1998: 36-7; Leys 2001: 114). 
The first major attempts to challenge the established PSB duopoly took place only 
after the 1983 General Election, which gave the Conservative Party the most decisive 
election victory since that of Labour in 1945. With the parliamentary Left largely split 
and the Conservative Party increasing its parliamentary majority over other parties, 
the second Thatcher administration was able to carry out more radical economic and 
political reforms than those carried out by her previous cabinet. The government 
extended its programme of marketisation to the telecommunications sector with 
liberalisation of the sector in 1983 and privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 
(Johnson 1991: 159). Thatcher’s aspiration was to transform broadcasting along the 
lines that she was implementing on telecommunications. In terms of regulation, this 
included a radical shift from interventionist or planning bodies (such as the IBA), to 
reactive regulatory bodies (such as the newly-established Office of 
Telecommunications [Oftel]), whose primary function was to maintain the operation of 
competitive markets (Wilks 1997: 694). 
The liberalising reforms in telecommunications and broadcasting had both ideological 
and economic motives. Thatcher’s views on broadcasting were characterised by both 
ideological opposition to the very concept of public service broadcasting, and the 
desire to break the BBC-IBA public service monopoly and implement a free market of 
television production and broadcasting in Britain. Her opposition was specifically 
directed at the licence fee, which she considered as antithetical to the free-market 
principles, as it connected the viewers with the broadcaster only indirectly and did not 
correspondent to the actual use of the service (Prosser 1992: 181; King 1998).  
In addition to this ideological antagonism, the government wanted to introduce a free 
market in broadcasting by opening up the market for new entrants and competition as 
part of its Information Technology (IT) strategy seeking to modernise structure of 
British industries. New high-capacity cable services were anticipated to provide 
information services for subscribers, thus generating business opportunities for 
private companies and boosting the economy (Goodwin 1998: 55; Tracey 1998: 205; 
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Murdock 2000: 122). Such a free-market strategy required liberalisation of cable 
broadcasting. The government’s broadcasting policies first focused on promoting the 
expansion of cable television services, which, prior to the 1980s, were limited to local 
experimental systems with limited success (Goodwin 1998: 54; Tracey 1998: 212-3). 
Impressed with the success of cable systems in the US, the government issued 
thirteen experimental cable pay-TV licences, of which the first came into operation in 
1981 (Goodwin 1998: 54). Instead of entrusting the regulation of these channels to 
the IBA, which held considerable interventionist powers to exercise proactive 
regulation, the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984 established the Cable Authority (CA) 
to oversee cable operations. 
The CA’s approach to regulation was fundamentally different from that of the IBA: it 
was a light-touch reactive watchdog, whose regulatory remit was intentionally limited 
in order to secure maximum financial interest to cable systems from the private sector 
(Goodwin 1998: 58; Tracey 1998: 208). In line with the cable industry lobby’s desires, 
cable channels were not given extensive public service obligations, but the CA’s 
content regulation was limited to monitoring programme standards in a reactive rather 
than constant manner (Tracey 1998: 208; Murdock 2000: 123). Matters like broadcast 
content and advertising on cable were largely left to the market forces to decide. In so 
doing, the Act treated cable television as a supplement to, rather than a branch of, 
PSB (McDonnell 1991: 74; Murdock 2000: 123). 
The Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984 left a permanent institutional legacy to the UK 
broadcasting policies. Prior to the Act, the role of broadcasting was defined in 
predominantly cultural terms, while the commercial element was considered 
something that needed to be restrained. In adopting an approach to broadcasting that 
placed commercial imperatives to an equal (if not higher) position to cultural 
considerations, the Conservative government introduced a fundamentally different 
approach to broadcasting, whose ideological essence was reflected in the following 
broadcasting acts, as will be examined in the following sections. As such, the Act and 
the road to its passage can be considered a major punctuation in the UK 
broadcasting policy equilibrium (Murdock 2000: 123). In allowing cable broadcasters 
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to focus solely on populist output, the Act also facilitated the influx of US-based 
entertainment channels (Tracey 1998: 211-2), whose agenda of light entertainment 
and imported films challenged the traditional public service programming agenda of 
UK PSBs. This new source of competition – for audiences, for advertising, and for 
programme rights, and the impact of new legislation, have been major factors in 
public service broadcasters’ shift towards a more populist agenda in programming 
(Murdock 2000: 127; Born 2005: 52), as will be examined in the following sections. 
 
4.2.3. The Peacock Committee and the BBC 
Before the 1980s, few calls had been made for a reform in the organisation and 
funding model of the BBC. From 1983 onwards, however, criticism against the 
Corporation began to mount from forces aligning themselves with free-market views, 
such as the right-of-centre think-tanks the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute for 
Economic Affairs that advocated neo-liberalist policies; discussion groups close to the 
Conservative party; and Conservative newspapers, those owned by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News International Group in particular20 (O'Malley 1994: 13-87). 
The BBC’s request for a 41 per cent increase on the licence fee in December 1984 
gave the government a rationale to commission a full enquiry on alternative methods 
for the funding of the Corporation from a committee chaired by Professor Alan 
Peacock, a distinguished liberal economist (McDonnell 1991: 95; Goodwin 1998: 76-
7). As Scannell (1990: 21) notes, whereas the previous committees had considered 
broadcasting in social, cultural and political terms, Peacock’s approach was radically 
different: he considered broadcasting as a predominantly commercial activity; a 
private commodity rather than a public good (Scannell 1990: 26). Related to this 
approach was another core element of the Committee’s philosophy and one of its 
lasting legacies: its emphasis on efficiency of resource allocation as a prime goal of 
broadcasting policy (Goodwin 1998: 80). The overall aim of the report was to 
                                                 
20
 O’Malley (1994) argues that the hostility of his press towards the BBC was motivated because of 
Murdoch’s businesses aspirations in satellite broadcasting. 
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establish a ‘sophisticated market system’ based on consumer sovereignty (Home 
Office 1986: para 133), free from state or broadcasting authority intervention. 
Already prior to the publication of the Committee’s report, the Committee was widely 
expected to propose the introduction of advertising on the BBC (McDonnell 1991: 95; 
Goodwin 1998: 77; Franklin 2001: 25). However, the final report, published in July 
1986, clearly recommended the retention of the licence fee in the short term and 
rejected the immediate introduction of advertising on BBC television, stating that it 
would, in the current limited duopoly, ‘reduce consumer choice and welfare’ (Home 
Office 1986: para 617). In order to subject the Corporation to a greater financial 
discipline and to make it to look for other (commercial) sources of income, the 
Committee recommended that the licence fee should be pegged to the retail price 
index (RPI) to subject the Corporation to a tighter budget responsibility (Crisell 1997: 
214). Considering the longer-term future of the BBC and the whole broadcasting 
system, the Report contains recommendations for a three-stage transition to a free 
market in broadcasting. At the first stage, cable and satellite services would be 
developed. This would be followed by the crucial second stage (forecast to take place 
in the 1990s), during which the rapid expansion in the broadcasting systems, 
channels and methods of payment would replace the current system and subscription 
would replace the licence fee. At the third stage (taking place ‘in the next century’), a 
full market of different technologies would be created based solely on direct payment 
(Home Office 1986: paras 608, 673, 700). 
It is noteworthy that even Peacock did not believe that the market could replace PSB 
completely. The role of PSB, however, would be limited to providing ‘those 
programmes of merit which would not survive in a market where audience ratings was 
the sole criterion’ (Home Office 1986: para 683). For the Committee, these 
programmes included, among others; news and current affairs; documentaries; and 
minority interest programmes: education; arts; and ‘critical and controversial 
programmes, covering everything from the appraisal of commercial products to 
politics, ideology, philosophy and religion’ (Home Office 1986: para 683). At the 
second stage of the Committee’s plan, the financing of the production of these 
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programmes would be organised through a new Public Service Broadcasting Council, 
financed by general taxation or levies on commercial broadcasting, which would 
allocate grants for individual programmes which it deemed merited public service 
support on any particular channel (Home Office 1986: paras 686-9).  
Peacock’s institutional legacy turned out to be the most influential for the 
organisational culture of the BBC, to an extent which prompted Scannell (1990: 22) to 
argue that public service broadcasting as it was known ceased to be the definitive 
feature of the British broadcasting system. Although the government announced in 
January 1988 that it accepted the Committee’s recommendations on keeping 
advertising out of BBC television and pegging the licence fee to the RPI, the 
Corporation was forced to adopt a stricter approach to cost efficiency (Tracey 1998: 
115), and adopt elements of marketisation into its institutional structures (Born 2005: 
64). Changes in the Corporation’s administration were a key measure in introducing 
elements of the neo-liberal agenda to the institutional culture of the BBC. In 1986, the 
Thatcher administration appointed Marmaduke Hussey as the Chairman of the Board 
of Governors of the BBC, who then persuaded the Board of Governors to replace the 
BBC’s Director-General Alasdair Milne with Michael Checkland. Initiated by 
Checkland (1987-1992) in the early 1990s and gathering pace under the term of his 
deputy and successor in the role, John Birt, since 1993, the Corporation’s institutional 
culture was transformed along neo-liberal lines, with markets, competition, efficiency 
and the pursuit for commercial activities taking a prominent position in the 
Corporation’s institutional culture (Tracey 1998: 118; Steemers 1999: 52; Born 2005: 
58). In order to cut production costs and meet the independent production quota, a 
programme of outsourcing and job cuts was implemented, with the Corporation’s 
losing approximately 5000 permanent jobs between 1986 and 1996 (Born 2005: 58). 
Co-productions, co-financing, sponsorship and commercial operations (such as 
foreign sales, joint commercial operations, publishing, home video sales and 
merchandising), all of which previously had been to a lesser extent important for the 
financing of the BBC, began to play an increasingly important role in the Corporation’s 
institutional agenda, responding to both the Thatcherite imperative to become 
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commercially oriented and the need to supplement the licence-fee income (Tracey 
1998: 118; Steemers 1999: 52; Born 2005: 58). 
Born (2005: 252) argues that while this discourse of measurement might well form 
part of a redefinition of the practice of public service broadcasting, these economic 
measures stood more as ends in themselves. By the mid-1990s, this preoccupation 
with measurement was translated into the Corporation’s public service paradigm, 
whose essence was now being set by marrying the Programme Strategy Review with 
audience research (Born 2005: 63-4). Propelled by the critique of producer elitism, 
consumer sovereignty; a key neo-liberal doctrine, was placed at the centre of the 
Corporation’s focus. Strategy, marketing and research informed the schedule, while 
the needs of the schedule determined commissioning (Born 2005: 287-9). However, 
Born (2005: 287) argues that ‘rather than strengthening accountability, the use of 
research in this period, by undermining creative responsibility, eroded the BBC’s 
capacity to carry out its central obligation: the production of high-quality programmes.’ 
In addition to expanding the Corporation’s ventures to external markets, Birt 
introduced another element of marketisation to the Corporation with the creation of an 
internal market in 1991. Known as Producer Choice, the intention of the scheme was 
to cost all the Corporation’s production activities and compel the internal production 
departments to compete with those provided by external providers, thus allowing the 
Corporation to root out its alleged inefficiencies and save money. The scheme served 
as an important stepping stone in the process of marketisation: all production 
operations of the Corporation – previously provided nominally free of charge – were 
individually priced to create a better understanding of the real production costs. 
However, while successful in increasing the financial efficiency of the Corporation to a 
degree, the ideological impact of Producer Choice and the new accounting culture 
was that corporate values and efficiency became an obsession within the institutional 
culture of the Corporation, paving way for more cuts and closures and eroding its 
central obligation to produce high-quality programmes (Tracey 1998: 118; Leys 2001: 
137; Born 2005: 60, 106-9 & 287). 
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4.2.4. The Broadcasting Act 1990 and re-regulation of British 
broadcasting 
The White Paper on Broadcasting in the 90s: Competition, Choice and Quality, the 
government’s response to the Peacock report, was published in November 1988. It 
retained essential aspects of the traditional BBC-ITV duopoly, and in this sense, 
halted the move towards a fully-fledged market system, envisaged by Peacock 
(Deakin and Pratten 1999: 338). The White Paper made four main proposals, of 
which the two latter were adopted directly from the Peacock report, and all of which 
would be core elements of the Broadcasting Act 1990: 1.) it proposed a fifth free-to-air 
commercial terrestrial television channel; 2.) the IBA was to be replaced with a new, 
lighter touch regulator, the Independent Television Commission (ITC); 3.) licences for 
ITV companies were to be allocated (subject to qualifications) to the highest bidder in 
an ‘auction’, rather than though an administrative procedure; and 4.) Channel 4 was 
to gain organisational independence and was to be allowed to sell its own advertising 
(Home Office 1988; Goodwin 1998: 93). The White Paper maintained that the new 
framework it proposed would promote more open and competitive broadcasting 
market without affecting programme standards and quality, but was rather ambiguous 
in specifying how the changes would be carried out to maintain quality and plurality. 
Outside observers were more sceptical, as each of the proposals had the potential to 
transform the core nature of the UK public service broadcasting system, with both 
programme standards and quality at risk (Goodwin 1998: 93).  
The proposal for a radical regulatory reform within the commercial broadcasting 
sector was without doubt the most ambitious and controversial element of the White 
Paper. The new regulatory body for commercial terrestrial, satellite and cable 
broadcasting, the ITC, would assume the powers of the IBA and the CA. However, its 
primary role was to award broadcasting licences and oversee programming in a retro- 
rather than proactive manner. Thus, the ITC’s regulatory approach reflected the 
institutional legacy of the CA, rather than that of the IBA. The ITC was no longer to be 
the legal publisher for ITV: it was stripped from the right to preview programmes or 
organise ITV schedules to the extent the IBA did. Its duty was to enforce the 
‘”consumer protection” requirements’ on all commercial services: to monitor the 
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impartiality of news, political and religious programmes, and to consider the violations 
against ‘taste’, ‘decency’ and ‘public feeling’ (Home Office 1988: para 6.10). 
Additionally the White Paper proposed that the ITV companies would be given 
detailed programme requirements, such as requirements to broadcast regional 
programmes, ‘high quality news and current affairs’ and to ‘provide a diverse 
programme service calculated to appeal to a variety of tastes and interests’ (Home 
Office 1988: para 6.11). The ownership and operation of the transmitters was also to 
be transferred to an external company.  
The organisational reform of Channel 4 also laid within the government’s proposals 
for a more competitive independent television sector. Channel 4 was still a subsidiary 
of the IBA, with its advertising sold by the ITV companies. The government wanted to 
transform Channel 4 to an independent, commercial broadcaster and a competitor to 
ITV, with its ownership under a public trust. Simultaneously, it maintained that this 
would not affect Channel 4’s public service remit, which aimed to serve 
underrepresented minorities in particular. The White Paper did acknowledge the 
concern that a fully commercial Channel 4 would be anxious to maximise profits at 
the expense of the public service remit. Apart from outlining three possible options for 
Channel 4 organisational structure (a private company, a non-profit-making-body or a 
joint operation between Channels 4 and 5) it was uncertain about the new Channel 4 
structure and its effects on the channel’s special remit (Goodwin 1998: 98-9). 
O’Malley (1994: 134) argues that the Act ‘created a relatively deregulated commercial 
TV, satellite, cable and radio sector’ and ‘left the BBC and Channel 4 as the only 
mainstream broadcasters with the sort of public service broadcasting obligations 
which had been embodied in the Broadcasting Act 1981 and which previously had 
been imposed on all TV and radio organisations’. However, it did not go as far in 
institutional privatisation and deregulation of the television system as some neo-
liberal politicians, businessmen and think-tanks wanted, mainly because of vocal 
criticism against the market elements of the Act from politicians and industry 
professionals (Bonner and Aston 1998: 381-419). Deakin and Pratten (1999: 325) 
maintain that the institutional changes produced by the Act modified, but did not 
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abandon, the ideal of PSB. Changes to the ITV network were minute,21 the 
organisational structure of the BBC was left untouched, and Channel 4’s public 
service role remained – theoretically at least – unchanged. Moreover, the process of 
allocating ITV licences was not based solely on financial considerations (i.e. the size 
of the bid). The ITC’s invitation to apply for Channel 3 (ITV) licences in the 1993 
franchise auction contained minute details about the public service programming 
strands (such as news, education, religion and children’s programmes) that 
applicants were expected to include in their schedules, and quotas for these strands 
were included in the broadcasting licences of the successful applicants. 
Nevertheless, Goodwin (1998: 166) contends that the introduction of the ‘light-touch’ 
regulatory regime of the ITC has undoubtedly been a factor in replacing public service 
by marketisation on commercial channels. The ITC’s regulatory powers to enforce the 
quality requirements proved to be insufficient once the competition for audience share 
intensified, since, unlike the IBA, it only monitored and commented on programmes 
retrospectively, imposing financial penalties in respect of breaches of its code of 
conduct. It was not able to withstand changes in the spirit or even the letter of public 
service obligations, such as changes in scheduling (Leys 2001: 146). Born (2005: 52) 
argues that throughout its existence the ITC was reluctant to exercise its controls and 
sanctions to the full because it ‘grew intimate with the industry it was supposed to 
police’. The result of the regulatory reform, Born maintains, has been an increasingly 
populist programming policies of the commercial broadcasters, to which the BBC had 
been impelled to respond. Johnson and Turnock (2005: 28) and Harrison (2005: 130) 
argue that the populism in ITV’s programming policies caused the network to move a 
number of its mandated public service programmes (such as news and religious 
                                                 
21
 Only four franchisees out of the 16 lost their licences: Thames Television’s previous licence was 
awarded to Carlton Television, Television South’s to Meridian, Television South West’s to Westcountry 
Television and TV-am’s breakfast TV franchise was awarded to GMTV. Only GMTV’s licence was 
awarded purely on grounds of highest bidder – the others were outbid in the auction, but licences were 
awarded to them on quality grounds. Thus, the process did largely preserve the IBA “beauty contest” 
administrative choice (Prosser 1993; Goodwin 1998). 
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programmes) from peak hours to the fringe. When Channel 522 was launched in 1997, 
it too was given rather modest public service obligations, which were eventually either 
reduced by the regulator, or broken at the margin with ‘relative impunity’ (Leys 2001: 
145), owing to the aforementioned inherent impotence of the ITC.  
The very process of auctioning the ITV franchises created pressure for ITV 
companies to review their programming. While a few uncontested licensees paid a 
nominal sum for their licences (such as Central Independent Television’s £2000 bid), 
the others ended up submitting excessive bids that, in some cases, exceeded their 
financial endurance.23 This not only affected ITV companies’ ability to invest in 
programming, but also created pressures for revenue maximisation through populist 
programming (Fitzwalter 2008: 102). Faced with increased competition from cable 
and satellite broadcasters; and, since 1997, Channel 5, the ITV companies felt they 
needed to grow in order to operate more effectively and economically against 
competition. The large ITV companies in particular lobbied for relaxation of the 
ownership rules, particularly as they faced an additional risk of foreign take-over. The 
Broadcasting Act 1990 prevented any ITV company from owning or controlling more 
than two licences, but it did not prevent a media company from an EU country to take 
over an ITV company. In response to fears of foreign takeover of the ITV companies 
the government amended the anti-monopoly ownership rules at the end of 1993 to 
allow companies to own up to two large ITV franchises (except for both London 
franchises) (Johnson and Turnock 2005: 28). These rules were relaxed further in the 
Broadcasting Act 1996, which permitted mergers as long as they were not considered 
to affect the quality and range of programmes, and the regional representation of the 
company and its programming. It also relaxed restrictions on cross-media ownership, 
allowing newspaper owners to enter the terrestrial television market (Goodwin 1998: 
148). The result was a set of mergers, and by 2000 11 of the 16 ITV networks were 
                                                 
22
 Rebranded as Five in September 2002. The original name was re-adopted in February 2011. 
23
 For example, Yorkshire Television submitted a bid for £37.7 million per annum for a licence for a 
much smaller region, which meant that it needed to spend 33 per cent of its annual revenues just to 
cover the licence costs (Fitzwalter 2008: 102). 
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owned by just two companies, Granada and Carlton. Following an inquiry by the 
competition watchdog, they were finally allowed to merge in 2004 creating ITV plc, 
which reduced the number of ITV companies to just five (Johnson and Turnock 2005: 
29).24 This concentration of ownership in the ITV network was accompanied by 
centralisation of programming production and drastic cuts in regional production 
budgets that served to reduce internal pluralism in ITV’s programming and 
compromise the quality of ITV’s regional programming (Fitzwalter 2008: 161-2). 
The passing of Channel 4’s control from the IBA-controlled Channel Four Television 
Company to the Channel Four Television Corporation, a statutory corporation that 
was institutionally independent from the IBA and responsible for its own advertising 
sales, in 1993 also had a profound influence on Channel 4’s programming policy. 
Originally envisaged as mainly complementary to the ITV network, the channel’s new 
position as an independent competitor to ITV made it exposed to commercial 
pressures of the broadcasting market, and hence shifted its programming radically 
towards that of a mainstream commercial channel.25 While the channel acted as a 
‘voice of plurality’ in its early years, with its alternative and experimental agenda 
facilitated by subsidies from the ITV network, it began to target mainly the three 
audience groups that were favoured by the advertisers; teenagers and young adults, 
light viewers and viewers from the ABC1 socio-economic group, in order to maximise 
its advertising revenue (Brown 2007: 155-64). Correspondingly, its programming 
shifted to a more populist direction, with ratings-boosting soap operas and imported 
American series dominating the peak-time schedules and minority interests 
occupying an increasingly marginal position in the channel’s organisational priorities 
(Ellis 2000: 158-9; Born 2005: 46; Hobson 2008: 194). As Born (2005: 46) notes, this 
                                                 
24
 ITV plc currently holds all but the following ITV franchises: Scottish and Grampian (owned by STV 
Central), Ulster (UTV Media) and Channel (Yattendon Investment Trust). It also owns 75 per cent of 
GMTV plc, which holds the national breakfast television franchise. 
25
 The link between ITV and Channel 4 was not, however, broken, but Channel 4 was guaranteed a 
share of ITV income should it run to financial difficulties (Brown 2007: 157). 
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has only served to increase the similarity between the schedules of Channel 4 and its 
commercial rivals, thus further intensifying competition in the broadcasting market. 
Paradoxically, considering that the ideological father of the Act, the Peacock 
Committee, was originally set up to scrutinise the BBC’s financing and position, the 
Broadcasting Act left the BBC untouched (apart from imposing a 25 per cent 
independent production quota26 and moving from the system of pegging the licence 
fee to the RPI to setting the fee below the RPI in April 1991 (O'Malley 1994: 134-5)). 
The fact that the Home Office and the Department of Trade and Industry were 
negotiating with the BBC and IBA about moving BBC2 and Channel 4 to satellite to 
free terrestrial frequencies for new advertising-funded commercial channels only five 
months before the White Paper demonstrates that the government was still uncertain 
about the future of the PSB system prior to the Act (Goodwin 1998: 89). The White 
Paper, however, acknowledged that ‘the BBC will continue as the cornerstone of 
public service broadcasting’ (cited in Reville 1991: 4). Reville (1991: 4) suggests that 
this fact ‘explains, in part, the policy of the 1990 Act in imposing on all independent 
services, other than Channel 4, programming requirements that fall short of those 
found in public service broadcasting.’ In other words, the government’s intention was 
to shift the public service ‘burden’ from commercial channels to public channels, thus 
allowing greater competition between the commercial channels. 
 
4.2.5. The rise of the New Labour and the neo-liberal consensus in the 
UK broadcasting policy paradigm 
The commercial broadcasting sector in the UK was relatively sheltered from serious 
competition prior to the 1990s as ITV and Channel 4 were operating as companions 
                                                 
26
 The independent production quota had actually already been proposed by Peacock and unofficially 
set as a target well before the White Paper. Furthermore, the 1989 EC Television without Frontiers 
Directive (Directive 89/552/EEC) had set a 10 per cent quota for independent productions. Both the 
BBC and ITV were pressed to meet this quota by 1992, thus the Act only made this requirement 
statutory (Goodwin 1998). 
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rather than competitors, and were not yet seriously challenged by non-terrestrial 
channels. Their hegemony was brought to an end in the 1990s, when the number of 
commercial television channels began to rise as cable and satellite services began to 
gain popularity amongst consumers. Their licences were not put to an auction like the 
ITV franchises, but companies received their licences free of charge (Leys 2001: 145; 
Hobson 2008: 194). Their low programming obligations, a feature already 
implemented in the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, enabled them to focus solely 
on populist forms of programming with low production or acquisition costs (e.g. 
imported films and sports) with mass audience potential (Leys 2001: 145), which gave 
them a significant advantage over terrestrial public service channels. The relatively 
steady income of subscription funding enabled these cable and satellite channels to 
invest substantial sums on securing exclusive rights for films and sporting events, 
such as live Premier League matches, which further increased their viewing share. 
The Broadcasting Act 1990 also gave a significant commercial boost to cable 
services, as it allowed cable operators to offer telecommunication services to their 
customers (Crisell 1997: 243).27 After a slow start, satellite services began to develop 
in the late 1980s, with two companies; British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) and Sky 
Television, competing for subscriptions with their own satellite television packages. 
Since Sky, owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News International, was based abroad, it fell 
outside the regulatory control of the IBA, while London-based BSB was obligated to 
originate a major part of its own programming on all channels (Crisell 1997: 222). 
This, together with the massive financial support from News International funds, gave 
Sky a vital competitive advantage and after a short period of costly competition 
between the two services BSB collapsed. Sky immediately absorbed BSB in a merger 
to form British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) in late 1990, which had a virtual monopoly 
on satellite broadcasting in the UK. 
                                                 
27
 Additionally, they were protected from competition from British Telecom (which, although privatised, 
still had a dominant status on the market), which was forbidden to transmit entertainment on its phone 
lines until 2001 (Leys 2001). 
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Changes in the Labour Party’s political course in the mid-1990s were fundamental in 
the cementing the neo-liberal agenda as the dominant paradigm in UK media policies. 
The traditional policy of the Labour Party had been broadly against any efforts to 
introduce elements of marketisation into British broadcasting (Goodwin 1998: 145; 
Freedman 2003: 142-3). Thus, inasmuch as it had influence on the outcome of 
government broadcasting policy, the Labour Party had consistently excreted that 
influence to restrain the Conservatives’ more deregulatory ambitions, thus acting as a 
political counterweight to the neo-liberal agenda of Thatcherism (Goodwin 1998: 145). 
Labour had an influential role in introducing several amendments to the Broadcasting 
Act 1990, which blunted the most severe free-market proposals, most notably the 
concession of an ‘exceptional circumstances’ clause in the awarding of ITV franchises 
that would allow the ITC to reject the highest bidder because of the poor quality of its 
proposals (Freedman 2003: 146). 
After losing its fourth consecutive general election in 1992 the party elected Tony 
Blair as its leader in 1994. Blair accelerated the party’s shift towards the political 
centre in a process already started under its previous leader Neil Kinnock. 
Rebranding itself as New Labour, the party adopted much of the free market 
philosophy, endorsing the view that the economic performance is best improved by 
keeping government intervention and regulation to a minimum, and accepted the 
economic and social restructuring of the Thatcher and Major years (see e.g. Goodwin 
1998: 145; Glyn and Wood 2001: 200-222). The party also adopted the market-led 
non-interventionist approach to its communication policies, in which the government’s 
role was limited to creating the appropriate competitive environment and promoting 
the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs).28 Another significant 
part of this ‘modernisation’ process was reassessing the party’s relationship with 
commercial media and its owners, some of which (the Murdoch press in particular) 
                                                 
28
 It is notable that while Labour had previously introduced policy plans for a technological revolution 
(e.g. under Harold Wilson’s premiership in the 1960s), they were strongly interventionist in character 
and aimed to plan a government-administered industrial strategy, while New Labour left the 
development of such technologies mainly in the private sector (Freedman 2003). 
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were traditionally unrelentingly hostile to Labour, through adopting a free-market 
approach to media policies and a relaxed attitude towards concentration of ownership 
(Freedman 2003: 158-61). This policy outlook was considered more neo-liberal in 
nature than that of the Conservative government (Goodwin 1998: 146). The fact that 
the government and the opposition now accepted the restructuring of the UK 
broadcasting policies by the Thatcher and Major administrations represented 
punctuation in the policy equilibrium, as there has been no major political 
counterforce to challenge the neo-liberal agenda in broadcasting policies since. 
Freedman (2003: 167-8) argues that one result of New Labour’s ICT initiative was an 
institutional shift in the party’s focus in communication policies from social and cultural 
to economic and technological considerations. Broadcasting became a part of the 
party’s industrial policy, which until that point had been more of a feature of the 
Conservatives’ rather than Labour’s policy approach. This meant that the party saw 
less need for separate media policies, but an urgent requirement to formulate a 
communications policy in tune with the more competitive market. A policy forum was 
set up by Tony Blair to outline New Labour’s communication policy in 1995. Although 
its report Communicating Britain’s Future contained few references to television, it 
promised to merge the telecommunications regulator Oftel and the ITC into a more 
streamlined structure, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), which would regulate 
the whole communications infrastructure. The report also indicated its deregulatory 
stance by hinting that a ‘revamped’ ITC would regulate content ‘albeit with a lighter 
touch’ (Freedman 2003: 167). 
After the 1997 general election landslide victory, which was assisted by powerful 
media support from the Murdoch press, New Labour positioned the ‘communications 
revolution’ as the heart of its vision for modern Britain (Sampson and Lugo 2003: 86). 
In line with the party’s pre-election plans, the Labour government began organising 
the regulatory reform in order to bring the various telecommunications and media 
regulators under a single organisation. The 2000 White Paper titled A New Future For 
Communications dismissed the existing regulatory structure as a by-product of a 
bygone era and proposed for a thorough regulatory reform through  new 
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communications legislation (Doyle and Vick 2005: 75). The document demonstrated a 
clear vision of a deregulatory approach, indicating that ‘[r]egulation should be the 
minimum necessary to achieve clearly defined policy objectives. The presumption 
that broadcasting and communications should be regulated should therefore in 
general be reversed’ (cited in Freedman 2003: 173). Although the government 
acknowledged that there was still the need for continuing content regulation of 
generalist television services mostly in advertising and on matters of violence, taste 
and decency, there should be a shift in the general trend of regulation from setting 
cultural objectives to be guided by economic considerations in line with Labour’s aim 
to make the UK home to the ‘most dynamic and competitive communications and 
media market in the world’ (cited in Freedman 2003: 174). Sampson and Lugo (2003: 
85) point out that this policy direction ‘echoes a goal of the former Conservative 
government, expressed by the 1986 Peacock Committee, to create a “sophisticated 
market system based on consumer sovereignty” rather than public service goals.’ 
 
4.2.6. The Communications Act 2003 as a deregulatory shift in UK 
broadcasting policies 
On 29 December 2003 the newly-established Ofcom assumed the functions 
previously carried out by the ITC, the Radio Authority, the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission, the Radiocommunications Agency and the Oftel. It drew its powers from 
the Office of Communications Act 2002 and the Communications Act 2003, of which 
the latter was essentially umbrella legislation on broadcast media and 
telecommunications. The government’s decision to bring five distinctively different 
regulators under one ‘super-regulator’ can be described as ambitious, considering 
that each legacy regulator had conducted its relations with the government, industry 
and the public in distinct ways (Livingstone et al. 2007: 613). The principal duties of 
Ofcom, as specified in the Communications Act 2003, are ‘a) to further the interests of 
citizens in relation to communications matters; and b) to further the interests of 
consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition’ (The 
Communications Act 2003: s 3). This binary nature was an outcome of the 
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amalgamation of the duties of Ofcom’s predecessors, whose focus was mainly 
economic (promoting consumers’ interests; e.g. Oftel) or cultural (promoting citizens’ 
interests; e.g. the Broadcasting Standards Commission [BSC]). Nevertheless, as 
Doyle and Vick (2005: 90-1) point out, promoting interests simultaneously can create 
policy tensions and contradictions: as evidence gathered from the previous 
amendments in broadcasting legislation demonstrates, public service and commercial 
values are difficult to combine without putting one above the other. The fact that the 
new regulator inherited its functions and institutional legacy from regulators whose 
primary duties were economic (e.g. Oftel) and cultural (e.g. ITC, BSC) resulted in a 
conflict of interest between the two regulatory traditions, and risked the domination of 
one tradition over the other (Doyle and Vick 2005: 90-1). Since the raison d’être of a 
convergence regulator was economic rather than socio-cultural, economic and 
consumerist interests preceded social and cultural goals in the new regulatory regime 
(Doyle and Vick 2005: 90-1; Livingstone et al. 2007: 628-9). 
The Communications Act introduced a three-tier system on television content 
regulation. On first tier are the basic obligations, which apply to all broadcasters in the 
UK and are to ensure that their programming output complies with basic domestic, 
European and international obligations. This category includes the EU quota on 
European content and independent programming, certain obligations on taste and 
decency, guidelines for advertising and sponsorship, and the protection of minors. 
The second tier consists of quantifiable and measurable public service obligations for 
channels with public service obligations (the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5). 
Examples of these are the quotas for original or independent productions, targets for 
regional programming and targets for scheduling of news during the peak time. The 
conditions are not uniform for all channels: for example, ITV has more public service 
obligations than Channel 5, but fewer than Channel 4. The third and the highest tier 
concerns high-level qualitative aspects of public service broadcasting provided by the 
commercial public service broadcasters (ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5). This 
category comprises numerous quality and diversity obligations, such as a requirement 
to broadcast children’s, educational, arts and religious programmes and a duty to 
cater for minority interests, similar to those previously imposed and monitored by the 
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ITC. However, assuming that the traditional style of monitoring of these abstract and 
qualitative requirements would lead to what the government referred to as ‘box-
ticking’, the government’s new framework involved a system whereby these 
obligations are to be delivered and monitored through self-regulation. Each licenced 
public service broadcaster is required to develop detailed statements of programming 
policy consistent with its public service remit, and to provide an annual self-evaluation 
of its performance in the light of its stated policy. Backstop powers have been 
reserved to Ofcom in the event that self-regulation fails, provided that failure is not 
attributable to economic factors (The Communications Act 2003: ss 264 & 270; Doyle 
and Vick 2005: 78-81). 
Section 264 of the Act also requires Ofcom to review and report on the state of PSB 
periodically, with specific focus on minority interest provision: 
(6) A manner of fulfilling the purposes of public service television broadcasting 
in the United Kingdom is compatible with this subsection if it ensures— […] 
(f) that those [public service television] services (taken together) include 
what appears to OFCOM to be a suitable quantity and range of 
programmes dealing with each of the following, science, religion and 
other beliefs, social issues, matters of international significance or 
interest and matters of specialist interest; 
(g) that the programmes included in those services that deal with 
religion and other beliefs include— 
(i) programmes providing news and other information about 
different religions and other beliefs; 
(ii) programmes about the history of different religions and other 
beliefs; and 
(iii) programmes showing acts of worship and other ceremonies 
and practices (including some showing acts of worship and other 
ceremonies in their entirety); 
(h) that those services (taken together) include what appears to 
OFCOM to be a suitable quantity and range of high quality and original 
programmes for children and young people. 
(The Communications Act 2003: s 264) 
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While the section clearly acknowledges children’s and religious programmes as parts 
of public service and even lists different religious programming sub-categories that 
were missing from the Broadcasting Act 1990 and the broadcasting licences of 
Channels 3, 4 and 5, the amount of discretion allowed to the regulator gave less 
protection to these programme types than the preceding acts. The Act required 
Ofcom to review the combined output of the PSBs, but its duties do not include 
promoting the provision of these programme types through anything else than 
recommendations. Thus, in terms of content regulation, the legislation did not 
guarantee Ofcom the necessary powers to secure the provisions of these 
programming types on commercial PSB channels. As the Act featured a move to a 
system in which the combined output of PSB channels was reviewed instead of 
monitoring outputs of each individual channel in fulfilling public service commitments, 
it also gave Ofcom a great deal of freedom in interpreting whether these 
commitments had been reasonably met, considering that the BBC’s remit alone could 
be deemed to fulfil the purposes of PSB in this respect (Born 2005: 501-2). 
In its first PSB review, published in 2004, Ofcom began drafting a revised 
interpretation of PSB that was essentially different from that presented in the 
Communications Act:  
PSB should in future be defined in terms of its purposes and its characteristics 
rather than by specific genres (programme types). Many of the most 
successful examples of broadcasting over the past five years have defied 
traditional categorisation. Audiences are, for instance, drifting away from 
specialist arts, religious and current affairs programming. 
(Ofcom 2004a: para 1) 
By concluding that PSB should not be defined in terms of its programme types but its 
purposes and characteristics Ofcom also proposed that the positive externalities 
delivered by minority interest programming could be delivered by other – more 
popular – programme types, such as drama and entertainment. The review also 
contained several propositions that contradicted with the traditional principles of 
public service. A proposition was put forward in the review that commercial methods 
of programme delivery, that are contrary to the universality principle of PSB, should 
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be considered for the delivery of minority interest programming: ‘[w]here a high cost 
of delivery is associated with low viewing figures, it will be harder to justify continued 
public intervention. Alternative means of funding, such as subscription, should be 
considered for these services’ (Ofcom 2004a: 12). As subscription services were 
never considered as a legitimate substitute to PSB, Ofcom’s newly-adopted policy 
approach indicates a significant branching point in the course of the UK’s 
broadcasting policy. 
The Act had a profound effect on the organisational cultures of commercial 
broadcasters. It allowed them to drift further away from the public service paradigm 
and to adopt increasingly populist commercial programming strategies, which, in turn, 
would push these broadcasters further towards ‘ruinous competition’. Brown (2007: 
275-6) argues that the greatest changes took place in the institutional culture of 
Channel 4, whose public service obligations were reworded. The previous obligations 
to catering for minority tastes and interests not served by ITV were replaced with 
more general and vague duties to be creative, to innovate, experiment and appeal to 
a culturally diverse society, as it was considered that minority interests would be well 
served by digital channels, and such a minority focus was increasingly inappropriate 
for a general interest channel. Shortly after the revision, evidence began to mount 
that the channel began to drift towards a more predictable and commercial schedule 
(Brown 2007: 275). This only accelerated competition between ITV and Channel 4, 
creating a ‘vicious circle’ of ruinous competition between the channels. ITV became 
alarmed of Channel 4’s aggressive counter-scheduling tactics of competing head-on 
with ITV with populist talk show or game show content in the evening peak time 
(Brown 2007: 275). Fitzwalter (2008: 244) regards that the deregulatory measures 
introduced by the Act encouraged ITV and Channel 5 to become even more 
commercial, counter-scheduling populist content against Channel 4’s public service 
slots, which would push Channel 4 even further away from its mandate. 
The concerns of Doyle and Vick (2005: 89) that the creation of a single regulator, 
whose authority extends to the regulation of the economic, technical and programme 
content aspects of telecommunications and broadcast media, ‘may ultimately facilitate 
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the triumph of a market-driven media policy’, and that a converged regulatory 
environment is likely to be more sympathetic to the perceived economic imperatives 
of communications industries appear to be realised in the light of recent media policy 
developments. ‘The current regime for Public Service Broadcasting, covering the 
BBC, Channels 3, 4 and Five, set out in the Communications Act 2003 is not 
surviving the transition to a fully Digital Britain’, concluded the government’s Digital 
Britain 2009 report (Department for Culture Media and Sport and Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills 2009: 136-7). At the same time, Ofcom has adopted 
an approach to content regulation that places consumerist and economic interests 
increasingly at the centre of its regulatory approach, and accepts the decline of the 
current PSB system as an inevitable, if not a ‘natural’ process. Ofcom’s second 
review on PSB was published in 2008. It concluded that minority interest programmes 
like religious and arts programmes require lesser future regulatory intervention 
because of their relatively low audience support and commercial profitability. Instead, 
it proposed online and digital services as substitutes to main channels in delivering 
these programmes (Ofcom 2008b: 33). As such, the review reinforced Ofcom’s 
consumerist approach to content regulation already featured in its first PSB review. 
Whether it is possible to preserve the present amalgamated public-commercial public 
service broadcasting model in an increasingly commercial and digital future, the 
polity’s answer appears to be negative, and public service delivery is increasingly 
being considered as the exclusive duty of the public broadcasters; the BBC and 
Channel 4. 
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4.3. History of broadcasting and broadcasting policy in 
Finland 
4.3.1. Origins of broadcasting in Finland 
Radio broadcasts were started in Finland in the 1920s amidst social and political 
unrest stemming from the 1918 Civil War. State structures were still relatively weak, 
while tensions between social groups were intense. Nevertheless, as early as in 1921 
the government began granting local broadcasting licences to low-power radio 
stations operated by ‘politically trustworthy’ organisations (i.e. those associated with 
the right-wing paramilitary White Guards, the winning party of the Civil War), private 
companies such as newspaper publishers, and military units. The Wireless Act 1919 
restricted the ownership of radio receivers to those who obtained a specific licence 
through a complex process from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works. Calls to 
bring broadcasting under public control soon arose in the parliament, justified by the 
lack of radio broadcasting in countryside and the need to provide enlightenment and 
spread a patriotic mood to the nation, still largely split by the Civil War (Lyytinen 1996: 
15-22). 
In 1925, the parliamentary radio commission invited various organisations, companies 
and voluntary associations, some of which were already involved in broadcasting, to 
establish a national broadcasting syndicate O.Y. Suomen Yleisradio - A.B. Finlands 
Rundsradion.29 The company did not yet have a monopoly on broadcasting, but 
following its initial transmission on 9 September 1926, most of the existing local radio 
stations ceased transmissions. As advertising was not considered a preferred option 
for cultural reasons, the Company began collecting its funding by licence fees, which 
were legislated by the 1927 Act on Radio Equipment (Lyytinen 1996: 22-8). 
The early Yleisradio considered the Reithian BBC as a model organisation and 
adopted its values, with the aim to improve moral and educational standards of the 
citizens (Lyytinen 1996: 31-2; Hujanen 2007: 115). The ownership structure of the 
                                                 
29
 Under the arrangement, Yleisradio was responsible for programming only. Broadcasting transmitters 
were owned by the National Board of Post and Telegraph. 
144 
 
 
 
Company, which included commercial companies, was soon found unsatisfactory for 
the fulfilment of these aims. The parliament voted to set up a committee to scrutinise 
options for broadcasting as a state enterprise. The committee published its report in 
March 1931, in which it recommended the government to take urgent action to ensure 
that a majority stake in Yleisradio was obtained by the state. As most members of the 
incumbent conservative government, however, were against the restructuring, it took 
until 1934 before the state finally acquired full ownership and control of Yleisradio 
(Lyytinen 1996: 69-80). 
Following nationalisation, the regulatory control of Yleisradio was delegated to the 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works, which elected the members of the company’s 
highest executive body, the Administrative Council (AC). However, following Hella 
Wuolijoki’s term as the company’s Director-General (1944-1949) and allegations of 
her pro-Communist bias in the company’s programming policies, the selection of the 
members of the AC was passed to the parliament in 1948 (Salokangas 1996: 13). 
The political composition of the AC has tended to mirror that of the Parliament 
thereafter, with a new AC appointed after each General Election. 
 
4.3.2. The Finnish television duopoly arrangement 
Initially, Yleisradio’s administration did not express interest in commencing television 
broadcasts. The medium was considered expensive for a poor, geographically vast 
and sparsely-populated country like Finland, and Yleisradio’s resources were tied in 
the development of the frequency modulation (FM) radio network (Salokangas 1996: 
115). As Yleisradio did not have a de jure monopoly on broadcasting,30 the National 
Board of Post and Telegraph issued a temporary licence to a consortium of 
                                                 
30
 The Act on Radio Equipment 1927 did not specify Yleisradio as the nation’s sole broadcaster, but 
the successive governments had refrained from granting operating licences to other broadcasters 
(Salokangas 2007). Salokangas (2007) notes that TES-TV’s licence was greatly advocated by the 
Director-General of the National Board of Post and Telegraph, who personally supported the 
dissolution of Yleisradio’s broadcasting monopoly. 
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broadcasting engineers and technical students. They set up a television service, TES-
TV, which started with experimental broadcasts in the Helsinki region on 24 May 
1955, and a regular service in March 1956. The TES-TV service was financed by 
commercials, which gave Yleisradio another reason to resist co-operation. By 1963 its 
viewing area covered the three biggest metropolitan regions of Helsinki, Turku and 
Tampere (Salokangas 2007: 40).    
Nevertheless, Yleisradio faced continual and mounting political pressure to launch a 
national television service31, however, and was forced to rethink its position. The 
costs associated with setting up a television service, too substantial to be covered by 
a television licence fee alone, remained an issue. The majority of the members of 
Yleisradio’s AC were initially against advertising, which was seen as a corruptive 
threat to the enlightening values of public service broadcasting, and conflictual with 
the company’s broadcasting licence. However, there were members who, together 
with lobbyists from advertising industry, supported an arrangement similar to the 
British ITV system, in which advertisements were separated from programmes by 
commercial breaks and thus were not an integral part of a programme. As a solution, 
advertising was outsourced to a separate, institutionally independent company, Oy 
Mainos-TV-Reklam Ab (MTV), set up by a consortium of advertisers, advertising 
agencies and film production companies in 1957. It hired mainly peak time 
broadcasting blocks from Yleisradio for its advertising-financed programmes in 
exchange for a share of its profits (Salokangas 1996: 118; Hanski 2001: 59-61). Thus, 
its primary role was to subsidise Yleisradio’s public service operations; its role as an 
independent broadcaster was considered secondary to this role. While the 
arrangement was a duopoly in economic terms, the companies were not considered 
equal competitors (as in the British BBC-ITV duopoly): MTV’s role was subordinate to 
                                                 
31
 Salokangas (1996) notes that the introduction of Finnish-language programming in the television 
service of the Estonian SSR in 1954, whose transmissions could be received in southern Finland, and 
the threat of Soviet propaganda forced Yleisradio to reconsider its previous position following 
diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom. 
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that of Yleisradio.32 Commercial broadcasting was tolerated for economic reasons, 
but its extent and influence was strictly limited (Hellman 1999: 136).33 The fact that 
MTV did not have a broadcasting licence of its own but operated as Yleisradio’s 
auxiliary under its broadcasting licence also meant that Yleisradio was able to 
exercise regulatory control over MTV, which included Yleisradio coordinating the 
schedules of MTV (Hanski 2001: 59-61). An outcome of this was that while MTV’s 
fundamental role as Yleisradio’s subsidiser naturally slanted its programming towards 
light entertainment, throughout its existence as Yleisradio’s lessee its programming 
demonstrated significant commitment to the public service tradition, with a broad 
programme portfolio including in-house produced drama, documentaries, arts, 
educational and minority interest programmes (Hellman and Sauri 1988; Hanski 
2001). This also demonstrated MTV’s desire to justify and reinforce its role as a 
broad-ranging broadcaster, which was necessary for its long-term aspiration of 
independence from Yleisradio’s control. 
This initiation of broadcasts under the above  arrangement in August 195734 under 
the name  Suomen Televisio35 started a period in Finnish broadcasting commonly 
referred to as the ‘longstanding experiment’ (Meier and Trappel 1992: 140; Hellman 
1999: 1; Jääsaari 2007: 5), which included both public service and commercial 
broadcasters operating under a single mixed system for mutual interests. Together 
the two companies formed such a powerful union that TES-TV (renamed Tesvisio in 
1960), whose transmissions were limited to southern Finland, was forced out of the 
                                                 
32
 This was reflected in Yleisradio’s broadcasting licence, which, until 1993, stated that Yleisradio can 
(but was not obliged to do so) in its television operations to make use of MTV’s assistance (Hellman 
1999).  
33
 This included placing limitations on MTV’s remit, which included a ban on news, current affairs and 
sports programmes, and restrictions on advertising and programming concerning political and religious 
topics (Hanski 1997). 
34
 Broadcasts were initially experimental, but become regular on 1 January 1958 (Salokangas 2007). 
35
 In English: “Television of Finland”. 
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market and acquired by Yleisradio in 1964. Its facilities in Tampere became TV 2, 
while Suomen Televisio was renamed as TV 1. As a legacy of the two separate 
institutions, both channels were organised under largely independent organisations, 
each providing a full range of programming rather than adopting a particular niche 
profile. This created competition for audiences between the channels (and between 
Yleisradio and MTV), which constituted a degree of internal pluralism within the 
system (Hellman 1988: 65). 
 
4.3.3. Liberalisation of broadcasting in the 1980s 
The Yleisradio-MTV duopoly remained mostly unchanged for two decades until the 
mid-1980s. A period of strong politicisation had started in Yleisradio in the mid-1960s 
and continued throughout the 1970s, during which the composition of the company’s 
administrative bodies was dictated according to the relative strengths of the 
parliamentary political parties, which transferred most of the executive power to 
politicians (Salokangas 1996). This was reflected in the company’s paternalistic 
approach to its programming policy, which, as Ruoho (2007: 122) argues, reflected 
ideals and objectives of the political parties more accurately than the actual tastes of 
the majority of the audience. As Yleisradio’s programming was directly administered 
and monitored by Programme Councils, whose members were elected mainly by 
political mandates, it was deemed unnecessary to introduce external regulation or 
detailed public service obligations in the company’s broadcasting licence (Salokangas 
1996). Notwithstanding the political struggles within Yleisradio, there was a broad-
ranging political consensus on the significance of the duopoly and Yleisradio’s role as 
the nation’s primary broadcaster. 
Yleisradio’s hegemony in Finnish broadcasting began to break in the 1980s for widely 
similar political, technological and economic reasons that were examined in chapter 
2. The political demarcation line between the proponents and opponents of 
liberalisation was drawn between the Parliamentary Left and Right, with the Left 
opposing all measures that it considered to strengthen commercial interests in 
148 
 
 
 
broadcasting. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), however, gradually grew more 
supportive to liberalisation towards the end of the decade (Hujanen 1996; Salokangas 
1996; Hellman 2012), while the political significance of the communists declined 
further following the General Elections of 1983 and 1987.36 The decline of the far-left 
was countered with the rise of the political influence of the centre-right National 
Coalition Party (NCP) to the government after the 1987 General Election. Having 
spent the preceding 21 years in opposition, its pro-liberalisation agenda was now 
adopted in the government’s media policies. 
The first concrete sign of the liberalisation of broadcasting policy was the decree to 
allow MTV to start its own news in 1981. The decision can be considered to have 
improved MTV’s institutional credibility as a ‘serious’ broadcaster, and was 
considered an important accomplishment for the company in its quest for an own 
channel (Lyytinen 2007: 187-8). Another important step was the licensing of 
independent local radio (ILR) in 1985, which broke Yleisradio’s monopoly on radio 
broadcasting (Salokangas 1996: 343). While the discursive legitimisation of ILR 
utilised calls for democratisation of communication through granting licences to 
various community radio ventures, commercial considerations soon replaced the 
democratic aims in their agenda, and commercial radio became a taken-for-granted 
fact in cultural and political terms (Hujanen 1996). Hujanen (1996: 191-3) concludes 
that the ‘democratic utopia of communication’ was utilised in the discourse to break 
the traditional dichotomy between public and commercial broadcasting and cement 
the commercial paradigm in broadcasting as a legitimate alternative for the public 
service paradigm. 
Emerging innovations in consumer electronics and technology eroded Yleisradio’s 
position further. Hellman (1999: 114) and Salokangas (1996: 389) identify the 
breakthrough of the video cassette recorder (VCR) in the consumer market in the 
early 1980s and the rise of cable systems in the mid-1980s as the key factors to 
                                                 
36
 Hujanen (1996: 188) notes that the reason for the change in the attitude of SDP was the crisis of the 
labour press. The social democrats wanted to increase their power in mass media through expanding 
their media activities to ILR stations. 
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challenge the hegemony of the duopoly. Pay-TV services had already emerged in the 
1970s, when it was realised that urban households with central aerial systems could 
to be connected into cable networks, across which programmes could be broadcast 
without a broadcasting licence. Owing to the structure of the Finnish broadcasting 
system, in which Yleisradio exercised regulatory control on commercial broadcasting 
owing to its monopoly on broadcasting licence, as well as the fact that the 1927 Act 
only recognised terrestrial broadcasting, cable and satellite broadcasting were 
practically outside all licencing and regulation. Cable operators were quick to realise 
that they could not compete with terrestrial channels by costly forms of original and 
local programming, but opted for imported, populist forms of programming instead 
(Salokangas 1996: 389; Hellman 1999: 112).  
While the 1987 Act on Cable Broadcasting made it mandatory for cable broadcasters 
to apply for broadcasting licences and gave some guidelines on content, their 
regulation and programming obligations were nominal in contrast to those of 
terrestrial channels (Hellman 1988: 52-4). These requirements did not apply to 
transnational satellite channels, whose position vis-à-vis domestic channels was 
consequently strengthened by the Act (Hellman 1999: 114-5). Available through most 
cable networks, their programming was significantly more entertainment-oriented than 
that of the terrestrial channels. Cable and satellite reach comprised almost 30 per 
cent of the population in the late 1980s, with 6-7 per cent of the population viewing 
these channels on a daily basis. A 1986-1987 survey on cable viewing concluded that 
its share of households in the three biggest cities was 20-35 per cent, with children 
aged 9 to 14 years being the keenest users of satellite services (Hellman 1999: 113-
5). 
 
4.3.4. The Kolmoskanava project as a defensive measure to protect the 
duopoly 
The ‘threat from the sky’ was not the only reason for Yleisradio and MTV becoming 
concerned about their position: both companies aspired to maintain the control of 
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broadcasting under the duopoly, and to increase their revenues by increasing MTV’s 
advertising time (Salokangas 1996: 393). Although their inter-company relationships 
had been strained since the 1960s (Hellman 1999: 137; Hanski 2001), they decided 
to ally and defend their mutual interests. In 1985, negotiations were started between 
Yleisradio, MTV and the technology conglomerate Nokia to launch a third terrestrial 
network, Kolmoskanava37, under a joint-stock company, Oy Kolmostelevisio Ab, with 
Yleisradio holding the stock majority of the channel.38 
While the channel would operate under Yleisradio’s operating licence, its remit was 
designed to be very different from those of Yleisradio and MTV. The channel’s 
programming would be only partially free-to-air; early plans contained proposals for 
reserving prime time for pay television programming only. Thus, the channel would 
receive its funding from a combination of advertising and subscription fees. Although 
the British Channel 4 was originally considered as an ideological model for 
Kolmoskanava, and the committee set to consider the conditions for the third network 
originally set significant minority interest service obligations for the channel (Hellman 
2012: 153-4), Salokangas (1996) and Hellman (1988, 2012) argue that these cultural 
aims turned out to be purely rhetorical: they were intended mainly to win over 
parliamentary support for the channel. Very few of Channel 4’s original cultural aims 
were actually implemented on Kolmoskanava, whose programming policies were 
populist and entertainment-oriented from the outset (Hellman 1988: 77-9). In so 
doing, the channel adopted a more outspoken commercial agenda than any Finnish 
terrestrial channel had done before. In order to cover the costs associated with 
establishing the new channel, Kolmoskanava’s broadcasting range would initially be 
limited to the large cities of Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Lahti in southern Finland, 
whose citizens were also considered desirable for advertisers because of their urban 
affluent status (Salokangas 2007: 47); a policy choice that further highlighted the 
commercial emphasises in the channel’s character. 
                                                 
37
 In English: “The Third Channel”. 
38
 Ownership of the new network was divided between Yleisradio, MTV and Nokia so that Yleisradio 
owned 50, MTV 35 and Nokia 15 per cent of the stock (Salokangas 1996). 
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Yleisradio’s operation licence was amended in July 1986 so that Kolmoskanava could 
commence broadcasts as Yleisradio’s auxiliary on 1 December 1986. The decision 
was preceded by an intense political and public debate, which had effect on 
Kolmoskanava’s final structure. The channel was obliged to provide its prime-time 
programming free from subscription charge and thus the pay television plans had to 
be abandoned. Yleisradio was also required to diversify the channel’s coverage, with 
modest and loosely-defined programming obligations set for the channel (Hellman 
1988). An important prerequisite for the channel’s remit was that it would support the 
growth of the independent production sector by commissioning its programming 
mostly from independent producers, thus operating as a publisher-broadcaster 
without in-house production. In an amendment to Yleisradio’s broadcasting licence, 
the company was obliged to ensure that at least one fifth of Kolmoskanava’s 
programming was of domestic origin, and to increase this proportion by the end of the 
licensing period (which ended in 1989) (Soramäki 2007: 81). The channel was also 
required to target a ‘sufficient proportion’ of its programming at the Swedish-speaking 
minority (Salokangas 1996: 401).  
The Kolmoskanava project can be seen as a defensive move from the established 
broadcasters, which was intended to delay the full liberalisation of the television 
sector in Finland by maintaining the established duopoly and preventing new entrants 
to the market (Salokangas 2007: 47; Hellman 2012). Its populist orientation and 
openly commercial objectives nevertheless indicate a certain branching point in 
continuity of Finnish broadcasting policies; a step towards marketisation in a system, 
whose commercial elements were traditionally subordinated to serve social and 
cultural aims. Hellman (1988) and Salokangas (1996) argue that motives for 
Kolmoskanava’s formation were predominantly economic rather than social or 
cultural, underpinned by an underlying demand for the expansion of the independent 
audio-visual sector, and a need to expand the scope available for advertising. 
An important feature in the Kolmoskanava project was also that it was aimed at 
protecting the traditional consensus in Finnish broadcasting. The ultimate aim of the 
process was to strengthen the duopoly rather than to contest it by introducing a 
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commercial competitor to Yleisradio. Thus, it was not designed – intentionally at least 
– to challenge the formative principles in Finnish broadcasting policy: Yleisradio’s 
special superior role over other broadcasters, cultural protectionism against foreign 
broadcasters and the duopoly arrangement, in which commercial broadcasting 
financed PSB. However, in terms of marketisation of the system, Hellman (2012: 299) 
argues that the third channel changed the political climate more favourable for the 
liberalisation of broadcasting in the 1990s, which culminated in MTV’s independence 
of Yleisradio’s control and its own channel in 1993, followed by the introduction of 
commercial competition in terrestrial broadcasting in 1997. 
 
4.3.5. The 1993 Channel Reform: the end of the ‘longstanding 
experiment’ 
While previously strictly against all attempts to increase MTV’s independence, by 
1988 Yleisradio’s administration had accepted the idea of allowing MTV to have a 
channel of its own, as long as Yleisradio’s funding could be secured. Hellman (1999: 
94-5) and Salokangas (1996: 406) ascribe this policy U-turn to Yleisradio’s 
management’s desire to find a solution to the strained relationship between the two 
companies, caused by MTV’s demands for further increases in its broadcasting hours 
and peak-time broadcasting slots. These stemmed from MTV’s serious financial 
difficulties, which it had encountered following the launch of Kolmoskanava. While 
previously having a monopoly on television advertising – and thus being able to 
uphold high advertising fees – it now had to compete against Kolmoskanava’s 
entertainment-oriented schedules, whose advertising rates were also significantly 
lower than those of MTV (Hellman 1988). Additionally, MTV was suffering from large-
scale inefficiency and overcapacity. It operated like a full channel employing over 700 
people, but produced less than ten weekly hours of in-house produced programming, 
while Kolmostelevisio’s staff numbered only 35 (Hellman 1988: 94). 
In 1989, an agreement was reached in negotiations between Yleisradio and MTV that 
Kolmostelevisio would become MTV’s subsidiary, and all of its programmes would be 
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migrated to this channel in 1993, leaving Yleisradio with two national advertising-free 
channels. The agreement was preceded with informal negotiations between 
Yleisradio and MTV, and Yleisradio’s AC accepted this resolution unanimously after it 
was agreed that MTV would operate under Yleisradio’s broadcasting licence for ten 
more years (Salokangas 1996: 408). MTV would also continue to subsidise Yleisradio 
by rental payments for the use of the transmission network (which Yleisradio owned 
and operated), together with a new ‘public service fee’; a levy on MTV’s income 
(Salokangas 2007: 49). Yleisradio’s intention was to keep MTV as a part – and an 
economic guarantor – of the public service system (Hellman 1999: 95). Salokangas 
(1996: 409) argues that the process was part of Yleisradio’s strategy to win more time 
for the duopoly in order to be more prepared to face the challenge of the anticipated 
liberalisation of broadcasting. 
In September 1992 the Minister of Transport – the minister in charge of 
telecommunications – Ole Norrback (Swedish People’s Party, SPP) appointed the 
Chairman of Yleisradio’s AC, Seppo Niemelä (Centre Party), to prepare a report on 
the ‘role of public service broadcasting in electronic media within the communication 
policies of the 1990s’ (cited in Hellman 1999: 99). While the report was strongly in 
favour of maintaining the established duopoly in broadcasting, its key 
recommendation was a reform in broadcasting legislation, which would split public 
and commercial broadcasting into two separate entities. The role and responsibilities 
of Yleisradio as a public service broadcaster, the report proposed, would be defined 
by skeleton legislation for broadcasting, which would also create a legal framework 
for issuing licences to commercial broadcasters and for their economic obligations to 
Yleisradio (Niemelä 1993: 52; Hellman 1999: 147). The report also recommended 
that MTV should be issued with a broadcasting licence of its own (Niemelä 1993: 52) 
– contrary to what was previously agreed between the companies.  
Following the publication of the Niemelä Report, the Minister of Transport, Ole 
Norrback, announced that in line with the report’s recommendations, the government 
would both strengthen Yleisradio’s institutional status in Finnish broadcasting system 
by legislative measures and grant an operation licence for MTV3. At this stage, 
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Yleisradio’s AC had no objections and was only concerned about the continuation of 
the company’s funding. Consequently, MTV3’s broadcasting licence was issued in 
September 1993. It was no longer regulated by Yleisradio, but directly by the Ministry 
of Transport, and gained a full institutional independence of Yleisradio’s oversight. 
This meant that Yleisradio’s AC lost even the hypothetical control on MTV3’s 
programming policies. 
MTV3’s broadcasting licence set some modest and rather vaguely worded 
programming requirements for the channel (Hellman 1999: 171-3). These included a 
requirement for the provision of ‘diverse programming of high quality’, which includes 
‘useful information and news, as well as appropriate entertainment’; a requirement for 
the inclusion of a ‘sufficient’ part of programming of domestic origin; and a 
requirement for ‘a sufficient amount’ of programming to ‘be understood by the 
Swedish-speaking population‘ (Valtioneuvosto 1993: para 2).39 Notably, neither the 
broadcasting licence of MTV3 nor the Ministry of Transport specified what constitutes 
a ‘sufficient amount’ or which public service programme types MTV3 was expected to 
provide. The fact that the Ministry of Transport paid little interest in monitoring MTV3’s 
compliance with these programming obligations demonstrates the polity’s faith in 
MTV3’s programming policies: the company was considered a trustworthy candidate 
to interpret these requirements without active supervision. In this respect, Hellman 
(1999: 101) notes that the outcome of the re-regulatory process reconciled elements 
of self-regulation by the broadcasting companies and external regulation by the state. 
The fact that no specific PSB obligations (apart from ‘useful information and news’) 
were specified in MTV3’s licence also reflects the Finnish pragmatist tradition of 
treating Yleisradio as the nation’s primary provider of public service television. 
However, MTV emphasised its public service role by introducing a wide portfolio of 
programming including programming associated with PSB such as news, current 
                                                 
39
 Moring and Wiik (2007) and Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring (2007) note that Swedish-language 
programmes on MTV/MTV3 consisted mainly of Swedish co-productions, while some Finnish 
programmes were subtitled in Swedish. The proportion of these programmes, however, was negligent 
compared with Yleisradio’s Swedish-language output. 
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affairs and minority interest programming, and becoming a full member of the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the European association of PSBs, in 1993 
(Hellman 1999: 98).  
The act of granting MTV3 a broadcasting licence annulled plans for skeleton 
legislation for broadcasting. In parliament, preparations for broadcasting legislation 
reform turned to concern Yleisradio alone. Along with securing the status of PSB, 
politicians had a growing interest in introducing a more business-like institutional 
structures and management for the company (Salokangas 1996: 430). This included 
replacing the post of the Director-General by Managing Director, which, according to 
Hellman (1999: 100) emphasised ‘corporate strategic aspects of operations and the 
company’s role as a media industrial firm instead of a cultural institution’, and 
introducing the director of television as a head of the directors of TV 1 and TV 2, thus 
enabling a better coordination between the two previously independently-operated 
channels, but removing a great degree of the previous internal pluralism within the 
company. The Act on Yleisradio Oy, enacted in December 1993, strengthened 
Yleisradio’s status by legally acknowledging its existence as the public broadcaster 
and guaranteeing it a privilege to broadcast without a renewable broadcasting 
licence, thus making it exempt from the decrees of the Act on Radio Equipment 1927 
still effective on commercial broadcasters. While granting these privileges, the Act 
was also remarkable in that for the first time it defined Yleisradio’s public service 
duties, which, until then, were largely set internally. The Act divided the duties of the 
company into ‘general public service’ and ‘special duties involving public service’. The 
general public service requirement stipulated that ‘the company shall be responsible 
for the provision of comprehensive television and radio programming for all citizens 
under equal conditions’ (Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993: s 7). In addition to the classic 
Reithian public service duties of supporting democracy and citizenship through 
comprehensive provision of informing and educational programming, the special 
duties involving public service stipulated by the Act included provision for minorities 
and special groups in the society, specifically referring to programmes in minority 
languages, educational and devotional programmes (Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993: s 
156 
 
 
 
7).40 Advertising on Yleisradio’s channels was ruled out by the Act (Act on Yleisradio 
Oy 1993: s 12).41  
 
4.3.6. The Government’s IT policy and digitalisation as catalysts for 
marketisation 
Jääsaari (2007: 73-4) associates the acceleration of marketisation in Finnish 
broadcasting policy with a new IT-focused industrial policy, adopted as a solution to 
economic problems caused by the severe recession of the early 1990s. The centre-
right Aho government (1991-1995) was particularly interested in developing national 
strategies for fostering the information society, and this enthusiasm was sustained by 
the subsequent Lipponen coalition governments (1995-2003)42. Importantly, the 
process was to be financed by businesses and consumers on a commercial basis, 
while the role of the government was limited to safeguarding the general prerequisites 
for developing the information society and, if necessary, to provide resources. Digital 
television was considered as one element of the strategy, and thus rapid digitalisation 
was seen as an essential part of the mission to take Finland to the international 
forefront in information and communication technology (ICT) development. As 
Kangaspunta (2006: 47) argues, economic and technological discourses; the more 
effective use of the broadcasting spectrum, together with the economic benefits 
received from new digital services, were used as the primary motives for 
digitalisation. The bundling of broadcasting strategies to the ICT strategy marked also 
                                                 
40
 Provision for children was added to these obligations by an amendment in 2005. 
41
 The original Act includes an exemption to this ban, allowing the Council of State to permit advertising 
in individual programmes ‘for particular reasons’ (Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993: s 13). In fact, Yleisradio 
broadcast advertising sporadically during major sporting events. All advertising and sponsorship of 
programmes was banned in a 2002 amendment (492/2002) of the Act. 
42
 Lipponen’s first and second cabinets were formed around Lipponen’s centre-left SDP and the centre-
right NCP, but also included ministers from the SPP, the Green League and the Left Alliance. The 
governments were in office for two terms in 1995-2003. 
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a branching point in the policy continuity, as broadcasting discourses of previous 
governments had addressed broadcasting in predominantly social and cultural terms. 
Jääsaari (2007: 94) argues that the seemingly neutral, technological framing of the 
digitalisation process provided an opportunity for the reshaping of interests and the 
introduction of new normative and cognitive ideas to Finnish broadcasting and 
communications policy making; thus, digitalisation provided the polity an opportunity 
to introduce marketised policy discourse to Finnish broadcasting policy paradigm. It 
featured the introduction of the norms and rules of the market in determining what 
was considered appropriate, fair and reasonable in policy considerations, 
accompanied by an increasing focus on choices of individual consumers and the right 
to the utilisation of the opportunities provided by the market (as opposed to the 
‘needs’ of viewers as citizens). Correspondingly, the principles of public service, 
‘culture’ and equality between regions and social groups were faded into background 
as justification for actions (Jääsaari 2007: 94-103). 
In September 1995, the newly-appointed Minister of Transport Tuula Linnainmaa 
(NCP) appointed another one-man committee to analyse the state of Finnish 
broadcasting and to outline a future strategy in response to the oncoming 
digitalisation of television and radio broadcasts (Hellman 1999: 156; Jääsaari 2007: 
75). The task was given to Jouni Mykkänen (NCP), a former Yleisradio director. While 
his report, like that of Niemelä, favoured the dual order of Finnish television, it 
contained recommendations that can be interpreted to be more clearly in favour of 
marketisation. While acknowledging that the analogue spectrum allows only one 
additional national television channel, the report recommended that a licence be 
granted for a commercial company to provide competition to MTV3. This, the report 
argues, would strengthen terrestrial broadcasters in competition against satellite 
broadcasting (Mykkänen 1995: 17). Technology policy (to pave way for digitalisation), 
industrial policy (to promote the independent production sector), employment policy 
(to create new jobs in the audiovisual sector) and financial aspects (to increase the 
television advertising turnover to the average western European level) are also 
mentioned as impetuses for the new channel; issues of programming policy, however, 
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were subordinate in the report, which does not address the preferred social and 
cultural objectives for the new channel (Mykkänen 1995; Hellman 1999: 156).  
In addition to introducing competition in the commercial broadcasting market, the 
Mykkänen report was also significant in that it makes recommendations, which 
formed the subsequent Finnish regulatory and licensing policy. While cross-media 
ownership was previously prevented by licensing practices, the report recommended 
that newspaper publishers should be allowed to partake in the business of 
broadcasting. More importantly, the report rejected the role of the state as a proactive 
regulator and the use of detailed programming obligations. The report referred to the 
negative experiences from granting too detailed programme obligations to local radio 
stations, which Mykkänen considered to have become ‘a dead letter’ as they could 
not be observed for mainly financial reasons. Instead, the overall assessment of the 
candidate prior to granting the licence should become the most important regulatory 
instrument (Mykkänen 1995: 35). This position was adapted as the policy approach to 
commercial channels’ regulation, and their programming obligations (while already 
missing quotas) began to be withdrawn gradually. In the 2000s, these obligations 
have been increasingly considered as part of Yleisradio’s exclusive duties (Moring 
and Wiik 2007: 442; Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring 2007: 104-114). 
In September 1996, the government granted an analogue broadcasting licence for the 
fourth national channel to Ruutunelonen, a fully owned subsidiary of the Sanoma 
Corporation, the publisher of Finland’s largest daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat. 
The channel commenced broadcasts on 1 June 1997 under the name Nelonen43. 
While concerns were expressed about overt concentration of Finnish media, the 
decision to grant the licence to Ruutunelonen reflects the pragmatic tradition in 
Finnish media policies in that the licence was awarded to a candidate which was 
deemed to have the best capacity to establish itself as a broadcaster and promote 
domestic culture in its programming, although in Nelonen’s case the decision can be 
considered to be based mainly on the robustness of the commercial strategy of the 
                                                 
43
 In English: “Four” or “Channel Four”. 
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candidate44 (Hellman 1999: 158-9). The fact that the competing application by A4 
Media included a much more culturally ambitious programming strategy emphasizes 
the pragmatist tradition in Finnish broadcasting policies, as the Ministry of Transport 
concluded that such a strategy would be likely fail commercially. The Ministry was 
also concerned of the fact that a candidate with an exclusive programming strategy 
would not yield enough profit to allow investments in the digitalisation (Hellman 1999: 
160). 
Nelonen’s strategy was significant in the sense that it was the first channel in Finland 
which did not aim to attract mass audiences from all groups in society, but targeted 
young urban viewers aged 10-44 years45 because of their perceived purchasing 
power and desirable consuming habits (Kaarlela 2004: 36-7). Thus, the channel’s 
programming was from the beginning strongly entertainment-oriented, consisting 
mainly of US-imported fiction and entertainment, which has constituted  40-50 per 
cent of the channel’s programming (Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring 2007: 110-1). 
Unlike MTV3, which still provided a relatively wide range of programming, Nelonen’s 
schedules contained little content associated with PSB, e.g. current affairs, domestic 
drama, arts and education (Kaarlela 2004, pp 46-8). Its entertainment-oriented 
schedules forced MTV3 to reassess its programming strategy, cut the size of its 
operations and focus more explicitly on commercially lucrative forms of content 
(Oksanen 2001; Virtanen 2001). 
Along with the recommendations of Mykkänen’s report, Nelonen’s broadcasting 
licence contained only vague programming obligations, similar to those of MTV3, but 
did not include the obligation to provide programming in Swedish (Hellman 1999: 173; 
                                                 
44
 While Sanoma Corporation already operated a semi-national cable network PTV (renamed PTV4 in 
1996 to highlight the network’s status as the fourth network), the decision to grant the licence to it can 
be considered to be based mainly on the financial strength of the candidate, as PTV’s programming 
consisted mainly of US fiction, entertainment and sports, with little domestic or factual content (Hellman 
1999). 
45
 This target audience was later adjusted to those aged 25-44 years, as affluent consumers favoured 
by advertisers were primarily in this age group (Kaarlela 2004). 
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Moring and Wiik 2007: 430).46 Programming obligations for the two commercial 
channels were harmonised and reduced further in the renewed licences issued in 
1999 for analogue and digital broadcasting, which no longer contain obligations for 
the provision of Swedish-language programming for MTV3 and Nelonen. These 
licences specified the provision of news, current affairs and entertainment as the only 
itemised programming requirements (Valtioneuvosto 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d). 
 
4.3.7. Digitalisation and its impact on broadcasting organisations 
The Act on Radio Equipment 1927 and the Act on Cable Broadcasting 1987 were 
replaced by the Act on Television and Radio Operations in January 1999. The Act 
maintained the practice of granting broadcasting licences through ‘beauty contest’, 
defining ‘safeguarding the diversity of the provision of programmes as well as the 
needs of special groups of the public’ as its policy aims (Act on Television and Radio 
Operations 1998: s 10). It also marked a significant degree of deregulation for cable 
television as it was released from any content obligations (other than those required 
by the EU Television Without Frontiers Directive [89/552/EEC]), since broadcasters 
on cable networks no longer required a broadcasting licence, but were only obliged to 
register with the Telecommunications Administration Centre (Hellman 1999: 174; 
Jääsaari 2007: 85).47 The Act also re-confirmed Yleisradio’s funding through 
revenues from television licence fees and ‘operation licence fees’, levied on 
commercial broadcasters’ income and formerly called public service fees, now paid 
into the State Television and Radio Fund instead of channelled to Yleisradio 
                                                 
46
 Moring and Wiik (2007) note that Nelonen had initially sporadic Swedish-language programming, 
consisting mainly of programmes produced in Sweden, and one mini-series specifically produced for 
the channel. Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring (2007) note that the latter served to improve the public 
image of the channel, even though its audience figures were low. 
47
 The obligations stipulated in cable channels’ licences had been minimal even before the 1998 Act, 
mostly concerning the minimum level of domestic content, with some limitations with regards to violent 
or pornographic content (Hellman 1999). 
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directly.48 These fees were remnants from MTV’s former role as Yleisradio’s auxiliary 
and collected in compensation for not providing certain minority interest programme 
types associated with full service but commercially unprofitable (Salokangas 2007: 
53). 
The legal status of the operating licence fee was, however, already being disputed by 
the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA). In its 1996 ruling, it concluded that the fees 
constituted a form of marked restraint by placing commercial terrestrial broadcasters 
in a disadvantaged position compared with commercial radio and cable television 
operators. The FCA questioned the justification for the fee, maintaining that both 
commercial broadcasters provided increasing levels of programming such as news, 
factual and current affairs output that satisfied the public service criteria. These 
considered, the Authority delivered a motion to the Ministry of Transport for the 
abolishment of the fee (Kilpailuvirasto 1996). FCA’s position was reflected in two 
reports compiled by the consulting company LTT-Tutkimus Oy (1997) and the 
Backman all-party working group (Backman 2001). Both reports were commissioned 
to scrutinise the financing of Yleisradio, and both concluded that the operation licence 
fees should be abolished in stages. The reports suggested that the consequent deficit 
in Yleisradio’s finances could be covered by increasing the licence fee, making 
Yleisradio’s operations more effective and selling its assets in technical distribution 
operations (LTT-Tutkimus Oy 1997; Backman 2001: 46-51). The subsequent report 
by the Niemelä committee (2004) on public service television and radio broadcasting 
in 2010 recommended that the fee should be waived altogether after the digital 
switchover. 
Digitalisation of Finnish television was carried out in a rather hasty process: the first 
digital licences were granted in 1999, while analogue broadcasts were ceased in 
2007. Yleisradio maintained its special status throughout the process, with one 
multiplex reserved for its channels The remaining multiplexes were allocated to 
commercial operators through an administrative process based on the commercial 
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 However, these funds were continued to be used exclusively to fund Yleisradio’s operations. 
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credibility and programming proposals of candidates in three licensing rounds so that 
in the autumn of 2009 30 channels were available on digital platform. Notably, in the 
two latter licensing rounds, 18 channels were allocated to subscription services, as 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications believed that pay-TV would stimulate 
the public to acquire digital set-top boxes, with just 63 per cent of the households 
owning one in 2006, just one year prior to the switchover (Miettinen 2006; Hellman 
2010). The high number of licences granted to subscription channels does not only 
highlight the polity’s policy focus of promoting economic and technological growth in 
the broadcasting sector, but also the polity’s willingness to accept subscription 
services as substitutes to FTA services in increasing the available viewing options. 
The digital switchover has also presented difficulties to Yleisradio’s finances. In 
accordance with the recommendations of the Backman committee (2001), the 
operation licence fees of commercial broadcasters – representing some 10 per cent 
of Yleisradio’s income – were halved in 2002, which instantly created a funding gap of 
25 million euros on Yleisradio’s budget for 2003 (F&L Management Services Oy and 
Asianajotoimisto Peltonen 2004: 40).49 The fees were abolished altogether after the 
completion of the digital switchover in 2007. As a result, Yleisradio has been forced to 
cut its staff numbers by nearly a third between 2000 and 2008 (Yleisradio Oy 2001, 
2009b). All this has taken place in a period of heavy investments in digital 
broadcasting technology, rapid expansion of broadcasting hours and the introduction 
of new services on digital platforms, and has meant that production resources have 
been compromised. 
Jääsaari (2007: 98) argues that the digitalisation process served to shift the balance 
of private interests in regulatory considerations between public and private interests 
towards the latter by strengthening the position of commercial television through 
gradual withdrawal of the financial obligations regarding public service funding. The 
fact that the original broadcasting licences of MTV3 and Nelonen imposed only 
                                                 
49
 The 2002 amendment which banned its special right to broadcast advertising during major sporting 
events cost Yleisradio a further 1.7 million euros annually (F&L Management Services Oy 2004). 
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minimal constraints to their operations and even these were further reduced in 1999 – 
in line with Mykkänen’s recommendations – also served to strengthen commercial 
interests in these broadcasters’ agendas. While the digitalisation process saw the end 
of the tradition of commercial broadcasters contributing in Yleisradio’s financing in 
exchange for their lesser participation in the public service programming provision, 
commercial broadcasters’ programming obligations were not increased in the 
process. Instead, along the neo-liberal notion adopted by the polity that the free 
market – rather than the state – is the most capable to address the policy objectives 
of digitalisation (Jääsaari 2007: 108-9), emerging digital services were expected to 
increase the diversity in channels available to viewers, and, in so doing, serve to 
increase the diversity in programming available to viewers. However, the polity 
adopted a revised interpretation of the concept of diversity, associating in with 
diversity in different viewing options rather than representing actual diversity in 
programme content, i.e. programming for different audiences and tastes (Jääsaari 
2007: 111; Hellman 2010). Hellman’s study (2010) on Finnish DTT channels actually 
demonstrates that most of the channels focus on commercially profitable types of 
programme types, e.g. sports, films, music and adult entertainment, and the actual 
diversity of different programme types has not increased. Hellman (2010) concludes 
that the Finnish DTT system represent a ‘poor man’s version of satellite television’, 
whose viewing options resemble those of subscription satellite television. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
A comparison of the marketisation-driven institutional changes in the UK and Finland 
reveals a number of similarities considering the significant differences in the political 
and economic characteristics between the countries. Until the mid-1980s, commercial 
broadcasting in both the UK and Finland was subordinated to goals and values of the 
PSB paradigm. This traditional policy equilibrium was punctuated in the mid-1980s by 
broadly similar technological, political-ideological and economic forces as examined 
in chapter 2. The norms and rules of the free market in determining what was 
considered appropriate, fair and reasonable were gradually introduced as guidelines 
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to broadcasting policy considerations. In the UK, political and ideological motives 
were primary in the process, and the introduction of neo-liberal initiatives into the 
broadcasting policies as well as the institutional culture of the BBC can be associated 
with the greater neo-liberal social and economic reforms of the Thatcher 
administration (1979-1990). In Finland, on the other hand, elements of the marketised 
policy paradigm were rather paradoxically initially adopted as a defensive measure to 
sustain the established duopoly against the influx of foreign cable and satellite 
channels. Thus, while the reasons were technological and economic, they were not 
ideological in that no party had a political motive to question the role of Yleisradio in 
the system. 
By the mid-1990s, the neo-liberal policy discourse had penetrated the political 
spectrum. Media policy focus shifted towards promoting economic growth in the 
media and communications sectors. Both New Labour in the UK and SDP in Finland 
adopted the neo-liberal policy position that economic growth in the audiovisual and 
ICT sectors can be best fostered through greater commercial competition and lesser 
public intervention. The seemingly neutral, technological framing of the digitalisation 
process provided an apt vehicle for the polity to introduce the neo-liberal policy 
discourse into communication policies. As a result, a series of policy reforms, whose 
primary objective was to foster growth in the ICT industries and address the 
challenges of the emerging telecommunications convergence more effectively, were 
performed in the UK and Finland. In broadcasting policy considerations, the 
prominence of these technological and economic aspects over the social and cultural 
concerns increased further, while traditional approaches to content regulation began 
to be increasingly considered hindering growth in the commercial broadcasting 
markets. Concurrently, the discourse of individual consumer choice was adopted, 
while the principles of public service, ‘culture’ and equality between regions and social 
groups were faded into the background in broadcasting policy objectives. The new 
channels launched in this period; Channel 5 in the UK and Nelonen in Finland, were 
allowed to start with a geographically limited service that targeted urban viewers that 
were most attractive to advertisers. This indicates that the polity were willing to 
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compromise the past policy focus of universality and geographical equality in 
broadcasting services to commercial objectives. 
Deregulatory measures that further reduced public service obligations of the 
commercial broadcasters were introduced. In the UK, the remodelled regulatory 
framework introduced in the Communications Act 2003 represented the greatest 
critical juncture for minority programme provision, as it featured a move to self-
regulation with respect to many categories of minority interest content. Similarly, 
programming obligations stipulated for Finnish commercial broadcasters were relaxed 
in the late 1990s. The broadcasting licence of Nelonen, issued in 1997, contained 
fewer obligations than that of MTV3, and the digital licences of both MTV3 and 
Nelonen were harmonised in 1999 with no other references to minority interest 
provision than a vague obligation for diversity in programming. The hasty launch of 
DTT increased the freedom of commercial broadcasting sector and competition 
between broadcasters further. It also marked the end of the longstanding practice of 
levying of commercial broadcasters’ profits in order to finance the operations of 
Yleisradio, resulting in severe cuts in the company’s budget. 
In terms of the impact of the aforementioned policy changes on broadcasting 
institutions, the impact of the four fronts of marketisation examined in chapter 2 could 
be identified in the following changes in the institutional cultures of UK and Finnish 
broadcasting organisations. First, in terms of policy focus, a shift took place from the 
previous social and cultural considerations in broadcasting policies that maintained 
the previous PSB orthodoxy, towards economic and commercial objectives. As 
suggested by van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) (see section 2.3.2), the 
broadcasting policy focus shifted towards promoting economic and technological 
growth in the sector in both the UK and Finland. The operational freedom of 
commercial broadcasting sector was increased through liberalisation of the sector 
and reorientation of regulation, which saw a gradual reduction in commercial 
broadcasters’ public service obligations. The delivery of public service programming 
began to be increasingly considered the exclusive duty of public broadcasters. 
Second, a shift took place in the interpretation of the concept of public service. As 
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examined in section 2.3.2, public service in broadcasting was increasingly interpreted 
as ‘broadcasting in the service of the listener/viewer’ (Syvertsen 1999: 6-7) by 
broadcasting institutions and regulatory organisations. While the previous 
interpretation of the public service paradigm was based on normative knowledge on 
audience’s presumed ‘needs’ (as defined by the elites), this consumerist 
interpretation of public service uses preferences of mass audience in building its 
programming policy and priorities. In the UK, the practices adopted by the BBC and 
Ofcom to set their public service priorities based on viewing preferences of the 
audiences (see e.g. BBC 2004; Ofcom 2008a, 2008b) illustrate this approach. Third, 
broadcasting institutions that were previously considered primarily as cultural 
institutions and whose organisational structures and institutional values reflected their 
cultural objectives were encouraged or compelled to adopt corporate structures and 
institutional practices. Corporate yardsticks such as efficiency of operations and 
audience maximisation were adopted as measures of assessing the functioning of the 
broadcasting institutions. 
There are, however, notable differences in the extent of changes between the UK and 
Finland that reflect institutional features distinct to these two broadcasting systems. 
While it was demonstrated in section 4.3.5 that there has been a shift in the focus of 
Finnish broadcasting policies, the aforementioned shifts were less pronounced in 
Yleisradio’s institutional structures and practices. This reflects Yleisradio’s special role 
in the broadcasting system and the traditional division of labour between public 
service and commercial broadcasting in Finland. The light-touch regulatory approach 
carried out through a policy of licensing (i.e. structural regulation) instead of 
employing a regulator to monitor programming was a by-product of this Yleisradio-
centred policy. It featured loose programming obligations stipulated in commercial 
broadcasters’ broadcasting licences that were a legacy of MTV’s role as Yleisradio’s 
auxiliary; an arrangement that gave Yleisradio’s a significant regulatory control over 
MTV’s programming and made it unnecessary to establish an external regulator. In 
comparison to the UK BBC-ITV duopoly, the Finnish arrangement undermined 
commercial broadcasters’ role in providing public service programming. 
Consequently, they were given no detailed public service programming obligations, 
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but were allowed to define the programme types and volumes of programming they 
deemed to fulfil the obligations for comprehensive programming by themselves. 
Yleisradio’s public service role, in turn, has been gradually enhanced by articulating 
its public service obligations in state legislation. While the pre-1993 broadcasting 
licences of Yleisradio defined the company’s public service duties in vague terms, 
thus leaving largely to Yleisradio’s administration to interpret the essence of these 
duties, in enacting the Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993 the polity assumed the responsibility 
to define these duties in more exclusive terms (Salokangas 1996: 430). These duties 
were increased further in a 2005 amendment to the Act, while Yleisradio’s 
commercial functions were limited by amending section 12 of the Act that allowed the 
company to sell advertising by the special permission of the Council of State in 2002. 
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5. Case I: Children’s programmes 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter will examine changes in the patterns of provision of children’s 
programming in the UK and Finland between 1986 and 2009 utilising the Industrial 
Equilibrium Model in analysing forces that have contributed to changes in children’s 
programming. The analysis will focus on changes in broadcasters’ performance, 
manifested by television output (volume, content, scheduling and origin). Each of 
these attributes will be subjected to individual analysis. As the model proposes, 
changes in television output are treated as indicators of punctuations in the corporate 
strategies and programming policies, which stem from changes in the broadcasting 
environment to which an institution is compelled to react by amending its conduct. By 
examining patterns of consistency and change in programming, this chapter provides 
an empirical account of the effects of neo-liberal marketisation on broadcasters’ 
institutional policies with regards to children’s programming. Interviews with industry 
professionals and primary and secondary source documents serve as additional 
evidence. 
Analysis of the programming output in the chosen research period is somewhat 
problematic, as significant changes have taken place in the Finnish and UK 
broadcasting environment and associated viewing habits. While children’s 
programmes in the 1980s were provided mostly by terrestrial channels and the reach 
of cable and satellite channels with children’s programming was relatively low, 
children’s viewing has rapidly migrated to specialist children’s channels and the 
Internet in the 2000s. Therefore, provision on the main generalist channels is in 
decline particularly in the UK, where an increasing number of children’s channels are 
available, and both the BBC and ITV now provide programming on their own 
children’s channels (CBBC, CBeebies and CITV). These channels now have to 
compete with an increasing number of dedicated children’s channels. While just 6 
such channels could be received in the UK in 1998, the number of these mainly 
commercial channels totalled 22 in 2007, with a total combined output of  over 
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100,000 annual hours of programming50 (Ofcom 2007: 22-4). As these channels 
operate on cable, satellite and online platforms, they are effectively exempt from 
content regulatory obligations that apply to CBBC and CBeebies. Thus they are able 
to fill their schedules with populist and cost-effective content such as imported 
animation, which gives them both popular and commercial advantage over channels 
with public service obligations: their combined viewing share amongst children in 
cable and satellite households totalled 26 per cent of total viewing in 2006 (Ofcom 
2007: 92). Owing to the differences in the nature of provision on these channels to 
main generalist channels, the outputs of dedicated children’s channels will be 
analysed mainly separately, as their high volumes of output, together with the high 
proportion of repeats on these channels, make direct comparison fruitless. 
The empirical evidence underpinning this chapter was produced by the author’s 
research on children’s programming using programme data from television listings 
and databases, closer details of which are detailed in chapter 3. Two one-week 
sample periods, in May and November, were selected for each year. Thus, the 
volume of output depicted in the charts represents that of these two-week samples 
rather than a weekly average. 
 
5.2. The volume of output of children’s programmes 
As noted in previous studies on children’s programming (e.g. Blumler 1992a; 
Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997; Buckingham et al. 1999; Ofcom 2007; 
Suoninen 2007a), the volume of children’s output has continued to grow progressively 
since the 1980s in both countries owing to an expansion of broadcasting, facilitated 
by liberalisation of industry structures and regulatory changes in broadcasting 
policies. The 1990s saw an escalated growth in programming, largely as a 
consequence of new terrestrial channels being introduced, which all adopted 
children’s programmes in their schedules. In addition, individual channels felt obliged 
to increase their provisions in order to be better able to compete with one another and 
                                                 
50
 Includes output of the CITV channel. 
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the emerging challenge from cable and satellite platforms. As illustrated in table 5.1, 
the volume of children’s output on general interest channels in both the UK and 
Finland has more than doubled between 1986 and 1998. Charts 5.1 and 5.2 
demonstrate that publicly funded channels in particular have increased their 
provisions in response to the introduction of new commercial channels’ competing 
strands of children’s programming. However, the growth on commercially funded 
channels seems to have slowed down in the 2000s indicating that a ‘saturation point’, 
where it is no longer commercially feasible to increase the volume of provision, has 
been reached. In contrast, the output on the main channels exhibits a slight decline in 
the UK, where commercial channels have recently cut their provisions following the 
enactment of the Communications Act 2003, which cancelled the statutory quotas for 
the provision of children’s programmes. 
 
Table 5.1: Average weekly hours of children’s programmes on general interest 
channels 
 UK Finland51 
1986 – 1990 41:29 14:30 
1991 – 1995 55:35 15:25 
1996 – 2000 71:45 23:28 
2001 – 2005 88:55 28:47 
2006 – 2009 84:49 32:28 
 
                                                 
51
 Figures include Swedish-language output. Changes in the volume of Swedish-language 
programming will be scrutinised in more detail in section 5.6. 
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Chart 5.1: Hours of output of children’s programmes on main channels in the sample 
weeks in the UK, 1986-2009 
 
 
Chart 5.2: Hours of output of children’s programmes on main channels in the sample 
weeks in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
The provision on UK free-to-air (FTA) digital children’s channels, launched in the 
2000s, has greatly added on the total volume of children’s programmes, as illustrated 
in chart 5.3. Each of these channels now provides nearly the same amount of 
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programming as the five general interest channels together, and the introduction of 
CBBC and CBeebies in 2002 and CITV in 2006 has tripled the dedicated 
programming available to child viewers. With the viewing of children’s programmes 
continuing to migrate to these channels as a consequence of increasing digital 
penetration and audience figures for generalist channels’ children’s programmes 
declining (Ofcom 2007), the provision of digital children’s channels will play an even 
more important role. Such FTA channels do not exist in Finland, where Yleisradio has 
chosen to focus its strategy on developing children’s online services instead (Teija 
Rantala, author’s interview, 17 December 2010). 
 
Chart 5.3: Hours of output of children’s programmes in the sample weeks in the UK, 
1986-2009, including free-to-air children’s channels52 
 
Charts 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate that there has been a shift in the provision from 
commercial to publicly funded channels following commercial channels’ cuts in 
children’s programming in the 2000s. The shift has been less pronounced in the UK, 
where commercially funded channels still provide around 45 per cent of the output. 
Nevertheless, considering that these channels’ output accounted for on average 55 
per cent of the output in the 1990s, the shift can be considered notable. The inclusion 
                                                 
52
 Figures exclude CBBC’s programming for schools. 
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of the UK FTA children’s channels into these figures makes this division starker and 
highlight the BBC’s central role in the provision of children’s programming, as the 
CBBC channel and CBeebies provide twice the volume of programming of the CITV 
Channel. In Finland, commercial broadcasters’ share of all children’s output has seen 
an even more dramatic decline. In the early-to-mid 2000s the two commercial 
channels provided up to 45 per cent of the output, but this proportion has since 
declined to just 28 per cent. Consequently, children’s television is increasingly 
dependent on the activities of publicly funded broadcasters in both locations. 
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Chart 5.4: Share of total children’s output between publicly funded and commercial 
channels in the UK, main channels 
 
Chart 5.5: Share of total children’s output between publicly funded and commercial 
channels in Finland, main channels 
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5.2.1. Volume of output on publicly funded channels 
Charts 5.6 and 5.7 represent the volume of children’s programming on publicly 
funded general interest channels in the UK and Finland. Both the BBC and Yleisradio 
saw a radical increase in their general interest channels’ children’s programming over 
the research period, whose volume more than doubled. On the BBC channels, this 
increase has been stable and constant, while Yleisradio’s programming has seen a 
radical expansion only in the late 2000s. 
Although both Yleisradio and the BBC had two channels in the 1980s, the volume of 
the BBC’s children’s programming in the late 1980s was notably higher than that of 
Yleisradio’s at the time, with around 20 hours of weekly programming. This reflected 
the fact that the BBC had long been forced to compete against ITV’s counter-
scheduled programmes, and thus children’s programmes did not employ such a 
pronounced pedagogic-paternalistic agenda as Yleisradio’s programmes were able to 
employ owing to Yleisradio’s virtual monopoly on children’s programming. Weekend 
mornings featured entertainment shows and ‘cartoon marathons’, which were absent 
from Yleisradio’s schedules. The output concentrated on BBC1, while BBC2 provided 
only 2-3 hours of programming per week, consisting mainly of daytime educational 
preschool series (e.g. You and me). While the volume of BBC1’s programming 
remained somewhat unchanged, BBC2’s output grew rapidly in the 1990s and 
overtook that of BBC1 in 1997. The growth in the BBC’s output reflects the increasing 
competition against children’s channels on cable and satellite platforms (Buckingham 
et al. 1999: 57) – TNT and The Cartoon Network were launched in 1993 and the 
Disney Channel in 1995 (Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997: 77). In the period 
between 2006 and 2009, the Corporation provided on average 44 weekly hours of 
children’s programming on its two main channels. 
Yleisradio’s children’s output in Finland in the late 1980s was still limited to just about 
ten hours of weekly programming, of which roughly two hours were in Swedish. 
Saturdays and Sundays featured on average one hour of additional programming, but 
elements commonly associated with commercial channels’ children’s programming, 
such as weekend morning ‘cartoon marathons’, were still absent. In terms of the 
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volume and structure of provision, programming still indicated a commitment to 
Reithian paternalism and measured pedagogic values, which included controlling 
children’s viewing habits by prescriptive programming practices. Yleisradio’s 
traditional children’s programming strategy favoured presenter-led magazines, which, 
according to TV 2’s producer of children’s programmes Anna-Liisa Kirsi (author’s 
interview, 17 December 2010), contained a varied mini-schedule of informative, 
educational and entertainment-based content. Heikki Takkinen, former screenwriter 
and presenter of TV 1’s preschool magazines Noppa and Lasten TV Puoli Kuusi, 
noted in author’s interview (29 April 2010) that programming was not even intended to 
be extensive, but Yleisradio’s then children’s programming policy was to discourage 
‘excessive’ viewing in accordance with classic ideals of Reithianism. The length of 
individual children’s programme slots was also limited to circa 30-60 minutes, and 
lengthy ring-fenced children’s programme blocks (such as the CBBC or CITV blocks) 
did not exist. As the schedules of neither Kolmoskanava (TV 3) nor MTV3 were 
extensive enough to challenge Yleisradio’s hegemony in the provision of children’s 
programmes, Yleisradio’s programming policies with in this respect sustained the 
state of equilibrium. In addition, because of Finland’s small size and linguistic 
isolation, Yleisradio had little competition in children’s programming from cable and 
satellite platforms. Consequently, its average children’s output grew only moderately; 
from 12 hours 8 minutes weekly between 1986 and 1990 to 12 hours 26 minutes in 
the 1991-1995 period. 
Another unique feature of the Finnish system was that both TV 1 and TV 2 had their 
own independent children’s programming units; a practice which originated from the 
1960s when Tesvisio was acquired by Yleisradio, resulting in two institutionally 
independent units. Because of this institutional independence, both units had their 
own distinctive institutional cultures, while operating under the general programming 
policy guidelines of Yleisradio. Thus, while there was little competition in 
programming from commercial channels, the arrangement constituted a degree of 
internal plurality in the system. Swedish-language programmes were gathered under 
a single production unit, Finlands svenska television (FST) in 1988, and Swedish-
language children’s programmes were thereafter broadcast mostly on TV 2 
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overlapping with TV 1’s Finnish-language programming. Only in the early 1990s was 
a division of labour established between the two channels, with TV 1 concentrating on 
catering for schoolchildren and teenagers; and TV 2 on preschool programming. The 
company’s two separate children’s programme departments were merged in 2001 
under TV 2’s organisation, and since 2003 most Finnish children’s programmes have 
been broadcast on TV 2 (Suoninen 2007a: 504).  
Changes in the industry structure – namely the intensification of competition from 
commercial channels (Nelonen started its operations in 1997) – finally created a force 
strong enough to force Yleisradio to depart from its traditional paternalist practices in 
children’s programming in the late 1990s. The significance of children’s programming 
as a vehicle of public value began to increase, as Yleisradio saw that it could use its 
role as the sole provider of Finnish children’s programming to justify the case of PSB 
further in the multi-channel broadcasting environment, where its status was no longer 
as self-evident as it had been during its de jure monopoly. Furthermore, the 1993 Act 
on Yleisradio Oy was amended in 2005 to include provision for children as a statutory 
requirement. Consequently, Yleisradio allocated additional resources on children’s 
programmes, which facilitated the introduction of daily morning schedules for children 
in 2008. This doubled TV 2’s children’s output, introducing ten additional hours of 
weekly programming. Teija Rantala (author’s interview, 17 December 2010), 
Yleisradio’s incumbent Head of Children’s Programmes, notes that increasing the 
volume of programming was part of Yleisradio’s institutional strategy to improve the 
share of viewing of its children’s programmes, thus granting the company with a 
competitive advantage over its commercial rivals. Swedish children’s programmes 
were migrated to the digital FST5 channel in 2007, which too facilitated an increase in 
the volume of Swedish-language programming. All these actions together increased 
the average weekly output of Yleisradio’s children’s programmes by 39 per cent from 
the first half of the 2000s to the second one, averaging 21 hours 28 minutes between 
2006 and 2009. Considering that Yleisradio has undergone severe cuts in its budgets 
and staff levels in the 2000s – it has lost a quarter of its income following the gradual 
abolition of commercial channels’ broadcasting licence fees – its significant expansion 
in children’s provision in the late 2000s can be considered a considerable investment 
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and signal that children’s programmes are now placed at the centre of Yleisradio’s 
institutional priorities. 
Chart 5.6: Hours of output of children’s programmes on the BBC’s main channels in 
the sample weeks in the UK, 1986-2009 
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Chart 5.7: Hours of output of children’s programmes on Yleisradio’s main channels in 
the sample weeks in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
While there undoubtedly has been a great increase in the volume of the output, much 
of it has been facilitated by increased use of repeats. As growth has taken place 
during a period in which PSBs’ programming has in general grown dramatically with 
the advent of digital channels, but without significant rises in licence fee revenues, 
PSBs have been unable to keep up with the expanding schedules through the supply 
of more original programming. Thus, Anna Home (author’s interview, 2 November 
2010) argues that while this expansion has created more airtime, it has not 
necessarily created any more new content owing to the high proportion of repeats. 
CBBC and CBeebies channels feature particularly high repeat rates of up to 95 per 
cent (Ofcom 2010a). Likewise, Virve Schroderus and Teija Rantala (author’s 
interviews, 17 December 2010) note that the repeat cycle for Yleisradio’s children’s 
programmes has become shorter and the proportion of repeats has increased slightly. 
Moreover, the increase in the volume of Yleisradio’s children’s programmes has been 
largely facilitated with an increasing proportion of imports and acquisitions. This will 
be scrutinised in more detail in section 5.5.1. 
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5.2.2. Volume of output on commercial channels 
As illustrated by charts 5.8 and 5.9, the volume of children’s programmes on 
commercial channels in both the UK and Finland generally benefited from the 
expansion of commercial broadcasting in the 1990s, with new channels established in 
this period (Channel 5 in the UK and Nelonen in Finland) adopting children’s 
programmes in their schedules. The intensification of competition in the 2000s has 
prompted most channels to adopt a more outright commercial strategy in their 
programming and cut their provision of children’s programmes correspondingly. In the 
UK in particular, the influence of changes in broadcasting policies has been influential 
in this process, with the Communications Act 2003 representing a major critical 
juncture in commercial broadcasters’ programming strategies. 
Children’s programming in the UK was traditionally ITV’s forte. It provided over 80 per 
cent of commercial channels’ children’s programmes in the 1980s. ITV featured a 
weekday afternoon ‘mini-schedule’ complementary to the BBC’s children’s 
programming, together with its weekend morning ‘children’s entertainment 
marathons’, provided by the breakfast franchises TV-AM and, since 1993, GMTV. In 
addition, ITV had a 30-minute slot for educational preschool programming at noon 
weekdays. The volume of ITV’s output in the late 1980s was comparable to that of 
BBC1, with an average of 15 hours 36 minutes of weekly programming between 1986 
and 1990. 
Although the Broadcasting Act 1990 represented a critical juncture for ITV with 
respect to its programming strategy by bringing the IBA’s control over its schedules to 
an end, the provision of the act to ensure that a ‘sufficient amount of time’ was 
dedicated to children’s programmes (The Broadcasting Act 1990: s 16), and detailed 
quotas were introduced for ITV companies containing detailed obligations for 
provision of different types of children’s programmes, as well as original programmes 
and regional productions53 served as a counter-balance that safeguarded ITV’s 
                                                 
53
 More precisely, Granada Television’s broadcasting licence effective from 1 January 1993 set the 
following weekly obligations for children’s programmes: 2 hours 3 minutes of drama, 8 hours 9 minutes 
of entertainment and 56 minutes of information. In addition, Granada’s obligation included 6 hours 56 
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equilibrium from forces that arose from the intensification of the competition in the UK 
broadcasting market in the 1990s, and the volume of ITV’s programming remained 
unchanged until the mid-2000s. The Act also licenced Channel 5, which eventually 
began broadcasting in 1997. Its licence bid included a pledge to broadcast around 14 
hours 40 minutes of children’s television per week, which was later formally set as a 
quota in its first broadcasting licence (Independent Television Commission 2003).54 
Most of the channel’s children’s output (branded Milkshake!) was scheduled in the 
early morning (as the channel felt unable to compete with the BBC’s and ITV’s 
afternoon programming) and was aimed at preschool children (Ofcom 2007: 9). 
By contrast, Channel 4’s contribution to children’s television until the mid-1980s was 
marginal: while some regular commissioned factual and educational titles can be 
singled out (such as The Pocket Money Programme), the average weekly output 
totalled only 4 hours and 50 minutes. This reflects the fact that children’s programmes 
were not initially considered a core priority in the company’s agenda, as they were 
already sufficiently served by the BBC and ITV. Channel 4’s original remit was 
considered to complement rather than compete with that of ITV, and Channel 4’s 
licence did not impose a quota for children’s programming (Buckingham et al. 1999: 
64). 
In Finland, prior to the 1993 Channel Reform, the commercial broadcaster MTV did 
not provide programmes which targeted preschool audiences. Under a mutual 
agreement between Yleisradio and MTV, these were considered Yleisradio’s 
exclusive (Tauno Äijälä, personal communication, 2 October 2011), reflecting the 
Finnish perception of commercial television as a complementary service that was not 
                                                                                                                                                         
minutes of regional children’s programming per annum, increased to 8 hours 40 minutes in 1997 
(Independent Television Commission 1991). 
54
 This quota for Channel 5 in its original 1997 broadcasting licence was 5 hours 30 minutes of drama, 
3 hours 40 minutes of entertainment and 5 hours 30 minutes of information (including preschools) per 
week. These quotas were amended in numerous variations to the licence; to 608 hours per annum (or 
11 hours 40 minutes per week) in 2001, and reduced further to 570 hours per annum (or 10 hours 56 
minutes per week) in 2003.  
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supposed to compete with Yleisradio in its central domains of public service provision, 
including children’s programming. In spite of this, the sample weeks between 1986 
and 1992 contain a few programmes that meet the characteristics of children’s 
programmes, indicating MTV’s desire to demonstrate its commitment to ‘full service’. 
This strategy, masterminded by MTV Oy’s then-Programme Controller Tauno Äijälä 
and the company’s former CEO Pentti Hanski, was part of its strategy to gain 
institutional independence and a channel of its own. Due to the low level of MTV’s 
output on Yleisradio’s channels in the mid-to-late 1980s (around 20 hours per week), 
the volume of children’s programmes is insufficient to make any further 
generalisations of MTV’s children’s programming. Regular output for children on 
commercial channels commenced only in 1987, when Kolmoskanava (TV 3) adopted 
children’s programmes into its schedules. However, throughout its existence, 
Kolmoskanava’s children’s output was limited to 2.5-3 weekly hours of programming, 
and as such it did not seriously challenge Yleisradio’s hegemony in children’s 
programming. The volume of commercial output began to grow only in the mid-1990s, 
when MTV3 began extending its weekend morning entertainment slots and 
introduced programming on early weekday afternoons. The fourth national channel 
Nelonen began broadcasting in 1997, and together these channels provided on 
average 8 hours and 56 minutes of weekly programming in the 1996-2000 period. 
Continuous growth in broadcasting hours and modest competition between terrestrial 
channels had positive effects on commercial channels’ children’s programming, 
whose output peaked in both countries in the first half of the 2000s. However, 
changes stemming from the broadcasting industry structure; intensification of 
competition and financial pressures created by the maturing television advertising 
market and fragmentation of audiences, together with changes in public policies that 
directly affect the conduct of broadcasting institutions (i.e. content regulation policies) 
created pressures for commercial broadcasters that eventually punctuated their 
equilibria, forcing them to respond by changing their conduct and adopting a strategy 
that focused more explicitly on lucrative types of populist programming for adult 
audiences. In the UK, the Communications Act 2003 served as a critical juncture for 
commercial channels’ programming policies, as it removed ITV’s and Channel 5’s 
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statutory quotas for children’s programmes. Another, although less dramatic, external 
shock was Ofcom’s 2007 ban on ‘junk food’ advertising in children’s programmes 
(Steemers and D'Arma 2013: 131-2). In addition, changes that were more 
evolutionary in nature took place in the broadcasting industry structure. Competition 
for viewers intensified following the increase in the multi-channel penetration in the 
early 2000s, while competition from transnational children’s channels intensified 
concurrently. Structural challenges to commercial channels’ core business (a 
maturing, possibly declining television advertising market), accompanied by 
fragmentation of audiences and the migration of viewing from main terrestrial 
channels to digital niche channels (Ofcom 2007: 71-2; D'Arma et al. 2010: 231-2), 
have also created pressures to commercial channels for behaviour modification 
(Steemers and D'Arma 2013: 131-2). 
In response to these cumulative pressures stemming from changes in the industry 
structure and public policies, commercial broadcasters have changed their conduct by 
adopting strategies that give priority to audience maximisation and commercial profit 
generation, and favour populist content accordingly. The combined output of 
commercial channels in the sample weeks of this research decreased by 14 per cent 
in the UK and 17 per cent in Finland between the 2001-2005 and 2006-2009 periods. 
In the UK, the decrease would have been even more radical had Channel 5 not 
increased its provision during the period. In the face of commercial pressures, ITV in 
particular have adopted a more pronounced commercial strategy (Steemers and 
D'Arma 2013: 131-2). The renewal of ITV network broadcasting licences in December 
2004 served as a critical juncture in ITV’s programming policy, as it removed the 
statutory quotas for children’s programmes. ITV’s children’s programming was 
subsequently subject to severe cuts, with its daytime children’s programming 
replaced with more lucrative forms of programming, such as soaps and game shows. 
While ITV delivered ten hours of weekly programming in 2005, it unilaterally dropped 
this commitment to four hours in 2007 and further down to 40 hours annually – i.e. 
less than one hour per week – in 2009 (Ofcom 2010b), arguing that transmissions on 
general interest channels are no longer economically viable in the face of competition 
from well-resourced competitors such as Disney and Nickleodeon (D'Arma et al. 
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2010: 231-2; Steemers and D'Arma 2013: 131).55 Consequently, while empirical data 
demonstrates that it provided an average of 16 hours 23 minutes of weekly 
programming between 2001 and 2005, its average weekly provision of children’s 
programmes declined to 8 hours 5 minutes in the 2007-2009 period. 
Changes of a similar nature have taken place with Channel 4’s programming policy, 
although given the fact that Channel 4 had no children’s programming quotas, the 
process started in the 1990s. Channel 4 gained full institutional independence in 1993 
as per the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1990, which effectively made Channel 4 
a rival of ITV and introduced commercial competition to the British terrestrial 
broadcasting market. The competitive entry represented a major critical juncture for 
Channel 4’s corporate strategy. Channel 4’s institutional response to these changes 
in the industry structure was to adopt a more populist agenda in its programming that 
was more explicitly focused on commercial profit maximising. The increasing 
awareness of strategy, installed by Channel 4’s new Chief Executive Michael Jackson 
in 1997, placed market analysis into a central role in the corporation. The 1999 
corporate strategy for the channel proposed that Channel 4 should centre its brand on 
film, entertainment, sports and factual programming, while diversity – originally a key 
concept in Channel 4’s remit – was not addressed in this strategy (Born 2003: 210-1). 
Children’s programmes (particularly those scheduled in the afternoon and early 
evening) were replaced with more commercially lucrative types of programming 
targeting grown-ups, and the channel’s focus with regards to young audiences turned 
more towards the more commercially lucrative markets of teenagers instead. 
Changes in Channel 4’s strategy were reflected in its programming, with empirical 
data demonstrating that its children’s programming entered a slow but steady decline 
in the mid-1990s. By 2006 it was no longer commissioning first-run original 
programmes for children. Thenceforth, its children’s output was made up of a low 
volume of animation, together with repeats of preschool programmes (Ofcom 2007: 
                                                 
55
 In 2010 ITV informed Ofcom that it did not intend to specify any minimum amount for its children’s 
programming, indicating that it was prepared to drop children’s programming altogether if commercial 
demands so required (Ofcom 2010b). 
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25). Consequently, by the 2006-2009 period, Channel 4’s average weekly output had 
declined to 6 hours 47 minutes. 
In the light of the above, Channel 5’s sustaining commitment to children’s television is 
an interesting case to consider. It appears to have been largely immune to the 
pressures that have forced ITV and Channel 4 to adopt programming policies that 
focus more exclusively on older audiences. Between 2006 and 2009, Channel 5 
provided an average of 23 hours 56 minutes of weekly children’s programming, which 
is well above the previous ITC quota of 11 hours 40 minutes and more than any other 
commercial channel has ever provided. In its own words, children’s content ‘is an 
area in which it has chosen to focus in order to deliver its PSB remit’ (Five 2008: 5). 
Nick Wilson (author’s interview, 7 October 2010), Channel 5’s former Controller of 
Children’s Programmes, put the reason for the channel’s commitment to child 
audiences down to the fact that the channel’s programming has always been 
commercially profitable, owing to the morning broadcasting slot and the successful 
branding of the channel’s preschool programming under the Milkshake strand. This 
will be examined in more detail in section 5.3.2.1. 
Competitive pressures have resulted in a comparable – although less radical – shift in 
institutional priorities in Finnish commercial broadcasters, which have never had 
formal quotas with respect to the provision of the genre. Following the intensification 
of commercial competition between commercial channels in the 2000s, both MTV3 
and Nelonen have largely replaced their afternoon slots of programmes for children 
and younger teens with commercially lucrative types of programming for adults, while 
shifting the remaining content to the early morning hours. Furthermore, as licensing 
practices have been relaxed, with fewer public service obligations imposed on 
commercial channels’ digital licences, extensive public service schedules are no 
longer required to demonstrate commitment to public service values, as public service 
programming is increasingly considered Yleisradio’s remit. While MTV3 and Nelonen 
provided on average 6 hours 56 minutes and 6 hours 22 minutes of weekly children’s 
programming in the 2001-2005 period, their average volume had declined to 5 hours 
34 minutes and 5 hours 25 minutes respectively.  
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Interviews with Finnish commercial television executives reveal that while children’s 
programmes are not particularly profitable types of programmes, their provision may 
produce certain positive externalities and indirect commercial revenue that may justify 
limited investment in these programmes even beyond their cost. Jani Hartikainen 
(author’s interview, 10 December 2010), the Head of Acquisitions of MTV Media, 
argues that while children are not particularly lucrative target audience for advertisers 
and children’s programmes could be replaced by commercially more lucrative types 
of e.g. lifestyle programming, it would not serve the goals of MTV3’s advertising 
strategy. Families are an important target group for advertisers on MTV3, and 
children’s programmes have potential to attract children’s parents to the channel. 
Furthermore, Pirjo Airaksinen (author’s interview, 8 December 2010), Senior Vice 
President of Nelonen Media, notes that while Nelonen’s youth programme 
Breikki/Buusteri (while not in this research) was not commercially profitable for the 
channel, it had an important role in introducing young audiences to the channel and 
building up their viewing loyalty at the early stages of the channel. As Nelonen was 
from the outset targeted for young urban viewers and needed to gain a solid viewing 
share in this audience segment quickly, the benefits of such an investment may have 
been justified by future commercial return. According to Airaksinen, the programme 
also had public relations functions in signifying the ‘goodwill’, or public service 
commitment, of the channel. Both Hartikainen and Airaksinen also note that MTV3 
and Nelonen interpret the obligation for comprehensive service in their broadcasting 
licences to include catering for audiences of all ages, including children (see also 
Sihvonen 2013: 119-20). 
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Chart 5.8: Hours of output of children’s programmes on commercial channels in the 
sample weeks in the UK, 1986-2009 
 
Chart 5.9: Hours of output of children’s programmes on commercial channels in the 
sample weeks in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
5.2.3. Proportion of children’s programmes in the main channels’ output 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 represent the proportions of children’s programmes of main 
channels’ output in the sample weeks. The growth in the volume of children’s output 
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has taken place in unison with the general growth in broadcasting hours on most 
channels. Publicly funded broadcasters in particular have concentrated their 
children’s provisions on their second channels (BBC Two and YLE TV 2), which are 
targeted at specialist interests. Provision on these channels has risen since the 1980s 
in both the UK and Finland. Considering that the provision of YLE TV 2 in 1986 
consisted of just five weekly hours of programming – of which roughly one hour was 
in Swedish – the provision can be considered to have risen dramatically on this 
channel. However, the overall proportion of children’s programming on commercial 
channels has declined in the recent years, as commercial broadcasters have cut their 
provisions of children’s programming. Channel 5 makes is notable exception to this 
trend, with its children’s output having remained at 13-15 per cent for the most of the 
2000s. 
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Table 5.2: Proportion of children’s programmes of main channels’ output in the 
sample weeks in the UK 
Year BBC1 BBC2 ITV Channel 4 Channel 5 Total 
1986 14.6% 2.3% 12.2% 1.5% 8.5% 
1987 13.3% 3.1% 13.1% 3.3% 8.7% 
1988 13.4% 3.7% 9.4% 2.2% 7.5% 
1989 14.3% 4.5% 8.7% 5.9% 8.4% 
1990 13.9% 4.5% 9.0% 6.4% 8.4% 
1991 12.7% 5.0% 9.9% 9.7% 9.4% 
1992 12.5% 5.3% 9.4% 11.0% 9.6% 
1993 12.7% 5.9% 10.7% 10.5% 10.0% 
1994 12.6% 6.7% 9.5% 11.2% 10.0% 
1995 10.7% 7.9% 9.4% 10.9% 9.7% 
1996 11.1% 8.5% 10.3% 9.8% 9.9% 
1997 10.6% 9.9% 9.3% 7.1% 5.2% 8.3% 
1998 9.4% 10.3% 10.3% 8.3% 8.4% 9.3% 
1999 9.2% 11.1% 10.3% 7.4% 6.9% 9.0% 
2000 9.5% 12.5% 10.0% 6.8% 7.4% 9.2% 
2001 9.7% 13.6% 9.8% 5.7% 9.4% 9.6% 
2002 9.7% 15.3% 9.9% 5.1% 13.5% 10.7% 
2003 9.7% 15.5% 10.2% 6.0% 14.7% 11.2% 
2004 9.4% 16.1% 10.0% 4.4% 13.7% 10.7% 
2005 9.3% 14.9% 8.9% 4.1% 16.2% 10.7% 
2006 6.4% 16.7% 9.6% 4.1% 15.3% 10.4% 
2007 6.4% 20.0% 5.0% 3.8% 13.1% 9.7% 
2008 6.4% 20.1% 4.8% 4.3% 13.1% 9.7% 
2009 6.4% 22.3% 4.7% 4.0% 15.5% 10.6% 
Average 10.3% 11.5% 9.3% 6.5% 11.7% 9.7% 
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Table 5.3: Proportion of children’s programmes of main channels’ output in the 
sample weeks in Finland56 
Year YLE1 YLE2 FST5 TV3 MTV3 Nelonen Total 
1986 12.5% 13.6%         13.0% 
1987 9.1% 14.7%   3.7%     10.0% 
1988 10.3% 12.1%   6.2%     9.7% 
1989 12.4% 15.5%   8.0%     12.1% 
1990 12.8% 14.6%   8.7%     11.9% 
1991 10.4% 14.4%   5.1%     9.8% 
1992 10.0% 10.7%   3.8%     8.0% 
1993 6.3% 14.4%     3.1%   7.4% 
1994 4.5% 14.1%     2.3%   5.9% 
1995 5.1% 10.3%     4.1%   6.1% 
1996 5.9% 7.4%     4.4%   5.7% 
1997 6.8% 6.4%     4.4% 3.3% 5.5% 
1998 6.4% 9.2%     3.1% 9.5% 6.5% 
1999 7.9% 6.9%     3.8% 7.9% 6.5% 
2000 7.5% 8.3%     3.8% 4.9% 6.0% 
2001 6.4% 9.2%     5.9% 5.5% 6.6% 
2002 5.4% 11.5%     6.9% 6.1% 7.2% 
2003 3.2% 10.5%     5.0% 6.9% 6.2% 
2004 1.9% 13.4%     5.8% 5.8% 6.3% 
2005 3.5% 12.4%     5.8% 4.9% 6.3% 
2006 2.4% 12.4%     5.5% 4.5% 5.9% 
2007 1.3% 10.4% 5.3%   4.4% 4.3% 5.0% 
2008 0.0% 15.6% 10.3%   4.2% 4.3% 6.7% 
2009 0.0% 17.8% 6.7%   3.7% 4.7% 6.5% 
Average 5.4% 11.8% 7.6% 6.0% 4.5% 5.6% 6.7% 
 
 
5.3. The structure of output in children’s programmes 
Analysis of the output reveals that parallel changes have taken place in the structure 
of output in both countries. There has been an evident departure from the pedagogic-
paternalistic tradition in public service children’s programming, with an increasing 
focus on audience maximisation and cost-effectiveness. Examination of the changes 
through the analytical lens of the Industrial Equilibrium Model suggests that the 
aforementioned changes in broadcasters’ children’s programme strategies were 
                                                 
56
 The children’s output of MTV (1986-1992) was negligible and has been omitted as statistically 
inaccurate. 
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largely produced by broadcasters’ desire to increase their shares of populist and cost-
effective types of output. Changes in the broadcasting market in the 1990s served as 
key incentives for these changes. The intensification of competition forced 
broadcasters to focus on populist types of content in order to maintain favourable 
ratings. Additionally, in trying to resolve the dilemma with their rapidly expanding 
children’s schedules and budgetary limitations in this respect, broadcasters opted for 
cost-effective types of programming. In terms of output, these changes are 
manifested predominantly by increases in the proportion of animation. 
In the UK, where commercial television was already in full competition with the BBC 
in the provision of children’s programming, children’s television reflected a less 
pronounced pedagogic-paternalistic tradition than was evident in Finland, where 
Yleisradio had no external pressure from the broadcasting market to change its 
programming policies in this respect. Evidence of this can be seen in the 1986 UK 
schedules, which contained a much higher level of animation (23 per cent) and 
entertainment (29 per cent) than those in Finland (13 and 10 per cent respectively).57 
Notably, British broadcasters’ entertainment-oriented agenda, which featured a 
number of elements commonly associated with commercialism in children’s 
television, was manifested in the presence of series containing cartoon violence (e.g. 
He-Man and the Masters of the Universe) and toy marketing (e.g. Care Bears), which 
were deemed incompatible with the pedagogic mission of Yleisradio and completely 
absent from its schedules. The levels of drama (14 per cent) and factual programming 
(14 per cent) were equal to those of Finland (13 and 17 per cent respectively). 
In both countries, a striking feature is that while the output on terrestrial main 
channels has increased by nearly four-fold in Finland and more than doubled in the 
UK since 1986, this increase has all but completely been facilitated by an increase in 
animation. In Finland, animated content has increased five-fold, while the outputs of 
all other sub-categories have seen less substantial increases or remained at their 
                                                 
57
 Considering that UK weekend morning shows in the entertainment category contained cartoons, the 
proportion of animation is likely to have been even higher. 
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late-1980s levels. In this respect, concerns of animation replacing other sub-
categories in the schedules in an unregulated market, articulated in the survey by 
Messenger Davies and Corbett (1997: 171), appear to have become manifest. While 
the weekly output of this sub-category between 1986 and 1990 averaged just 3 hours 
39 minutes, or 26 per cent the output, by the 2006-2009 period the volume of 
animation had increased to 18 hours 18 minutes and already represented 56 per cent 
of the output. The second biggest rise has taken place in the volume of entertainment 
from an average of 46 minutes between 1986 and 1990 to 2 hours 23 minutes 
between 2006 and 2009. Within the same period, the average output of drama has 
risen just by 8 minutes from 2 hours 27 minutes to 2 hours 35 minutes, and the 
average output of factual programming has actually contracted from 2 hours 4 
minutes to 1 hour 30 minutes. Given the significant increase in the overall volume of 
output, the proportion of drama actually contracted from 17 to 8 per cent, with an 
even more significant decrease in the proportion of factual programming from 14 to 
just 5 per cent. Chart 5.11 illustrates changes in the structure of children’s 
programming on Finnish channels. 
Likewise, in the UK between 1986 and 1990, weekly output of animation averaged 10 
hours 44 minutes, or 26 per cent of the total output. By the 2006-2009 period, output 
of this sub-category had increased by nearly four-fold to 37 hours 41 minutes and 
comprised 44 per cent of the total output. Contrary to concerns of Blumler (1992a) 
and Messenger Davies and Corbett (1997), an average volume of preschool output 
had also more than doubled in this period, from 9 hours 28 minutes (23 per cent) to 
22 hours 14 minutes (26 per cent). Meanwhile, lesser growth had taken place in 
drama (averaging 5 hours 21 minutes between 1986 and 1990; 5 hours 53 minutes 
between 2006 and 2009) and factual programming (averaging 5 hours 9 minutes 
between 1986 and 1990 in contrast to 8 hours 54 minutes between 2006 and 2009), 
with their proportions actually declining from 13 to 7 per cent and 12 to 10 per cent 
respectively. Changes in UK output are detailed in chart 5.10. 
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Chart 5.10: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes in the 
UK, main channels 
 
 
Chart 5.11: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes in 
Finland, main channels 
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The rise of animation and preschool programming in both countries can be 
considered as a consequence of broadcasters’ growing desire for cost effective 
programming, which in turn partially was an outcome of a continuous growth in the 
volume of children’s programmes, accompanied by a disproportionally low growth in 
children’s programming budgets. Animation and preschool constitute programming 
sub-categories, whose acquisition costs are low because of the high volume of 
imports and acquisitions available (Steemers 2004: 33-4; Ofcom 2007: 45). As these 
formats often rely on stylised characters and generic time that requires minimal 
cultural interpretation, they also have a wide appeal for children of different genders, 
socio-cultural backgrounds or ethnicities, and are often a safe option for broadcasters 
in commercial terms (Pecora 1998: 136). Technological advances have also 
facilitated the use of computer-generated animation techniques, which has brought 
down costs of this sub-category radically since the 1980s. The international 
commercial success of the Teletubbies in the 1990s, on the other hand, boosted 
producers’ interest in preschool programming, and reformed and opened up this sub-
category – which had previously been largely produced in a national context – for 
large-scale international productions. 
In a wider perspective, the changes also reflect changes in PSBs children’s 
programming strategies forged by changes in the broadcasting ecology. The 
traditional public service ethos in children’s programming was premised upon a 
philosophy that, given choice, children will not naturally consume a healthy diet but 
will instead consume only content that has less educational benefits and is thus 
considered ‘unhealthy’ (Whitaker 2011: 14). For this reason, the ideal type of 
schedule contained a carefully balanced mix of programming, in which formats and 
genres that were deemed most beneficial in pedagogic terms, e.g. news and factual 
programming, were well represented. Promotion of a healthy ‘diet’ of programming 
was relatively easy within the de facto public service children’s programming 
monopoly (Finland) or duopoly (UK), when there was only a few alternative viewing 
options (Whitaker 2011: 13-14). Audience maximisation or commercial profit 
generation were not considered important goals per se, but programmes were 
charged with several cultural and pedagogic missions. With the absence of the 
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commercial populist paradigm in children’s programming, broadcasters were able to 
deliver these missions readily by prescriptive scheduling of social drama; storytelling; 
factual programming and documentaries; news; and educational content, all of which 
were considered to support children’s development. Domestic programming had a 
self-evident priority over imported programming. Pertti Nättilä (author’s interview, 17 
December 2010) and Heikki Takkinen (author’s interview, 29 April 2010) explain that 
Finnish children’s magazines of the 1970s and 1980s featured programming 
produced predominantly within the domestic context, and even most of their carefully-
selected animated segments were commissioned from domestic animation studios 
notwithstanding the high costs associated with its production. 
While many of these goals have persisted, the growth of the commercial children’s 
channels available through cable, satellite and DTT platforms and the consequent 
escalation of competition for child audiences’ attention have significantly eroded 
PSBs’ willingness and ability to implement these goals through their programming. As 
the multi-channel broadcasting environment has enabled a greater choice for viewers, 
even publicly funded broadcasters now feel unable to maintain the traditional 
paternalist approach to programming, needing as they do to compete to a certain 
degree for audiences to ensure maximum viewing to avoid excessive marginalisation 
and maintain justification for their public funding. Joe Godwin (2010), Director of BBC 
Children’s, summarised this dilemma between populist and socially beneficial content 
as not being able to ‘offer sprouts and a glass of water, when there's a world full of 
burgers and coke beckoning. To give children the benefit of our content, we have to 
make it attractive to them.’ 
 
5.3.1. Structure of output on publicly funded channels 
5.3.1.1. Terrestrial channels 
Increases in the overall proportion of animated content in the UK can be put down 
mainly to expansion of such output on commercial channels, as analysis of the BBC’s 
output reveals that its children’s programming has undergone fewer structural 
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changes, although the proportions of animation and preschool programming have 
seen modest rises since the 1980s (see chart 5.12). While the BBC’s agenda in 
children’s programming in the 1980s lacked such an exclusive pedagogical focus 
typical of Yleisradio’s programming at the time (characterised by e.g. limited volume 
of overall output, low levels of animation and entertainment, the absence of 
‘commercial’ cartoons and high share of educational preschool content), its output in 
the late 1980s featured a high factual output (averaging 17 per cent) and moderate 
animation output (29 per cent). 
The proportion of animation on the BBC’s schedules increased from 23 per cent in 
1986 to around 32-36 per cent in the 1990s and 2000s. In terms of the Industrial 
Equilibrium Model, the impetus came from the intensification of competition against 
commercial channels and the subsequent pressure to maintain ratings. This, in turn, 
was facilitated by changes in the BBC’s institutional culture following the introduction 
of the ‘culture of measurement’ by John Birt in the early 1990s, which saw ratings 
being introduced as a yardstick for measuring performance and the Corporation 
adopting an increasingly populist strategy in its programming (Born 2005). Teresa 
Plummer Andrews and Michael Carrington; former Head and Deputy Head of BBC’s 
Acquisitions, argue that this culture of measurement extended to children’s 
programmes and influenced the Corporation’s children’s programming strategy: ‘[t]he 
performance reviews at the BBC are, basically, ratings pressures. If you have not 
performed, why not and what can you do to change it?’ (cited in Messenger Davies 
and Corbett 1997: 37; see also Born 2005: 90). In the period 2006-2009, however, 
the proportion of animation has dropped to 27 per cent, which is the lowest since the 
late 1980s. Preschool programming has increased from an average of 22 per cent 
between 1986 and 1990 to around 27 per cent between 2001 and 2009. Other sub-
categories of output have remained unchanged, with drama averaging at 9 per cent 
and factual programming at 16 per cent between 2006 and 2009. Thus, in spite of the 
moderate rise in animated and preschool content, which can be accounted for by the 
aforementioned desire for cost-effective content, similarities in the structures of the 
BBC’s output between 1986 and 2009 indicate strong institutional continuity in this 
respect. 
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As the BBC’s former Head of Children’s Programmes Anna Home (author’s interview, 
2 November 2010) notes, changes in children’s production economy also acted as 
catalysts in the shifts in its programming. As examined in chapter 4, in order to defend 
against the threat of privatisation by the Thatcher and Major governments that were 
broadly critical of what they considered economic inefficiency within the BBC, it was 
forced to adopt certain marketised institutional practices while its income was cut by 
setting the licence-fee to a level below the RPI in 1991. Thus, in terms of the 
Industrial Equilibrium Model adopted for this study, the pressure originated from the 
government, represented by the public policy element. These political and economic 
pressures – occurring in a period when funding was flat while services were 
expanding – that the Corporation considered potentially jeopardising its institutional 
privileges and continuity were powerful enough to forge an institutional change within 
the Corporation’s production strategies in order to achieve a greater degree of 
efficiency in its performance. Under the Director-Generalship of John Birt, the BBC 
introduced an increasingly commercial corporate culture. Its programmes were 
compelled to seek commercial business opportunities in international sales and 
merchandising more actively. The Corporation now encouraged such commercial 
activities as an appropriate ‘top up’ to the licence fee, ‘helping us to invest more in 
programming and services for […] the licence fee payer’ (cited in Buckingham 2002: 
44). Consequently, in the course of the 1990s, co-production and co-financing 
became established as the norm to share the costs and risks of the production (Born 
2005: 165-6; Steemers 2010: 33). Broadcasters such as the BBC also began to seek 
international programme sales and merchandising opportunities more actively to 
substitute their revenues (Steemers 2003: 133). In the UK, animation and preschool 
programming have a higher commercial return, as they receive the least income from 
broadcasters but account for nearly 90 per cent of secondary revenues of 
broadcasters. Presenter-led or live action formats, in turn, are largely dependent on 
income from the commissioning broadcaster to cover the cost of production and a low 
profit margin (Ofcom 2007: 48). In terms of licensing revenue, licensing executives 
prefer costumed character shows and animation over presenter-led live action series 
or storytelling because these more culturally neutral forms have better toy-marketing 
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potential (Steemers 2009: 54). The potential conflict between local culture and 
international (commercial) television markets also sets certain requirements and limits 
for content. Culture-specific programmes are more difficult to sell in international 
markets, as is non-fiction; thus, animation and some character-based preschool 
formats have an upper hand over drama and factual programming in acquisitions and 
international co-productions (Blumler 1993: 419; Pecora 1998: 136; Buckingham 
2002: 43; Steemers 2004: 34).  
These recent changes in the structure of the BBC’s output demonstrate that its 
commercial activities have actually benefited its output in terms of diversity. While its 
drama and factual programmes have few sales opportunities in the international 
market because of their cultural references (Steemers 2004: 33-4, 168), Steemers 
(2004: 168-173) argues that the BBC has managed to cultivate its public service 
tradition in children’s programming to a competitive advantage over their rivals, that 
has enabled them to sell their preschool and animation in particular in foreign 
markets. Its involvement in co-production with independent producers and its 
commercial arm BBC Worldwide has also facilitated savings in certain expensive 
productions, such as In the Night Garden (Ofcom 2007: 189). 
As chart 5.13 illustrates, changes that are more fundamental have taken place in 
Yleisradio’s provision. Yleisradio’s children’s programming in the 1980s indicated 
strong commitment to traditional pedagogic-paternalistic values, facilitated by its de 
facto monopoly on children’s programming. Programming was arranged to a ‘mini-
schedule’, with equal segments of different sub-categories of programming. This 
paralleled the still-prevalent Reithian approach to scheduling, which considered 
television as a cultural medium with a duty to create informed citizens, and whose 
schedules should be aptly balanced to fulfil this obligation, with a diverse range of 
enlightening and socially beneficial output to balance the more populist output (Ang 
1991: 101-2). In terms of the structure of programming, this paradigm was manifested 
by relatively high proportions of preschool (47 per cent), factual (18 per cent) and 
drama (13 per cent) programming, and a very low proportion of animation (13 per 
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cent).58 The fact that there was no serious challenge from commercial channels (as 
Kolmoskanava’s schedules and network coverage were still limited) maintained a 
state of equilibrium in Yleisradio’s children’s programming policies. However, in the 
light of empirical data, changes in the industry structure – i.e. the competitive entry of 
MTV3 in 1993 – represented the exogenous shock that punctuated Yleisradio’s 
children’s programming policy equilibrium in this respect. Already suffering from 
decreasing ratings following the initial success of MTV3, Yleisradio responded by 
departing from its past pedagogic-paternalistic agenda in children’s programming and 
giving in to a degree to elements of commercial channels entertainment-oriented 
agenda.  
Yleisradio’s institutional response to this punctuation was manifested in two ways. 
First, anxious to maintain its share of viewing, Yleisradio was obliged to depart to a 
certain extent from the pedagogic-paternalistic practices in children’s programming by 
introducing more populist children’s schedules that include higher proportions of 
animation and entertainment. Anna-Liisa Kirsi (author’s interview, 17 December 2010) 
and Heikki Takkinen (author’s interview, 29 April 2010) note that the competitive 
challenge increased pressure to make the content more appealing for children. 
Takkinen argues that the popularity of TV 2’s Pikku Kakkonen added pressure on the 
administration of TV 1 to increase their share of viewing through adjusting the 
channel’s children’s output towards a more populist and ‘commercial’ direction, which 
resulted in increases in fast-paced, audience-friendly and entertainment-based 
content. Thus, while the shift in the agenda of Yleisradio’s children’s programming 
was already in motion owing to internal competition between Yleisradio’s channels, 
the introduction of commercial television acted as a catalyst in this institutional 
change, as is exhibited by increases in imported animated content in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Second, in order to be able to compete with commercial 
broadcasters, it was compelled to expand the volume of its programming. However, 
given the fact that its revenues have not increased proportionately, the expansion has 
                                                 
58
 The preschool magazines contained segments of other sub-genres, which these figures do not 
reflect. Nevertheless, the proportion of animation was low even within these magazines. 
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been facilitated mainly through increasing the share of imported animation. Unlike 
broadcasters in the UK, Finnish broadcasters cannot acquire e.g. foreign drama and 
factual programmes owing to difficulties associated with dubbing these programmes. 
Animation, however, has low acquisition costs, fewer cultural references than drama, 
and it can be easily dubbed. Furthermore, owing to the small population of the 
country and the low number of national broadcasters, there is no secondary market 
for domestic children’s programmes to be acquired from commercial broadcasters. 
Nor is there a significant independent production sector akin to that of the UK that 
would facilitate co-productions. Hence, the increase in the animated content can be 
explained by the budgetary constraints of Yleisradio and, on the other hand, the lack 
of co-production opportunities owing to the small size and cultural isolation of the 
market. For these reasons, unlike the BBC, Yleisradio’s own children’s programming 
has not benefited from commercial activities. 
In terms of programming, this change was manifested by an increasing level of 
animation and entertainment, whose weekly average provisions doubled from 2 hours 
2 minutes (17 per cent) and 1 hour 21 minutes (6 per cent) in the 1986-1990 period to 
4 hours 46 minutes (33 per cent) and 3 hours 7 minutes (11 per cent) between 1996 
and 2000 respectively. This increase was countered by a decrease in factual 
programming, which saw a decline from 3 hours 32 minutes (15 per cent) in the 1986-
1990 period to 1 hour 16 minutes (4 per cent) between 1995 and 2000. By the period 
2006-2009, the provision of animation had doubled again and stood at 8 hours 52 
minutes, or 41 per cent of all programmes. However, volumes of drama and factual 
programming have remained at their 1980s levels, and their proportions have 
consequently decreased in schedules; the former from 17 per cent in the 1986-1990 
period to 10 per cent in the 2006-2009 period, and the latter from 15 to just 6 per cent 
respectively.  
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Chart 5.12: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes in the 
UK, the BBC’s main channels 
 
 
Chart 5.13: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes in 
Finland, Yleisradio’s main channels 
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5.3.1.2. Digital channels 
Compared with the CITV Channel, the structures of outputs of both the CBBC 
channel and CBeebies demonstrate a stronger commitment to diversity and 
pedagogic missions, with the shares of drama and factual programming considerably 
higher on CBBC than on CITV. No major changes have taken place in the structures 
of these channels’ programming, indicating that they have largely maintained their 
institutional equilibria in this respect. 
The structure of programming of the CBBC channel represented in chart 5.14 
demonstrates that the structure of its programming has been similar to that of the 
BBC main channels, with the evident absence of preschool programming. The 
entertainment category comprises the biggest group of programmes with 35 per cent 
of programmes. Interestingly, CBBC featured a lower average proportion of animation 
(20 per cent) than the programming on the BBC’s main channels, although its 
proportion was slightly increasing between 2003 and 2009. The only significant 
change in the structure of CBBC’s programming was the cancellation of its Class TV 
daytime schools programming in 2008, when CBBC’s remit was changed to remove 
the schools programming from the channel. These programmes were replaced mainly 
by increases in the provision of factual content, whose proportion averaged 13 per 
cent in the research period.59 The channel also featured a high proportion of drama 
(19 per cent). 
Chart 5.15 demonstrates that preschool programming constitutes the bulk of 
CBeebies’ output with three quarters of total programming, followed by preschool 
animation, which comprises one fifth of the channel’s output. The rest of the channel’s 
output consist of low levels of factual (e.g. Nina and the Neurons), entertainment and 
drama productions (e.g. storytelling). 
While both CBBC and CBeebies provide 80-90 hours of weekly programming, up to 
95 per cent of the content consists of repeats (Ofcom 2010a). However, the 
                                                 
59
 Following the cancellation of the schools programmes on the channel in 2008, however, the 
proportion of factual programmes increased to 18 per cent. 
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proportion of first-run content on CBBC has been on the rise in the last few years, 
albeit modestly (Ofcom 2010c). Both channels have significant commitments to invest 
in original productions. For instance, in 2008-2009, 70 per cent of the CBBC’s output 
and 80 per cent of CBeebies’ output was designated for BBC-commissioned original 
productions60 (British Broadcasting Corporation n.d.-b). 
 
Chart 5.14: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes on 
CBBC 
 
  
                                                 
60
 These include all BBC-commissioned programming, including originations and all repeats of 
programming first shown on any BBC channel. 
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Chart 5.15: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes on 
CBeebies 
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types of programming, such as drama, factual and preschool programming. 
Interestingly, ITV provided less animation (on average 22 per cent of the total output 
between 1986 and 1990) and slightly more drama (16 per cent) than the BBC 
provided in that period. The share of factual programming was lower at 7 per cent. 
Channel 4, which was not given particular obligations with regards to children’s 
programming, and which did not provide in-house programming, provided children’s 
schedules whose structures were more preschool-oriented, with 52 per cent of the 
channel’s programming in this subcategory. Animation represented 26 per cent of the 
channel’s output. Drama and factual programming represented 12 and 8 per cent of 
the output respectively. 
The 1990s saw commercial channels’ children’s programming policies punctuated by 
political and commercial forces. The Broadcasting Act 1990 did result in the 
weakening of centralised regulation in commercial broadcasting, with the new 
regulator, the ITC, adopting a less interventionist, reactive approach to content 
regulation (Buckingham et al. 1999: 57). Furthermore, increasing competition with 
cable and satellite channels, whose cartoon-oriented children’s schedules challenged 
the provision of the PSB channels, forced commercial PSBs to respond by changing 
their conduct by adopting a more populist strategy in children’s programming, with 
increased proportions of animation (Messenger Davies and Corbett 1997: 257). The 
volume of drama and factual programmes remained fairly unchanged owing to the 
fact that their provision on ITV was secured by quotas, but owing to the fact that 
commercial channels’ output grew rapidly in the 1990s, their actual share in 
commercial channels’ schedules contracted. Nevertheless, given the fact that the 
ITC-imposed quotas served to maintain diversity in the programming of ITV and 
Channel 5, the impact in terms of the structure of programming was still somewhat 
limited. 
The enactment of the Communications Act 2003, which removed the genre-specific 
quotas for children’s programmes from commercial channels’ renewed licences in 
December 2004, represented another critical juncture in the institutional strategies of 
commercial channels. Declining commercial returns of children’s programmes as a 
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consequence of a range of factors, including increased competition, financial 
pressures created by the maturing television advertising market and migration of 
viewing to specialist channels and online platforms acted as catalysts in this process 
(Ofcom 2007: 51). Commercial channels responded to these challenges by adopting 
a more pronounced populist children’s programming strategy, with focus on cost-
effective forms of imported or acquired programming of wide appeal. Consequently, 
the proportion of animation on Channel 5 increased from an average of 41 per cent in 
the 2000-2004 period to 75 per cent between 2005 and 2009. ITV adopted a strategy 
that prioritises commercial considerations even more. Its proportion of animation 
more than doubled in this period; from 26 to 64 per cent respectively. In contrast, 
proportions of drama have reduced from already-low 5 to 4 per cent on Channel 5, 
and from 15 to 12 per cent on ITV. Factual programmes have remained at their 1990s 
level at 4-5 per cent on both channels. Animation now dominates the output of UK 
commercial channels, with shares of other types of children’s programming 
disproportionally low. 
As chart 5.17 illustrates, the output of the Finnish commercial channels reflects the 
predominantly populist-commercial approach to children’s programming these 
broadcasters adopted during the broadcasting liberalisation process in the absence of 
regulation. This approach is characterised with the unprecedented domination of 
animation, averaging 84 per cent of the output over the entire research period. As 
Kolmoskanava was a commercial publisher-broadcaster without an in-house 
production department for children’s programmes, its children’s schedules consisted 
exclusively of imported programming: mainly US animation and drama. MTV3 
‘inherited’ Kolmoskanava’s children’s schedules, and having no specific programming 
obligations in this respect (apart from the obligation for comprehensive service), it 
saw no reason to depart from Kolmoskanava’s children’s programming strategy. As 
commercial channels were unwilling to invest in domestic commissions, and neither 
MTV3 nor Nelonen considered it necessary to set up an in-house children’s 
production department, both companies opted for filling their schedules with low-cost 
imported animation. Provisions of other types of children’s programming have been 
much more limited, with preschool programmes accounting for 5 per cent of 
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programmes, and entertainment and drama both for 4 per cent. The provision of 
factual programmes has been marginal, totalling just one per cent for the research 
period. The structure of programming reflects the lack of detailed children’s 
programming obligations, but can also be explained with the small size of the 
domestic independent children’s production sector and the secondary market for 
children’s programmes in Finland.  
 
Chart 5.16: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes in the 
UK, commercial channels 
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Chart 5.17: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes on 
commercial channels in Finland, commercial channels 
 
(N.b.: Samples for 1986-1987 are too limited in size to make generalisations about structure of output 
in these particular years) 
Commercial channels’ inclination to animation can be accounted to the wide appeal of 
the format for children of different ages. Older children in particular are an attractive 
audience for advertisers because of their ability to express and act on their consumer 
preferences (Steemers 2004: 169). In Finland, commercial channels target children 
aged 8-12 years in particular (Pirjo Airaksinen, author’s interview, 8 December 2010; 
and Jani Hartikainen, author’s interview, 10 December 2010). To an extent, this can 
be considered to be a consequence of Yleisradio’s historical privilege in catering for 
this age group, which is still reflected in its hegemony in the provision for preschool 
children, but commercial reasons are equally important. According to Jani Hartikainen 
(author’s interview, 10 December 2010), the focus in MTV3’s children’s programmes 
is boys’ action series, as boys of primary school age are more attractive to 
advertisers. Preschool children in Finland are better served by Yleisradio and 
subscription channels (e.g. MTV Media’s Sub Juniori61, which is specifically targeted 
at this age group). Animated content also has better merchandising opportunities and 
                                                 
61
 Renamed MTV3 Juniori in 2010. 
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therefore is more attractive to advertisers and broadcasters alike, as broadcasters 
may be able to negotiate revenue share deals for merchandised products. 
This considered, Channel 5’s strategy appears to challenge the assumption that older 
children are a more profitable audience. While always focusing primarily on children 
of preschool age, it refocused its programming more exclusively on younger children 
in 2007. Notwithstanding the rise of animation in its schedules in the 2000s, most of 
this content it targeted at preschool audiences, and includes internationally-renowned 
titles such as Fireman Sam and Peppa Pig. According to its own view, younger 
children’s productions – especially animations – are more likely to garner co-
production and merchandising income than other types of children’s programming. 
Furthermore, preschool audiences bring with them an adult audience, which can yield 
greater revenues than an unsupervised audience of older children. Channel 5 also 
notes that owing to the lower costs and higher audiences associated with it, younger 
children’s and preschool programming is likely to have a lower opportunity cost for a 
broadcaster than older children’s programming (Five 2008: 7). 
 
5.3.2.2. The CITV Channel 
The structure of the output of the CITV Channel (illustrated in chart 5.18) is similar to 
that of ITV1 in the late 2000s, and features a high proportion of animation (on 
average 64 per cent in 2006-2009). It appears that the channel, which has no PSB 
obligations and is operating on purely commercial basis, has deliberately adopted an 
entertainment-oriented programming strategy to maximise audiences. The fact that 
the channel’s levels of factual and preschool outputs are, at 4 and 13 per cents, 
below the average of terrestrial channels supports this theory, as these particular sub-
categories are less attractive for advertisers. However, its provision of drama is 
slightly higher (10 per cent), as the channel has benefited from ITV’s extensive 
portfolio of drama already broadcast on ITV1. 
Contrary to the BBC and subscription children’s channels, little output has been 
specifically commissioned for CITV, whose output consists mainly of repeats of 
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ITV1’s old children’s programmes. In 2006-2008 no original children’s programming 
was commissioned for the channel (Conlan 2008). Even in 2008, when the CITV 
commission freeze finally ended following the cancellation of ITV1’s weekday 
afternoon children’s programming, the entire budget of the channel was just £3.5 
million (Sweney 2008) in contrast to ITV1’s £27 million investment in children’s 
programmes still in 2006 (Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates Ltd. 2007: 25). 
 
Chart 5.18: Proportions of different sub-categories of children’s programmes on CITV 
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commercially lucrative forms of programming, which is another indication of change in 
broadcasters’ institutional priorities and demonstrates that economic considerations 
have replaced the previous social and cultural priorities in scheduling. 
A core feature of the public service tradition in children’s programming was that 
children’s programmes on general interest channels were scheduled when most 
children were available to view and scheduling was designed to encourage audience 
exposure to a variety of offerings (Blumler 1993: 417-8). The after school slot (at circa 
16:00-17:30 in the UK; 17:30-18:30 in Finland) was the main domain for children’s 
television. Children’s programmes had been broadcast in this slot since the early 
days of children’s television, as these programmes traditionally opened the evening 
schedules. Between 1986 and 1990, 46 per cent of the programmes in the UK and 79 
per cent in Finland were broadcast in this slot. UK channels also provided daytime 
output in the early afternoon, targeted mainly for preschool audiences. Additionally, 
weekend mornings featured children’s programmes. These slots were limited in 
length in Finland compared with the all-morning entertainment marathons featured on 
UK channels. Output in this 06:00 to 12:00 slot comprised 38 per cent of the total 
output in the UK and 14 per cent in Finland. The schedules were nevertheless 
balanced towards the afternoon, with the median point of output (i.e. the time when 
half of the output has been broadcast) at 16:00 in the UK and 17:30 in Finland in 
1986. 
Broadcasters’ scheduling practices began to change in the 1990s. In terms of the 
Industrial Equilibrium Model, this change emanated from increasing competition for 
audiences and advertising revenue. While afternoon remained the primary domain for 
children’s television and output in this slot was not yet subjected to cuts, the 
expansion in broadcasting hours took place mainly in the morning hours, with 
commercially lucrative types of adult programming with mass audience potential (e.g. 
talk shows, lifestyle programmes, soaps and game shows) increasingly occupying the 
afternoon slots. By the 2000s, increasing competition for audiences between the 
channels (especially from those featuring such populist afternoon schedules) had 
increased commercial channels’ pressures to replace their afternoon children’s 
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programmes with more commercially lucrative forms of programming, often justifying 
these shifts by commercial loss the less-lucrative programmes produce in comparison 
to more profitable types of content.62 With publicly funded channels simultaneously 
increasing their morning provisions in response to the competition from commercial 
broadcasters, the early morning has now become the new peak time for children’s 
television, with 62 per cent of programming in the UK and 53 per cent in Finland 
having been scheduled in the 06:00-09:00 slot between 2006 and 2009.63 
Accordingly, the median time for children’s output had moved ahead to around 08:15 
in both the UK and Finland in 2009. 
 
Chart 5.19: Proportions of children’s programmes across the schedule in the UK, 
main channels 
 
 
                                                 
62
 See Ofcom (2007: 55-8) and Doyle (2002: 6-7) for more about this "opportunity cost". 
63
 In 1986-1990 the corresponding figures were 12 per cent for the UK and 6 per cent for Finland. 
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Chart 5.20: Proportions of children’s programmes across the schedule in Finland, 
main channels 
 
 
5.4.1. Marginalisation in the scheduling of children’s programmes on 
commercial channels 
The aforementioned shift in scheduling practices is mostly accounted for by changes 
in commercial channels’ scheduling priorities, which indicate that children’s 
programming is now a lesser priority for these channels. Children’s programmes on 
commercial channels in both the UK and Finland are now almost exclusively 
scheduled in the margins of the schedule. 
The scheduling of children’s programmes on UK commercial channels is represented 
in chart 5.21. The IBA-imposed proactive regulation maintained consistency in ITV’s 
scheduling policies in the late 1980s. ITV’s children’s programmes were counter-
scheduled to the BBC’s programmes, with nearly half of the programmes being 
broadcast in the after school slot. The Broadcasting Act 1990 ended the IBA’s 
regulatory control of scheduling practices. Consequently, commercial channels’ 
scheduling practices began to change in the late 1990s, with programming 
increasingly occupying the morning slots. Channel 4 gained full institutional 
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independence in 1993 as per the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1990, which 
effectively made Channel 4 a rival of ITV and introduced commercial competition to 
the British terrestrial broadcasting market. The competitive entry represented a major 
critical juncture for Channel 4’s corporate strategy. Channel 4’s institutional response 
to these changes was to adopt a more populist programming strategy that was more 
explicitly focused on commercial profit maximising. Consequently, it began shifting its 
children’s programmes away from the afternoon hours and introduced commercially 
more profitable of programming for adults in these slots. By the end of the decade, 
Channel 4 had shifted most of its output to the early morning, with practically no 
programming in the afternoons. Channel 5 was launched in 1997 and it scheduled all 
of its children’s programming in the morning, as it felt unable to compete with the 
provisions of the BBC and ITV (Ofcom 2007: 9). 
Channel 4’s decision to introduce more populist programming in its weekday 
afternoon schedules produced a feedback effect that resulted in increasing 
competition for viewing and mounting commercial pressures for ITV in the 2000s. 
These pressures eventually punctuated ITV’s equilibrium, forcing it to respond by 
changing its scheduling practices. Until 2005, children’s programmes occupied the 
15:30-17:00 slot on ITV1, but according to an Ofcom estimate, they resulted in an 
opportunity cost of £18-28 million per annum in 2005 figures (Ofcom 2007: 56). Fierce 
competition from Channel 4’s counter-scheduled Deal or No Deal game show finally 
prompted ITV to respond by moving its children’s programmes to an earlier slot in the 
autumn of 2005 in order to better compete for advertising revenue (Brown 2007: 275). 
In the end of 2006, ITV axed its afternoon provision altogether, justifying this cut by 
commercial pressures stemming from intensified competition and decline in children’s 
programme advertising revenues (Davidson 2006; Ofcom 2007: 55). In 2009, 86 per 
cent of all children’s programmes on UK commercial channels were broadcast 
between the hours of 05:00-09:00, and the remaining output between the hours of 
09:00-12:00, with no programming outside these times. 
Chart 5.22 details changes in scheduling of children’s programmes on Finnish 
commercial channels. The scheduling of Finnish commercial channels’ output was 
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much more irregular, owing to the fact that prior to Kolmoskanava, commercial 
channels had no tradition in the regular provision of these programmes since MTV 
had agreed not to compete against Yleisradio in children’s programming. While 
Kolmoskanava introduced fixed schedules to Finnish television, children’s 
programmes were not allocated their own slots in the original plans drafted by MTV’s 
Senior Vice President of Programming, Tauno Äijälä (Hellman 2012: 330). 
Kolmoskanava initially counter-scheduled its children’s programmes against 
Yleisradio’s children’s programmes, which was met with condemnation from the 
press, and Kolmoskanava moved these programmes to an earlier slot in the spring of 
1988 (Hellman 2012: 228). Since Yleisradio was historically considered the sole 
provider of the genre, with Kolmoskanava’s attempt to introduce competition to the 
early evening slot met with such an objection, Kolmoskanava confined its children’s 
programmes to weekend morning ‘kid-vid ghettos’. MTV3, which ‘inherited’ 
Kolmoskanava’s children’s schedules, continued this practice even after the 1993 
Channel Reform. While it introduced programming in the early afternoons in 1995, it 
chose to focus on more lucrative adult genres of imported soaps, talk shows and 
game shows in its early evening schedules. On the other hand, this practice also 
reflects Yleisradio’s almost canonical hegemony in the provision of children’s 
programming in the Finnish broadcasting landscape. Nelonen initially provided 
programming in weekday evenings, but these programmes were moved to a regular 
slot on weekday mornings between 07:00 and 08:00 to counter the breakfast shows 
of Yleisradio and MTV3 in 1998, as Nelonen had no breakfast show of its own. 
Nelonen also broadcast imported cartoons in weekday afternoons, in addition to a 
daily youth magazine Buusteri (although not included in this study) and repeat later in 
the afternoon. 
In Finland, too, commercial pressures forced children’s programmes out of the 
afternoon slots in the late 2000s. MTV3 cancelled its early afternoon cartoons in 
2008, while Buusteri had been cancelled in the previous year. Like UK commercial 
channels, both MTV3 and Nelonen replaced these programmes with a mix of lifestyle 
programmes, imported drama and interactive games and quizzes. These 
programmes attract a larger share of advertising income than children’s programmes, 
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or as is the case with interactive games and teleshopping, have very low production 
costs and bring in additional income through phone-in revenues or airtime sales. 
As commercial broadcasters have recently reduced their commitments to catering for 
children following increasing competition and commercial pressures, early morning 
scheduling may turn out to be the decisive factor in maintaining children’s output on 
commercial general interest channels. As there are little additional opportunities for 
commercial exploitation in this slot other than breakfast television, the slot offers a 
‘natural’ habitation and guaranteed audiences for children’s programmes even in a 
multi-platform media environment. As Nick Wilson put it: 
…I think it’s the one area where there’s a certain amount of protection against 
the child audiences disappearing to broadband or multi-channel because in the 
morning everybody’s in a rush or a hurry, it’s easy to switch on the TV. What 
we’ve done is offer a consistent high quality reliable schedule so that parents 
and children know what they’re going to find and when they’re going to find it. 
Just press one button in the morning, you’re on Milkshake and, you know, at 
half past seven you’re going to see Roary the Racing Car. And you fiddle with 
that reliability at your peril. 
(Nick Wilson, author’s interview, 7 October 2010) 
 
 
  
Chart 5.21: Proportions of 
commercial main channels
Chart 5.22: Proportions of children’s programmes across the schedule in Finland, 
commercial main channels
(N.b.: Samples for the late 1980s are too limited in size to make generalisations about scheduling in 
these particular years) 
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5.4.2. Marginalisation in the scheduling of children’s programmes on 
publicly funded channels 
While similar trends can be found in the output of publicly funded main channels, 
changes in these channels’ scheduling have been somewhat less dramatic owing to 
the fact that both the BBC and Yleisradio continued to provide children’s 
programming in weekday afternoons on their main channels throughout the research 
period, as demonstrated in charts 5.23 and 5.24.64 Joe Godwin (author’s interview, 3 
November 2010) considered the provision of children’s programmes on BBC main 
channels as an important symbolic sign of the Corporation’s commitment to children’s 
television, although viewing of these programmes had declined so dramatically in the 
2000s that their presence on the BBC’s main channels had little justification in terms 
of public service. In Finland, where Yleisradio has no dedicated children’s channels, 
the visible presence of these programmes on main channels serves an even more 
important function indicating its commitment to comprehensive service and public 
service values. Thus, this symbolic significance of these programmes for these PSB 
institutions has served to protect the equilibrium in scheduling practices to an extent 
from competitive challenges from the market. 
The shift in the balance of their schedules was caused by the rapid expansion in the 
BBC and Yleisradio’s morning schedules; while output in these slots in the 1986-1990 
period represented just 38 per cent of total output in the UK and just 12 per cent in 
Finland, in 2009 output in this daypart comprised roughly three quarters of the total 
output in both countries. 
 
  
                                                 
64
 Children’s programmes on BBC One were discontinued on 21 December 2012 following the 
completion of the digital switchover, while the CBeebies morning slots on BBC Two were discontinued 
on January 4th, 2013. 
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Chart 5.23: Proportions of children’s programmes across the schedule in the UK, the 
BBC’s main channels 
 
Chart 5.24: Proportions of children’s programmes across the schedule in Finland, 
Yleisradio’s main channels 
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5.5. The origin of children’s programming 
Empirical data on programme origin demonstrate that changes in broadcasting 
industry structure and broadcasting policies have produced changes in the 
institutional conduct of UK and Finnish broadcasters in this respect. The traditional 
PSB paradigm considered television an instrument for representing and reproducing 
national and regional culture and identity, and thus domestic content was preferred 
for various cultural externalities it delivered (Blumler 1993: 406-7). However, 
increases in the volume of output and the shift towards a commercial-populist agenda 
in programming have resulted in gradual increases in the levels of imported content 
on commercial channels in particular. Broadcasters’ desire for cost-effective 
programming has been a major stimulus in this transformation: for broadcasters, 
imported content represents an economically attractive way of filling the schedules, 
as its price remains much lower than that of original productions (Steemers 2004: 23). 
As our analysis on changes in the structure of programming indicated, Finnish 
children’s programming has undergone changes that are more radical than those in 
UK programming, and these changes extend to the origin of programming too, 
depicted in chart 5.26. In the mid-1980s, Yleisradio still had a virtual monopoly on 
children’s programming. Its pedagogic-paternalistic paradigm in children’s 
programming, which gave priority to domestic content over imported material, had 
remained largely intact because of the absence of competitive forces from the market 
that would have punctuated its institutional equilibrium in this respect. Accordingly, up 
to 73 per cent of Finnish children’s programming (almost completely delivered by 
Yleisradio) in 1986 consisted of domestic content. The gradual liberalisation of 
broadcasting in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in steady increases of the proportion of 
imported content, as the schedules of Kolmoskanava and MTV3 consisted of mainly 
imported content. While the average proportion of imports was 48 per cent65 between 
1991 and 1995, by the period 1996-2000 this had risen to 67 per cent66 and remained 
                                                 
65
 With the origin of content unknown for 4 per cent of programming in this period. 
66
 With the origin of content unknown for 6 per cent of programming in this period. 
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somewhat unchanged for the 2000s. Notably, while Finnish channels broadcast on 
average 8 hours 28 minutes of weekly domestic programming between 1986 and 
1990, their volume had risen to just 10 hours 31 minutes by the late 2000s 
notwithstanding the fact that the overall volume of programming nearly quadrupled in 
the research period. This demonstrates that the increase in the volume of children’s 
output has been facilitated for the most part by an increased use of imports, with 
domestic audio-visual industries gaining little benefit from this increase. 
Chart 5.25 demonstrates that UK output also featured an equally high share of 
domestic programming in the 1980s, whose proportion was 74 per cent between 
1986 and 1990. Like in Finland, the share of imports began to rise rapidly in the late 
1980s mainly since Channel 4 facilitated its expansion in the volume of children’s 
programming through exports, and remained at around 40-45 per cent between 1991 
and 2005. However, given that the BBC has increased its volume of UK programming 
in the late 2000s, the proportion of imports decreased slightly to 35 per cent in the 
2006-2009 period following the decline in the outputs of ITV and Channel 4. 
Meanwhile, the volume of UK content on main channels has doubled between 1986 
and 2009. 
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Chart 5.25: Origin on children’s programmes in the UK, main channels67 
 
Chart 5.26: Origin on children’s programmes in Finland, main channels68 
 
                                                 
67
 These figures do not account for the significant proportion of imported material in entertainment 
magazines, and thus the figures for imports are likely to be underestimates. 
68
 These figures do not account for the significant proportion of imported material in entertainment 
magazines, and thus the figures for imports are likely to be underestimates. 
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In both the UK and Finland, the increase in the rate of imports correlates strongly with 
the rise in animation (see charts 5.10 and 5.11), suggesting that broadcasters have 
used imported animation to facilitate the expansion in the volume of output, as it 
allows greater cost efficiency in programming. As Home (1993: 67) notes, animation 
is an expensive format to produce, and thus its demand cannot be fulfilled by 
domestic production alone. Out of all animated content broadcast between 1986 and 
2009, 69 per cent in the UK and 99 per cent in Finland69 consisted of imports or 
international co-productions. While the proportion of Finnish animation (consisting 
mainly of co-productions) has not exceeded 2-3 per cent in the research period owing 
to the small size of the national audio-visual market, there has been a significant rise 
in UK animation in the 2000s, from an average of 23 per cent between 1996 and 
2000 to 54 per cent between 2006 and 2009. Preschool programming makes up the 
second largest sub-group of imports in the UK, with 40 per cent of programming 
imported or internationally co-produced. This explains its prevalence in the 2000s. In 
contrast, sub-categories with the lowest rates of imports are factual programmes (2 
per cent in the UK; 16 per cent in Finland), and entertainment (2 per cent in the UK; 9 
per cent in Finland). 
  
5.5.1. Origin of programming on publicly funded channels 
Charts 5.27 and 5.28 represent the origin of children’s programmes on the BBC’s and 
Yleisradio’s general interest channels. Both the BBC and Yleisradio featured high 
proportions of domestic content in their schedules in the late 1980s (79 per cent in the 
UK; 69 per cent in Finland), while the proportion of North American imports was 
remarkably low in both countries (15 per cent in the UK; 5 per cent in Finland). Both 
of these features reflect the Reithian tradition in the children’s outputs of the BBC and 
Yleisradio: promotion of domestic culture in children’s programming was considered 
to be a core duty of PSB, while American content in particular was treated with 
                                                 
69
 This figure excludes animated segments in preschool magazines, such as Pikku Kakkonen and 
Lasten TV Puoli Kuusi. 
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suspicion, as it was considered to undermine national traditions and endorse 
commercialism and television violence (Home 1993: 29; Buckingham et al. 1999: 17 
& 99; Oswell 2002: 140-8). 
This cultural protectionism was a formative element of the Finnish media policy 
paradigm (Jääsaari 2007: 70-1). The unpublished ‘handbook’ of Yleisradio TV 2’s 
Pikku Kakkonen magazine, composed by Pertti Nättilä for guidance for the production 
team of the programme, highlights this devotion to domestic content in explicit terms: 
‘[o]ne of the most important duties [of Pikku Kakkonen] is to act as a counterbalance 
to supranational entertainment junk [emphasis by MS], and thus Pikku Kakkonen has 
an important national mission’ (Nättilä 1985). The handbook notes that over 90 per 
cent of the content of Pikku Kakkonen was of domestic origin. Likewise, Heikki 
Takkinen (author’s interview, 29 April 2010) notes that segments for Yleisradio TV 1’s 
children’s magazine Lasten TV Puoli Kuusi were predominantly of domestic origin, 
with even animated segments commissioned from Finnish animation studios. The low 
proportion of North American content in Yleisradio’s schedules (around 5 per cent of 
the output in 1986) is another notable feature, and reflects children’s programme 
producers’ aforementioned suspicion with American animation, whose production 
standards and values were considered to be at odds with the pedagogic missions of 
Yleisradio’s children’s programmes. Pertti Nättilä (author’s interview, 17 December 
2010) notes that when imported content was used, it was acquired rather from the 
Nordic and Eastern European countries on quality grounds.70  
Pressures to increase the volume of output for children within the limits of the existing 
budgets, while simultaneously improving the viewing figures of children’s 
programmes, produced by the intensification of competition with commercial 
channels, began to take their effect on the children’s outputs of the BBC and 
Yleisradio already in the late 1980s. Both companies responded by changing their 
conduct in this respect. The BBC increased its share of exports in the 1980s and 
                                                 
70
 Buckingham, Davies et al. (1999: 99) refer to similar UK tendency to distinguish between “good” 
imports; e.g. Czechoslovakian folk tales, and “bad” imports; principally in the form of US cartoons. 
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1990s, which reached a high of around 35 per cent in the early 2000s. In Finland, too, 
Heikki Takkinen (author’s interview, 29 April 2010) notes that the 1980s saw an 
increase in the volume of imported content in TV 1’s children’s programmes. He 
argues that resources for domestic in-house production were cut, as importing 
animation from Eastern European countries represented a more cost-effective 
method of filling the schedules than commissioning them from Finnish animation 
studios. Following the 1993 Channel Reform, which left Yleisradio with a gap of 1300 
annual broadcasting hours in its schedules, Yleisradio’s average proportion of 
imported children’s programming increased to 58 per cent of the output between 1996 
and 2000. In both countries, the largest increases in this period took place in the 
proportion of North American content, which peaked at 27 per cent in the UK and 20 
per cent in Finland between 1996 and 2000. 
In the late 2000s, however, contradictory patterns to this trend have emerged. As 
already noted, the BBC has been able to benefit from commercial activities and co-
production in expanding the volume of children’s programming. Consequently, the 
BBC’s average share of imported programming decreased to 20 per cent between 
2006 and 2009. Meanwhile, the expansion in the volume of Yleisradio’s children’s 
programming in the late 2000s has been mostly facilitated with the use of imports, 
which has increased the average proportion of imports to 55 per cent from the slightly 
lower figures of the early 2000s. As Teija Rantala (author’s interview, 17 December 
2010) noted, the increased proportion of imports can be accounted for by the fact that 
the budgetary increases in children’s programming have been disproportional to the 
increases in output: while the latter has doubled in the 2000s, Rantala estimates that 
the budgets have only seen an increase of 30 per cent. Notwithstanding this, the 
massive increase in imported content can be considered a significant departure from 
Yleisradio’s pedagogic-paternalistic institutional paradigm of the 1980s, which 
promoted national culture in all areas of children’s programming and limited the 
volume of imported programming to a minimum. This increase in the use of imports 
corresponds with Jääsaari’s (2007: 174) argument of the cognitive re-
conceptualisation of the operating environment of Finnish broadcasting as an 
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international instead of a primarily domestic one, and supports her position of a partial 
surrender of cultural protectionism. 
 
Chart 5.27: Origin on children’s programmes in the UK, the BBC’s channels 
 
Chart 5.28: Origin on children’s programmes in Finland, Yleisradio’s channels 
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5.5.2. Origin of programming on commercial channels 
As chart 5.29 demonstrates, domestic programming dominated commercial channels’ 
schedules in the UK in the 1980s, indicating that they too were committed to the 
same public service ethos of promoting domestic culture in programming that guided 
the output of the BBC. Between 1986 and 1990, 70 per cent of the combined output 
of ITV and Channel 4 was of domestic origin, while North American content – the 
biggest group or imports – represented a modest 23 per cent of the output. The IBA’s 
proactive approach to content regulation played a major role in maintaining the state 
of equilibrium in ITV’s institutional conduct. 
ITV’s programming in the late 1980s was produced or commissioned largely by 
individual ITV network companies. Their average share in the 1990s was 75 per cent, 
indicating a high commitment to domestic productions in ITV’s children’s 
programming policy. The regulatory reform implemented in the Broadcasting Act 1990 
did not have an effect in the share of owing to the fact that ITV licences contained 
quotas for commissions of drama, factual and preschool programming (D'Arma et al. 
2010: 229), while the share of domestic programming remained at over 70 per cent 
until the mid-2000s. Meanwhile, the fact that Channel 4 had no specific quotas or 
obligations for domestic children’s programming was reflected in its output, which had 
just an average of 12 per cent of UK content in the 1990s. While the channel’s 
children’s output grew rapidly at the turn of the 1990s, practically all this growth was 
facilitated with imported content mainly from North America. Channel 5, whose 
children’s programming obligations were similar to those of ITV, with similar quotas 
for commissions, provided an average of 60 per cent of UK content in the late 1990s, 
but it too facilitated the expansion of its programming through imported content, with 
the proportion of UK content dropping to 30-40 per cent in the early 2000s.  
As was the case with the structure of programming, the Communications Act 2003 
represents a critical juncture in the institutional strategy of ITV in this respect too. The 
Act removed detailed quotas for children’s programmes, including quotas for 
commissions. ITV responded to mounting commercial pressures by halving its 
provision of UK content in 2005 and replaced these programmes mainly with North 
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American imports, before axing its weekday afternoon output and closing down its in-
house production unit ITV Kids in 2007 (Steemers and D'Arma 2013: 131), with little 
UK content commissioned for the network since (Five 2008: 6). Between 2006 and 
2009, the share of UK original output on ITV1 averaged just 39 per cent. Channel 5, 
on the other hand, has increased its provision of UK content in the late 2000s 
significantly. Consequently, the share of UK output on commercial channels has risen 
in 2006-2009 to an average of 47 per cent. 
The lack of quotas for commercial broadcasters in Finland and the small size of the 
domestic independent production sector for children’s programmes are pronounced in 
the children’s schedules of Finnish commercial channels, which consist mainly of 
imported content, as chart 5.30 demonstrates. Consistency in this respect reflects the 
fact that no forces stemming from the industry structure or public policies have forced 
Finnish commercial broadcasters to change their programming strategies, whose 
characteristics are typical for outspokenly commercial types of broadcasters (e.g. UK 
commercial children’s channels on cable and satellite platforms – see e.g. Ofcom 
(2007: 43)) rather than PSBs. North American productions dominated the output, 
averaging 59 per cent for the research period, but the proportions of programming 
originated from the European countries (24 per cent) and Asia and Oceania (10 per 
cent) were also notably higher the UK figures, although much of the European 
content originated from the UK. The proportion of domestic programming averaged 
just 5 per cent for the entire research period. Nevertheless, a handful of independent 
producers have begun to develop children’s programmes for both domestic and 
international sales in the 2000s, and more of such productions can be found in the 
schedules of the late 2000s. However, in contrast to the UK, children’s programmes 
are not of commercial interest to independent producers in Finland. Hanna Kallankari 
(author’s interview, 8 March 2011), MTV Media’s Acquisition Executive for children’s 
programming, claimed that MTV3 is constantly looking for more domestic children’s 
productions, but their low availability limits their provision on the channel. 
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Chart 5.29: Origin of children’s programmes in the UK, commercial channels 
 
Chart 5.30: Origin of children’s programmes in Finland, commercial channels 
 
(N.b.: Samples for 1986-1987 are too limited in size to make generalisations about structure of output 
in these particular years) 
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5.5.3. Origin of programming on UK children’s channels 
Changes in the origin of children’s programming on CBBC and Cbeebies channels 
are detailed in charts 5.31 and 5.32. Both BBC digital children’s channels featured 
proportions of UK programming much higher than the output on the BBC main 
channels; the share of UK content averaged 80 per cent on CBBC and 94 per cent for 
CBeebies in the period 2003-2009. There have been little changes here over the 
years. The high proportions of UK programming reflect the fact that both channels 
have various detailed PSB commitments related to investing in domestic productions. 
While these commitments change on an annual basis, in 2006-2007, for instance, 
CBeebies’ commitment included spending 75 per cent of its investment in new UK 
programming (British Broadcasting Corporation n.d.-a). However, while both channels 
feature a high investment in the UK content, they also feature repeat rates up to 95 
per cent (Ofcom 2010a). 
 
Chart 5.31: Origin of children’s programmes on CBBC 
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Chart 5.32: Origin of children’s programmes on CBeebies 
 
Programming on the CITV Channel (chart 5.33) included a higher proportion of UK-
originated content (55 per cent) than on ITV1 (39 per cent) between 2006 and 2009. 
Like programming on ITV1, CITV’s programming also featured a high proportion of 
North American programming (31 per cent). The relatively high proportion of imported 
content implies that in the absence of regulatory obligations the channel has adopted 
a predominantly commercial approach to its children’s programming, while its 
investment in original UK content has been relatively low (Conlan 2008; Five 2008: 6).  
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Chart 5.33: Origin of children’s programmes on CITV 
 
 
5.6. Swedish-language children’s programming in Finland 
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years, with approximately 2.5 hours of programming per week in the 1980s and 
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language programming has been akin to Finnish-language provision, but with 
preschool programmes constituting over half of the overall output. The broadcasting 
slots for these programmes have also remained constant and there is no evidence of 
these programmes being marginalised in scheduling in spite of their small audiences. 
 
Chart 5.34: Hours of Swedish-language children’s programmes in the sample weeks 
in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
(N.b.: Includes Swedish-language children’s programmes on Finnish main channels and FST5’s 
programming since 2007) 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
Changes in the volume, content, scheduling and origin of children’s programming in 
the UK and Finland suggest that broadly similar marketisation-driven changes have 
taken place in public and private broadcasters’ children’s programme policies. There 
has been an evident shift away from the social and cultural goals of the past public 
service paradigm in children’s programming, which, in terms of output, were 
manifested by high diversity in output, low proportion of animation and relatively high 
proportions of drama and factual programming, as well as high investment in 
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0
4
:1
0
0
4
:3
5
0
4
:4
0
0
5
:1
0
0
4
:4
5
0
5
:4
0
0
4
:2
5
0
4
:4
5
0
5
:2
5
0
5
:1
0
0
5
:3
5
0
4
:1
3
0
6
:0
7
0
5
:2
6
0
4
:5
5
0
5
:0
9
0
5
:4
7
0
5
:1
2
0
5
:4
4 0
8
:5
5
0
5
:5
5
0
8
:2
5
1
4
:2
6
1
0
:4
6
00:00
02:00
04:00
06:00
08:00
10:00
12:00
14:00
16:00
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
234 
 
 
 
paradigmatic shift was manifested by increasing proportions of populist types of 
programming (e.g. animation and entertainment) and lower proportions of factual 
programming, lower overall diversity in programming, increased share of imports and 
scheduling practices that give priority to commercially lucrative or populist types of 
adult content over children’s programmes while pushing them to the early fringe of the 
schedule. The extent of these changes was significantly different depending on the 
primary funding methods of the broadcasters. All of the aforementioned changes 
were more manifest in the provisions of broadcasters that receive their funding mainly 
from commercial sources, suggesting that they have adopted a more pronounced 
commercial strategy. Most commercial broadcasters in this research have also cut 
their provisions of children’s programmes in the late 2000s owing to commercial 
pressures and changes in the commercial profitability of these programmes, 
suggesting that their commercial models may not be able to accommodate schedules 
for children in their current extent. 
While pedagogic goals in programming have not been completely replaced by 
commercial or populist considerations, evidence suggests that they have an 
increasing influence on UK and Finnish broadcasters’ programming policies. 
Economic and consumerist considerations: audience maximisation, commercial profit 
generation and cost-effectiveness have been accepted as new ‘virtues’ alongside the 
previous social and cultural goals in the children’s programming policies of UK and 
Finnish broadcasters. The increase in viewing options available for children has also 
produced a shift away from the past normative knowledge on children’s needs to 
catering for their preferences, while the expert views of broadcasting professionals 
and pedagogues have a lesser influence on broadcasters’ children’s programming 
policies. Popularity and reach were introduced as the primary yardsticks against 
which the performance of all broadcasters was measured. These developments 
reflect the changes in the communications policy paradigm examined in chapter 2, 
with policies now driven increasingly by pragmatism and populism rather than 
idealism and ideologies. Meanwhile,  the field of communications is no longer 
primarily viewed as an appropriate area for collective welfare policies (van Cuilenburg 
and McQuail 2003: 197-202). 
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In terms of the Industrial Equilibrium Model, empirical evidence suggests forces that 
punctuated broadcasters’ equilibria and stimulated them to change their children’s 
programming strategies originated from changes in the industry structure. The 1990s 
saw an unprecedented intensification of competition, facilitated mainly by the 
expansion of commercial broadcasting sector through liberalisation, but also by 
advances in broadcasting technology, which increased the number of viewing options 
available for child audiences and prompted broadcasters to attract larger audiences 
through increases in populist programming. These changes were accompanied by 
changes in regulatory regimes that allowed private broadcasters in particular to 
operate with lesser public intervention. Publicly funded broadcasters, in turn, were 
subjected to a tighter budget discipline that forced them to seek out less expensive 
types of programming and, in the BBC’s case, encouraged to look for commercial 
income and co-production opportunities.  
The aforementioned processes have only intensified in the 2000s, as the advance of 
digital broadcasting technologies have increased the competition further, while 
deregulatory measures in content regulation policies have allowed commercial 
broadcasters to adopt children’s programming strategies that focus more explicitly on 
profit maximisation. At the same time, financial pressures created by the maturing 
advertising market and changes in children’s media consumption habits (i.e. the 
increasing use of online platforms and specialist children’s channels) have reduced 
commercial broadcasters’ willingness to invest in the genre, and the focus of their 
programming priorities has increasingly turned to lucrative types of adult 
programming instead. 
National differences highlight historical differences between UK and Finnish 
broadcasting institutions. Commercial broadcasters in the UK have had a stronger 
and longer-running tradition in children’s programming, whose volume and diversity 
was maintained by regulatory measures until the Communications Act 2003. The Act 
served as a critical juncture in their programming policies, after which the provision on 
ITV in particular has declined. The Act has also resulted in a drop in the diversity of 
programming, with commercial broadcasters focusing increasingly on cost-effective 
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and audience-maximising populist types of children’s programming. Nevertheless, 
compared with the offerings of the Finnish commercial channels, which have had no 
quotas or obligations to contribute to children’s programme provision, diversity in the 
provision of the UK commercial channels has remained slightly higher owing to the 
more robust tradition in commercial channels’ children’s provision. The fact that the 
UK has a larger secondary market for children’s programmes has also contributed to 
this. Finnish commercial channels, in turn, have far fewer opportunities for domestic 
acquisitions because of the negligible size of the independent children’s production 
sector. They are forced to resort to imports, which slants the programming towards 
animation owing to the fact that the format is typically based on fictional characters 
that are not culturally bound. 
Fewer changes have taken in the programming strategies of Yleisradio and the BBC. 
For instance, while the expansion of the schedules has taken place mainly in the 
morning hours, programming has not been completely shifted to the early fringe of the 
schedule, and the diversity of the output has remained high in spite of increased 
volumes of imported animation and decreases in the proportions of factual 
programming, indicating that public funding has served to protect the public service 
paradigm in children’s programming to an extent. Nevertheless, increasing 
competition for audiences has forced Yleisradio in particular to give in to the 
audience’s preferences and depart from its past pedagogic-paternalistic paradigm in 
its programming (manifested by a low proportion of animation and high proportions of 
drama, factual and preschool programmes; a high proportion of domestic content and 
low share of commercial animation in particular) to an extent. Even the increase in the 
volume of its children’s programmes, which was previously limited for pedagogic 
reasons, can be considered a departure from the past paternalist tradition that 
considered excessive viewing potentially harmful and encouraged children to engage 
themselves in other activities instead. 
The output of the UK children’s channels: CBBC, CBeebies and CITV, was also 
analysed as part of this study, although independently from the main channels’ 
output. The schedule of the CBBC channel contained relatively low proportions of 
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animation and high proportions of programmes in the entertainment, drama and 
factual categories. Preschool programming logically comprised the bulk of the output 
on CBeebies. Both channels also featured high shares of domestic content (80 per 
cent for CBBC and 94 per cent for CBeebies). In contrast, the structure of 
programming of the CITV Channel indicates in the absence of regulatory guidelines 
with respect of the structures of its content, the channel has adopted a programming 
strategy typical for a commercial channel. Its proportion of animation was at 64 per 
cent higher than that of ITV1, and its shares of factual and preschool programmes 
were below those of the main channel. 
Differences between the structures of the BBC’s and Yleisradio’s children’s output 
highlight differences in national factors that have facilitated the BBC utilise 
commercial activities to sustain the structure of its children’s programming, while 
Yleisradio has been forced to increase its share of imports in order to fill its expanding 
schedules. The fact that the BBC has engaged itself in co-productions and substituted 
its income from licensing and secondary sales deals has facilitated its continuous 
investment in original UK animation, drama and preschool programming. 
Furthermore, commercial income from these sources has facilitated investment in 
factual programming, whose co-production and merchandising potential is low. 
Yleisradio in Finland, however, has been very cautious with merchandising 
opportunities in particular, as it wants to maintain the non-commercial brand of its 
children’s programmes. The small size of the independent production sector 
specialising in children’s programmes in Finland also prevents Yleisradio from 
engaging itself into such co-production opportunities.  
While these changes have undoubtedly had a profound effect on children’s 
programming, this study does not attempt to comment on whether these changes 
have had an effect on programme ‘quality’. While the concept of quality in children’s 
programming is debated in a number of academic and professional studies (see e.g. 
Alexander et al. 1998; Ofcom 2007; Briggs 2009; Grewenig 2009; Mikos 2009; 
Wassmer et al. 2010) – mainly from children’s parents’ point  of view – ‘quality’ 
remains ‘an emotive subject that is notoriously difficult to define, largely because 
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quality means different things to different people’ (Ofcom 2007: 17). Notably, the key 
deficiency of these studies is that they often associate ‘quality’ with value-laden 
concepts such as ‘well-funded and well-produced’ (Ofcom 2007: 14). While some of 
the quantitative methods used in this research measure changes e.g. in domestic 
content and diversity in programming, which are commonly associated with quality, 
measuring value-laden concepts (such as informative content and pedagogic 
approach) that require qualitative methods in such a large-scale longitudinal 
comparative study would be infeasible. Thus, the marketisation-determined changes 
in the structure of children’s programming cannot automatically be equated with a 
decrease in quality, but instead simply indicate changing institutional behaviour in the 
provision of children’s television. For instance, in spite of the significant changes in 
the structure of Yleisradio’s programming, the quantitative research methods used for 
this research fail capture the continuity in Yleisradio’s children’s programming values, 
which include non-violence, safety, non-commerciality and pedagogic approach in 
programming, all of which are strongly associated with quality in the aforementioned 
studies on the subject. Generally speaking, the children’s programmes of the BBC 
and Yleisradio have become popular and robust brands, which enjoy a high status 
and appreciation amongst parents (see e.g. Ofcom 2007; Yleisradio Oy 2009a).  
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6. Case II: Religious programmes 
6.1. Introduction 
The provision of religious programmes, the second case in this research, is analysed 
in this chapter. Like the previous chapter, this chapter provides an empirical account 
of religious programming in the UK and Finland between 1986 and 2009, and 
examines the changes in patterns of provision utilising the Industrial Equilibrium 
Model detailed in chapter 3. Evidence in this chapter is based on empirical research 
on religious programming conducted by the author. 
Religious programmes differ from children’s programmes in that they are a thematic 
group of programmes rather than targeted to a specialist interest group, as is the 
case with children’s programmes. Previous studies on religious programming (e.g. 
Svennevig et al. 1988; Gunter and Viney 1994; McDonnell 2009) also suggest that 
the outlook for religious programmes is more insecure than that of children’s 
programmes, as their popular support is more limited (see e.g. Independent 
Television Commission 2001; Yleisradio Oy 2007: 15; Ofcom 2008a: 34). Thus, while 
competition in the provision of the genre is more limited, the low volume of the 
provision on PSB channels means that the genre is also more vulnerable to changes 
in the output. Consequently, religious programmes can be considered to represent a 
genre that is at higher risk than several other types of minority interest content. 
While certain religious organisations have set up their specialist religious channels on 
cable, satellite and online platforms, neither UK nor Finnish terrestrial broadcasters 
have launched their own specialist channels for this subject, although certain digital 
FTA channels now specialise in religious programming. More such channels are 
available on cable, satellite and online platforms, such as the UK-based transnational 
God TV, Revelation TV and Muslim Television Ahmadiyya International. Ofcom’s 
move to lift its ban on religious on-air fundraising in 2007 has improved the 
commercial prospects of such channels. Compared with the viewing figures of 
religious programming on PSB channels, these specialist religious channels, 
however, attract just tiny audiences (McDonnell 2009: 168). While these channels 
cater for smaller Christian denominations as well as for followers of other faiths, their 
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approach to religious matters usually differs radically from that adopted by PSBs: 
although the obligations regarding responsibility, objectivity and protection of 
vulnerable members of audience implemented in the Ofcom Broadcasting Code apply 
to these channels too, their programming does not necessarily treat the highly 
sensitive matters of religion in a responsible and objective manner, but their missions 
may include to subtly seek recruits or raise funds to a particular religious group. 
Because of this, they do not provide an ecumenical forum for inter-faith discussion, 
but rather act as electronic pulpits for sectarian preaching and proselytising, thus not 
offsetting the need for programming on religious matters by PSBs. 
Given the low level of weekly religious output in both the UK and Finland, most of the 
statistical analysis in this chapter is conducted by analysing the data in five-year 
quintiles (except for the last period of 2006-2009, the length of which is four years). 
This gives a more accurate picture of the output, as it represents an average output of 
a period rather than that of an individual year, which may be influenced by e.g. 
scheduling of a particular series or the occurrence of a religious event. While annual 
changes in the provision are not reflected in this type of analysis, the long-term trends 
are nevertheless observable. 
 
6.2. The volume of output of religious programmes 
[Religion on] television, […] it’s been [on] a steady decline since 1986. I arrived at 
the BBC in 1986. I was actually working in radio, and in television, there was a 
massive amount of [religious] television going on. There was the Rock Gospel 
Show on the Sunday night. There was Everyman current affairs strand, posh 
documentaries. There was Heart of the Matter, a more quick turnaround 
documentary strand on television. Songs of Praise was at 6:40 in the evening, 
again in 7-8 million viewers. There was a morning worship show but also a 
morning discussion, I think, from time to time. There were several other 
documentary outputs. There were even contributions to the drama strand, like the 
first ever Shadowlands was made by religious broadcasting. There was a plethora 
of religious stuff going out on the telly. 
(Michael Wakelin, Head of BBC Religion & Ethics 2006-2009, 
author’s interview, 22 October 2010) 
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Empirical data on UK religious programming detailed in chart 6.1 demonstrate that a 
change has taken place in the strategies of UK PSBs in the 2000s, which have cut 
their provisions in the latter part of the decade. In the 1980s, religious content still had 
a generally accepted place in the British PSB system in spite of the fact that neither 
the BBC nor the commercial channels had a statutory obligation to broadcast religion. 
The relatively high volume of religious programming was maintained rather by the 
public service ethos, which considered it axiomatic that a certain portion of 
broadcasting time should be devoted to religion (Dean 1997: 92; McDonnell 2009: 
151). The ITV quota for religious programming was introduced only in the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 in response to a fear that religious programming might be 
seriously diminishing on commercial networks (McDonnell 2009: 151). The 
Communications Act 2003 and the cancellation of quotas for religious programming 
have served as a critical juncture in UK religious programming. Subsequently, all 
channels have made cuts in their religious provisions, and the overall volume of 
religious programming between 2006 and 2009 represents just 58 per cent of the 
average output between 1986 and 1990 in spite of expansion in broadcasting hours 
and increases in the number of channels. 
Chart 6.2 represents the output of religious programmes on Finnish channels. In 
Finland, religious programmes were provided by both Yleisradio and, to a lesser 
extent, MTV. As the weekly broadcasting time of MTV totalled only about 20 hours 
per week, MTV’s religious output consisted of infrequent one-off programmes and 
short series: religious programming comprised only 0.1 per cent of the company’s 
output in 1992 (Peräaho 2001: 6). The 1993 Channel Reform initially boosted the 
output, with both Yleisradio and MTV3 increasing the number of religious 
programming in their schedules. Table 6.1 demonstrates that the average weekly 
output of religious programming peaked at the turn of the millennium at 3 hours 38 
minutes. However, the introduction of commercial competition in 1997 and the 
subsequent commercial pressures punctuated MTV3’s policy equilibrium, with MTV3 
responding by cancelling its religious output in the early 2000s. While Yleisradio has 
also suffered from a chronic shortage in its resources, there has been a slight decline 
in output, which stood at an average of 3 hours 19 minutes per week between 2006 
242 
 
 
 
and 2009 despite the fact that the provisions of YLE Teema and FST5 have been 
included in the research data since 2007. 
Chart 6.1: Hours of output of religious programmes in the sample weeks in the UK, 
1986-2009 
 
Chart 6.2: Hours of output of religious programmes in the sample weeks in Finland, 
1986-2009 
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Table 6.1: Average weekly hours of output of religious programmes 
 UK Finland71 
1986 – 1990 7:41 2:20 
1991 – 1995 6:02 2:39 
1996 – 2000 5:43 3:38 
2001 – 2005 8:07 3:12 
2006 – 2009 4:27 3:19 
 
As a result of the aforementioned commercial channels’ withdrawal from religious 
provision in the 2000s, there has also been a notable shift in the provision of religious 
programmes from commercially funded to publicly funded channels, as charts 6.3 and 
6.4 demonstrate. Again, this shift has been particularly radical in the UK, where, until 
the early 2000s, commercially-funded channels provided on average half of all 
religious output. In Finland, MTV’s share of religious programming was significantly 
lower, varying between 20-30 per cent between 1993 and 1999. Nevertheless, in both 
countries, religious programmes are now almost entirely dependent on the activities 
of publicly funded broadcasters, i.e. the BBC and Yleisradio. 
Chart 6.3: Share of total religious output between public funding and commercial 
channels in the UK 
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Chart 6.4: Share of total religious output between public funding and commercial 
channels in Finland 
 
 
6.2.1. Volume of output on public funding channels 
Less dramatic changes have taken place in the volume of religious output on the 
BBC’s and Yleisradio’s channels portrayed in charts 6.5 and 6.6. This suggests that 
the institutional policies of public broadcasters have been slightly more immune to the 
pressures created by marketisation than those of their commercially funded 
counterparts. However, unlike children’s programmes, whose output has increased 
significantly, the volume of religious programmes has not grown significantly over the 
years, and the BBC’s output has actually declined since the 1980s. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the specialist interest digital portfolio channels such as BBC Four and 
YLE Teema has enabled the public broadcasters to move religious programming from 
main channels to these niche channels, whose share of viewing is small compared 
with the main channels. 
As testified by Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 12 September 2011), former Head of 
BBC Religion & Ethics, religion was considered an axiomatic part of the BBC’s 
programming in the 1980s. He describes the Corporation’s attitude towards the 
subject as ‘almost deferential’, which can be traced back to the Reithian origins of the 
Corporation. Reith, himself a devout Christian, considered religion (namely 
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Christianity) an essential part of the British society and way of life, which ought to be 
nurtured and promoted by the BBC (Briggs 1985: 54). The status and resources 
religious programmes received were reflected in the volume of output, which 
averaged 3 hours 40 minutes per week in the late 1980s despite the limited 
broadcasting hours of the two BBC channels. As Ernie Rea recalls, religious 
broadcasting directors enjoyed a high level of independence and power over channel 
controllers in terms of programming. He took over as Head of Religious Television in 
1991: 
I inherited my colleague’s [predecessor’s] files, and I discovered that when he 
went in to television offers programmes he was asked to say what were his 
priorities, and he would say: “this is what I want to do and this is what I want to 
do, and if there’s anything left over, I’d like to do this and this”. And – generally 
speaking – he would get his way. So it was almost as if he had carte blanche 
to take, he was given a certain amount of money and told “that’s what you’ve 
got, go and do it”. That completely and utterly changed in the 1990s. 
(Ernie Rea, author’s interview, 12 September 2011) 
Between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, the volume of the BBC’s religious output 
saw a decrease of one third during a period in which the BBC’s total broadcasting 
hours increased by half (Holmes 2000: xii). Both Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 12 
September 2011) and Michael Wakelin (author’s interview, 22 October 2010) argue 
that the decline of BBC religion was initiated by the relocation of the BBC Religion 
department from London to Manchester in 1992 as part of the Corporation’s 
programme of decentralisation (Born 2005: 101). Not only did it hinder religious 
executives’ ability to pitch their programmes to channel controllers, who were based 
in London, but the BBC also lost most of its talented programme-makers, who moved 
to other BBC departments: 
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…there was not big enough factual base in Manchester to attract talent, so the 
difficulty was that you couldn’t get a critical mass of talented programme-
makers around the subject. They did in radio, but didn’t in television, and […]  
that’s why the move to Manchester represented part of a decline. 
(Andrew Graystone, former producer, The Heaven and Earth Show (BBC), 
author’s interview, 7 February 2011) 
Moreover, challenges from cable, satellite and DTT platforms brought the protected 
duopoly to an end, while changes in the regulatory regime stemming from the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 facilitated commercial broadcasters to adopt more 
commercially-oriented strategies and introduce populist schedules in peak hours in 
particular. The logical feedback effect was the intensification of competition for 
audiences. In the mid-1990s the BBC began to feel increasingly pressurised to 
respond to these competitive forces and improve its declining share of viewing by 
adopting a more populist programming strategy in order to maintain the legitimacy of 
the licence fee (Born 2005: 62-4). Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 12 September 2011) 
and Michael Wakelin (author’s interview, 22 October 2010) argue that commercial 
channels’ gradual withdrawal from religious programming had an impact on the 
programming policy of the BBC as well, as it forced the Corporation to respond to the 
populist offerings of its commercial competitors by changing its conduct. The 
legislative reforms of 1990 and 2003 served as major critical junctures in the process, 
as they allowed commercial channels to adopt more explicitly commercial strategies. 
While the Broadcasting Act 1990 imposed religious output quotas for ITV companies, 
its regulatory authority did not extend to scheduling of programmes, and ITV 
companies unilaterally replaced religious programming in the Sunday evening ‘God 
Slot’ with populist output (Bonner and Aston 1998: 130). 
The BBC was forced to respond to this competitive challenge, and the Corporation’s 
institutional strategy underwent a gradual change. The Corporation’s new strategy 
was manifested in the 1995 document People and Programmes, which criticised the 
BBC’s over-reliance on paternalist programming policies and acknowledged the need 
to better respond to ‘changing tastes’, thus placing consumer satisfaction at the 
centre of the Corporation’s focus (Born 2005: 63). Thenceforth, engaging new 
viewers from audiences then most distant from the BBC – lower socio-economic 
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groups, young people and female viewers – whilst maintaining ratings became an 
increasingly important objective in the strategy of the BBC television (Born 2005: 255-
9). Ratings gave the channel controllers a simple yardstick for public accountability, 
and thus increased BBC executives’ pressures to attract larger (and younger) 
audiences. In the Corporation’s religious programming department, mass audiences 
and mass impact became the new strategic objectives that guided its programming 
strategy: 
Under John Birt’s Director-Generalship measurement became absolutely vital. 
He moved to system of performance review. Every January every programme 
strand across the BBC had to be reviewed in terms of its impact and its 
audiences […] The number of people listening and watching became 
something that had to be measured very carefully. […] I remember John Birt 
leaning across the table to me one day and saying: “Ernie, you’ve got to 
understand, I crave measurement”. Those were his exact words: “I crave 
measurement.” […] We became very anxious about the number of people who 
were watching our programmes. […] I used to get the audience figures on […] 
Tuesday morning or Wednesday morning, and I used to pour over them and 
think “oh my goodness, what’s going on”. They became something that was 
terribly important to us. 
(Ernie Rea, author’s interview, 12 September 2011) 
This newly-found ‘measurement discourse’ demonstrates that mass audiences 
became to be considered as part of public value delivery: they served as concrete 
evidence that the Corporation was delivering its public value objectives. In attempting 
to draft a new universal framework for better performance measurement, the Reithian 
normative knowledge of public interest and the ‘needs’ of the audience as citizens 
was replaced by a system of measuring public value for its services using complex 
criteria including factors as diverse as audience reach and size, appreciation index, 
cost per hour and awards won (BBC 2004: 88). Notably, most of these public value 
objectives were based on how the mass audiences received the programmes. As the 
BBC’s 2004 policy document on public value measurement states: ‘Pure ratings – 
audience size – also matters. Everyone pays the licence fee and audiences want the 
BBC to make popular programmes – there would be no point to a BBC that no one 
watched or listened to’ (BBC 2004: 88). 
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Another logical consequence of the rise of this ratings discourse in the BBC was that 
by the mid-1990s it became increasingly focused on mass audience preferences in its 
corporate strategy. Consequently, between 1996-7, the BBC drafted a new vision for 
BBC One as an entertainment channel of broad appeal (Born 2005: 259). Such a 
populist and ratings-obsessed strategy accommodated religious programmes 
uneasily. As a sign of changing priorities within the Corporation, religious 
documentary strands Everyman and Heart of the Matter were shifted to BBC Two – 
the minority interest channel of the Corporation – in 2003. However, BBC Two was 
undergoing similar changes under its Controller Jane Root, who repositioned the 
channel in 2000 to appeal to an older, ‘more mainstream, suburban audience’ with a 
strategy that centred on a ‘wall of leisure’ and ‘lifestyle programming in mid-evening’ 
in order to secure ratings success (Born 2005: 473).  Michael Wakelin (author’s 
interview, 22 October 2010) notes that Root wanted to discontinue programme 
strands, resulting in the cancellation of these long-running series and a drop in the 
volume of religious documentary output: 
…we were promised that we would get a certain number of documentaries a 
year. That promise was quickly forgotten about when Jane [Root] left, and we 
were left pretty much with Songs of Praise and the Sunday morning strand, 
and occasional documentaries. 
(Michael Wakelin, author’s interview, 22 October 2010) 
Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 12 September 2011) argues that the combination of the 
loss of talent and documentary strands resulted in a vicious circle of compromised 
production quality and dropping audience figures, which gave the broadcasting 
executives a suitable excuse to perform cuts in programming:  
[W]hen BBC Religion was moved from London to Manchester we had got a 
very strong team of documentary filmmakers in London who had proper 
religious expertise. They were people who were really at the top of their game. 
And when the announcement was made that religion was going to be moved 
from London to Manchester other departments like documentaries cherry-
picked these people, they said: “you don’t want to go to Manchester, go and 
join our department”. And we were left denuded. All of a sudden this fantastic 
group of filmmakers had gone and we were told […] that we weren’t allowed to 
use London filmmakers to make Everyman. And it basically meant that for a 
very short warning – within six months –  we had to find a whole new raft of 
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very skilled filmmakers to make Everyman. Now, I would have to be honest 
and say I think that for a period of a couple of years – I think – the quality 
dropped, I think the programmes weren’t up to the standard that they had been 
in the late 1980s. […] We then regained the ground and we started to do well 
again but it was a very, very difficult period, and I wonder: did that give channel 
controllers who didn’t really want Everyman on their channel an opportunity to 
say: “well maybe we shouldn’t be doing this anymore?” 
(Ernie Rea, author’s interview, 12 September 2011)  
While the BBC’s religious output revived to an average of 4 hours 24 minutes in the 
period 2001-2005 following 9/11 and the launch of the BBC’s digital channels, 
changes in UK commercial PSBs strategies forced the BBC to rethink the position of 
religion in its internal priorities. The Communications Act 2003 allowed commercial 
channels to withdraw from religious programming by discontinuing the religious output 
quotas. Changes in its rivals’ programming strategies prompted the BBC to respond 
to this competitive challenge by cutting its religious programming. In the 2006-2009 
period, its average output of religion had contracted to 3 hours 16 minutes per week. 
That was another one on my list of things that was a disaster: […] ITV’s 
decision [to discontinue weekly religious output], because if there’s no 
competition, then the BBC thinks “why should we bother”. I think that has had a 
huge effect. […] And when there used to be a programme on Sunday evenings 
called Highway, and it was opposite Songs of Praise, and they would fight it 
out. But of course standards were very high at the time and money was given 
to them and… But ITV do big dramas so the BBC’s got to do big dramas; ITV 
do comedy; BBC’s got to do comedy, ITV do the X-Factor; the BBC’s got to do 
something big on a Saturday night. So, of course, the competition going was a 
disaster. 
(Michael Wakelin, author’s interview, 22 October 2010) 
In contrast to the UK, Finland features a unique religious programme production 
arrangement, in which devotional programmes are produced (and, to large extent, 
financed) by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the largest church in Finland. From a 
historical viewpoint, this can be explained by the close historical ties between the 
Church and the state, with the Church having a number of responsibilities and 
privileges, such as the right to collect taxes and administer population registers. The 
institutional cooperation between Yleisradio’s television and the Church concerning 
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television was formalised in 1964 following Yleisradio’s acquisition of TES-TV, after 
which the Church created the post of television and film secretary, whose duties 
included producing devotional programmes (Väätäinen 2008). 
The relationship between the Church and Yleisradio aggravated during Eino S. 
Repo’s tenure as Yleisradio’s Director General. Repo wanted to subject religious 
programmes under similar pre-broadcast review that Yleisradio’s other programmes 
were subject to (Salokangas 1996: 176-7). This seemingly minor schism – evocatively 
dubbed the ‘sermon censorship dispute’ (Salokangas 1996: 220) – escalated and 
culminated in 1967, when archbishops of both the Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
the Orthodox Church presented an ultimatum to Yleisradio’s Administrative Council 
(AC), threatening to prevent all cooperation between the Church and Yleisradio if the 
reforms were brought in. A compromise was reached in October 1967, when the AC 
decided to set up an external committee called Hartausohjelmien valvontaelin72, 
which consisted of two representatives from Yleisradio, three from the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, one from the Orthodox Church and one representative of ‘free’ 
Christian denominations73 (Castrén 1992: 15; Salokangas 1996: 177). Its primary 
duties include designating presenters for devotional programmes and sermons, 
distributing the designated broadcasting hours between different denominations, and 
ensuring that all devotional programming comply with the terms of Yleisradio’s 
broadcasting licence and the decrees of the AC. Its jurisdiction, however, only covers 
devotional programmes (e.g. acts of worship and programmes with religious reading), 
and other types of religious programmes (e.g. religious documentaries, lectures and 
current affairs programmes) are covered by Yleisradio’s rules and regulations. 
Salokangas (1996: 177) notes that in reality Yleisradio’s chances of exercising 
editorial influence on the content of devotional programmes were marginal, and in 
that aspect the Church retained its control on religious programmes. The editorial 
responsibility of devotional programmes was thus retained by the Church. In order to 
                                                 
72
 In English: “The Monitoring Organ for Devotional Programmes”. 
73
 The Advent Church, the Baptist community, the Pentecostal Church, the Methodist Church, the 
Salvation Army and the Free Church. 
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enhance and optimise its media and communications functions, it set up a central 
body for media functions, Kirkon tiedotuskeskus74 (KT), in December 1966. 
In practice, all Yleisradio’s devotional programmes have been produced by KT. 
Yleisradio’s control on religious programming is limited to deciding the volume, 
broadcasting slots and broadcasting channels for religious programmes. It also 
provides the technical staff and resources required for the programmes and 
reimburses costs directly associated with the programmes. However, all editorial 
work, including the costly pre-production research, is done by KT’s staff, who are 
employed by the Church (Väätäinen 2008). Yleisradio also appoints a producer for 
religious programmes, but his/her responsibility is limited mostly to overseeing the 
process from Yleisradio’s end and he does not actively participate in the editorial 
process. 
Prior to the 1993 Channel Reform Yleisradio also employed two religious 
correspondents, whose responsibilities included coordinating KT’s devotional 
programming in Yleisradio’s end and producing ecumenical and ethical programming 
independent from the churches. Elina Paloheimo (formerly Pylkkäinen) and Hannu 
Kamppila were appointed to these roles in 1979 and 1980 respectively. As Hannu 
Kamppila (author’s interview, 20 June 2011) recalls, Yleisradio’s own programmes 
were less confessional in nature and took a more investigative approach to the 
questions of religion and ethics. They consisted of a handful of series like Keskellä 
kylää75 and Usko ja todellisuus76, most of which were not particularly long-living or 
frequent, with programmes being broadcast once a month or so. These programmes 
were first broadcast under Yleisradio’s Societal Programme Department, and 
following an organisational restructuring in 1982, under the Factual Programme 
Department. Thus, unlike in the BBC, religious programmes have never been 
produced under their own department in Yleisradio. 
                                                 
74
 In English: “The Communications Centre of the Church”. 
75
 In English: “In the Middle of the Village”. 
76
 In English: “Faith and Reality”. 
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Empirical data demonstrate that this institutional arrangement between the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and Yleisradio, which also features a significant 
contribution of the Church to the production resources to religious programmes, has 
been a major factor in maintaining and safeguarding the output on Yleisradio’s 
channels. Unlike the output of the BBC, Yleisradio’s output has increased slightly 
since the 1980s when it averaged just 2 hours 17 minutes weekly. Elina Paloheimo 
(author’s interview, 25 May 2011) and Hannu Kamppila (author’s interview, 20 June 
2011) put this down to the dominant Leftist institutional paradigm that gained foothold 
in the company in the 1970s, which gave religion a lesser status in the priorities of 
television executives. The lack of competition between broadcasters and the 
politicised administration of Yleisradio meant that direct audience feedback and 
ratings played a lesser role in setting the programming agenda of the company. As 
Hannu Kamppila (author’s interview, 20 June 2011) notes, Yleisradio’s administration 
was considered to be responsible primarily to the politically appointed AC, whose 
preferences consequently had a major influence on the programming policies. 
Elina Paloheimo (author’s interview, 25 May 2011) and Hannu Kamppila (author’s 
interview, 20 June 2011) agree that the status of religion saw an improvement in 
Yleisradio’s priorities in the late 1980s and 1990s in that the genre gained a wider 
acceptance from the company’s administration. The Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993 
marked a critical juncture in this respect, as it cemented their status by identifying 
them as part of the company’s statutory public service duties. In the aftermath of the 
1993 Channel Reform, Yleisradio decided to increase the volume of devotional 
programmes by 50 per cent as part of measures to fill the gap of approximately 1300 
annual broadcasting hours vacated by MTV’s former broadcasting slots. 
Consequently, Yleisradio introduced a weekly Sunday morning ‘God Slot’ in 1993 for 
services of worship and other religious programmes. Frequent programming was 
intended to improve viewing loyalty and strengthen TV 2’s new ‘family Sunday’ brand 
(Kirkkohallitus 1993: 132). 
Notwithstanding the increase in Yleisradio’s broadcasting hours, the 1993 Channel 
Reform also created two dilemmas to Yleisradio. First, it was now compelled to 
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compete with MTV3, whose entertainment-oriented strategy instantly gave it a 54 per 
cent share of viewing (Salokangas 1996: 427). Yleisradio, in turn, had failed to meet 
its target of 50 per cent of viewing, which it considered essential for the future 
justification of the licence fee (Salokangas 1996: 423). In Yleisradio’s administration, 
the blame for this failure was widely laid to the fact that MTV’s programming on TV 1 
in particular had been substituted mainly by factual programming (Salokangas 1996: 
426-8; Hellman 1999: 102-3). TV 2, in turn, had met its individual target of 20 per cent 
of viewing mainly because it focused on mass appeal programming, such as 
domestic fiction and sport. Thus, while the Channel Reform had given Yleisradio 
more broadcasting hours at peak time, it was under great internal and external 
pressures to regain its institutional state of equilibrium by changing its conduct. As its 
previous public service oriented programming strategy involving emphasis on factual 
output had been largely unsuccessful, the only way to recover its share of viewing 
was through increases in populist programming. 
Moreover, the increase in the output of religious programming occurred at a period 
when Yleisradio’s resources were tied in filling the gap left by MTV’s programming. It 
soon became clear TV 2 was unable to increase its religious programme budget in 
line with the increase in the volume of religious content (Niinistö 2000: 135). Thus, the 
volume of devotional programmes had to be cut already in 1994 (Väätäinen 2008). 
Due to this resource shortage, Yleisradio’s own in-house religious production 
resources were also reduced following the reappointment of its two religious 
correspondents to other duties within the company in the mid-1990s (Elina 
Paloheimo, author’s interview, 25 May 2011), after which Yleisradio has not had 
designated religious correspondents. As production resources became increasingly 
scarce, genres that enjoyed mass appeal; e.g. sport – another forte of TV 2, were 
able to secure majority resources, while religion was increasingly neglected in this 
respect. Satu Väätäinen, former producer of KT, argues that the Channel Reform 
represented an institutional shift in Yleisradio’s priorities in terms of resource 
allocation, with populist types of mass audience programming receiving the bulk of 
production resources: 
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…I don’t understand how there was so much money [for religious 
programming] before the Channel Reform, but there was plenty. […] After the 
Channel Reform there was a total shift to the other extremity in this respect. 
Production of devotional programmes was moved to the Vaasa regional 
production unit, which was completely under-resourced for the purpose. […] 
The low regard to religious programming was demonstrated by the fact that 
sports did get whatever resources it required. From the late 1990s to the late 
2000s during which I worked with these programmes; for countless times I 
noticed that an outside broadcasting unit suitable for my production needs was 
standing unused, but I had to use some small old van instead. […] Even if the 
resources were there, we didn’t get them. I think this reflected Yleisradio’s low 
regard to religious programming. 
(Satu Väätäinen, author’s interview, 22 January 2011) 
Empirical data demonstrate that in spite of Yleisradio’s financial problems following 
the gradual depletion in its income from commercial broadcasters, no significant 
reduction has taken place in the volume of programming. The annual reports of KT 
confirm that the volume of devotional programming has remained largely unchanged 
in the 2000s, with around 35-37 televised acts of worship per year. Thus, the decline 
has been far less dramatic than it has been on the BBC’s channels. In the period 
2006-2009 the average volume of religious programming on Yleisradio’s channels 
was 3 hours 19 minutes per week. However, considering that the volume of 
Yleisradio’s total annual television output nearly doubled within this period from 
10,660 hours in 2000 to 19,825 hours in 2009 (Yleisradio Oy 2001, 2010) the 
increase can be considered somewhat moderate. Yleisradio also launched its digital 
channels Teema and FST5, whose output has been added to the data source since 
2007. Considering this growth in the volume of output, the provision of religious 
programming has stagnated to an extent. Satu Väätäinen (author’s interview, 22 
January 2011) argues that their provision is now ‘extremely marginal’: in her view, 
they only serve to fulfil Yleisradio’s statutory public service duties in this respect. 
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Chart 6.5: Hours of output of religious programmes on public funding channels in the 
sample weeks in the UK, 1986-2009 
 
Chart 6.6: Hours of output of religious programmes on public funding channels in the 
sample weeks in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
6.2.2. Volume of output on commercial channels 
In the UK, commercial PSB channels historically made a significant contribution in 
religious programme provision, as chart 6.7 demonstrates. The ITV network had a 
particular commitment in religious programming, with the structure of its output similar 
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to that of the BBC. While no formal quotas for religion existed prior to the 
Broadcasting Act 1990, it was considered an axiomatic part of ITV’s public service 
duties (McDonnell 2009: 151), and the IBA mandated ITV companies to reserve the 
Sunday evening ‘God Slot’ for religious programmes (Viney 1999: 16). Notably, most 
ITV companies provided a short epilogue before the closedown on weekdays until the 
late 1980s (Sendall 1982: 280).77 ITV was also the sole provider of regular televised 
Sunday services: the BBC only provided such services at religious feasts. ITV also 
broadcast Highway, a popular peak time alternative to the BBC’s Songs of Praise, in 
the 1980s. Nevertheless, religion was never a profitable genre for ITV companies, not 
least since advertising was only allowed in programmes more than 30 minutes of 
length, while services of worship and programmes of devotional nature were still 
subject to an advertising ban and religious advertising was prohibited altogether 
(Potter 1989; Bonner and Aston 1998: 278). Religious programmes were also 
associated with elderly and less affluent viewers (Svennevig et al. 1988: 15), whose 
purchasing power and consuming habits were not attractive to advertisers. While 
Viney (1999: 3) argues that religion enjoyed a greater protection on ITV under the IBA 
oversight when no formal quota existed for religion, the Broadcasting Act 1990 had 
little effect on the volume of religious programming on ITV. The ITC-imposed quota 
for two weekly hours of religion served to offset mounting pressures for ITV to adopt a 
more outright commercial strategy, which, in terms of the Industrial Equilibrium Model, 
were produced by the intensification of competition in the broadcasting market in the 
1990s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ITV provided on average two hours of 
religious programmes weekly, with little variation in this figure. 
The provision of Channel 4 was equally extensive and frequent in the 1980s. While 
there were no broadcasting slots similar to the BBC and ITV’s ‘God Slots’ (since 
Channel 4’s founding Chief Executive Jeremy Isaacs had ruled against Sunday 
scheduling of religious programmes and slots for ‘institutionalised’ religious 
programming (Brown 2007: 102-3)), Channel 4 provided an average of two hours of 
                                                 
77
 Granada Television was a notable deviate from this habit, in spite of the ITA’s numerous caveats 
(Sendall 1982: 280). 
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religious programming per week in the sample weeks in the late 1980s. A relatively 
high proportion of its programming was also scheduled at peak time. The religious 
output of the channel in the late 1980s reflected its early character as an alternative 
channel, consisting of documentaries, talk shows, programmes for youth, gospel 
concerts and religious education programmes. The programming of Channel 4 also 
led the way in recognising religious diversity in the UK in television programming 
(McDonnell 2009: 166). 
Channel 4’s programming strategy changed radically in the 1990s following the 
appointment of Michael Grade as the Chief Executive of the channel in 1987. Grade 
wanted to introduce a more mainstream and populist programming strategy in order 
to increase the channel’s share of viewing, ignoring the channel’s original 
experimental, public service character. Grade’s re-evaluation of Channel 4’s 
institutional strategy concurred with the sweeping reforms of the Broadcasting Act 
1990 that changed the nature of content regulation, granted Channel 4 full 
institutional independence and introduced competition to commercial broadcasting in 
1993. In response to these competitive challenges, Channel 4 increased its share of 
entertainment and adopted an increasingly ‘tabloidised’ agenda in factual 
programming (Brown 2007: 140-177). While the ITC imposed a quota of a minimum 
of one hour of weekly religious programming on Channel 4 (Brown 2007: 337), 
empirical data demonstrate that religious programmes began to be sidelined in 
Channel 4’s programming strategy thereafter. 
Channel 5’s original broadcasting licence also had a one-hour quota for religious 
provision. Like Channel 4, its programming was less confessional in nature and 
consisted of religious talk shows and religious music. The channel also had a notable 
provision of religious programming for children and young people. Programming was 
concentrated on Sunday mornings. Channel 5’s output was less extensive than that 
of ITV, averaging just about an hour a week in the years preceding the 2003 
regulatory reform. 
The Communications Act 2003 served as a critical juncture in commercial channels’ 
programming policies, as it allowed commercial broadcasters to reassess the status 
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of religious programmes in their schedules. The Act removed the ITC-imposed quotas 
and introduced a system of co-regulation in association with Ofcom for the three 
commercial channels. In practice, however, Ofcom has made little efforts to maintain 
religious programming on UK commercial PSB channels as the co-regulatory regime 
does not grant Ofcom with mandate or the necessary powers to promote religious 
output on commercial channels’ schedules in spite of section 264 of the Act designed 
to maintain diversity in religious programming. In 2005, Ofcom allowed ITV to cut its 
commitment to religious output by 50 per cent, justifying this reduction by arguing that 
it would bring ITV’s religious output level with those of Channel 4 and Channel 5 
(Timms 2005). As a result, ITV cancelled its regular televised Sunday service, which 
had been part of the channel’s schedules for decades. Channel 5 followed suit the 
following year by replacing its regular Sunday morning religious programming with 
output of more populist appeal. Religious programming on these channels has 
declined even further between 2005 and 2009: ITV’s annual religious output declined 
from 67 to 21 hours, and Channel 5’s output from 51 hours to just 12 hours 
respectively (Ofcom 2010c). In 2009, Channel 4 was the only commercial broadcaster 
with ongoing commitment to religious programming. However, its output has not been 
able to offset the significant cuts in the offerings of ITV and Channel 5.  
As MTV’s former Senior Vice President of Programming Tauno Äijälä (author’s 
interview, 9 December 2012) recalls, religion (as well as drama, documentaries, 
factual programmes and other types of programming commonly associated with PSB) 
was considered part of the company’s public service duties even before the 1993 
Channel Reform. MTV considered the provision of these public service programmes 
necessary to comply with the public service mission that Yleisradio’s broadcasting 
licence subjected it to, but these programmes also served to further its long-term 
institutional mission to gain a full institutional independence from Yleisradio’s control 
(see e.g. Hanski 2001). Consequently, during its years under Yleisradio’s control, it 
aimed to operate like a full-scale PSB, with large in-house production resources and 
an extensive portfolio of programmes. 
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MTV’s religious programming was produced in-house under MTV’s Family 
Programming Unit78, and following its closure at the end of 1985, directly under Tauno 
Äijälä’s office (Tauno Äijälä, author’s interview, 9 December 2010; personal 
communication, 19 January 2013). However, the limited broadcasting hours of the 
company confined the provision of religious content to one-off programmes and short 
and infrequent series. MTV’s low output is illustrated in chart 6.8, with just one 
programme in the sample weeks of this study. Only after the launch of the MTV3 
Channel in 1993 did the company really start investing in religious programming, 
which was now considered part of the channel’s comprehensive service obligation 
stipulated in its broadcasting licence. Many of the channel’s religious documentary 
series of the 1990s were co-produced with KT. This cooperation pleased MTV3 as it 
enhanced its institutional status as a ‘serious’ broadcaster that the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church – that had previously cooperated exclusively with Yleisradio – 
considered worth cooperating with. The channel’s programming consisted of religious 
phone-in programmes, talk shows and religious magazines. 
MTV3’s institutional policy towards religion changed radically in the early 2000s. 
Religious programming disappeared altogether from the channel’s schedules and 
was replaced with populist types of output. These changes emanated from changes 
in the structure of the broadcasting industry following the launch of Nelonen in 1997. 
During MTV3’s monopoly on advertising on terrestrial channels, it was able to 
maintain artificially high advertising rates, which had put off many prospective 
advertisers. The monopoly was brought to an end in 1997 when the fourth 
commercial channel Nelonen was launched. It targeted young urban adults; the 
audiences with the highest purchasing power and thus sought after by advertisers 
(Kaarlela 2004: 36-7). The new channel eroded MTV3’s share of advertising revenue 
and forced it to adopt several cost-cutting measures in order to recover its profitability. 
The remaining in-house production departments (apart from news, current affairs and 
sports) were outsourced in 2001 (Oksanen 2001). The company also changed its 
                                                 
78
 In Finnish: “Perhetoimitus”. 
260 
 
 
 
commercial strategy by turning its attention to commercially profitable types of 
programming instead of aiming for a full portfolio of programmes (Virtanen 2001). 
These changes concurred with changes in the management of MTV Oy. Eero 
Pilkama, the company’s CEO since 1984 retired in 1999, and Senior Vice President 
Tauno Äijälä in 2001. Both Pilkama and Äijälä had worked for the company since the 
1960s and their views on programming policy were strongly influenced by the 
dominant public service paradigm of the era. Tauno Äijälä (author’s interview, 9 
December 2012) argues that his successor since 2002, Jorma Sairanen, did not 
share his view on the importance of religious programming, and the company 
adopted a more populist programming strategy, with a focus on young, urban 
audiences rather than the provision of a broad-ranging comprehensive service (see 
e.g. Virtanen 2001). The 2002 annual report of KT contains the last reference to 
religious programming on MTV3, stating that a seven-part documentary series 
Paavalin jalanjäljissä79, produced by KT, was broadcast in spring 2002. In spite of the 
programme attracting average audiences of 211,000, thus exceeding the targets set 
by MTV3 (Kirkkohallitus 2003: 64), MTV3 has had practically no programming on 
religious matters on its schedules thereafter. 
 
                                                 
79
 In English: “In the footsteps of Saint Paul”. 
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Chart 6.7: Hours of output of religious programmes on commercial channels in the 
sample weeks in the UK, 1986-2009 
 
Chart 6.8: Hours of output of religious programmes on commercial channels in the 
sample weeks in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
 
6.2.3. Proportion of religious programmes in the main channels’ output 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 represent the output of religious programmes as a proportion of all 
programmes on main terrestrial channels. A clear downwards trend is visible in the 
proportion of religious programmes in both countries, both in individual channels and 
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across the system. Not surprisingly, the proportions were at their highest in the late 
1980s. Even though the volumes of religious programmes might appear low in 
Finland, religious programming did nevertheless make up 2.4 per cent of all 
programmes owing to the limited broadcasting hours. As broadcasting hours 
continued to rise in the 1990s and 2000s, the proportion of religious programmes 
declined so that in the period 2006-2009 they made up just 0.4 per cent of 
programmes in the UK and 0.6 per cent in Finland. It is noteworthy that the total figure 
for Finland would have been even lower, were the lack of religious output on Nelonen 
taken into account in these figures. 
Table 6.2: Proportion of religious programmes of all programmes in the UK, main 
channels 
Period BBC1 BBC2 ITV Channel 4 Channel 5 Total 
1986 – 1990 1.9% 1.2% 1.3% 1.8% 1.5% 
1991 – 1995 1.6% 1.1% 1.2% 0.4% 1.1% 
1996 – 2000 1.1% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 
2001 – 2005 1.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 
2006 – 2009 1.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
Total 1.4% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 0.4% 0.9% 
 
Table 6.3: Proportion of religious programmes of all programmes in Finland, main 
channels 
Period YLE180 YLE281 MTV3 Total 
1986 – 1990 3.1% 1.5% 2.4% 
1991 – 1995 0.8% 2.4% 1.2%82 1.4% 
1996 – 2000 0.5% 3.0% 0.5% 1.1% 
2001 – 2005 0.8% 2.4% 0.0% 1.0% 
2006 – 2009 1.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 
Total 1.2% 1.9% 0.3% 0.9% 
                                                 
80
 Figures for 1986-1992 exclude the broadcasting hours of MTV and its religious programming on the 
channel. 
81
 Figures for 1986-1992 exclude the broadcasting hours of MTV and its religious programming on the 
channel. 
82
 1993-1995. 
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6.3. The structure of output in religious programmes 
While the quantitative methods used in this research are not sufficient to provide an 
exhaustive record of changes in programme content, empirical data demonstrate that 
the structure of religious programming has changed following the marketisation-driven 
changes in the institutional strategies of UK broadcasters. These changes have had 
the strongest effect on devotional programmes, whose share has declined by two 
thirds from 24 per cent in the late 1980s to just 7 per cent between 2006 and 2009. 
Chart 6.9 illustrates the structure of religious output in the UK. The structure of the 
output in the late 1980s indicated high diversity in religious programming. The four 
programme sub-categories were almost equally represented in the schedules, with 
religious magazine and music representing the largest sub-category. It included 
programmes such as Praise Be!, Songs of Praise and Highway. As per its original 
minority interest focus, Channel 4’s programming targeted non-Christian audiences, 
while the outputs of the BBC and ITV were more distinctly Christian. The proportion of 
devotional programmes, including various televised acts of worship and short 
programmes exploring religious dogmas, was also relatively high, comprising a 
quarter of religious output. Most programming in this sub-category was provided by 
ITV, which still had a weekly televised Sunday service in its schedules.  
The late 1990s saw a critical juncture emerging in broadcasters’ religious 
programming policies. Examination of the changes against the Industrial Equilibrium 
Model reveals that this shift was an institutional response to forces originating from 
the broadcasting market structures: increasing competitive pressures forced 
broadcasters to shift the focus of their strategy on programming with greater audience 
potential, while also keeping the production costs proportionate to actual viewing of 
the programmes. In sum, religious programming strategies began to be increasingly 
influenced by factors like ratings, reach and cost-per-hour of programming, while less 
attention was paid on its social and cultural impact. In terms of broadcast output, this 
shift translated to a decrease in the proportion of confessional programming, which 
had low audience potential but often high production costs. ITV’s previous Morning 
Worship was replaced with a religious magazine Sunday Morning in 1999, with a full 
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televised church service on 15 Sundays per year and only a short act of worship on 
the remaining Sundays (Viney 1999: 19). As these magazines were largely studio 
productions, their production costs were significantly lower than those of the live 
outside broadcasts of Morning Worship (Holmes 2000: 27). Andrew Graystone 
(author’s interview, 7 February 2011) names ITV’s My Favourite Hymns as another 
example of a programme whose production costs – at around £35,000 per hour 
(Brown 2005) – were pushed to the minimum at the expense of content quality. ITV 
axed the programme in 2005 on basis of its low viewing figures, which, at the final 
days of the show, averaged 400,000 viewers. It was replaced with a light docusoap 
Parish in the Sun that followed the life of an Anglican vicar in Majorca (Brown and 
Conlan 2005). There has been no regular service of worship on UK terrestrial 
television thenceforth. 
Pressures for audience maximisation began to shift the focus of the BBC’s 
programming in the late 1990s, too. As examined in section 6.2.1, the BBC’s strategy 
underwent a change in the 1990s, and engaging new viewers from audiences then 
most distant from the BBC – lower socio-economic groups, young people and female 
viewers – whilst maintaining ratings became an increasingly important objective in the 
strategy of the BBC television (Born 2005: 255-9). As Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 
12 September 2011) recalls, obsession with ratings was introduced to the institutional 
culture of the Corporation under John Birt’s term as Director-General, and religious 
programme producers and executives were under an increasing pressure to introduce 
programming that was considered to better match popular tastes. Consequently, talk 
shows on ethical matters such as The Heaven and Earth Show replaced the previous 
strands of confessional programmes (e.g. First Light). Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 
12 September 2011) recalls that the high cost associated with providing live televised 
acts of worship, together with their relatively low viewing figures, served as the 
incentives for the BBC Religion and Ethics department to move towards more cost-
effective types of studio programming: 
In television […] we moved away from worship. […] When we looked at the 
cost of doing a televised outside broadcast from the church on worship and the 
cost of doing it for radio, there was just no comparison, […] it was about the 
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tenth of the cost. And yet, we were getting about twice the audience and 
sometimes more. And in the BBC we had to ask the question “is that a wise 
use of resources?” when there are other things that we felt that we should be 
doing particularly in the multi-faith area […]. So […] I became pretty convinced 
that […] the case for regular televised worship wasn’t sustainable. Now, by the 
time I left [in 2001] we were still doing the major Christian festivals and we 
were doing services of advent, but for the rest of the time we’ve given that up. 
So I think within the department there was quite a move away from doing 
worships to doing more cutting-edge stuff. 
(Ernie Rea, author’s interview, 12 September 2011) 
Andrew Graystone argues that this marketised culture involving the obsession with 
measurement became an end in itself in the Corporation’s religious programming 
policy in the 2000s, in an extent that it began to inform the Corporation’s religious 
programming policies. Meanwhile, the social and cultural impact of religious 
programming became a lesser issue in the Corporation’s religious programming 
agenda: 
It changed the culture of the BBC and the culture of broadcasting massively. 
[…] It did change things because it meant that everything was accounted, 
everything had a number attached to it […] and religion doesn’t fare well in a 
culture where everything is measured by economics. […] When I was a 
programme-maker at the BBC […] every week we would count the audience, 
and if the audience was bigger this week than it was last week, we were 
happy, and if the audience was smaller than last week, we wanted to know 
what had gone wrong. […] But in all those years I never heard a discussion 
about what we were doing to the audience. What were we feeding them, what 
was happening to their souls because of the programming, what impact we 
were having on people’s lives; those were questions that weren’t relevant in 
the 90s and the 2000s. Now, it seems to me that those are incredibly important 
questions for broadcasters, but they’re questions that aren’t asked now, and I 
think they were asked before, in the earliest days of religion… In religious 
broadcasting, and in the earliest days of broadcasting […] the core question 
was: “what are we doing to the audience?”. They may have been right or 
wrong with some of the things or the conclusions they drew, but it was a 
question you no longer asked in the 1990s; you just asked: “how big is the 
audience?” You weighed the audience rather than asked what you’ve done to 
them. 
(Andrew Graystone, author’s interview, 7 February 2011) 
An additional evidence of this shift towards populist content is demonstrated through 
increasing tabloidisation of programme content. Michael Wakelin (author’s interview, 
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22 October 2010) argues that the treatment of religion has become increasingly 
sensationalist and seeks to stir controversy in order to drive up audience figures. He 
argues that programmes like Jesus Boot Camp (Channel 4) and the documentaries 
on Scientology, that focus on religious extremists and extremities, intend to 
sensationalise matters of religion, thus ‘treating religion like a problem’ and portray 
people with religious beliefs as being abnormal. He argues that religious debate 
shows like Big Questions regularly focus on creating a conflict of polarising views to 
create drama and stir audience’s interest, rather than creating a constructive 
discussion of religious matters that would benefit the viewers in their spiritual needs. 
Dame Joan Bakewell, former presenter of the BBC’s long-running religious 
documentary series Heart of the Matter, also referred to similar practices in justifying 
her reasons for leaving the programme in 2000: 
During the late Nineties, the [BBC Religion & Ethics] department joined the 
ratings-chasing fever, coming up with proven audience grabbers – yet another 
half-baked theory about the Egyptian pyramids, or the latest update on the 
search for the Holy Grail. On Heart of the Matter I found myself debating the 
moral dilemma of body piercing. In trying to please the ratings tsars, the 
programme yielded its own high ground. 
(Bakewell 2000) 
As the Finnish devotional programming arrangement gives KT – itself a department 
within the Evangelical Lutheran Church – a central role and great institutional 
autonomy in the production of programmes, it is only logical that devotional 
programming dominates the schedules, as chart 6.10 demonstrates. Programming in 
this sub-category made up over half of the output in the late 1980s and 1990s, with its 
share rising to roughly two thirds of the output in the 2000s as a consequence of 
commercial broadcasters’ withdrawal from religious programming. There have been 
only a few attempts to reform the output and introduce new formats, the latest in 
1997, when an ecumenical religious magazine Credo – Minä uskon was introduced. 
As there were insufficient resources to maintain the number of televised Sunday 
services, their number had to be subsequently halved (Väätäinen 2008). The low 
number of televised services provoked vocal opposition from regular viewers of the 
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Sunday services, and the issue was also regularly raised in the General Synod of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. The increased pressure from the Church and the 
audiences prompted Yleisradio and KT to cancel the programme in 2000 and restore 
the number of Sunday services (Väätäinen 2008). To date no further attempts have 
been made to reform KT’s programming. 
Yleisradio’s own religious output consisted mainly of religious documentaries, 
magazines and concerts, as well as low levels of religious programming for schools 
and colleges. Their combined share has decreased in the recent years, as Yleisradio 
has been forced to undertake radical cost-cutting measures in the 2000s following the 
gradual discontinuation of the subsidies it received from commercial broadcasters. 
These payments were discontinued altogether at the digital switchover in 2007. Due 
to Yleisradio’s financial difficulties and the central role of KT in the production of 
religious content, the proportion of programmes examining religious matters from a 
more ethical point of view has been low and declining further in the 2000s. Religious 
magazines and music have experienced a similar fate. 
In spite of the aforementioned role of the Finnish religious production arrangement in 
protecting the equilibrium in Finnish religious programming from the decline that has 
taken place in the religious output of the UK channels, it has also prevented the genre 
from being modernised. Yleisradio has largely abstained from having editorial 
influence on devotional programming, and considers this provision by the Church to 
fulfil its statutory public service obligation in this respect. The substantial contribution 
of the Church to the production resources of devotional programmes83 keeps 
Yleisradio satisfied with the status quo, and it sees little need to contribute to the 
provision of the genre by its own programming. The Evangelical Lutheran Church, in 
turn, has been unable – or unwilling – to introduce new forms of religious output, as 
any such attempts have been vetoed by a powerful lobby within the Church. As 
devotional programmes are produced by the Church, it has sought to preserve its 
                                                 
83
 The annual budget of KT’s television department was 348,914 EUR in 2005; most of this was spent 
towards religious programming on Yleisradio’s channels (Kirkkohallitus 2006: 55). 
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own institutional interests in its programming, which has also prevented evolution 
within the genre. 
Chart 6.9: Proportions of different sub-categories of religious output in the UK, all 
channels 
 
Chart 6.10: Proportions of different sub-categories of religious output in Finland, all 
channels 
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6.4. Marginalisation in the scheduling of religious 
programmes 
Changes in scheduling of religious programmes demonstrate that a shift has taken 
place in broadcasters’ institutional priorities in this respect. Evidence suggests that 
ratings, rather than social and cultural considerations, increasingly set the scheduling 
priorities of public and private broadcasters alike. Because of their low audience 
figures, religious programmes are now increasingly scheduled outside the peak time, 
which is reserved for populist output of wider appeal. Chart 6.11 illustrates that in the 
UK in particular an increasing proportion of output is scheduled in the margins of the 
schedule and in the hours of night (between 23:00 and 07:00), when audience 
numbers are at their lowest.  
Religious programmes were traditionally broadcast mainly in two Sunday 
broadcasting slots, which were designed to provide a televised alternative to Christian 
worships. Morning programming was broadcast during the morning worship between 
the hours of 09:00 and 12:00. It consisted of televised church services, readings of 
religious texts and Sunday school programmes. The output in Finland was balanced 
towards the morning slot. The ‘God Slot’ closed period, coinciding with evensong 
around 18:40-19:15, was the classic domain for religious programming in the UK, with 
many long-running BBC and ITV series such as Songs of Praise and Highway being 
broadcast in this slot. This closed period was a product of the historical practice of 
BBC1 and ITV to broadcast only religious programming in this slot in order to protect 
evensong. Originally a statutory requirement, the closed period was formally 
withdrawn in 1972, but the slot was maintained by the BBC and ITV under a 
gentleman’s agreement (Potter 1989: 72). While London Weekend Television had 
campaigned for the move of religious programming to daytime hours throughout the 
1980s, the IBA refused to allow ITV companies to withdraw from the closed period 
(Potter 1989: 72; Bonner and Aston 1998: 125-30; Viney 1999: 16). In addition, the 
BBC’s religious documentary strands Everyman and Heart of the Matter were 
broadcast in the late evening; at 22:30 or so. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, 81 per 
cent of output in the UK and 97 per cent in Finland was broadcast between 09:00 and 
21:00. 
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The loosening of public service commitments and the reduction of the interventionary 
powers granted to the regulator, both of which actions were a result of the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 and its provision to replace the IBA with the ITC, represented 
a punctuation in ITV’s religious programming policy equilibrium in terms of 
scheduling. ITV companies had for long campaigned against the ‘God Slot’, as they 
felt that they were losing potential revenue by being obliged to air religious content 
that was not of particular interest for advertisers. One of the first actions of the new 
ITV Network Centre – which took over the duty of commissioning and scheduling of 
programmes from individual ITV network companies – was to cancel the ‘God Slot’ 
and the long-running religious programme Highway, and replace it with commercially 
more lucrative types of content in January 1993 (Wheeler 1997: 154; Bonner and 
Aston 1998: 130). ITV’s religious output was now concentrated on the morning hours 
and, increasingly, the night-time hours84, with no programming at peak time (Ofcom 
2004b). Perhaps not surprisingly, audiences for ITV’s religious programmes 
contracted by 62 per cent between 1992 and 1993 (Viney 1999: 16).85 
ITV’s decision to withdraw from peak time religion was advanced by financial factors, 
which themselves were a by-product of the Broadcasting Act 1990 and its decree to 
sell ITV licences in an auction. The auction forced several ITV network companies 
(such as Yorkshire Television and Carlton) to pay excessive sums for their licences, 
which increased their pressures to maximise commercial profit by maximising 
audiences through populist programming strategies. As Fitzwalter (2008: 146) notes, 
the first programmes to be cut back were lower rating religious, arts and educational 
programmes. Moreover, the 1990s saw changes in the structure of the UK 
broadcasting market, with cable and satellite broadcasters and Channel 4 breaking 
                                                 
84
 The proportion of religious programmes broadcast on ITV after 22:30 increased from 19 per cent in 
1998 to 52 per cent in 2002 (Ofcom 2004c). 
85
 Svennevig et al. (1988) note that in 1988 the combined audiences for these two peak time 
programmes accounted for nearly three quarters of the audiences for all religious programmes 
selected for their research. Their combined audience share was 68 per cent of all terrestrial audiences 
on the 18:45-19:15 Sunday slot. 
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ITV’s advertising monopoly, which increased competition for advertising income. In 
terms of the Industrial Equilibrium Model, these financial changes punctuated ITV’s 
equilibrium by deteriorating its commercial profitability, while its decision to move its 
religious programming to the fringes of its schedules was ITV’s attempt to recover its 
profitability and state of equilibrium in this respect.  
Due to the popular competition between ITV and BBC One, changes in ITV’s conduct 
in this respect produced a feedback effect that gave its programmes a competitive 
advantage over the programming of BBC One in terms of viewing figures. The threat 
of losing viewers to ITV prompted the BBC to respond to the competitive challenge 
from the industry structure by adopting a similar populist programming strategy in 
peak time programming in order to maintain a favourable share of viewing (Born 
2005: 62-73; Fitzwalter 2008: 148). Ernie Rea (author’s interview, 12 September 
2011) argues that the 1990s were a particularly difficult period for religion, with the 
BBC introducing more populist schedules. Getting religious programmes scheduled 
into peak time slots became increasingly difficult for the BBC Religion & Ethics 
department because of resistance from channel controllers. Songs of Praise, the 
BBC’s only regular peak time religious series, was pushed to a slightly earlier 18:25-
19:00 slot in response to the scheduling challenge from ITV already in 1993, and its 
broadcasting time has been mainly outside the peak time hours in the 2000s. While 
concerns about this marginalisation have been raised by both the CRAC and the BBC 
Governance Unit (2005a), which acknowledged that audiences for the programme 
had been affected as a result of the earlier and irregular scheduling, to date no efforts 
have been made to reinstate the peak time slot. 
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Chart 6.11: Proportion of religious programmes scheduled in different dayparts in the 
UK 
 
Chart 6.12: Proportion of religious programmes scheduled in different dayparts in 
Finland 
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The changing scheduling priorities of UK broadcasters are also manifested in their 
increasing tendency to schedule religion outside the peak time (18:00-22:30). While 
the proportion of peak time output accounted for 26 per cent in the late 1980s, its 
proportion had decreased to 18 per cent between 2006 and 2009, as chart 6.13 
demonstrates. Concurrently, a growing proportion of output was scheduled in the so-
called ‘graveyard slot’ (between the midnight and 06:00). While the proportion of 
output in this slot prior to the 2000s had been negligible, it increased to 20-30 per 
cent in the 2000s. Given the fact that the volume of religious output decreased by 
over a third between the late 1980s and late 2000s (see section 6.2), it can be 
concluded that peak time religious programmes have become a sporadic feature. 
Scheduling practices in Finland have been subject to much less radical changes, as 
chart 6.12 illustrates. Over 90 per cent of programmes are still broadcast between 
09:00 and 21:00, with the proportion of night-time output negligible. The dominance of 
devotional programming in the output, produced in cooperation with KT, provides a 
viable explanation for this, as it establishes the broadcasting times of devotional 
programmes to concur with services of worship. Thus, the Finnish devotional 
programme production arrangement, which gives the churches a high degree of 
editorial control over Yleisradio’s devotional programming, can be considered to have 
been a major factor in maintaining consistency in the scheduling of these 
programmes. Religion is a typical daytime genre in Finland, with over half of the 
output being broadcast between 09:00 and 15:00. Sunday services, in particular, 
have ring-fenced broadcasting slots at 10:00. However, chart 6.14 demonstrates that 
the proportion of peak time (18:00-22:00) religious programming has decreased from 
20 per cent between 1986 and 1990 to 12 per cent between 2006 and 2009, 
indicating that similar transformation in peak time programming priorities has taken 
place in Finnish broadcasting, with the peak time increasingly reserved for mass 
audience content. 
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Chart 6.13: Proportion of peak time (18:00-22:30) religious output in the UK 
 
Chart 6.14: Proportion of peak time (18:00-22:00) religious output in Finland 
 
As Svennevig et al. (1988: 9) argue, it cannot be assumed that there is a ‘natural’ 
constituency of viewers who both want to and can view religious programmes. 
Ratings for religious programmes (as is the case for all programmes) depend heavily 
on scheduling factors: time of transmission, opposing programmes on other channels, 
preceding and following programmes on the same and other channels, etc. 
(Svennevig et al. 1988: 9). The survey by Gunter and Viney (1994: 71) supports this 
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Andrew Graystone (author’s interview, 7 February 2011) and Juha Rajamäki (author’s 
interview, 18 April 2010) argue that the audience for off-peak programmes in 
particular was not determined mainly by the programme content, but by the 
inheritance effect of the previous programme; a popular programme scheduled before 
a religious programme will boost the ratings significantly.  
For this reason, even a well-produced, popular type of programme risks attracting 
only low viewing figures if it is scheduled unfavourably. At an interview, Ernie Rea 
(author’s interview, 12 September 2011) illustrated this by using Heart and Soul, an 
innovative attempt to reform and rejuvenate the religious programme genre to appeal 
to younger audiences, as an example. While the programme was critically acclaimed, 
its scheduling at 10:00 on Sunday morning meant that it could not reach young 
audiences effectively, and channel controllers were unwilling to give it a more 
favourable slot. Low audience figures eventually led to its cancellation. Rea argues 
that this was also the case with Heart of the Matter, which was losing its audiences as 
a result of later scheduling: 
I quite frequently was faced with the argument that Heart of the Matter is losing 
audiences. And I would say: “well, it’s losing audiences because you’re 
scheduling it later and later at night, you know, you’re not going to get the 
same audience at half past eleven at night as you get at half past nine”. 
(Ernie Rea, author’s interview, 12 September 2011) 
The combination of unfavourable scheduling and low viewing figures may lead to a 
‘vicious circle’, in which each action is justified by the other, which can eventually lead 
to the programme being terminated. Evidence from both the UK and Finland suggests 
that by ill-considered institutionally driven scheduling choices, channel controllers and 
programming executives have – intentionally or unintentionally – contributed to the 
decline in the viewing of religious programming.  
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6.5. The origin of religious programming 
Religious programmes reflect primarily national and regional religious culture. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of programming in both locations 
(97 per cent in the UK; 88 per cent in Finland) is of domestic origin. The proportion of 
imports detailed in charts 6.15 and 6.16 remained low over the research period, and 
there is no evidence of a similar marketisation-driven imperative for increased use of 
imported programming as was manifest in children’s programming. While the number 
of religious broadcasting networks and production companies producing programmes 
for international distribution (such as GOD TV) has increased significantly since the 
1990s, the research data do not indicate that their multiplication would have been 
reflected in terrestrial broadcasters’ programming. The substance of imported 
programming consists of documentaries, while confessional programming is 
predominantly produced in a national context. 
 
Chart 6.15: Origin of religious programmes in the UK, 1986-2009 
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Chart 6.16: Origin of religious programmes in Finland, 1986-2009 
 
 
6.6. Swedish-language religious programming in Finland 
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The figures represented in table 6.4 (which have already been included in the 
analysis of the output of religious programming in Finland) indicate that the provision 
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the Swedish-speaking minority in this respect. While average audiences for the 
programmes were small (in tens of thousands in the mid-2000s, on a par with other 
Swedish-language programmes (Klemets 2007: 193-205)), there is no evidence of 
programming being marginalised in terms of scheduling or resources. Continuity in 
this respect reflects the fact that service for the Swedish-speaking population enjoys a 
particular protection from the political elite (Jääsaari 2007: 103); from the Swedish 
People’s Party in particular, which has an influential position in Finnish politics in spite 
of its small size.  
 
Table 6.4: Average weekly hours of Swedish-language religious programming in 
Finland 
Period Hours 
1986-1990 00:44 
1991-1995 00:25 
1996-2000 00:57 
2001-2005 00:23 
2006-2009 00:40 
(N.b.: Given the small size of the sample, these figures are only suggestive.) 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
The study has exposed a number of changes in institutional priorities of both public 
and private broadcasters, whose effect on religious programmes have been broadly 
negative. These changes suggest that religious programmes occupy a less central 
role in the agendas of UK and Finnish broadcasters than was the case prior to the 
introduction of the neo-liberal policy paradigm. In particular, pluralistic provision of 
religious programming is considered less important, with the provision on public 
channels – and even on alternative platforms – deemed to satisfy the social need for 
such programming. The changes also indicate that the public service broadcasting 
agenda is increasingly influenced by popular tastes of mass audiences rather than 
serving social and cultural objectives, as religious programming is increasingly being 
pushed to the margins because of its presumed low popular demand. 
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During the PSB orthodoxy until the 1980s, religious programmes were considered an 
axiomatic part of PSB provision and all UK and Finnish broadcasters provided 
religious programmes. In the UK, their provision on commercial channels was 
secured by regulatory measures. MTV in Finland had no obligation for religious 
programming but it nevertheless considered it necessary in order to demonstrate its 
commitment to public service values, which was part of its broader strategy to gain a 
full institutional independence of Yleisradio’s control. Broadcasters’ commitment to 
religious output was manifested in the volume and diversity of output, which 
comprised a variety of programme types and formats. The UK output was particularly 
high, with all three broadcasters providing programming. The programmes received 
favourable broadcasting slots, and both the BBC1 and ITV reserved their Sunday 
evening peak time ‘God Slot’ for competing strands of religious programming. 
Empirical data demonstrate that religious programmes benefited from the closed 
nature of the broadcasting market, where certain broadcasters were granted national 
monopolies on terrestrial television advertising, as the fact that advertising time was 
limited facilitated broadcasters to sell advertising to religious programmes too. While 
religious programmes were not a genre particularly favoured by commercial channels 
because of their limited commercial exploitation potential, their provision was 
nevertheless sustained by regulatory measures and the positive externalities 
stemming from these programmes for the broadcasters. Income from commercially 
lucrative types of output could also be used to offset losses in religious programming 
owing to lesser commercial pressures. In the absence of shocks that would have 
forced commercial channels to change their conduct, their programming strategies 
remained in the state of equilibrium, and only minor changes took place in their 
religious programming. 
Transformations in broadcasters’ institutional priorities with regards to religious 
programming began to unearth in the 1990s. Examination of the changes through the 
analytical lens of the Industrial Equilibrium Model reveals that commercial 
broadcasters’ institutional equilibria was punctuated by competitive pressures 
emanating from the expansion of the commercial broadcasting sector, facilitated by 
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the liberalisation of broadcasting in the 1990s and emerging competition from 
channels on cable, satellite and DTT platforms. Notwithstanding its regulatory 
measures designed to protect the provision of religious programming, the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 served as an underlying catalyst in the UK in this process, as 
the auctioning of ITV licences had seen many companies submitting bids beyond 
their means, and they were now obliged to compete for advertising revenue with the 
newly-independent Channel 4. Commercial broadcasters responded to these 
competitive pressures by beginning to withdraw from their previous public service 
oriented programming strategy and shifting their focus to programming with higher 
commercial potential. In Finland, the introduction of Nelonen and commercial 
competition between commercial broadcasters in 1997 represented the punctuation 
that forced MTV to reassess its previous programming strategy, which was to a large 
extent a production of – and facilitated by – MTV’s monopolistic status in Finnish 
commercial television market. As intensifying competition created great financial 
difficulties to the company, it was forced to adopt a more commercial programming 
strategy in order to recover its profitability and discontinue its religious provision in the 
early 2000s. 
In the UK, the aforementioned commercial pressures to adopt programming 
strategies that sidelined religion were largely restrained by regulatory measures. 
Thus, the Communications Act 2003 represented a critical juncture in UK religious 
programming, as it removed commercial channels’ quotas for religion, thus allowing 
ITV and Channel 5 to cancel their regular religious provisions to little objection from 
Ofcom. Ofcom’s own method of setting regulatory priorities indicates an increasing 
focus on consumerist preferences rather than aiming to secure provision for a 
comprehensive range of audiences and tastes. Ofcom’s second PSB review (Ofcom 
2008b: 33) concluded that owing to low viewing figures of religious programmes and 
its presumed low importance for PSB purposes, less public intervention would be 
needed for this genre despite the fact that 68 per cent of respondents in its PSB 
survey considered it important to maintain at least the current volume of provision on 
main channels (Ofcom 2008a: 44). Following the withdrawal of ITV and Channel 5 
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from religious programming, the BBC and Channel 4 have been left as the only 
terrestrial broadcasters in the UK with regular religious output in their schedules. 
The BBC’s religious policies underwent changes in the 1990s and 2000s too. These 
changes were to extent results of the feedback effects of the commercial channels’ 
decision to focus their peak time programming strategies on populist content, which 
forced the BBC to respond by changing its conduct and adopting a similar strategy 
that gave priority to populist types of programming over religious content. However, 
empirical data demonstrate that the introduction of the Thatcher government’s 
ideologically-driven neo-liberal imperatives, introduced mainly through changes in the 
Corporation’s administration, acted as key catalysts in the process. A new institutional 
culture was introduced by the Corporation’s Director-General John Birt in the early 
1990s. Markets, competition, efficiency and the pursuit for commercial activities took 
a prominent position in the Corporation’s institutional culture, which adopted various 
types of measurements as a yardstick of success in programming. Unlike the old 
public service paradigm that was based primarily on normative knowledge on the 
social and cultural needs of the audience as members of the society, this culture of 
measurement gave high priority to ratings and other types of quantitative information 
on the relationship between the programmes and their audiences, with ‘public 
accountability’ being the key objective of the Corporation. This measurement 
discourse translated as obsession with ratings and cost-efficiency, as the BBC was 
anxious to maintain its share of viewing while trying to fight off earlier accusations for 
inefficiency. Pressures grew within the BBC Religion & Ethics department to make 
programming mass audience oriented and to reach new audiences that had been 
considered to be the most distant from the BBC’s religious programming, while 
simultaneously keeping production costs under control. As the BBC’s institutional 
focus shifted towards programmes of mass appeal, the status of religious 
programmes within the Corporation began to wane and they lost out to populist 
programming in terms of production resources and scheduling. Empirical data 
demonstrate the BBC’s religious programming has declined since the 1980s, and less 
programming is scheduled at peak hours. 
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In terms of the output, the aforementioned institutional shifts are manifested in three 
major trends in the output. First, in spite of the significant growth in the volume of 
output, facilitated by the expansion of broadcasting hours and introduction of new 
PSB channels on DTT platform, the overall volume of religious output has declined 
since the 1980s, indicating that the broadcasters’ current programming strategies 
accommodate religious programmes uneasily. Private broadcasters; ITV and Channel 
5 in the UK and MTV3 and Nelonen in Finland, have all but discontinued their 
religious provisions. This has also resulted in a regression in the diversity of 
programming, with certain sub-categories of religious programming (e.g. televised 
acts of worships and other types of devotional programming in the UK and religious 
magazines in Finland) becoming extinct. Second, changes have taken place in the 
structure of output reflecting broadcasters’ increasing desire for higher audiences and 
cost-efficiency. Third, broadcasters’ scheduling priorities indicate increasing populist 
tendencies, with peak hours increasingly reserved for mass-audience programming 
and religious programmes being pushed to the fringes of the schedule. The 
aforementioned changes were more pronounced in the UK, where transformations in 
the industry structures and broadcasting policies have been more penetrating, and 
have acted as a key catalyst in the process. 
Given the pervasive nature of the changes, it is remarkable that there is little evidence 
of these changes taking place in Yleisradio. While the overall level of output has 
remained low compared with the provision of the BBC, the provision of religious 
programmes on Yleisradio’s channels, however, has been mainly unaffected, and 
there is even a slight rise in the volume of provision since the 1980s. The institutional 
cooperation between Yleisradio and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in production of 
devotional programmes has clearly maintained the equilibrium in Yleisradio’s 
devotional programming and safeguarded the output from the effects of 
marketisation. The fact that programming receives a significant part of its production 
resources from the Evangelical Lutheran Church (which itself collects the funds from 
its members and businesses through the church tax) has certainly cushioned the 
programming from the effects of recent cuts in Yleisradio’s resources. The Act on 
Yleisradio 1993, which mandates the company to provide devotional programming, 
283 
 
 
 
has also strengthened the institutional status of religious programming within the 
company. On the other hand, Satu Väätäinen (author’s interview, 22 January 2011) 
argues that devotional programmes in particular are produced with such low 
production resources that any further cuts in them would simply not be possible 
without cutting the volume of provision, which would conflict with Yleisradio’s statutory 
duty to provide devotional services. 
In spite of the benefits of the active involvement of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in programme production, the production arrangement has also held back 
development within the genre. While the traditional religious programming receives a 
strong mandate from its audiences (Juha Rajamäki, author’s interview, 18 April 2010; 
Ari Meriläinen, author’s interview, 19 October 2011), its forms and modes of address 
date back to the 1960s and are in urgent need of reform. If no attempts are made to 
modernise the content and address new audiences, religious programming in Finland 
risks becoming a relic that fails to engage younger viewers in particular. KT’s 
devotional programmes have not recently attempted to introduce new modes of 
addressing religious audiences, nor have they attempted to attract new audiences 
outside the core viewers. The problem here is of institutional nature: due to the fact 
that programming is produced within the Evangelical Lutheran Church, attempts to 
modernise programming have been terminated by the powerful lobby within the 
Church, which considers the provision of traditional devotional programmes as 
paramount to other forms of religious programming. The central role of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in programme production also raises a question about 
the editorial impartiality in programming. Satu Väätäinen (author’s interview, 22 
January 2011) argues that the arrangement allows the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
to exercise editorial power over the agenda of religious programmes, which puts 
religious programming at risk of becoming an instrument of the Church in maintaining 
the status quo rather than dealing with challenging and controversial issues 
associated with the Church and matters of religion. These problems highlight the 
need for a more extensive provision of religious programming produced 
independently from the Church. 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1. Introduction 
This study set out to examine the impact of the neo-liberal policy paradigm on 
minority interest programming policies of UK and Finnish broadcasting institutions. 
These changes were addressed under the overarching concept of neo-liberal 
marketisation (Murdock and Golding 1999, 2001; Murdock 2004). The purpose of this 
research was twofold. First, the study aimed to provide an enriched empirical and 
theoretical understanding of the consequence of marketisation for children’s and 
religious programmes in the terrestrial broadcasting networks of the UK and Finland. 
In addition, the aim of the study was also to contribute to the provision of a revised 
theoretical and pragmatic model of the relationship between PSB and minority 
interest programming in the 21st century public service media environment. The final 
chapter of this thesis revisits the research questions raised in chapter 1. 
As the analysis by Murdock and Golding (Murdock and Golding 1999, 2001; Murdock 
2004) demonstrates, marketisation is a complex process with socio-political, 
economic, institutional and ideological dimensions. Its impact is also reflected in 
changes in the objectives, norms and values associated with broadcasting, 
transforming them to match the needs of the capitalist free market. Thus, its impact 
extends well beyond the broadcasting policies and formal institutional structures of 
broadcasting and regulatory organisations. The culture of marketisation (including the 
norms and values associated with it) has produced extensive changes in 
broadcasting institutions that are not visible in organisational strategies or written 
policies. As was demonstrated through the evidence of this research in chapters 5 
and 6, marketisation has legitimised certain consumerist and corporate values and 
goals in the institutional cultures of broadcasting organisations, which have also 
transformed the output of children’s and religious programming. 
As this final chapter demonstrates, these transformations extend to the very 
conception of PSB. Marketisation-driven imperatives have widened the gap between 
the conceptual, ideal model of PSB and its practical application. In particular, they 
have resulted in a shift in the way priorities are set within the model: while they were 
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previously based on the views of the political and cultural elite on audience’s needs, 
the consumerist interpretation of PSB purposes draws its substance and priorities 
from the preferences of the audience. While this is a seemingly democratic method of 
setting priorities, it leads to a bias towards populist preferences and may discriminate 
against the preferences of the ‘silent minorities’, with potentially hazardous social 
consequences for these groups. 
 
7.2. From public service to serving the public: marketisation 
and institutional transformations in the UK and Finland 
A comparative analysis of changes in broadcasting policies of the UK and Finland 
reveals that notwithstanding significant national differences in political environments 
and traditions, marketisation-driven transformations in broadcasting policies and their 
impact on broadcasting institutions have been broadly similar in both the UK and 
Finland. Both the UK and Finland historically featured broadcasting policies, whose 
substance was tailored for national social and cultural interests. As van Cuilenburg 
and McQuail (2003: 191-4) note, this pre-marketised phase of public service media 
policy was dominated by social and political rather than economic or technological 
strategic concerns, and aimed primarily to strengthen the democratic structures of the 
civil society. The central role of PSBs and the limitations placed on the institutional 
independence of – and on the scope of operational space allowed for – commercial 
broadcasting was considered necessary to promote these goals. In the UK, the ITV 
network served as an alternative to the public broadcaster; the BBC. Its public service 
agenda was maintained by a proactive regulation of the ITA/IBA, whose authority 
derived from the extensive powers it held to manipulate the schedules of ITV 
companies, but also from the allocation process of the periodic ITV franchisees 
through a ‘beauty contest’ that allowed the ITA/IBA to grant licences only to the 
candidates that demonstrated commitment to PSB in their programming. The status 
of MTV in Finland in providing public service was more auxiliary, as the company’s 
ultimate role was to supplement the funding of the PSB, Yleisradio, which had a 
central role in the Finnish broadcasting system. The fact that the continuation and 
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independence of commercial broadcasting was still questioned by several politicians 
and Yleisradio’s administration nevertheless acted as an incentive for MTV to adopt a 
public service oriented programming strategy. In both countries, negative externalities 
caused by commercial competition were eliminated by granting commercial 
broadcasters national (Finland) or regional (UK) monopolies on television advertising, 
thus allowing these broadcasters to gain a maximum advertising income and 
subsidise the production of minority interest content by income from mass audience 
programmes. In such a system, the demand for advertising time regularly exceeded 
the supply, facilitating the commercial broadcasters to maintain artificially high 
advertising rates. 
This public service orthodoxy persisted until the 1980s, when the neo-liberal agenda 
first entered the broadcasting policy discourse. Terrestrial broadcasting in both 
countries was gradually opened up for commercial competition and significant 
deregulatory changes were made in regulatory policies in the 1990s. The period 
featured a significant increase in the independence of the commercial broadcasting 
sector, whose expansion and rising influence prompted politicians to introduce more 
articulated guidelines to avoid accusations of arbitrariness in regulatory decisions. In 
the UK, the Broadcasting Act 1990 acted as a critical juncture in this respect, as it 
opened up the commercial broadcasting sector to competition and introduced a 
regulatory reform that significantly reduced the ITC’s interventionist powers in 
television content regulation. In Finland, commercial competition commenced only 
when Nelonen was launched in 1997. However, MTV3 had already been granted 
institutional independence from Yleisradio’s control in the 1993 Channel Reform, 
which granted the company a greater degree of freedom in programming that was 
allowed to the ITV network broadcasters in the UK. Minority interest provision was 
secured in both countries by introducing programming obligations in the broadcasting 
licences of commercial broadcasters. These consisted of detailed quotas in the UK, 
while in Finland they were articulated in more vague terms, reflecting path 
dependence in the historical light-touch regulatory approach. 
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The neo-liberal policy position was advanced further in the mid-1990s by the then-
incumbent political administrations’ desire to foster economic growth through creating 
commercial opportunities for new entrants in the telecommunications sector. By then, 
the neo-liberal discourse had practically penetrated the political spectrum, and the 
leading parties of the political Left in both Finland and the UK had accepted and 
adopted the neo-liberal policy position that economic growth in the audiovisual and 
telecommunications sectors can be best fostered through greater commercial 
competition and lesser public intervention. Broadcasting policies introduced in this 
period were nominally designed to meet the challenges set by the looming 
digitalisation and emerging convergence in broadcasting technologies, but their 
seemingly neutral, technological framing provided an apt vehicle for the polity to 
promote the neo-liberal agenda in communication policy considerations. Policy focus 
shifted towards promoting economic growth, consumer welfare replaced the previous 
social and cultural considerations, while traditional approaches to content regulation 
began to be increasingly considered hindering growth in the commercial broadcasting 
market. Meanwhile, the principles of public service, ‘culture’ and equality between 
regions and social groups were discreetly faded into the background in broadcasting 
policy considerations. 
The aforementioned shift in the policy focus has led to a gradual relaxation of 
programming obligations from commercial broadcasters and an increasing ideological 
polarisation between public and commercial PSBs. The enactment of the 
Communications Act 2003 represented a key branching point in the continuity of UK 
commercial broadcasting policies. It replaced the ITC with a convergence regulator 
Ofcom, which was no longer mandated to promote the provision of most types of 
minority interest content, but introduced a system of co-regulation that allowed 
commercial broadcasters to steer themselves further away from the public service 
paradigm. In Finland, where commercial broadcasters were allowed much greater 
independence to set their programming strategies, changes have been more 
incremental-evolutionary. Nevertheless, the digital broadcasting licences granted to 
commercial broadcasters in the late 1990s and 2000s contained less public service 
obligations than was required from these companies during the analogue era, 
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sending a signal to these companies that they were permitted to set their 
programming strategies with a lesser public intervention. 
The key legacy of this liberalisation has undoubtedly been the unprecedented growth 
in the number of commercial broadcasters, with evident repercussions on the industry 
structure. The increasing number of channels and the following abundance in 
available viewing options has led to an inevitable fragmentation of audiences, while 
the new entrants have attracted viewing from the ‘old’ public service channels. This 
has posed a great challenge for commercial PSBs in particular, as their previously 
secure commercial revenues have seen significant reductions following the 
introduction of competition in the television advertising markets. 
As the analysis utilising the Industrial Equilibrium Model demonstrated, these 
changes in the industry structure – the competitive challenge – punctuated the 
equilibria of PSBs by rendering their conduct (i.e. their institutional strategies) 
impracticable for the emerging competitive market. Faced with the threat of potentially 
declining viewing figures and revenues, they responded by gradually departing from 
the public service paradigm in their programming and adopting increasingly similar 
populist programming strategies that targeted the majority’s preferences, as 
suggested in the theory of ‘ruinous competition’ by van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg 
(2001). The gradual deregulation in programming obligations acted as a key catalyst 
in the process, as it has removed the regulatory obligations that previously served to 
counterbalance such commercial tendencies in programming, thus facilitating the 
implementation of programming strategies that prioritise commercial goals over public 
service. As more broadcasters aimed at the lowest common denominator in their 
programming, both popular and commercial competitive pressures have only grown 
further. 
This process has had the strongest impact on commercial (‘hybrid’) PSBs, which 
featured a provision of a wide range of socially valuable but commercially unprofitable 
types of programming maintained by various regulatory measures. The gradual 
relaxation of these measures, together with the intensification of competition in the 
broadcasting sector, has prompted these broadcasters to adopt a more commercial 
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agenda. Empirical data demonstrate that these broadcasters are increasingly 
unwilling to contribute to minority programme provision. This indicates that the time is 
running out for this model of PSB, at least in its past scope. The reluctance of policy-
makers to impose further public service obligations on commercial broadcasters 
indicates that there is a mutual understanding on this matter. While it could be argued 
that the Finnish public service arrangement has always been based on a monocentric 
model, in which Yleisradio had a central role in providing PSB programming, the 
formal and informal public service obligations imposed on MTV/MTV3 – and its active 
role in provision of public service content on the other hand – suggest that MTV had 
an important role in public service provision. However, MTV’s public service 
obligations have been cut further in the 2000s, notwithstanding the fact that it is no 
longer obliged to subsidise Yleisradio for not having to contribute to the delivery of 
certain types of public service programming. As Jääsaari (2007: 174) notes, such 
public service duties became increasingly to be seen as Yleisradio’s sole 
responsibility in the course of the digitalisation process, which saw commercial 
broadcasters’ public service obligations being reduced further. 
The UK policy has taken similar course in this regard, although changes in the UK are 
more radical owing to the past significance of commercial broadcasters in public 
service provision. The decline in the minority programming obligations of UK 
commercial PSBs indicates that the UK PSB model is shifting from the ideal of 
pluralistic to a dualistic model, in which the public PSBs (the BBC and Channel 4) are 
considered to have the main duty to provide public service programming, while 
private broadcasters are allowed to devise their programming policies with lesser 
public intervention. While Ofcom’s first PSB review (Ofcom 2005a) made a radical 
proposal for public service provision through a Public Service Publisher; a 
commissioning and publishing body for the digital world to maintain plurality in 
provision, the second review (Ofcom 2008b) adopts a more conservative approach by 
acknowledging that the BBC and Channel 4 will be the primary providers of public 
service content, while ITV and Channel 5 play gradually lesser roles in this respect. 
Thus, the past UK ‘idealism’ in the regulatory approach, reflected by a diverse range 
of programming obligations, is being replaced by a ‘pragmatist’ policy paradigm, in 
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which regulatory obligations with regards to content regulation focuses on 
safeguarding certain programming categories, whose pluralistic provision is 
considered important (e.g. news). The political administration and Ofcom increasingly 
acknowledge – following an extensive lobbying by commercial PSBs – that an 
extensive provision of public service programming is unfeasible in the current 
competitive business environment, and that ITV in particular has been only willing to 
invest the cash value equivalent of the analogue spectrum it was allocated in public 
service programming (Conlan and Sweney 2008; Fitzsimmons 2009). In so doing, the 
gap between the cultural forms of commercial and public service television is being 
broadened further. 
On an ideological level, marketisation has facilitated the rise of populist and 
consumerist emphases in broadcasters programming policy discourses. Such 
emphases are closely associated with the reorientation of the public service concept, 
which has introduced a new layer to the previous interpretation of PSB, with the 
concept increasingly associated with a duty to fulfil the ‘wants’ of the audiences 
(Syvertsen 1999: 6-7). While certain latent populist tendencies could be identified in 
the programming policies even prior to this shift, the politically reinforced hegemony 
of the public service paradigm effectively suppressed the most blatant commercial 
excesses. The neo-liberal shift in the media policy focus examined in chapter 2, which 
saw the rise of economic and consumerist goals in media policy considerations, 
legitimised the populist audience-as-consumers agenda in broadcasting. As was 
examined in chapter 4, economic and technological objectives, i.e. national 
governments’ desire to promote growth in the telecommunications sector, served as 
primary stimuli for this shift in both the UK and Finland. National governments of the 
UK and Finland began to consider content regulation as something hindering 
economic growth, and priority was given to economic welfare over social-cultural and 
political welfare where priorities had to be set (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 
198-9). The liberalisation of the terrestrial broadcasting sectors of the UK and Finland, 
the consequent abundance in viewing options and the intensification in commercial 
and popular competition have acted as key catalysts in this process that has 
facilitated the rise in the ideological preference to address the audience as a 
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collective of consumer groups whose individual preferences broadcasters cater for, 
thus rendering the past paternalist practices in programming mostly impracticable. 
This has resulted in a shift in the balance of public and private interests towards 
private interests, which has aided to uplift the commercial paradigm to an equal, if not 
superior, status vis-à-vis the public service paradigm. As Mäntymäki (2006: 30) 
argues, the preconditions of the commercial business environment; competition, 
commercialism and consumerism, are considered to apply to public service 
institutions too. They also provide a fertile ground for consumerist and neo-liberal 
arguments that consumers are the only relevant arbiters of taste. Such a position 
dismisses the traditional value hierarchies that favoured certain forms of content over 
others, but suggests that viewers should be able to make their viewing decisions 
based on their individual preferences; ‘to be free to watch what they want’ (Syvertsen 
2003: 163-4). Consequently, the demarcation line between public service and 
commercial forms of television (i.e. the dual standard of television examined in 
chapter 2) has faded, and public service increasingly lends from the cultural 
standards of commercial television. 
The neo-liberal shift in the broadcasting policy focus that altered the equilibrium from 
social and cultural considerations towards economic and commercial interests has 
also seen an increase in the preference to measure the operation of broadcasting 
institutions – and to define the norms and virtues of an ‘ideal’ organisation in 
particular – using a commercial and economic discourse. Analysis of this shift through 
the Industrial Equilibrium Model demonstrates that such discourse was installed in 
public service broadcasting institutions in particular through government’s policy 
measures, while changes in the industry structure were influential in this process too. 
Public broadcasters’ finances have been taken under a greater scrutiny. They have 
been encouraged or compelled to adopt administrative structures typical for 
commercial companies and curb their spending in the name of efficiency, while 
simultaneously subsidising their income through commercial ventures. The attempts 
of the Thatcher government to change the BBC’s administration in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s; the appointment of the Corporation’s pro-marketisation Director-
292 
 
 
 
Generals Michael Checkland and John Birt, serve as examples of such a direct 
political influence. As examined in the empirical chapters, Birt’s Producer Choice 
project, together with his preoccupation with measuring the output using various 
economic yardsticks, greatly changed the Corporation’s institutional culture. Changes 
made in Yleisradio’s administration in 1993-1994 in order to introduce more business-
like institutional structures and management culture for the company serve as an 
example of parallel changes in Finland. Economic incentives – some created by the 
government through cuts in public broadcasters’ core funding – served as additional 
incentives in the process. 
Both private and public broadcasters have responded to these challenges by 
adopting certain institutional values and practices previously associated exclusively 
with the culture of commercial television. Their conduct is influenced by economic 
concerns like efficiency, value for money, audit and accountability, which increasingly 
set the frames for programme production and provision. While economic constraints 
have always influenced programme production, empirical data demonstrate that these 
considerations have since risen in prominence to the previous social and cultural 
considerations in programming. This has resulted in a rise in the preference for a 
discourse of measurement within broadcasting companies: programming is measured 
in various quantitative and qualitative terms, but the discourse is less concerned with 
the social and cultural externalities the programming produces to the audiences. 
While there has been no outright shift to the ratings discourse in that ratings would be 
used as the sole measure to set broadcasters’ programming priorities, they 
nevertheless have recently gained an increasing influence in informing schedules, 
and in setting the priorities of broadcasters in terms of resource allocation and 
scheduling. As was evident with the cases of Yleisradio’s children’s programmes and 
the BBC’s religious programmes, while these broadcasters showed little interest in 
ratings in the 1980s, they have since demonstrated an increasing awareness in this 
respect, with evidence of attempts to accommodate populist tendencies in their 
programming to improve ratings. Audience figures – whether simply anticipated or 
real – are increasingly used to justify production resource allocation, even though 
audience figures per se do not give much indication about the ability of the 
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programme to meet PSB objectives. As demonstrated by the BBC’s model for public 
value assessment (BBC 2004: 87), cost-per-viewer is now considered as a key 
component of what the Corporation considers to constitute public value.86 
 
7.3. Marketisation and its impact on minority interest 
programming: summary of empirical findings 
In terms of children’s and religious programmes, the shifts in institutional policies and 
strategies outlined in the previous section are manifested in changes in the volume, 
content, origin and scheduling of the programming. It is noteworthy, however, that 
while a number of aforementioned changes were observable in children’s and 
religious programming in both the UK and Finland, they did not form a linear pattern, 
but significant disparities between the countries, channels and programme types were 
found. This indicates that there is no universal trend applicable for all types of minority 
interest content on all channels even in national contexts where marketisation has 
produced parallel institutional changes. Programme type (children’s vs. religious) and 
method of funding (public vs. commercial) turned out to be the differentiating factors, 
in addition to the predictable national differences stemming from different institutional 
traditions and environments surrounding these programmes. Religious programmes 
were more vulnerable to these changes, as was programming on commercial 
channels. One important finding was that the public service status itself did not 
nurture minority interest content, as was demonstrated by Channel 5’s ongoing 
commitment to children’s programming in contrast to Channel 4’s practical withdrawal 
from the genre in the 2000s.87 This section summarises the common patterns in 
marketisation-driven changes in programming observed in this study. 
                                                 
86
 In Finland, popular criticism about Yleisradio’s spending on its Swedish programming – 
disproportionate to the proportion of Swedish-speaking population – reveals a similar discourse. 
87
 Similarly, children’s programming has maintained its presence on Finnish commercial channels’ daily 
schedules, while ITV1 – which still has more extensive and articulated public service obligations than 
its Finnish counterparts – has practically withdrawn from the genre. 
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The most evident – but perhaps not unexpected – of these patterns is that more 
radical changes had taken place in commercial broadcasters’ programming policies 
than in the programming policies of publicly funded broadcasters. While some of the 
changes in the patterns of children’s and religious programming examined in chapters 
5 and 6 were observed in publicly funded broadcasters’ schedules, their extent was 
significantly more limited than was observed on broadcasters with commercial 
funding even in the UK, where commercial terrestrial channels are still formally 
considered an extension of PSB. This demonstrates that the argument of most public 
broadcasters adopting the compensation strategy, put forward by Siune and Hultén 
(1998) and Bardoel and d’Haenens (2008: 340-44), applies to minority interest 
programming as well. This discursive convergence has enabled PSBs to defend their 
position in both fronts, but has also introduced certain marketised imperatives in 
broadcasters’ policies, resulting in changes in institutional priorities in public service 
broadcasting, as will be examined below. On commercial channels, on the other 
hand, the overall volume of children’s and religious programmes has declined, the 
diversity of the output has dropped and the remaining output has been marginalised 
to the fringes of the schedules in the 2000s. This manifests the impact of the 
aforementioned policy changes that saw the broadcasting market being liberalised 
and commercial PSBs’ broadcasting obligations gradually lifted, with the resulting 
intensification of competition for commercial income punctuating the equilibria of 
these broadcasters by rendering their past public service strategies impracticable. 
Faced with the threat of potentially declining viewing figures and revenues, 
commercial PSBs’ responded by adopting commercial strategies that focused more 
explicitly on populist programming.  
Consequently, the ratings discourse now occupies a bigger role in the programming 
strategies of these channels, with much of minority interest content being replaced 
with content of higher commercial potential, and the remaining output marginalised in 
terms of scheduling and production resources. This shift has been more radical in the 
UK, where commercial channels historically had an important role in the provision of 
minority interest content. Finnish commercial channels, in turn, have always had a 
lesser role in the provision of minority interest content owing to the historical role of 
295 
 
 
 
commercial television as a complementary service, upon which Yleisradio exerted 
negative regulation rather than encouraging it to provide a comprehensive service. 
This allowed MTV3 and later Nelonen to adopt a more outright commercial corporate 
strategy following the 1993 Channel Reform than was permitted for UK commercial 
channels. Thus, while the provision of children’s and religious programming has 
experienced similar decline in volume, loss in diversity and marginalisation in 
scheduling as has taken place on UK commercial channels, the extent of the changes 
has been less radical owing to the lesser historical role of these channels in providing 
these programmes. 
In terms of the volume of programmes, diverging trends emerge between children’s 
and religious programmes. The volume of children’s programmes has generally 
benefited from the expansion of broadcasting hours and a rise in the number of 
channels, and the output on main channels has grown four-fold in Finland and more 
than doubled in the UK. If the specialist children’s channels are taken in account, the 
increase is even more significant. Despite the fact that the more competitive 
broadcasting market of the 2000s has forced many channels to adjust their 
programme policies, all terrestrial channels sustained children’s programmes in their 
schedules over the research period, which signifies the importance of this genre for 
broadcasters. This importance does not necessarily stem from commercial 
profitability, as several other types of programmes (e.g. lifestyle programmes) are 
more attractive to advertisers. As examined in chapter 5, children’s programmes have 
potential to produce several externalities to broadcasters in e.g. expanding the 
potential range of viewers of the channel and increasing viewing loyalty amongst 
commercially attractive audience groups. Thus, their presence in schedules may 
produce long-term commercial benefits, even if their instant profit would be limited. 
Children’s programmes also benefit publicly funded broadcasters, which, in a 
competitive multi-platform broadcasting environment, are more obliged to highlight 
the public value they deliver to viewers and the polity in order to maintain justification 
for the public funding. As the provision of children’s programmes is regularly ranked 
high in surveys on the public service priorities of the audiences – while that of 
religious programmes is considered a significantly lower priority (see e.g. Yleisradio 
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Oy 2007: 15; Hall et al. 2008: 48; Yleisradio Oy 2009a: 9), children’s programmes are 
an apt vehicle for public broadcasters to highlight their role in public value delivery. 
In contrast, the volume of religious output has declined on all channels in the 2000s. 
The Communications Act 2003 served as a critical juncture here, as it allowed 
commercial broadcasters to adopt a more pronounced commercial strategy and axe 
commercially unprofitable types of output by cancelling the previous ITC-imposed 
quotas for religious output. Consequently, UK provision has been in steep decline, 
with the average output between 2006 and 2009 representing just 58 per cent of the 
output between 1986 and 1990. A similar, although far less dramatic, pattern has 
taken place in Finnish religious output, which peaked in the late 1990s following the 
introduction of the Act on Yleisradio Oy 1993, which defined devotional programmes 
as part of Yleisradio’s statutory duties. MTV3’s contribution to the genre was 
important too, and its discontinuation of the genre in the 2000s following the 
competitive entry of Nelonen and changes in the administration of the company has 
served to reduce the volume of the genre. However, the overall reduction in Finnish 
religious programming has been far less critical owing to the Finnish devotional 
programming arrangement, which features significant contribution from the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church towards the production resources of these programmes. 
This diverging trend between children’s and religious programming signifies shifts in 
broadcasters’ institutional agendas. Both were considered to be important during the 
public service orthodoxy and their provision was considered an axiomatic part of PSB 
missions. Although the concept had not yet entered the public discourse, their ‘public 
value’ was defined in terms of their social and cultural externalities, based on 
normative knowledge on audience’s ‘needs’ of politicians and broadcasting 
executives. Because of these externalities, they were considered as merit goods, 
whose extensive provision was justified even beyond their actual consumption (i.e. 
viewing). However, as was examined in the previous section, the neo-liberal 
discourse introduced a more consumerist and ratings-oriented agenda, which 
included a consumerist interpretation of PSB missions. Competitive pressures 
produced by the liberalisation of broadcasting rendered the past paternalism in 
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programming policy considerations impracticable, with deregulatory changes in 
content regulation acting as a powerful catalyst in this process. This competitive 
challenge was accompanied by a shift in the media policy paradigm examined in 
chapter 2 that saw the rise of economic and consumerist goals in broadcasting policy 
considerations. This neo-liberal policy paradigm accepted the argument that 
consumers are the only relevant arbiters of taste, while mass audience preferences – 
manifested in ratings – are increasingly seen as the indicators of ‘quality’ in 
programming (Ruoho 2007: 133). Consequently, broadcasters have concentrated 
their resources on programming that enjoys a larger popular appeal or acceptance 
amongst the audiences, and religious programmes, whose popular appeal amongst 
the mass audiences is relatively low (see e.g. Yleisradio Oy 2007: 15; Ofcom 2008a: 
34), have lost out in the process. 
Along with this focus on serving audiences in their highest possible numbers has 
flourished another marketised imperative examined in the previous section: the rise of 
economic and commercial objectives and their increasing influence on programming 
policies and production resource allocation. This is manifested in an increasing 
preference for cost-effective programming (e.g. acquired animation and studio-based 
religious programming) and content with commercial exploitation potential (e.g. co-
produced preschool and animation programmes) over more expensive and less 
popular/lucrative types of productions (e.g. first run drama and televised church 
services). Changes in the origin of children’s programming; rise in the use of imported 
content in children’s programming also serve as an indicator of such a trend. 
Empirical data demonstrate that children’s programmes were produced primarily 
within broadcasting companies, i.e. in a predominantly domestic context, still in the 
1980s. This practice reflected the formative idea of PSB representing and 
reproducing national culture and identity, and can be traced back to the Reithian 
ideals of the broadcasting as a tool for producing national unity. In Finland in 
particular, cultural protectionism was a particularly important principle of broadcasting 
policy, which, until the 2000s, served as a major policy mission in institutional policies 
and licensing practices (Jääsaari 2007: 70-1 & 174; Hellman 2010: 195-210). 
Domestic content was favoured on cultural grounds in spite of the high production 
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costs associated with it, and certain types of content (e.g. US cartoons) were all but 
absent from Yleisradio’s schedules. 
The rapid expansion of public broadcasters’ broadcasting hours in the late 1980s and 
1990s, necessitated by increasing competition from commercial channels on 
terrestrial, cable and satellite platforms, forced public broadcasters to give in to the 
terms of competition and increasingly use imported material in order to keep the costs 
at bay. As governments have simultaneously subjected broadcasting companies to a 
tighter budgetary discipline, while relaxing the regulatory obligations with regards to 
original programming, broadcasters have been forced to seek external funding 
outside the companies or cut production costs by looking for cheaper forms of 
productions, or increasing the proportion of acquisitions. As these (often US-
originated) series were well-known global brands, they widened the popular appeal of 
children’s programmes on these channels, thus serving to increase public 
broadcasters’ share of viewing. This indicates that marketisation-driven focus on cost-
efficiency and populism challenged the previous discourse of cultural protectionism in 
national media policies that featured suspicion over certain types of content; e.g. 
animation and US imports (see e.g. Buckingham et al. 1999: 99), and foreign content 
became a more accepted part of schedules. 
Empirical data demonstrate that the BBC’s children’s programming has benefited 
from the Corporation’s increasing commercial activities in terms of the volume and 
diversity of output. In contrast with the increases in Yleisradio’s share of imported 
programming, the fact that the BBC has been able to utilise various co-production, 
licensing and secondary sales deals to substitute the expansion of its children’s 
schedules has facilitated it to produce several expensive and creatively ambitious 
preschool shows that could not be financed by the Corporation alone (Steemers 
2009: 54).88 The Corporation has used its commercial arm, BBC Worldwide, in 
distributing its children’s programmes, and these revenues have been channelled 
                                                 
88
 For example, CBeebies fully funds only about 50 per cent of its in-house productions (Steemers 
2010: 44). 
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back to children’s programme production. In 2006/7, children’s content generated 
£69.4m, and accounted for about 8.5 per cent of the company’s total sales (Steemers 
2010: 87). This demonstrates that commercial activities per se do not necessarily 
lead to an outright loss in diversity of programming, but can be used to support public 
service provision. 
It is noteworthy, however, that there was a difference between the BBC and 
Yleisradio with this regard. While the BBC was subjected by various political 
measures to look for commercial activities, partnerships and secondary markets to 
supplement its licence fee income (Steemers 1999: 47-8), little pressure has been 
exerted on Yleisradio to subsidise its income through commercial activities. This can 
be considered to be a result of differences between the basic conditions of the 
broadcasting markets of the two countries (with Finland having a relatively small and 
culturally isolated broadcasting market, with few opportunities for cultural exports), but 
also reflects the historical cross-party consensus on the special role of Yleisradio as 
an important national cultural institution, whose public service values need to be 
protected by preventing its involvement in commercial ventures. Thus, while 
Yleisradio’s administration and institutional practices have been remodelled to an 
extent to reflect those of a commercial corporation, it has engaged itself into 
commercial ventures only to a limited extent. 
The increasing preference for utilising ratings to justify production resource allocation 
and scheduling is also demonstrated in the marginalisation of children’s and religious 
content. The proportion of religious content broadcast at peak hours has decreased in 
both Finland and the UK, with peak hours increasingly reserved for content with more 
populist appeal. Religious programmes increasingly occupy the ‘graveyard slots’ of 
early morning and late night, when viewing is at its lowest. Likewise, on commercial 
channels in particular, children’s programmes have now been completely shifted to 
the early fringe of the schedule, while public channels have increased their children’s 
provisions in the hours of morning only. This suggests that while these programmes 
were never equal to other types of populist content, marketisation has only served to 
widen this inequality gap. It also demonstrates that while the scheduling of minority 
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interest programmes was based on their social and cultural merits and conventions 
(demonstrated by e.g. the BBC-ITV counter-scheduling of religious programming on 
the Sunday evening ‘God Slot’), commercial considerations and ratings play an 
increasing role in setting the scheduling priorities of public and commercial 
broadcasters alike. While scheduling data demonstrates that an outright 
marginalisation to the graveyard slots has been a lesser issue in publicly funded 
broadcasters’ schedules, the overall output has been marginalised since most 
commercial channels have recently cut their outputs of children’s and religious 
programmes.  
Finnish devotional programming is a notable exemption of this marginalisation, with 
little changes having taken place in scheduling of these programmes. The Finnish 
devotional programme production arrangement itself represents an institutional 
settlement that has acted to prevent the religious output from similar decline and 
marginalisation that has taken place in the religious output of the UK channels. Satu 
Väätäinen (author’s interview, 22 January 2011) argues that since the arrangement is 
built on the ‘power equilibrium’ between two powerful institutions; Yleisradio and the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, neither is willing to sway the delicate balance of power 
because of the trauma of the historical ‘sermon censorship dispute’ and its long-term 
hindrance on their relationship. The comparatively low level of religious output in 
Yleisradio’s channels – consisting mainly of televised acts of worships – is another 
explaining factor, as the broadcasting times of these televised church services are set 
to concur with the morning worship. 
 
7.4. Catering for minority interests in a marketised 
broadcasting environment: considerations for the conceptual 
model of public service broadcasting 
While PSB organisations analysed in this study have maintained, rhetorically at least, 
their commitment to a comprehensive provision of public service programming, the 
extensive changes in PSBs’ conduct examined in the previous sections suggest that 
past, normative definitions of the conceptual model of PSB devised in the era of 
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public service orthodoxy are no longer entirely valid. Some of their features have 
been rendered unfeasible by the marketisation-driven changes in the broadcasting 
environment, while the neo-liberal policy paradigm has introduced its own conditions 
to the public service paradigm as well. 
As the analysis utilising the Industrial Equilibrium Model demonstrated in the previous 
sections of this chapter, the marketisation-driven changes in the industry structure, 
i.e. intensification of popular and commercial competition between broadcasters 
following the liberalisation of broadcasting in the 1990s, together with the 
accompanying changes in the regulatory frameworks that saw a reduction in the 
interventionist powers allocated to regulatory authorities for content regulation, 
punctuated the strategy equilibria of commercial broadcasters. They responded to 
this competitive challenge by adopting a populist strategy that sought to maximise 
commercial returns. Public broadcasters – anxious to maintain their share of viewing 
to uphold their case for public funding – have been forced to respond by broadly 
similar strategies. 
On an ideological level, marketisation has facilitated the rise of populist and 
consumerist emphases in broadcasters programming policy discourses. Such 
emphases are closely associated with the reorientation of the public service concept, 
which has introduced a new layer to the previous interpretation of PSB, with the 
concept increasingly associated with a duty to fulfil the ‘wants’ of the audiences 
(Syvertsen 1999: 6-7). While certain latent populist tendencies could be identified in 
the programming policies even prior to this shift, the politically reinforced hegemony 
of the public service paradigm effectively suppressed the most blatant commercial 
excesses. The neo-liberal shift in the media policy focus examined in chapter 2, which 
saw the rise of economic and consumerist goals in media policy considerations, 
legitimised the populist audience-as-consumers agenda in broadcasting. As was 
examined in chapter 4, economic and technological objectives, i.e. national 
governments’ desire to promote growth in the telecommunications sector, served as 
primary stimuli for this shift in both the UK and Finland. National governments of the 
UK and Finland began to consider content regulation as something hindering 
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economic growth, and priority was given to economic welfare over social-cultural and 
political welfare where priorities had to be set (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003: 
198-9). The liberalisation of the terrestrial broadcasting sectors of the UK and Finland, 
the consequent abundance in viewing options and the intensification in commercial 
and popular competition have acted as key catalysts in this process that has 
facilitated the rise in the ideological preference to address the audience as a 
collective of consumer groups whose individual preferences broadcasters cater for, 
thus rendering the past paternalist practices in programming mostly impracticable. 
As was examined in section 7.2, these changes in the industry structure were 
accompanied by the rise of populist and consumerist emphases in the programming 
policies and institutional strategies of broadcasters. Changes in the structures of both 
children’s and religious programmes demonstrated that normative knowledge of the 
‘needs’ of the audience were replaced with the preferences of the mass audiences in 
broadcasters’ programming policy considerations, while the audience is increasingly 
seen as a collective of consumers (Ang 1991: 165-6; Syvertsen 2003: 163-4). 
Empirical evidence examined in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that this preoccupation 
with mass audience preferences extends to setting broadcasters’ programming 
priorities, with content viewed by mass audiences increasingly receiving priority over 
minority interest programming in production resource allocation and scheduling. The 
rise in the political preference for utilising various quantitative measurements of 
economic efficiency in measuring the performance of public broadcasters has also 
encouraged broadcasters to concentrate their resources so that they can reach the 
highest number of viewers. 
The impact of these changes on the conceptual model of PSB deserves a closer 
scrutiny. The 1985 analysis of the PSB characteristics provided by the Broadcasting 
Research Unit (BRU) (1985) is used here as a point of comparison. It provides the 
most articulated model of traditional PSB characteristics used in this study, which 
includes an appropriate level of detail for comparison. While the BRU model 
specifically deals with the UK PSB model, its characteristics essentially applied to the 
Finnish model as well.  
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In the light of the results of this study, it can be concluded that marketisation has 
altered two key elements of the model. First, the shift in PSBs’ programming 
strategies towards populist content examined in the previous sections demonstrates 
that the BRU’s guideline that PSB should ‘compete in good programming rather than 
for numbers’ is clearly not viable in a competitive multi-channel broadcasting 
environment. Although the BRU assumed that competition for audiences is not 
necessary since the system is funded directly by its users, it did not anticipate the 
consumerist shift in the political and public discourse, with audience preferences 
increasingly seen as indicators of ‘quality’ in programming (Ruoho 2007: 133). Nor did 
the model foresee the challenge that PSBs’ declining share of viewing would pose for 
the political and popular justification of the licence fee. Corporate yardsticks have 
been introduced as measures of quality, with ratings being one indicator of how well 
the system delivers ‘value for money’, as examined in the BBC’s case in chapter 2. 
The prevalence of private broadcasters allows them to set the agenda in broadcasting 
and makes it difficult for PSBs to adopt a strategy of winning repute by the range and 
quality of programming, as suggested by the BRU, as such an approach to 
programming risks them becoming elitist organisations watched by the few and 
without popular support. 
Thus, PSBs can no longer ignore the popular competition from the increasing number 
of commercial broadcasters. This balancing between popular preferences and cultural 
externalities, or between ratings and quality, is an age-old unresolved dilemma of 
publicly funded broadcasters that marketisation has only aggravated, as it has served 
to increase the contrast between the standards of public service and commercial 
television (Costera Meijer 2005). As Collins et al. (2001: 7-8) point out: ‘[t]here is little 
point to public funding of merit goods if they are consumed by few. Public service 
broadcasting cannot succeed unless it is popular. It cannot therefore be consigned to 
a ghetto at the margins of the market, filling the gaps disdained by profit-maximizing 
broadcasters.’ As the number of broadcasters on different platforms continues to 
increase and the audiences will fragment further, this competition is only set to 
become fiercer, and PSBs will be under even higher pressure to scoop the latest 
popular US network imports and come up with ratings-topping soaps and light drama. 
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Unfortunately, this also means that these programmes will continue to be favoured in 
terms of production resources and scheduling priorities. 
In addition to this populist shift in the programming policy focus of PSBs, the previous 
section demonstrated that PSBs have adopted an increasingly consumerist 
interpretation of their function. Empirical data demonstrate that popular preferences 
increasingly inform programming policies even in terms of minority interest provision: 
PSBs and regulators have increasingly adopted practices to measure the viewing 
preferences of their audiences, which they use to set their programming strategies. 
As a consequence, the ability and willingness of PSBs to cater for interests of 
disadvantaged minorities, whose provision the BRU considered particularly important, 
has also been compromised to an extent. While PSBs still cater for a number of 
minority interests and tastes, it is debatable whether the disadvantaged minorities 
receive an equal treatment, and how well the smallest and least vocal minorities are 
catered for. Great differences have emerged in the provisions of different programme 
types, as the diverging trends in children’s and religious programme provision 
demonstrate. While the range of minority interest programmes provided by PSBs has 
by and large remained unchanged since the 1980s, the provision of certain types of 
minority interest content (e.g. religion) has declined, and their provision is increasingly 
becoming a rhetorical part of PSB: rather than serving the public service objectives 
per se, empirical data suggests that these programmes increasingly act to fulfil public 
broadcasters’ statutory PSB obligations. 
The consumerist interpretation of PSB agenda has placed minority interest provision 
into a paradoxical situation within the PSB paradigm. While the theoretical 
conceptions of PSB that were formulated in a pre-marketised broadcasting 
environment considered a diverse provision for different minority groups valuable for 
social and cultural reasons, the marketised PSB paradigm appears to rate these 
groups according to the tastes and preferences of the audience majority. Thus, while 
minority interests are still catered for, only those with the most substantial audiences 
or vocal support are favoured in resource allocation and scheduling, while provisions 
for minority interests are declining. 
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This approach, while representing a seemingly democratic method of allocating 
limited production resources according to the preferences of the majority, is not 
without serious hazards for diversity in PSB provision. The most important 
shortcoming of this method is that while certain programmes have smaller audiences 
and lower overall support, the positive externalities they produce may be significant 
and extend beyond boundaries of the audience group. A number of programmes are 
regularly viewed only by a fraction of the audience, but their importance for their 
audiences and communities may be high. The quantitative measurement methods 
based on viewing figures are largely unable to measure the impact and the 
externalities these programmes will produce on their audiences and the society in 
general. Services in minority languages provide an example of such programmes, as 
these programmes serve to strengthen the identity of the group, while also making 
them visible for the majority. The worst-case scenario for a type of programmes with 
low audience support is that its production resources will be cut and its presence in 
the schedules will be marginalised. After its provision has become marginal and 
irregular, it will ultimately cease to be considered as a legitimate part of PSB 
provision, and it will be removed from PSBs’ statutory public service programming 
duties as ‘obsolete’. Religious programmes are certainly at risk of such a fate. 
 
7.4.1. Minority interest content: future directions 
The diverging trends in the provisions of minority interest content between private and 
public channels indicate that the future provision of such content is increasingly 
concentrating on publicly funded PSB channels. While commercial channels still 
provide certain types of minority interest programmes (e.g. children’s programmes), 
there has been an evident change in the programming priorities of these channels. 
Few effective minority content provision obligations exist for commercial channels and 
the trend has been deregulatory in this respect. The fact that policy changes have 
facilitated a more outspokenly commercial agenda on these channels predicts that 
these channels will only be prepared to provide minority interest programmes with 
potential for significant commercial return or other externalities for these channels. 
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This includes programmes that can be targeted to certain audience groups that are 
favoured by advertisers because of their purchasing power. However, as examined in 
chapters 5 and 6, direct commercial revenues from advertising sales are not the only 
criteria for providing minority interest content. Minority interest content has potential to 
produce certain political and commercial externalities that may support the provision 
of certain programmes, even if they are not commercially profitable. Children’s 
programmes, for example, are still provided widely by commercial broadcasters as 
they attract young families to channels and build up their viewing loyalty. The disparity 
of the potential of different types of minority interest content to deliver these 
externalities indicates that the provision of certain types of minority interest content 
will disappear from commercial channels altogether. Moreover, unless the audience 
associated with a particular minority interest programming type has an exceptionally 
significant potential to deliver commercial return and/or the aforementioned 
externalities, empirical data suggests that commercial channels’ investment in original 
content in minority interest provision will be marginal in the future. Their provision will 
consist of mainly low-cost imported or acquired content, and repeats. 
As the case of religious programmes demonstrated, changes in commercial channels’ 
programming policies have repercussions on public broadcasters’ agendas as well. 
Certain marginalisation in scheduling has been evident in religious programmes in 
particular. The increasingly consumerist interpretation of public service has also 
prompted public broadcasters to concentrate their resources on programmes that are 
most commonly considered to produce positive externalities. However, the forecast 
for minority interest content on publicly funded channels is generally more optimistic 
than that of commercial channels. The 1990s and 2000s have seen the introduction 
of more articulated statutory public service remits (detailed in service licences and 
national broadcasting legislation) that guarantee a greater security to the output. In 
addition, a greater proportion of output is broadcast on digital portfolio channels. The 
main general interest channels are rapidly changing their focus on content with the 
lowest common denominator and are increasingly avoiding minority interest content 
that may alienate mass audiences (Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring 2007: 114). 
While this may be a ‘logical’ development with children’s programmes, whose 
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provision on BBC One past the digital switchover89 served political goals rather than 
public service objectives, this migration to low-reach specialist interest channels may 
have serious ramifications for social groups who benefit from contact with the public 
sphere. 
In spite of the indisputable changes in the minority interest provision, there are no 
indicators that provision for minority interests and tastes would diminish – or even 
decline – in the 21st century multi-platform broadcasting environment. The expansion 
of private channels on digital and online platforms has benefited minority interest 
programmes too; both the UK and Finland feature a number of specialist interest 
channels that cater for minority interests and tastes. The number of such channels 
has only increased over the last ten years following the emergence of digital platforms 
and online delivery of programmes. 
The increasing demand for cost-effectiveness in the policy agenda makes the delivery 
of minority interest programmes via pay channels and online platforms a legitimate 
alternative to terrestrial PSB delivery. Policy-makers and regulatory organisations 
have gradually grown supportive to the idea that these platforms may supplement or 
even substitute PSB in minority interest provision. Ofcom’s first (2004a: 12) and 
second (2008b: 33) PSB reviews contained clear recommendations that alternative 
platforms should be considered for the delivery of minority interest content. In Finland, 
Yleisradio has utilised online children’s services extensively in the absence of 
designated children’s channels. In addition, subscription channels are increasingly 
considered to substitute PSB delivery of programmes despite the fact that they do not 
provide universal service, nor does their content serve the interests of the national 
public sphere (e.g. in that it portrays or reflects national cultures and identities). As 
BSkyB pointed out in its response to Ofcom’s second PSB review: 
                                                 
89
 Children’s programmes on BBC One were discontinued on December 21st, 2012, while the 
CBeebies morning slots on BBC Two were discontinued on January 4th, 2013. 
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On the Sky platform alone, there are 14 dedicated news channels, over 50 
channels catering to foreign language or ethnic audiences, 15 channels 
dedicated to religion and faith, and 29 channels for children. Devotees of 
wildlife documentaries, gardening, history programmes, the arts and many 
other interest areas are similarly well-catered for. 
(Ofcom 2008b: 17) 
While there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that increasing availability and 
political support to the use of alternative platforms in minority interest delivery in short 
and medium term would result in a complete migration of minority interest content 
away from terrestrial PSB channels, it will undoubtedly mean that less minority 
interest content is visible to the mass audiences (Österlund-Karinkanta and Moring 
2007: 114).  
While regulators and politicians have demonstrated increasing willingness to accept 
the output of these private channels as a legitimate substitute to public service 
provision, such position is problematic from the public service perspective. Much of 
the content on these platforms is provided by international operators, and thus has 
only a limited potential to serve the interests of a national public sphere. As Price 
(1995: 25) notes, a medium cannot be considered truly a participant in the public 
sphere if those who habitually use it do not, in their speech, abide by a high standard 
of truth, comprehensibility, appropriateness, and sincerity. The output of most 
children’s channels, for instance, does not provide the balanced diet of PSB 
programming: the substance of their output is usually imported material, with few 
references to national cultural spheres; it is cartoon-dominated; and contains little or 
no factual content (Ofcom 2007). The benefits of PSB provision are even more 
evident with religious programming, with much of its cable and satellite content 
provided by religious sects and televangelists. Public service religious programming is 
typically non-sectarian in allowing different faiths and sects to be presented. It is non-
proselytising, at least in the sense that televangelists would like it to proselytise. It 
does not allow fundraising by religious groups. It provides an ecumenical forum for 
inter-faith discussion, and it can develop people’s understanding of different religions, 
including that of their own (Dean 1997: 92-4). By contrast, as religious channels are 
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usually provided by a certain religious group or sect, their purpose is to proselytise 
rather than to raise religious or ethical debate. 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the alternative platforms is that since 
these platforms have potential to reach only limited audiences, and do not have the 
mass audience potential of the main general interest terrestrial channels, they do little 
to serve the interests citizens as members of the national public sphere, which is an 
important duty of public service. Accessibility is an important prerequisite for a 
functional public sphere: as Price (1995: 26) notes, a system in which costs to 
participate are bid way up and entry is scarce and difficult will be a poor version of the 
public sphere. Since many cable and satellite platforms are available on subscription 
only, they cannot be considered to provide a universal service, but serve to further the 
social exclusion of the groups with the lowest incomes, and increase their ‘information 
poverty’. Thus, their potential to provide a forum for public discourse that serves to 
improve social coherence and makes them visible to the general population is 
insufficient to maintain a healthy public sphere that is essential for a democratic 
society (Dahlgren 1995: 2-8). Religious niche channels, for example, are only likely to 
appeal to the most devoted believers, and have only a limited impact on mass 
audiences or members of other religious groups. Thus, they are unable to raise inter-
faith discussion that would benefit people’s understanding of other faiths. Michael 
Wakelin (author’s interview, 22 October 2010) argues that religion provides an 
important function as a cohesive ligament that links people together, with their past 
and the world around us. Thus, the public sphere is essential for these programmes 
to perform their social functions successfully. 
The case of Swedish-language programmes in Finland provides another example of 
the hazards stemming from marginalisation of minority interest programming. While 
Swedish-language programmes in Finland were historically broadcast as part of 
Yleisradio’s main channels’ schedules, the 2007 digital switchover shifted them to the 
FST5 channel. This also marked the end of the long-standing practice of broadcasting 
these programmes as part of Finnish schedules that acted to maintain social 
coherence between these two groups. Consequently, their viewing collapsed, as 
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Finnish-speaking viewers did not switch to the channel (Hellman 2007). Yleisradio’s 
former Managing Director Arne Wessberg has warned about the dangers of such 
segregation: it offers few opportunities for dialogue between the Finnish and Swedish-
speaking population. He considers it important that programmes in Swedish would be 
broadcast on Yleisradio’s main Finnish channels (Moring and Wiik 2007: 443-4). 
This considered, two recommendations can be made. First, minority interest provision 
by private channels should not be considered as a substitute, or even a supplement, 
to PSB delivery. The duty to cater for minority interests and tastes needs to be kept at 
the heart of the public service mission, while the provision of minority interest content 
needs to be safeguarded by undertaking regular reviews on the delivery of such 
programming. These reviews can be carried out either by regulatory organisations, or 
broadcasters themselves. In this respect, the reports on the state of religious 
programming compiled by the BBC Board of Governors/Trust (e.g. BBC Governance 
Unit 2005a, 2005b) and the ITC/Ofcom (Independent Television Commission 2003; 
Ofcom 2004b, 2005b, 2007) are promising, although more mixed-method research on 
output, production resources and content is required in order to gain a more holistic 
picture of the provision. This is particularly important for Finland, where only cursory 
reports on output are produced on a regular basis. This highlights the importance of 
establishing a more coordinated professional research tradition on television output, 
as reports produced by separate actors at different times produce results that are not 
necessarily intercomparable. 
Second, minority interest provision should not be marginalised by shifting it fully to 
niche channels or non-terrestrial platforms. Changes in the way broadcasters are 
defining their programming priorities; the shift from social and cultural considerations 
to the consumerist focus on ratings in production resource allocation and scheduling 
considerations poses a potential hazard for minority interest programming and the 
groups these programmes are serving. Empirical data demonstrate that this shift has 
led to an escalating trend of scheduling minority interest content to the margins of the 
schedule, with religious programming at particular risk. Excessive marginalisation of 
minority interest content does not only jeopardise service to minority audience, with 
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potential social and political repercussions, but may lead to a vicious circle in which 
declining audience figures are used to justify further cuts in production resources and 
marginalisation in scheduling. Thus, while the current regulatory frameworks neither 
in the UK nor in Finland facilitate regulatory intervention on commercial broadcasters’ 
scheduling practices, it is important to secure a sufficient proportion of minority 
interest content at peak hours. Internal quotas for peak time minority interest content 
set in public service channels’ service licences may be a useful method to increase 
the visibility of minority interest content, as empirical data demonstrate that such 
quotas were effective in promoting peak time religious content on UK commercial 
channels. 
The interests of the public sphere can only be served by making the groups visible in 
the society. It is important that regulatory organisations such as Ofcom accept these 
ideas as a foundation for their policies, too, as the aforementioned examples 
demonstrate that it is important to make a distinction between the public service and 
commercial provisions. 
 
7.5. Limitations of this study and further research in this field 
While there has been a growing research interest on neo-liberal marketisation in 
broadcasting, prior studies have mainly focused on the institutional and media policy 
impact. Little research has been conducted on the impact of marketisation on 
television content. While this study has, in its part, has attempted to make a 
contribution to the knowledge on the subject, the breadth and complexity of the 
phenomenon necessitate further research in this field.  
The key limitation of this study is that its methods are not sufficient to examine 
whether the marketisation-driven changes in the structure of the output extend to the 
actual content itself, i.e. whether, to what extent, and in which ways the neo-liberal 
discourse is reflected in programming content. A common claim by critics of 
increased commercialism in television content has led to ‘erosion in standards’ and 
‘dumbing down’ of programming (Buckingham et al. 1999: 7; Oswell 2002: 153). 
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Television content, it is claimed, has been subjected to a certain ‘tabloidisation’ and 
‘entertainisation’ in broadcasters’ quest to maximise their audiences. Other attributes 
associated with commercialism in cultural forms of television include escapist, more 
superficial, undemanding and conformist, more derivate and standardised content 
(McQuail 2000: 105). While evidence from interviews suggests that certain 
marketisation-driven changes had indeed taken place in children’s and religious 
content, and some conclusions can be made from changes in the structure of 
programming, such arguments were mainly based on subjective views rather than 
empirical evidence. In order to validate such claims, a more comprehensive 
qualitative content analysis on individual programmes is required. 
Changes in the cultural forms of television also support the use of more elaborate 
forms of qualitative content analysis, especially if the analysis will be extended to 
other forms of programming too. Borders between different genres of television 
content have become obscure, and thus accurate and unambiguous grouping of 
programming to separate categories has become increasingly difficult. There has 
been a general trend to make news (and factual content in general) entertaining 
before it is informative; ‘infotainment’ in other words, that is said to promote ignorance 
and detach people from political participation (McQuail 2000). This has rendered a 
strict division of programmes to Type A (information and education, favoured by 
public service television) and Type B (entertainment, favoured by commercial 
television), introduced by Raymond Williams in 1974 (Williams 2003), impractical. In 
her mixed method study on changes in Finnish television contents, Aslama (2008) 
found no significant evidence of such ‘tabloidisation’ in news and current affairs 
content. However, such approach would have been impractical in a comparative 
longitudinal study that aims to form a more holistic picture of changes in terrestrial 
television content. The problem with such case studies employing qualitative content 
analysis methods also relates to the fact that they facilitate only a limited perspective 
on each type of programming; children’s programmes, for example, represent a 
programming genre within which great differences exist between different 
broadcasters, channels and even production teams within a channel. Successful 
utilisation of qualitative analysis would therefore require relatively large samples that 
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provide a comprehensive picture of each type of minority interest content under 
observation. Given the boundaries with time and resources, this study has been 
unable to employ such qualitative content analysis methods. 
The study has also uncovered evidence of transformations in the role and value of 
minority interest programmes for broadcasters, which call for additional research on 
the subject. Empirical evidence suggests that the provision of certain minority interest 
programme types (e.g. children’s programmes) may produce externalities that may 
justify their provision even though it would not be commercially profitable. In the 
public service arena, political externalities may arise from the provision of a genre. 
Closer scrutiny of such externalities and their significance for broadcasters would not 
only uncover broadcasters’ motives for providing certain types of programming more 
extensively than others, thereby improving our understanding of their programming 
strategies, but would also improve our ability to speculate about future trends in such 
content on general interest channels. 
 
7.6. The contribution of this study 
The key scientific contribution of this study can be broken down to its empirical 
contribution and methodological contribution. This concluding section sums up the 
contribution of this study. 
As outlined in chapter 1, while the neo-liberal impact on national broadcasting policies 
of the UK and Finland is a phenomenon that is relatively, though not exhaustively, 
well documented, little research has been made on its impact on the provision of 
specific programmes. Until now, few studies have attempted to analyse 
marketisation-driven changes in an institutional setting, and their impact on 
programming strategies of the UK and Finnish broadcasters, despite the fact that 
neo-liberal marketisation is a contemporary, complex and, above all, controversial 
phenomenon, with all-encompassing effects. Marketisation-driven changes in minority 
interest television content have not been subject to prior comparative research, at 
least in this national context. 
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This study has provided new empirical evidence of the influence of this reasonably 
well-studied phenomenon on television programming. It has revealed a number of 
transformations in the institutional agendas of broadcasting companies that stem from 
neo-liberal policies and marketisation-driven changes in the industry structure. These 
changes indicate that economic and commercial considerations have a greater 
influence on the programming content than during the public service orthodoxy, when 
programming promoted social and cultural objectives more explicitly. It has 
demonstrated that broadcasters increasingly use populist preferences of the majority 
audiences to set their programming strategies, while their minority interest strategies 
increasingly target larger minorities. In so doing, this study has also revealed 
transformations in the public service priorities (in particular how these priorities are 
set) that, if applicable to other programme types too, may indicate a greater shift in 
the public service paradigm that necessitates a thorough re-evaluation of the 
theoretical conception of modern PSB. All of these changes have potentially 
hazardous effects on certain types for minority interest content, while different 
minority audience groups are facing increasing inequality in terms of the level of 
provision. The study has also made policy recommendations in order to maintain the 
diversity and plurality in the provision of children’s and religious programmes in the 
UK and Finland. 
In addition to these empirical findings, the research has also made a key 
methodological contribution. While historical institutionalism is primarily a descriptive 
model (Peters 2005: 85), and previous historical institutionalist studies have 
somewhat lacked focus in explaining institutional change, the study has addressed 
this key deficiency of historical institutionalism by employing elements of the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm (SCPP) in devising a new explanatory 
model – the Industrial Equilibrium Model – for the study. This Industrial Equilibrium 
Model is able to benefit from the key advantages of the two models, which has 
produced significant synergy benefits. It provides an apt explanatory model for 
analysing the behaviour of large industrial corporations operating in an oligopolistic 
market under an extensive regulatory framework. 
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The key benefit of historical institutionalism lies in its ability to examine structures, 
rules and conventions that constrain and shape behaviour, in a cross-national 
comparative context. It has been an apt tool in examining periods of consistency and 
change in institutional environment, while simultaneously identifying key branching 
points in institutional continuity. In particular, it has highlighted the national differences 
in an institutional setting, which explains certain differences in the provisions of 
children’s and religious programmes between the UK and Finland. The SCPP, in turn, 
allows for more elaborate analysis of forces contributing to institutional change within 
an industrial organisation, and their mutual dynamics. Thus, it is better suited for 
analysing changes within industrial organisations such as broadcasting companies, 
which need to keep their institutional structures and practices adjusted to the political 
and economic conditions of the broadcasting environment. In establishing a bilateral 
relationship between institutional changes and the institutional environment, the 
Industrial Equilibrium Model has added a dynamic element into the otherwise static 
analytical framework of historical institutionalism. By acknowledging the influence of 
the feedback effects on the industry structure, the model accepts that the behaviour 
of broadcasting institutions also shapes the environment in which they operate.  
In facilitating the examination of the impact of macro-level policy and structural 
changes on micro-level institutional procedures of broadcasting organisations, the 
Industrial Equilibrium Model has greatly sharpened the resolution of the lens of 
historical institutionalism by upgrading its scientific utility from a descriptive model to 
an explanatory one. The model does not only identify and describe the punctuations, 
but facilitates a closer analysis of the forces that caused them. By treating institutional 
changes as institutional responses to forces that punctuate (or pose as potential 
threat to) the institutional equilibrium, the model accepts that institutions are active 
and strategic actors, rather than just passive subjects to exogenous forces. Moreover, 
whereas the degree of resolution of the analytical lens of historical institutionalism is 
largely unable to identify and analyse the impact of lesser forces that cause 
punctuations in the institutional equilibria, the Industrial Equilibrium Model is better 
able to examine more subtle incremental-evolutionary changes. 
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An additional contribution of the Industrial Equilibrium Model can be associated with 
its capacity to use quantitative data on television programming as empirical evidence 
of institutional changes in broadcasting organisations. As historical institutionalism 
has been developed primarily in the context of political science, it lacks an 
explanatory element that would facilitate analysis of institutional changes utilising 
industrial output as evidence of such changes. Such data have served as concrete 
evidence of marketisation-driven changes in broadcasting institutions in this study, 
and provides an empirical and objective account of institutional changes to support 
the evidence gained through interviews. Given that this quantitative programming 
data can be accurately measured, it gives a better indication of the extent of changes 
than could be achieved through qualitative data gathering methods only. Through the 
analysis of programming data, the study has exposed several transformations in 
institutional strategies and procedures that would be difficult to document using other 
methods, e.g. through interviews. The Industrial Equilibrium Model has also facilitated 
the examination of micro-level changes in industrial conduct through the analysis of 
programming data as reflections of superordinate changes in formative norms and 
values, which may indicate a paradigmatic shift in broadcasting. 
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Appendix A: List of interviewees 
 
Pirjo Airaksinen, Senior Vice President, Content, Nelonen Media, interview 8 
December 2010 
Anne Brogan, Director, Kindle Entertainment; controller, Granada Kids (2004-2006), 
telephone interview 25 May 2011 
Joe Godwin, Director of BBC Children’s, interview 3 November 2010 
Andrew Graystone, Director, The Church and Media Network (formerly the Churches’ 
Media Council); producer, The Heaven and Earth Show (BBC), interview 7 February 
2011 
Jani Hartikainen, Head of Acquisitions, MTV Media, interview 10 December 2010 
Anna Home, Head of BBC Children’s Programmes (1986-1997), interview 2 
November 2010 
Hanna Kallankari, Acquisitions Executive, MTV Media, telephone interview 8 March 
2011 
Hannu Kamppila, editor and producer, Yleisradio, Factual Programmes Department 
(1981-), telephone interview 20 June 2011 
Anna-Liisa Kirsi, producer, editor, children’s programmes, Yleisradio TV 2, interview 
17 December 2010 
Ismo Kosonen, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Finland, 
interview 1 December 2010 
Jim McDonnell, religious television specialist, interview 2 November 2010 
Ari Meriläinen, producer, Yleisradio’s religious programmes, telephone interview 19 
October 2011 
Pertti Nättilä, Head of Children’s and Youths’ Department, Yleisradio TV 2 (1975-
1993), interview 17 December 2010 
Elina Paloheimo, editor and producer, Yleisradio, Factual Programmes Department 
(1979-1994), telephone interview 25 May 2011 
Juha Rajamäki, Vice Director, Kirkon Tiedotuskeskus (The Communications Centre of 
the Church), interview 18 April 2010 
Teija Rantala, Head of Children’s Programmes, Yleisradio, interview 17 December 
2010 
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Ernie Rea, Head of BBC Religion & Ethics (formerly Religious Broadcasting) (1989-
2001), interview 12 September 2011 
Virve Schroderus, Acquisitions Executive, children’s programmes, Yleisradio, 
interview 17 December 2010 
Heikki Takkinen, editor and producer, children’s programmes, Yleisradio TV 1, 
interview 29 April 2010 
Satu Väätäinen, producer, Kirkon Tiedotuskeskus (The Communications Centre of 
the Church) (1983-2008), telephone interview 22 January 2011 
Michael Wakelin, Head of BBC Religion & Ethics (2006-2009), interview 22 October 
2010 
Nick Wilson, Head of Children’s Programmes, Channel 5, telephone interview 7 
October 2010 
Tauno Äijälä, Senior Vice President; Programme Controller, MTV Oy (1967-2003), 
interview 9 December 2010; personal communication (email) 2 October 2011; 
personal communication (email) 19 January 2013 
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Appendix B: Television output sampling periods used in 
this research 
 
• 6 - 12 May and 1 - 7 November 1986; 
• 5 - 11 May and 1 - 7 November 1987; 
• 3 - 9 May and 1 - 7 November 1988; 
• 2 - 8 May and 1 - 7 November 1989; 
• 8 - 14 May and 1 - 7 November 1990; 
• 7 - 13 May and 1 - 7 November 1991; 
• 5 - 11 May and 1 - 7 November 1992; 
• 4 - 10 May and 1 - 7 November 1993; 
• 3 - 9 May and 1 - 7 November 1994; 
• 9 - 15 May and 1 - 7 November 1995; 
• 7 - 13 May and 1 - 7 November 1996; 
• 6 - 12 May and 1 - 7 November 1997; 
• 5 - 11 May and 1 - 7 November 1998; 
• 4 - 10 May and 1 - 7 November 1999; 
• 2 - 8 May and 1 - 7 November 2000; 
• 8 - 14 May and 1 - 7 November 2001; 
• 7 - 13 May and 1 - 7 November 2002; 
• 6 - 12 May and 1 - 7 November 2003; 
• 4 - 10 May and 1 - 7 November 2004; 
• 3 - 9 May and 1 - 7 November 2005; 
• 2 - 8 May and 1 - 7 November 2006; 
• 8 - 14 May and 1 - 7 November 2007; 
• 6 - 12 May and 1 - 7 November 2008; 
• 5 - 11 May and 1 - 7 November 2009. 
 
